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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship 
between success in sport and explanations of performance. The study 
examined explanations (attributions) of performance in hockey.
One field experiment, a personality inventory study, and three 
lab experiments comprise the empirical work. A total of 592 subjects 
participated (102 in the field, 248 in the personality inventory and 
242 in the lab experiments). Subject’s ages ranged from 17 to 46 
with males and females of varying levels of hockey experience partici­
pating.
First, it was demonstrated in the field that a self-serving, 
motivational approach to information-processing was employed, as negative 
self attributions were unrelated to success. Experienced club hockey 
players completed aLikert-type questionnaire pre-game, at half-time, 
and post-game. Attributions remained unchanged throughout, supporting 
a schema-based approach as well as a self-serving and team-serving bias 
approach.
Next a sports personality inventory was developed which predicts 
attributional responses. Two types of personality were identified: 
self-doubting and self-trusting. A scenario was presented as the 
subjects imagined that they had played a hockey game. Sports 
personality predicted attributional responses. A subsidiary purpose 
was to examine the effects of outcome information on attributions.
Groups given no outcome information used schema similar to those given 
winning information to make attributions.
Finally, three experiments studied attributions following participation 
in perceptual tasks (interpreting videotaped segments of hockey matches, 
matching and recognizing players’ positions in slides, and recalling 
positions in slides). Results confirmed a motivational, self-serving 
approach;
An information-processing model was developed, based on results, 
which included various social-psychological dimensions in sport.
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INTRODUCTION
Attribution theory is based on the assumption that individuals 
need to predict and understand their world. Since early work by 
Heider (1958), theorists have examined the type of information used 
to make explanations (Kelley, 1967, 1971 and 1973) and the types of 
responses made (Weiner, 1972). Self-serving (Heider, 1958 and Kelley, 
1967) biases and group serving (Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee, 1982) 
biases have been examined. Others (Miller and Ross, 1975) saw 
conclusions as logical, based on the information availablej and supported 
an information-processing model as proposed by Bem (1972). The 
motivational vs. non-motivational conflict has been a long-standing 
issue in social psychology research.
The present study addresses this issue in a sport setting, examining 
attributional responses and testing for a motivational approach to the 
processing of information. The study is primarily concerned with 
explanations of performance in sport. Hockey was chosen as the arena 
for examining attributional responses because of the group interactions 
which take place.
It is in a competitive setting, then, that behaviour will be 
examined. The team sport’s arena is a microcosm of our competitive, 
demanding world, so where better to examine an achievement-orientated 
society than in such an achievement-orientated setting?
Others have addressed the motivational vs. non-motivational dilemma 
in academic settings, and support has been found for both approaches, 
leaving the unanswered question of whether explanations are made in a 
manner which is self-serving or not.
Similarly, sport psychologists have done research in sports other 
than hockey and found conflicting results. The present study attempts 
to add to the attributional literature by testing for a motivational 
approach.
It is important to resolve this conflict for several reasons.
First, how people account for their performance can influence how they
I
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respond to success or failure, how they learn new skills and techniques, 
and how they adapt to various situations in sport. Also, attributions 
influence the individual's feelings about the situation. . Finally, 
and most importantly, attributions influence behaviour, and this must 
be considered so that maladaptive responses can be recognized and 
dealt with.
An attribution is seen here as a peep-hole through which the 
processing of information can be seen. By examining attributions, one 
can find out how an individual has processed information. It becomes 
clear whether the individual has used a motivational (self-serving 
bias) approach, or whether a non-motivational approach was used. It 
also becomes clear whether causal schemata play a part in the individual’s 
information-processing techniques.
It is important at this point to clarify the use of the term 
’information-processing’. Unfortunately, the term which originally 
was used to refer to the processing of information took an another 
meaning when Bem (1972) proposed his theory which used the term 
’information-processing’ to describe processes which were non- 
motivational. This is unfortunate, as it is therefore easily 
confused with the use of the term which describes the ’process’ of 
information-processing which may or may not be motivational.
The present study proposes support for a motivational (self- 
serving biased) approach to information-processing, and presents an 
information-processing model which is motivational in nature.
An understanding of how people make causal attributions is at 
the heart of the matter. The study is concerned with motivational 
biases which are self-serving, and in order to understand whether 
attributions are self-serving, one must understand the concept of the 
self.
It is proposed that individuals have a self-image which influences 
their attributional responses. If sports are important to the individual, 
then being successful in sports may also be important and ’winning' may 
be valued. The individual may have a picture of a successful sportsman/
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women, and their self-image may or may not be similar to such a 'winner'.
If one's self-image is positive, and if the individual is motivated 
to do well in sports, they are said to have a 'winning-type^ sports 
personality. If their self-image is negative, or if they do not value 
sport, their personality type is a 'losing-type' sports personality.
Thus, two extremes exist on a continuum. Some individuals will be 
winning-types, others will be losing-types, and some will fall between 
these two extremes.
The *winning-types' are expected to be less anxious and less 
threatened by participation in sports than the 'losing-types'. They 
may expect to win more often, and are likely to make different causal 
attributions than the losing types.
The 'losing-types', on the other hand, are the individuals who are 
anxious about their participation and feel threatened by sport. They 
may expect to lose and may make more negative attributions regarding 
their own ability and effort.
To the 'losing-type' individual, losing is expected and may, in 
fact, support their negative image of themselves. Their attributions 
may reflect this, as they may blame their losing on their own poor 
ability and effort. Winning may result in crediting their own ability 
or effort if their self-image isn't too weak. Otherwise, winning may 
be attributed to external factors such as luck. This would be the case 
in individuals who had a very weak self-image. In that case winning 
would be seen as out of their control. Like Seligman and Meiser's (1967) 
learned helpless individuals, they may feel that success is beyond their 
control.
Winning, for the winning-type individual is expected and confirms 
their positive self-image. Their attributions would be to positive 
aspects of the self, such as good ability or effort.
The bias in attributional responses is proposed to occur when a 
threat to the self-image occurs. This might happen to a 'winning-type' 
individual who loses. This individual may value good ability and effort.
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and to view the self as having poor ability or not having tried may 
be threatening. In this case the individual may bias attributions in 
a self-serving manner in an attempt to protect the self-esteem. Rather 
than making negative attributions to the self, the individual may make 
positive attributions in line with their positive self-image.
The following shows briefly how the two types would arrive at 
causal attributions when they won and when they lost:
WINNING-TYPES
Onotivated)
I
Positive 
Self-Image
LOSING-TYPES 
(not motivated)
I
Negative 
Self-Image
WON
(Expected
Outcome)
Confirms
Self-Image
Initial
Attributions
Positive
No Threat to 
Self-Esteem
I
No Bias
I
Positive
Self-
Attributions
LOST
(Not Expected 
Outcome)
In^  Conflict 
with
Self-Image
I
Initial
Attributions
Negative
Threat to 
Self-Esteem
I
Bias
I
Positive
Self-
Attributions
WON
(Not Expected) 
Outcome)
In Conflict 
with
Self-Image
I
Initial
Attributions
Positive
I
No Threat to 
Self-Esteem
I
No Bias
I
Positive
Self-
Attributions
LOST
(Expected
Outcome)
I
Confirms
Self-Image
Initial
Attributions
Negative
No^Threat to 
Self-Esteem
I
No Bias
I
Negative
Self-
Attributions
It can be seen here that bias occurs only when a threat to the 
self-esteem is evident, and this threat occurs only when the individual 
is motivated to succeed.
Attributions are proposed to be intially made by relying on 
schema regarding winning and losing. Certain causes are believed to 
be associated with winning and losing. Good ability, for example, 
is often seen as a cause of winning while bad ability is the cause of 
losing. Initial attributions are formed based on such schemata and 
are therefore positive regarding the self when the outcome is a win
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and negative when the outcome is a loss. The less information which 
is available, the more the individual is proposed to rely on schemata 
in forming causal attributions.
The present study proposes the use, then, of schemata and further 
proposes that information is processed in a motivational manner as 
described above.
The threat which is proposed to lead to bias can be internal or 
external. Threat can be felt when the self-image is threatened. This 
type of threat is an internal threat. Threat can also result from 
fears which may be associated with sport, such as fear of injury.
This type of external threat may also exist in sport, particularly among 
* losing-type’ individuals. Because of the importance of the concept 
of threat relative to self-concept, both types of threat will be 
examined in this study.
It may be quite obvious that a theoretical background to this 
theory is lacking. This is due to the novelty of the topic. Attributional 
literature will be discussed in Chapter 1, and literature relative to 
the self will be discussed in Chapter 3, but past research has failed 
to establish any relationship between these two areas.
I
The theoretical background in sports is also weak. Apart from 
a handful of studies which have examined winner’s and loser's attributional 
responses, research is non-existent. No studies have related personality 
types to attributions nor have any looked at threat to self-image as 
a reason for bias. For this reason, the present study was undertaken 
in an attempt to explain why biases occur and how motivational factors 
play a part in the attributional process.
CHAPTER 1
REVIEW OF LITERATURE: ATTRIBUTION THEORY
1. REVIEW OF LITERATURE; ATTRIBUTION THEORY
The present study sets out to examine attribution theory, first 
by examining its origins and history, and then by relating it to 
sport. Early developments of the concept are discussed, followed 
by the further developments which have centred on two main areas:
Type and classification of attributional responses, and theories 
which examine the motivational and non-motivational explanations 
of responsei
The way in which stereotypes and schemata influence attributions 
is introduced and will be further developed in later Chapters.
Finally, important considerations in attributional analyses are discussed 
in terms of related literature, followed by a summary of this first 
Chapter.
1.1 EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN ATTRIBUTION THEORY
Heider (1958) is acknowledged as the person who founded modem 
attribution theory. His work was based on the assumption that man 
has a need to understand events and to predict future events. Man 
assigns levels of responsibility and makes attributions. Heider 
believed that personal and environmental forces produce action, and 
that ’’There also appears to be individual differences in the tendency 
to attribute the causes of events to the self and to outside sources”. 
(1958, p.168).
Attribution theory, then, is concerned with the ’causes’ given for 
one’s own and other’s behaviour, and the effects of these attributions 
on behaviour. Man is seen as a ’naive scientist' by Heider, as he 
attributes to self and to the environment. Heider further sub-divided 
the personal and environmental into ’’Components of Action”.
Components of Action (Heider, 1958)
Can
Luck
Trying
Skill
Ability
Action
Power
Outcome
ExertionIntention
Possibility
Personal Force
Completed Task
Task Difficulty
Environmental Force
Heider*s components include ability, intention, exertion, 
task difficulty and luck which are components found in work by 
later attributional theorists (Weiner, 1972). In Heider's model, 
these components lead to the ’try- and ’can’ dimensions, and 
eventually to outcome, action, and task completion.
Early work by Jones and Davis (1965) addressed the issue of 
perception of people. They developed a correspondent influence - 
theory which helps to explain how a person decides whether internal
dispositions of a person are responsible for their action. Following
Heider*s theory, that perceivers try to understand their world by 
examining causes of behaviour, they examined how attributions are 
made. The correspondent influence theory looks at the overlap 
between various possible actions. The perceiver examines all possible 
actions and the effects of these actions. All possibilities are 
computed, and the effects of thé action are found. Next, the effects 
of actions not chosen are computed. Finally the overlap between these 
are examined, and non-common effects are identified. The less the 
overlap, the less thé perceiver could decide which effect was significant ;
the more the overlap, the more the perceiver could decide. A second
important factor according to Jones and Davis, in addition to non­
common effects, was desirability. How socially desirable the effect 
was would be an important issue in decisions made.
Thus, early work by Heider, and Jones and Davis, laid the 
foundations of attribution theory. Définitions of attribution weré 
defined, and assumptions were formed which would lead to further 
definition, including an examination of the types of attributions made 
and of classification systems.
1.2 TYPE AND CLASSIFICATION OF ATTRIBUTIONAL RESPONSES
Harold Kelley (1967, 1971, 1973) has been one of the major 
attributional theorists of our time. His work (1973) proposed a 
’discounting principle’. In this discounting principle, people are 
found to process information by looking for plausible causes. If, 
for example, a plausible external cause is found, it is accepted 
and an internal cause is discounted. Similarly, if a plausible 
internal factor is found, then an external factor is discounted.
As Kelley puts it (1973, p. 113), ’’The role of a given cause in 
producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes 
are also present”.
In attempting to further examine how explanations are made,
Kelley (1967, 1973) viewed the person as if he were a scientist who 
made inferences from observations, as an attempt was made to make 
sense of his/her world. The information available is processed 
like a statistician would process it. Through objective information, 
one gets to know one's environment, collecting information which 
will explain behaviour. Kelley examines the 'consistency' of behaviour 
(does it happen on different occasions?), the 'distinctiveness’ of 
behaviour (does it happen toward different objects?) and the 'consensus' 
of behaviour (does it happen by different actors?)* Kelley sees these 
three sources of information as those which people use to make 
explanations.
McArthur's (1972) example helps to describe these three sources 
of information. The well-known example is of an observer, for example, 
John who laughed at a comedian on TV. The question involves to what 
John's laughter should be attributed. There could be a situation of 
high distinctiveness (John does not laugh at any other comedians), 
or of low distinctiveness (John laughs at many comedians). There 
could be high consensus (many other people laugh at this comedian) or 
low concensus (hardly anyone laughs at this comedian). Finally, there 
could be high consistency (John has laughed at this comedian many 
times before) or low consistency (John has never before laughed at this 
comedian).
Kelley argues that we use these three sources of information to 
mWce attributions. He claims that high distinctiveness, high consensus, 
and high consistency lead to external attributions. Thus, if John 
doesn’t laugh at other comedians, if many others laugh at this comedian, 
and if John has laughed at this comedian many times before, one could 
conclude that the comedian was the cause of John’s laughter. Conversely 
if low distinctiveness, low consensus, and high consistency existed, 
we would make internal attributions. If John laughs at every comedian, 
if hardly anyone else laughs at this comedian, and if John has laughed 
at this comedian in the past, then one would attribute John’s laughter 
to John himself. Results reported by McArthur (1972) confirmed Kelley’s 
hypothesis.
Kelley (1967) proposed that on the basis of these three types of 
information, individuals perform a ’mental analysis of variance’. He 
suggested that a sort of logical analysis takes place as mental 
computation is carried out. Kelley looks at a perceiver who knows 
or draws inferences about the case. The information is collected from 
the three sources mentioned in order to establish whether the behaviour 
co-varied with the aspect about the actor, Kelley was responsible 
for the famous co-variation theory which states (1973, p.108), "an 
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with which, 
over time, it covaries". Based on the assumption that people have 
a need to attribute events and behaviours to causes, then, Kelley 
has studied not only components of attribution and how they should 
be classified, but also how this information is processed.
Bernard Weiner (1972, 1974) also made significant contributions 
based on Heider’s work. He used Heider’s four factors and two dimensions 
as a starting point, and constructed the following classification 
scheme. Proposed dimensions were stable/unstable and internal/external.
Weiner’s (1974) classification scheme placed components on a 
two-dimensional scale, with causality (interal/extemal) and 
stability (stable/unstable) being the dimensions.
Weiner’s Causal Attribution, Scheme GITeiner, 1972)
INTERNAL EXTERNAL
STABLE
UNSTABLE
ABILITY TASK DIFFICULTY
EFFORT LUCK
Although most studies of causal judgements are restricted to 
four attributions: ability, task difficulty, effort, and luck, 
criticisms have been made about the use of these four causes.
McAuley and Gross (1983 ) point out that restricting attributions 
to four causes should be contested. Roberts and Pascuzzi (1979) 
agree, as they found these four to account for only 45% of the 
attributions in sports settings. They argue that Weiner’s model is 
less applicable to sport than academic settings, and suggest 
relying on free-response and open-ended responses. Elig and Frieze 
(1979) also discuss the issue. Roberts and Pascuzzi (1979) add to 
the discussion, arguing that the greater number of external factors 
in sport compared to academic settings could account for differences 
in attributional responses. When individual elements were carefully 
diagnosed, however, Roberts and Pascuzzi (1979) did find support 
for Weiner’s model. When the responses were placed into one of 
the four categories, all elements were able to be placed in the 
locus of causality and the stability categories.
Roberts and Pascuzzi’s (1979) Model of Classification
Locus of Control
Stable Ability Coaching
Stability
Unstable Effort Luck
Psychological Factors Task Difficulty
Unstable Ability Team work
Practice Officials
Roberts and Pascuzzi C1979) argued that an achievement model 
applicable to sport needed to be developed. The model they developed 
had the obvious difference of placing task difficulty in the category 
of external and unstable.
Results of Roberts and Pascuzzi's study supported the applicability 
of Weiner's dimensions of Locus of Control and Stability, although *
additional elements were added. They proposed careful analysis of 
components for dimensional relevance depending on the individual 
situation. One example cited was the classification of task difficulty. 
In an open skill Csuch as hockey) the difficulty would depend on the 
opponent and therefore be unstable, while in closed skills (such as a 
gymnastic stunt) task difficulty would be stable. Dimensional relevance 
is, therefore, highly context specific.
Rosenbaum (1972) expanded previous models to include an intentional/ 
unintentional dimension in,an attempt to further define components.
Rosenbaum's (1972) Attributional Model
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
STABLE UNSTABLE STABLE UNSTABLE
Stable Unstable Ability Fatigue, mopd.
effort of effort of of self fluctuations
self self in skill of
self
Stable Unstable Ability Fatigue, mood.
effort of effort of of others. fluctuations
others others task in skill of
difficulty others
Finally, many would agree with Cratty (1981, p.130) who concludes, 
"People attribute success and failure to a variety of courses, not 
all of which are accounted for in currently available models".
1.3 PROCESSES OF ATTRIBUTION: MOTIVATIONAL VS. NON^MOTIVATIONAL 
EXPLANATIONS
Once the content and classification of attributions has been 
defined; then processes of information processing can be assessed.
Once the types of attributions most commonly used are identified, 
the processes used to arrive at these attributions can be examined. 
Several prominent theories exist with regard to explanations, 
including both motivational and non-motivational theories.
Kelly's (1955, 1963) early work saw man as a problem solver, 
who forms predictions,which are confirmed or disconfirmed. He 
proposes that psychologists see others as 'scientists' rather than 
objects to be studied.
Theories of information processing continued to be developed 
as Bern (1967, 1972) expanded on early work by Weiner ejt. £l. (1971) in 
his study, Bern developed his self perception theory, stating that 
our explanations are no more than guesses based on our observations 
of overt behaviour. He saw information processing as a purely logical 
and non-motivational process. Man draws logical conclusions based 
on information available to him. Motivational theories saw people 
attributing, not in a logical manner, but in a manner which maintained 
or enhanced their perception Of themselves (Heider, 1958, Kelley 
1967, Miller and Ross, 1975).
1.3.1 Self-Serving Bias
Heider (1958) proposed a 'self-serving bias model* where he 
points to the fact that good acts but not bad ones are attributed 
to the person himself. Kelley (1967) also sees this as a need for 
self-esteem. These theorists felt man was motivated to view himself 
positively, taking credit for something good but not for something bad. 
Miller and Ross (1975) suggest that we take credit for something good 
because it was intended more often than we take responsibility for 
negative results which we attempted to avoid. They claim we also take 
responsibility for expected rather than unexpected results. As we
expect or hope, for example, to win rather than lose, we expect success 
more than failure. Miller and Ross discuss this in terms of whether 
this, in fact, shows motivational or non-motivational information- 
processing.
While an information-processing, or non-motivational approach, would 
not support the idea of self-serving bias, motivational explanations 
support their existence. Self-serving biases have been found to include 
self-enhancing (taking excessive credit for success) and self-protecting 
(denying responsibility for failure or ego defensive) biases. Nicholls 
(1975), for example, found support for a self-enhancing and self- 
protecting bias. Success was internal and stable (self-enhancing), 
while failure was external and unstable (self-protecting or ego-defensive). 
Others (Weiner and Kukla, 1970) found self-enhancing but not self- 
protecting biases.
Both motivational and non-motivational approaches agree that 
information is processed, although they differ on whether this information 
processing is purely logical or influenced by bias.
Further examination of studies show the majority supporting a 
self-serving bias approach. Scanlon and Passer (1980), for example, 
found winners more internal than losers, although losers still felt 
internal attributes were more important to success. Their results, 
they claim, support an egocentric bias. Roberts (1975) also found 
proof of a self-serving bias, although Duquin (1977) did not. Miller 
and Ross (1975) discuss self-serving bias in an attempt to clarify 
the self-serving vs. information-processing dilemma, pointing out 
that although some proof of self-serving bias exists under success 
conditions, only minimal evidence has been found for self-protection 
biases. Results will be discussed fully in Œapter 2.
Miller and Ross (1975) claim that the self-enhancing effect may 
not be due to distortion caused by motivation, but because people tend 
to expect their behaviour to lead to success. Therefore, they discern 
closer covariation between their behaviour and outcome in cases of 
success than in the case of failure. Works by Feather (1969) and
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Feather and Simon (197la and 1971b) show that unexpected outcomes, 
whether success or failure, are more often attributed to external 
factors than expected outcomes. These findings would seem to 
support Miller and Ross's suggestion.
Other theorists have also claimed that motivational biases can 
be explained in purely logical manners (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1975;
Nisbett and Ross, 1980; Ajzen and Fishbein, 1983). The fact that 
individuals have more access to internal states than observers is one 
reason cited. Ajzen and Fishbein (1983) point to another possibility, 
as they also claim that much data which seems to support motivational 
biases can be interpreted as being reasonable when considering what 
information is available. They propose the application of a Bayesian 
theorem where rational rather than defensive processes exist. A study 
by Johnson et al (1964) is a case in point. Participants acted as 
teachers on two trials. The student did poorly at first, but on the 
second trial, students did well for some teachers and poorly for others. 
Teachers attributed failure to students and success to themselves.
Kelley (1967), as well as Ajzen and Fishbein (1983), contends that 
rather than an ego-defensive bias, a rational analysis took place, 
as teachers tried harder after their student's initial failure. The 
student's improvement would then be logically attributed to the teacher, 
as the co-variation theory was applied. Such studies rely on responses 
in hypothetical situations, and may not be based on actual responses.
Thus, Ajzen and Fishbein (1983) go on to claim that attributions 
credited to hypothetical people (Frieze and Weiner, 1971) can not 
be interpreted as being ego-defensive. Finally, they cite a study by 
Streufert and Streufert (1969) as an example of a situation which would, 
at first glance, appear to show motivational biases, as success was 
attributed internally and failure externally. Two possible explanations 
for what appears to be a self-serving bias are suggested. First, 
that subjects expected to succeed, and second, that the task was seen 
to be difficult and thus success would have greater 'diagnostic value' 
for the ability of the actor than failure would for a lack of ability. 
Therefore, subjects would be expected to attribute this success to ability 
more than their failure to a lack of ability.
11
1.3.2 Group-Serving Bias
Schlenker (1975) followed Heider (1955) and examined attributions 
in terms of groups. Gill (1980) went on to look at attributions to 
team and to opponents and found that team members assign responsibility 
for their success to their own team and failure to opponents, supporting 
an egocentric pattern. When attributions to team or self were compared, 
an opposite trend occurred as team members gave credit to partners for 
success and took responsibility for failure. This shows a reverse 
egocentric pattern.
Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) support the idea of a group- 
serving bias. Pupils from private schools were found to hold beliefs 
about their superiority academically. Attributions of state school 
students showed that they were aware of inequalities of the school 
systems, attributing luck as the most important determiner of group 
differentiation. Hewstone (1983) points to the need to examine groups 
more closely rather than concentrating purely on individuals.
A study by Ross and Sicoly (1979) adds to the contention of a group- 
serving bias. When asked which group was responsible for the turning 
point in the game (either their own team or their opponent), their own 
team was assessed as more responsible. It was easier for team members 
to remember their own team's rather than their opponent's contributions.
While Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) compared in- and out-group 
differences, Ross and Sicoly (1979) examined salience of in- and out-groups 
Taking a different perspective, Iso-Ahola (1977) examined player's 
judgements of their own vs. their team's internal qualities. He found 
that team outcome did not affect judgements by players of their own 
internal qualities of ability and effort, but judgements of their team's 
internal qualities were significantly affected by outcome. Team failure 
resulted in decreases in judgements of the team's ability and effort.
We find, therefore, several different perspectives regarding 
attributions to self, team and opponent. All support, in one manner or 
another, the view that attributions regarding self may differ from 
attributions regarding the team and the opponent.
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1.4 SCHEMATA AND STEREOTYPING
Much research exists regarding causal schemata. The idea of 
a cognitive framework or frame of reference, often called 'schema', 
became well-used in the 1970s (Kelley, 1971 and Rumelhart, .1976).
The basic assumption underlying attribution theory is that man has 
a need to make sense of the world around him. Schema, or 'rules' 
are adopted to help him to process information and make sense of his 
world.
Schemas have been found to be overused, misapplied, and résistent 
to changes when challanged by contradictory data (Tversky and Kahneman, 
1974 and Nisbett and Ross, 1980). A logical extension of this research 
leads to the contention that schemata exist in sport - the form and 
resilience of which need to be defined.
No research regarding schemata or stereotyping exist in sport 
regarding ideas about 'winning' and 'winners'. Further discussion 
of both stereotypes and schemata can be found in Chapter 3 of the 
present study.
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1.5 IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS IN ATTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Various factors have been examined regarding attributional responses. 
These include the perspective of the perceiver (whether actor or 
observer); locus of control of the perceiver, expections of success, 
perceived competence and achievement motivation, performance levels, 
outcome, and sex factors.
1.5.1 Actors and Observers
Looking first at the perspective of the perceivers, we find that, 
according to Jones and Nisbett (1972, p.51),"Actors tend to attribute 
the causes of their behaviour to stimuli inherent in the situation while 
observers tend to attribute behaviour to stable dispositions of the 
actor". Their work on 'actors’ and 'perceivers' led to much research 
in the 1970s regarding perspective. Actor/observer differences must 
be heeded as sports attributions may be made from various perspectives. 
Players may be attributing credit or blame to self, to the team, or 
to the opponent - sometimes from the actor's perspective and sometimes 
from the observer's.
1.5.2 Locus of Control
A second factor to bear in mind is locus of control (a person's 
belief about whether contingency relationships exist between behaviour 
and reinforcements). The relationship between actions and outcomes 
are examined in locus of control studies which examine beliefs. Situations 
which are felt to be under one's own control are internal, and those 
situations outside of one's control are external. Rotter (1966, p.25) 
states, "Not only do subjects in general differentiate learning 
situations as internally or externally determined, but individuals 
differ in a generalized expectancy in how they regard the same situation. 
Such generalized expectancies can be measured and are predictive of 
behaviour in a variety of circumstances". Rotter's social learning 
theory was the basis for locus of control constructs. His students,
James (1957) and Phares (1955) named the construct and developed scales 
for measuring 'internal-external locus of control'. Rotter's (1966) 
Internal-External Scale is commonly used today to measure internality/ 
externality, although some critics (Collins, 1974) feel his scale is
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too broadly defined and simplistic, including only four factors.
Rotter's work has several implications when examined in a sport 
setting. Research on locus of control in sport shows conflicting 
results. While DiGiuseppe (1973) found no differences between team, 
individual and non-participants in internality/externality, Lynn,
Phelan and Kiker (1969) found differences. Team sport athletes were 
lower in externality than non-participants or individual sports 
participants in the later study, while no differences between the 
three groups existed in the former study. Work by Gilliland (1974) 
attempted to clarify results and found no significant differences 
between athletes and non-participants.
One final and important note in relation to attribution is 
Lefcourt's (1966) conclusion that locus of control is a useful 
predictor of performance if the information being learned is 
'relevant to the individual's goal striving'. As Beck states 
(1983, p.361), "If the individual is 'not interested' in particular 
material, it does not make much difference whether he or she is 
high or low in externality". Players in sport might be more interested 
in perceptions of sport than non-players.
In addition to information being more relevant, Lefcourt (1982) 
also points to the fact that internals seem to be more 'cognitively 
alert' than externals, more ready to grasp information which could 
contribute to interpretation and coping with tasks and situations.
1.5.3 Expectations of Success
Rotter's (1966) locus of control theory is linked to expectations 
of success. People who have higher expectations of success are 
usually more internal, are high achievers, and perceive higher 
amounts of freedom. Considerations of locus of control should, 
therefore, be borne in mind when expectations of success are examined.
Past experience in sport may also be a factor when non-players 
are compared to players, as their expectations of success may vary, 
as may their locus of control. Reinforcements in the past, according
15
to Rotter, create tendencies for locus of control. A past history 
of success or failure leads to a general tendency to attribute 
either to internal or external factors. He concludes that 
individuals who are internal place a higher value on skill and are 
concerned with ability and failure, as well as being more alert to 
their environment, résistent to attempts to try to influence him, 
and more willing to try to improve his condition.
Implications of work by Weiner et al (1971) lead to the possibility 
of inducing changes in expectations of success. They found that 
when unstable attributions are changed to stable ones, prospects for 
future success are increased. Changes in attributions may, therefore, 
lead to changes in expectations of success.
1.5.4 Ferceived Competenoe
Past experience in sport has also been found to affect perceived 
competence. Participants in sport were found to be higher with regard 
to perceived competence, had higher expectations of success for the 
future, and were more persistant than non-participants (Roberts,
Kleiber and Duda, 1981). Three areas (cognitive competence, 
physical competence and self-worth) were tested and mean scores were 
higher for participants than non-participants in all three areas. 
Perceived competence is not only greater for participants than non­
participants , but was also greater for elite players than tournament 
players. A study by Kane and Warburton (1966) found world class tennis 
players to be more stable emotionally, lower in anxiety and higher 
with regard to self-confidence than tournament players.
1.5.5 Achievement Motivation
Another personality factor important to an analysis of a person's 
cognition and behaviour is what Atkinson (1957) and McClelland et al 
(1953) described as the achievement motivation theory. 'Need for 
achievement' and 'anxiety over failure' are seen as personality factors 
which need to be included with factors such as task difficulty and appeal 
of the task. The achievement motivation theory states that a feeling of
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accomplishment is a motive. In order to analyse behaviour, achievement 
motivation needs to be considered. The relevance to sport is important, 
as players might find more intrinsic appeal in sports tasks than non­
players, and they might differ in need for achievement.
Weiner et al (1971) contend that high achievement motivation 
individuals more often attribute success to themselves than low 
achievement motivation individuals. These findings support work done 
by Weiner and Kukla (1970). Weiner et al contend that it should be 
possible to induce causal ascriptions and thus arouse achievement 
motivation. In one condition, subjects were told success would be 
determined by their effort. In the other condition, subjects were 
told that outcome would be determined by their ability. They contended 
that the first condition was an attributional set which would be 
maintained by high-achievement individuals, while the second would be 
maintained by low-achievement individuals. Results showed that high- 
achievement individuals in the effort condition worked harder and 
chose more intermediate difficulty tasks than low-achievement subjects. 
These results were not found in the ability condition, supporting their 
contention that achievement motivation can be aroused as causal 
ascriptions are induced.
Need for achievement has been found to be related to locus of 
control by McClelland, Atkinson, Clark and Lowell (1953). Most 
research shows high achievers to be more internal than low achievers. 
Rotter (1966), for example, found high achievers attributed success and 
failure internally, while low achievers attributed success and failure 
externally. Lefebvre (1979) also found high achievers attributed 
success internally, but, unlike Rotter, he found that high achievers 
ascribed failure externally.
High achievement motivation people may be different from low 
achievement motivation people for several reasons. They may be more 
internal because they perceive in such a way as to enhance their self- 
image. They may expect success more often than low achievement 
motivation people. Finally, they may perceive themselves as more 
able than low achievement motivation people as suggested by Kukla 
(1972).
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1.5.6 Leve% of Sports Ferformanoe
It appears, then, that achievement motivation is an important 
consideration in cognitive behaviour as well as in physical behaviour. 
Actual achievement seems also to be important, as levels of performance 
and levels of performance in sport seem to be related to attributions 
and motivational factors. Weiner and Kukla (1970), for example, 
found attributions of high and low achievers to be different, and Auvergne 
(1983) found better skiers to be more internal in their attributions 
to success and more external in their attributions to failure. Auvergne 
found that skiers of high, average, and poor levels of competition 
differed in attributions, although degrees of motivation were found 
to be similar. Skiers with above average results in competition attributed 
success to internal, unstable factors. Below average skiers were found 
not be differentiate attributions for success. Failure was attributed 
to stable, external factors by a higher number of above average skiers, 
while failure was attributed to both internal and external stable factors 
by below average skiers.
Internality has been related to better performance in athletics, 
as well as in skiing. Morris, Vaccaro and Clarke (1979) and Kaufman 
(1975) noted that better performance was related to athlete's internality.
Spink (1977, 1978), Roberts (1975) and Iso-Ahola (1975) examined 
experience and attribution as well. Experience seems to affect mode of 
attribution, with inexperienced players attributing less to stable factors 
than experienced players. Spink (1977, 1978) found basketball players 
to be internal when successful, as effort and ability were endorsed more 
often than luck and difficulty of task. Attributions following failure 
were more external.
All of these studies show the need to consider level of performance 
in attribution studies in sport.
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1.5.7 Outoome And Its Effect On Attributions
Although past performance has not been found to determine patterns 
of attribution (Brawley, 1980), present game outcome has. Thus, in 
addition to examining various levels of skill, many researchers have 
examined attributions of winners and losers in order to study the 
effects of game outcome on attributional responses. The vast majority 
of this research has shown that game outcome does in fact determine ' 
attributional responses, as winners differ from losers in attributional 
responses to ability, effort, task difficulty and luck. Scanlon (1977) 
for example, found losers to be more internal in their attributions 
than winners, as did Gill (1980). Studies by Brawley (1980) found 
ability and effort to be more important causes according to winners 
than task difficulty and luck. However, to losers, ability and effort 
were less important than task difficulty and luck. McAuley and Gross 
(1983), as well as Scanlon and Passer (1980), found winners more internal 
than losers, although both winners and losers were internal.
McAuley and Gross (1983 ) who found winners attributing more often 
to internal factors, also found winner's attributions to be more control­
lable and stable than losers. On the other hand. Gill, Rudder and Gross 
(1982) found winners more controllable and unstable in their attributions
Finally, differences occured in research with regard to attributions 
to one's own ability and effort. While Brawley (1980) found winners 
attributing more often to their own ability and effort than losers, 
Iso-Ahola (1977) found winners and losers attributing similarly to 
ability and effort. One area which needs defining is exactly what 
the researcher is examining. Some research compares winners and losers. 
Other research examines which attributes (internal or external) are 
more important as determinants of success. Scanlon and Passer (1980) 
tested both. In addition to comparing winners and losers, they also 
examined each group (winners and losers) separately to see whether 
internal or external attributes were considered to be more important 
as determinants of success. Losers, for example, felt that internal 
attributes were more important than external attributes as determinants 
of success. It, thus, appears important that when interpreting results.
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clarification is made regarding exactly what is being compared.
Clarification of past research findings is thus needed and issues 
need to be re-examined post-game. While conflicting results emerged in 
post-game research (when the outcome of the game was known), attributions 
under uncertain conditions (pre-game) have gone unresearched.
Similar distinctions can be seen in research carried out by Gill, 
Rudder and Gross (1982). They found winners attributions to be more 
controllable than losers, especially in unstable, controllable 
attributions. Members of winning teams used more controllable than 
uncontrollable attributions, and losing teams gave equal controllable 
and uncontrollable attributions. Both aspects of investigation - 
between group, and within group- were clearly displayed. Their 
research, at first glance, appears to contradict past research, as 
they claim that winners were hot more internal than losers, but they 
explain that both groups gave internal attributions, and controllability 
needed to be taken into account.
Clarification of results also depends on the criteria for success. 
Outcome may be dependent on others, as in a competitive setting, or 
may be cooperative, when success is independent of others. Miller and 
Ross (1975) point out that studies such as Streufert and Streufert (1969) 
or Wolosin et al (1973) are examples of experiments where there is only 
one winner and results of two individuals depend on each other. Other 
experiments, such as Feather and Simon (1971a) and Wortman et al (1973) 
differ from these because subjects work independently and outcomes are 
unrelated.
Other considerations include the type of scale used, according to 
Miller and Ross, as some are bi-polar and others work on a percentage 
system, assigning a certain percent of responsibility to the self, 
the opponent, and the situation. Skill may be more salient in situations 
emphasising interpersonal comparisons. These types of experimental 
differences could easily lead to varying results from experiment to 
experiment, as studies using independent measures yielded no self- 
serving bias, while non-independent measures showed self-enhancing
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biases (success was self-attributed). Miller and Ross (1975) suggest 
that interdependence increases motivation and a strong desire to succeed, 
which when coupled with high effort would lead to subject's perceiving 
themselves as personally responsible for success.
In addition to considerations of independent/interdependent and bi-polar/ 
percentage scales, consideration must be made to type of outcome described. 
'Clearly perceived' outcomes, for example, differ from 'Ambiguous' outcomes, 
as clearly perceived outcomes were internally attributed and ambiguous 
outcome were externally attributed (Spink and Roberts, 1980). Success and 
failure may not always be synonomous with winning and losing, and objective 
outcome may, therefore, not be the best as a determinant of attributions.
1.5.8 Sex Factors
Another important consideration which must not be overlooked is the 
sex differences which may exist in attribution. Another important 
factor, sex of the subject or participant,may account for differing 
attributional patterns. To assess sex differences in attribution 
without considering factors such as achievement motivation, locus of 
control, performance levels, sports competence, and valued goals would 
give an incomplete picture.
Certain differences regarding sex differences in sport attribution 
are summarised by Carron (1980) who points out that a number of sex 
differences occur in attribution. He states that these differences 
may be inherent differences in the ability to perceive. Females 
evaluate their own ability much lower in comparison to males. Females 
view effort as the most important determinant of success, as do males.
Women endorse outcomes (successful and unsuccessful) to external factors, 
as task difficulty or luck more frequently. The value of success is 
therefore, lowered, as the task is rated as easy. This causes a stigma 
to be attached to failure. Women tend to endorce luck for success and 
failure more than men, and therefore, "there is less responsibility (and 
satisfaction) attached to a positive outcome but less responsibility 
(and dissatisfaction) attached to negative outcomes". (Carron, 1981, p.38).
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Brooks' (1982) findings agree that females externalize athletic 
success more than males. It is important to examine both between- 
group and within-group results, however. Females were found to 
internalize both success and failure, while males internalized success 
more than they internalized failure.
In contrast to these findings, Gilliland (1974) found no significant 
differences between males and females with regard to locus of control.
Conclusions regarding achievement motivation and sports competence, 
possible intervening factors, show conflicting results. While studies 
show gender main effects when studying achievement motivation (Stein 
and Bailey, 1973; Weiner and Frieze, Kukla, Reed, Rest and Rosenbaum,
■1971),others show no difference (Lefebvre,1979). Lefebvre found 
that females scored higher on tests of intrinsic motivation than males, 
but no significant differences were found on total achievement motivation. 
Results of Weiner et al found that among male students, self-attribution 
for success and achievement concerns are positively related. However, 
achievement motivation and locus of control are undetermined for females 
for success events. Results of Stein and Bailey (1973) also found males 
and females to differ in achievement motivation. Finally, no sex 
differences were found by Gill, Rudder and Gross (1982) in attributional 
responses, although win/loss by controllability effects were stronger for 
males than females.
McHugh, Duquin and Frieze (1978) found young females and those in 
recreational sports to endorse external factors, but question whether 
high achievers in competitive sports have the same patterns of attribution.
The question of sex differences in Sports competence is yet another 
area of conflicting findings. While Roberts, Kleiber and Duda (1981) 
found no gender main effects when studying cognitive competence, general 
self-worth and physical competence in sport, Naditch (1975) found significant 
differences between males and females in sports competence and locus of 
control. Males were found to have an internal locus of control associated 
with competent performance in areas where performance represented valued 
goals. The opposite effect was found in females, with locus of control 
and competence related only when there is low interest value.
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To summarize, some studies of sex differences in sport show 
conflicting results. Factors such as sports competence, value of 
task and performance levels, as well as locus of control are important 
considerations.
1.5.9 Affective Reactions
One of the main reasons for studying attributions and identifying 
those factors which need consideration in assessing and interpreting 
them is that attributional processes determine affective reactions 
(Weiner, 1980; Weiner, Russell and Lerman, 1978, 1979; and McAuley 
et al, 1983 ).
To examine a case in point, one needs only to look at McAuley 
et al's study of male and female undergraduate's reactions to performance 
results in tennis. Attribution processes were found to be important 
determinants of affective reactions, especially for winners. These 
findings are in agreement with the majority of past research which 
has found that attribution for failure and success outcomes are 
'important determinants' of affective reactions to the outcome.
Forsyth and McMillan (1981) found that individuals who felt their 
performance was due to factors over which they had control experienced 
positive emotional reactions more often than students who felt the 
cause of their performance was beyond their control. Results can be 
examined in light of Weiner's (1979) work with causality, stability 
^ d  controllability. Weiner felt that controllability was the most 
important factor, while Forsyth and McMillan found causality to be 
more important.
1.5.10 Differing Responses to Failure
As different people have different affective reactions, they 
also have different responses to failure. Some display persistence 
when facing failure, while others display deterioration, according 
to Dweck (1980). 'Persisters' (mastery-oriented) and 'deteriorators' 
(learned helpless) individuals are distinguished by how they perceive
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success. Mastery-orientated children do not see themselves as failing 
as do the learned helpless. They foresee success and have a more 
positive affect, while learned helpless children chose to withdraw or
escape from situations of achievement. For some children, then,
failure leads to escalation of effort, intensification of concentration, 
sophistication of strategies, and enhanced performances. For others, 
the effects are the reverse. Their efforts are curtailed, their 
strategies deteriorate,and performance is disrupted. Dweck goes on 
to explain that these later individuals may become unable to solve 
problems that they could solve before, and that these differences are 
found to be in their cognitions with regard to success and failure.
According to Seligman and Maier (1967), learned helplessness is 
•perception of independence* between a person's response and aversive 
outcomes. An external locus of control leads to the belief that your
actions will not have an effect on the course of events and that
you lack control of these negative events. Failure to the learned 
helpless is inevitable and insurmountable. Mastery-oriented subjects 
have different cognitions; they feel that success is replicable and 
they see their mistakes as rectifiable.
In reference to sport, reaction to failure has often been discussed 
and deemed to be an important issue. Ogilvie (1968, p.159) puts it in these 
terms: "To be a winner it is essential that failure to achieve or failure 
to realize the coach's goal be accepted as a responsibility, which of 
course demands emotional strength... High achievement needs are based 
upon personal attitudes about the probability of success vs. failure 
associated with each investment of self". He concludes that, "The great 
athletes I have interviewed do not dwell upon their losses, but concentrate 
upon that part of their performance that limited their excellence".
Practical suggestions regarding dealing with failure have been 
presented in various ways, including suggestions for internal-external 
change techniques.
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1.5.11 Intemat-Extemat Change Techniques
The bulk of the attribution research comes to the conclusion that an
external locus of control handicaps people. Those who are not doing well
may be trained to be more internal. IE change techniques have been
developed (Dua, 1970). Action programmes help create behaviours which
deal with problems. Work by Dweck (1980), Halliwell (1980), Singer 
®t a^ , (1980), and deCharmes (1968) advocate retraining, claiming practical
considerations for coaches can result in behaviour change.
Weiner et al (1971)found that expectancies of future success increase 
when stable attributions are changed to unstable attributions in a failure 
situation. Similarly, when success is attributed to stable as opposed to 
unstable factors, future expectancies of succeeding increase. Teachers 
and coaches can structure a competitive situation to disconfirm expectancies 
Singer _et (1980). When failure is expected and does in fact
occur, the attribution will usually be to low ability. However, if failure 
is expected, and success occurs by structuring the situation to disconfirm 
expectations, then the behaviour will be attributed to high ability. 
McManan's (1973) findings support the reversal of expectancies with regard 
to failure and success.
Duke, Johnson and Mowicki (1978) also conclude that internality is 
advantageous. Children participating in sport's camps for fitness became 
more internal because of their experience, a gain which appears permanent 
in follow-up studies.
Dweck (1980) also advocates changing attributions from external 
factors to internal factors. With an internal locus of control, intrinsic 
motivation will increase.
DiFebo (1974) however tested skill acquisition changes as a result 
of IE change techniques and found no significant differences in skill 
acquisition involving gymnastics and handball with internals showing 
greater gains in skill. His model was designed to modify locus of control 
toward an inward direction.
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Reimanis and Schaefer (1970) developed a counseling technique 
to shift a person's orientations to a more internal orientation.
They counsel by helping the subject to see himself as having
the power to change the situation. This is done by rewarding internal
statements and challenging external statements with internal questions.
Although not an IE change technique, Masters (1970) developed a 
technique which alters perception and attitudes without necessarily 
changing the actual behaviour.
MacDonald (1972) proposes a global strategy encompassing all of 
these three techniques' benefits.
Cratty (1981) points out that subjects who look for external reasons 
for failure before a contest are probably anxious, while the person who 
sees stable factors will have less anxiety. He also suggests that coaches 
help teams to define success in realistic terms when an opponent's ability 
is far superior. Coaches can be alert to verbal behaviour to assess 
attributions, and concentrate on modifiable factors rather than unstable 
factors such as luck. He points to three factors to consider:
1. Not all athletes think alike. 2. The athlete may be thinking of 
more than one cause» 3. An athlete may not be voicing his true 
thoughts. Athletes should be approached individually rather than in 
groups. Finally, Cratty points out that attributions immediately 
following a contest may be different a day or two later. Coaches should 
keep this in mind when talking to athletes about results. The coach 
must help the athlete make realistic assessments in order to improve 
future performance. The coach should also be aware of problems the 
athlete is having which could affect the attributions. A solution to 
a personal problem, according to Cratty, may result in more realistic 
appraisals.
Iso-Ahola (1976) also gives practical considerations of attributions 
following a loss. He suggests punishing lack of effort rather than 
lack of ability as the former is capable of being changed more quickly.
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DeSharais (1982) suggests two objectives in re-attribution:
1. To educate the coaches and parents to the principles and effects 
they have on the child's social development, and 2. To 'persuade* 
children to attribute failure to factors besides lack of ability.
To summarize, internality is generally seen as advantageous, 
and programmes can be developed for helping athletes to become more 
internal. Coaches, parents, and the athlete himself can play an 
integral part in such internal-external change techniques.
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1.6 SUMMARY OF REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE - ATTRIBUTION
1. Early work in attribution theory was carried out by Heider (1958) 
who has been regarded as the founder of modem attribution 
theory. Heider saw man as an 'naive scientist' who has a need
to explain the world. His personal and environmental distinction 
was developed into 'Components of Action*.
2. Jones and Davis' (1965) correspondent inference theory explains 
how a person decides whether internal dispositions are responsible 
for their actions. The person does this by examining all 
possible actions and their effects. The effects of actions not 
chosen are computed, and non-common effects identified. Thus 
non-common effects and desirability are key factors.
3. Kelley's covariation theory analysed classification of attributions 
according to consistency, distinctiveness, and consensus.
4. Weiner (1972) developed attributions initially examined by Heider
and proposed the use of four factors (ability, effort, task
difficulty, and luck), as well as two dimensions (internal/external 
and stable/unstable). This model was later modified by Roberts 
and Pascuzzi (1979) and Rosenbaum (1972).
5. The motivational vs. non-motivational approach to information 
processing has been a major issue of recent concern in social 
psychology. Heider (1958), and Kelley (1967) proposed the 
motivational approach which Bem (1967, 1972) has questioned, 
proposing instead, an information-processing approach.
6. The majority of researchers have supported the motivational
approach as success was found to be internally attributed and
failure was externally attributed.
7. Both team-serving and group-serving biases have been supported 
by the majority of researchers.
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8. Schemas and stereotypes have been examined in relation to 
attribution theory.
9. Other important considerations need to be made regarding 
attribution research. These include the actor/observer 
perspective (actors tend to attribute to the situation while 
observers tend to attribute to the actor); the locus of control 
of the person (whether the person believes factors to be under 
one’s control or outside of one's control); their expectations 
of success, perceived competence, and achievement motivation; 
their level of expertise; the outcome of the game ; and the 
player's sex. These factors are important, as are responses 
following failure such as affective reactions, differences in 
response to failure, and possible internal-external change 
techniques.
CHAPTER 2
AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ATTRIBUTION THEORY 
IN SPORT
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2.1 AIMS OF CHAPTER 2
(a) To test whether a motivational (self-serving bias) approach 
explains how information is processed in sport.
(b) To test whether a schema-based approach explains how 
information is processed in sport.
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2.2 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 2 involves a study carried out at hockey matches in 
an attempt to find support fora motivational, schema-based approach 
to information-processing in sport. It is predicted that a 
motivational approach is utilized and that biases in attributions 
result from a threat to the self image. These predictions are 
tested in this Chapter and are based on theories presented in 
Chapter 1.
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2 .2 .1  General Intvoduct'Con
The present study examines inconsistencies in related literature 
and relates findings concerning the motivational vs. non-motivational 
dilemma to the present study.
The present study examines the processing of information with 
particular emphasis on causal attributions and biases which exist.
The factors which lead to attribution are assessed, including schemata 
which exist regarding winning and losing, expectations about the 
outcome of the game and expectations about attributions, and psycholog­
ical variables such as motivation and frustration. The effects of 
outcome information on attributions is also assessed.
Examining past research sheds light on whether bias exists. The process 
of examining causal attributions, the effect of threat, and consequently 
biases must be based, as is all attributional research, on the 
assumption that a basic need exists in all of us to predict and 
understand our world. Since Beider’s early work, theorists have 
examined the types of information used to make explanations (Kelley,
1967, 1971, 1973). Thus, the idea of self-serving biases and the 
background of motivational vs. non-motivational dilemma can be 
traced to early work by Beider and Kelley. In more recent years, 
others have carried out interesting work regarding group-serving 
biases, adding another dimension to the motivational vs. non- 
motivational problem (Bewstone, Jaspars, and Lalljee, 1982). A 
non-motivational approach has been proposed and supported by those who 
support the idea of a logical, information-processing approach 
(Bern, 1972).
The present study examines the issue of motivational vs. non- 
motivational theories. Many researchers in the past have compared 
success attributions to failure attributions. The present study 
uses a method which compares winners and losers, but expands on 
the types of questions asked of them including some which have not 
been identified in the past.
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Scanlon and Passer C1980) introduced these two terms to describe 
the areas of questioning which were studied in sports attribution 
research: quantity and causal. Quantity attributions were sub-divided 
into self and team attributions. An example of a self-quantity 
attributional question would be one which asks, "How much did you try 
in the game today?", while a team-quantity attribution would ask,
"How much did your team try in the game today?". The ’Causal’ area 
also includes self and team. An example of a self-causal attribution 
would be, "Was how much you tried important to the way you played 
today?". An example of a team-causal attribution would be, "Was how 
much your team tried important to the outcome of the game?".
A third area of attribution is proposed in the present study and 
is an area previously unresearched. Absolute/Relative are the dimensions 
proposed. The present study proposes that in addition to asking 
whether effort, for example, exists (Quantity) and whether it’s 
important (Causal), it’s also important to ask whether it is a 
factor credited for good personal performance or blamed for poor 
personal performance. This area examines where responsibility is 
assigned. Sub-divided, the areas are Absolute Cthose which 
assign responsibility to one factor) or Relative (those which assign 
responsibility to a combination of factors). An example of ah ’Absolute’ 
attributional question would be, "How much credit is given to your 
effort for your good personal performance?" The same type of Absolute 
question could be asked in order to assess blame, "How much blame is 
given to your effort for your poor personal performance?". Relative 
questions are concerned with factors which operate causally only in 
interaction with some other factor(s). An example of a Relative 
question would be, "How much credit is given to factors relative to 
your effort (i.e. opponent’s effort and task difficulty which results 
from a comparison of your effort to your opponent’s) for your good 
personal performance?". Similar questions could be asked to assess 
blame.
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To summarize, then, three areas are identified for attributional 
study. Examples of each are as follows:-
Quantity (self) asks how much effort you displayed
(team) asks how much effort your team displayed
Causal (self) asks how important effort is to your personal 
performance
(team)*asks how important effort is to outcome.
Absolute (self)*asks how much credit/blame is given to your
Causal effort for your personal performance
Relative (self)*asks how much credit/blame is given to factors
Causal relative to your effort (i.e. opponent's effort
and task difficulty which results from a 
comparison of your' effort to your opponent's) 
for your good personal performance.
* Areas examined in the present study.
Other areas of attribution which were not examined were Absolute 
Causal (team) and Relative Causal (team) attributions which might have 
related either team's effort to personal performance, personal effort 
to team performance, or team effort to outcome. Because of the 
practical problem of questionnaire length, these areas, plus quantity 
attributions have not been included in the present study. They are, 
however, areas which could be examined by others who are interested 
in group dynamics.
The present study focuses instead on the areas of causal—team, 
as well as Absolute and Relative Causal(self) attributions. Rather 
than asking how much effort was displayed (quantity attributions), 
the present study asks how effort affects personal performance. 
Causal-self attributions are not included, as absolute and relative 
attributions cover this area with more specific questions.
Having identified areas of attributional concern in the present 
study, areas of concern regarding outcome/success also need to be 
identified. Only when terms are defined can past research and present 
data be adequately evaluated. Outcome/success areas are therefore
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sub-divided into three parts in the present study.
Success (Personal)* asks how successful you have been
Success CTeam)* asks how successful your team has been
Outcome* aSks whether your team won or lost
* Areas examined in present study
Outcome was used as a criterion separate from success. For far too 
long researchers have failed to distinguish these separate entities. The 
present study differentiates outcome (whether the team won or lost) from 
team success and also from personal success. Having rated players as 
either a winner ^ r a loser has led some researchers to assume that subjects 
have been either successful or unsuccessful in their personal performance. 
Some researchers have asked the subjects to rate themselves either as 
successful or unsuccessful. Others ask subjects to rate their success on 
a continuum. The present study asks subjects to rate both success (team 
and personal) as well as outcome.
In addition to examining outcome then, the present study examines 
success as a discrete variable - subjects rate their success on a scale 
of 1-5. Subjects are also asked to examine success as an aspect of 
their performance. They are also asked to examine failure as an aspect 
of their performance. Take, as an example, a subject who is asked how 
much they agree with the following statement:
I, personally, succeeded today.
Stongly Disagree Uncertain Agree Strongly
Disagree Agree
1 2 3 4 5
According to the subject's response, they would be placed on a 
continuum of successful-unsuccessful. A subject who responded with 
an answer of 4 would be one considered to be successful overall.
The approach used in this study is two-fold. First, questions regarding 
success are asked which assess perceived success as described above.
Second, questions are asked which examine those 'aspects' of one's 
performance which were good and those which were not so good. Thus 
in addition to asking subjects to what extent they felt they had
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succeeded, they were also asked what factors caused them to do well 
and what factors caused them to do poorly.
It is important to note that questions regarding successful and 
unsuccessful 'aspects' of performance are quite distinct from 
whether the performance itself is successful or unsuccessful.
More often than not, during a 70 minute hockey match, players are 
involved in some good and some not so good plays. The player may 
make a brilliant pass one time they receive the ball and then give 
it away the next time. The player may have been on the winning team, 
my have felt that he and his team had been successful, but also may 
have felt that there were areas of this performance which could be 
improved. The question, "When I did poorly, personally, it was 
because..." may be equally important to ask as, "When I did well, 
personally, it was because...". These are the questions which the 
present study examines as they ask what the player believes has 
caused him/her to do well during the game as well as what caused 
him/her to do badly. These aspects of performance have not been 
studied in past research in sport. Thus, the present study has 
examined areas which have otherwise been neglected.
Many past studies have been carried out between-gfoups, and a few 
have been carried out within-groups. The present study proposes three 
types of analyses: within-group, between-group, and within-individual.
Between-group analyses would be those that compare responses of two 
groups. These groups could be winners vs. losers, successful vs. 
unsuccessful, etc. Within-group analyses would be those that compare 
responses of one member of that group to others in that group.
Winners would be examined to see the types of attributions they make, 
for example. Within-individual studies would be those that compared 
responses of one individual to other responses by that individual.
An individual's response to factors he/she credits for good performance 
would be compared to responses to factors he/she blames for poor 
performance. These three types of analysis have been labelled 'Between* 
Group', 'Within-Group', and 'Within-Individual'. These labels and 
distinctions have not been used elsewhere, and are used here in an 
attempt to explain not only inconsistencies in the past, but also 
original contributions in the present study as no studies of sports
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attribution have been carried out of the 'Within-Tndividuals' type.
It is the aim of the study to examine data collected in the 
light of inconsistencies in past research and explain their origins.
All too often, past research has failed to account for differences 
in attributional areas studied. Past research doesn't always make 
it clear which area is being tested - perhaps stating, for example, 
that effort attributions were greater for winners than losers, leaving 
one wondering whether attributions were asked in the area of quantity 
attributions or causal attributions, or whether they were team or 
self-attributions. In reporting findings of others, researchers too 
often generalize findings and thus draw incorrect conclusions because 
of a lack of distinctiveness in reporting results. When these 
distinctions are unclear, interpretations of results are difficult, 
and comparisons to other studies are impossible.
Related literature will be discussed in this Chapter with this 
type of problem in mind. The person interpreting previous research 
must know exactly what the experimenter is asking. The interpreter 
must also know to 'whom' the question is posed. All too often 
comparisons of results involving subjects of differing ages are made 
without regard to the implications which these age differences 
might have for interpretation of results. Many of the studies have 
involved children, and should not therefore be interpreted as if the 
subject had been adults or undergraduates. Sex and age are variables 
which need consideration when results are interpreted. Inconsistencies 
in research findings will be discussed in relation to differences in 
the samples studied.
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2 .2 .2  SelfServinq Bios
Results of the present study will be examined in light of previous 
research regarding winners and losers (see Figure 2.2). As mentioned 
in the literature review earlier, Iso-Ahola (1977) and Roberts (1975) 
found support for a motivational approach by comparing winners and 
losers, although Duquin (1977) did not. Iso-Ahola, for example, 
examined self-quantity attributions, asking 300 Little League 
basketball players to judge their own ability and effort, the task 
difficulty and their luck. Team outcome did not affect the player's 
judgements of their own ability and effort, but players judged their 
personal task to be more difficult and themselves to be more unlucky 
following team failure than success. Players rated their internal 
qualities high regardless of their team's past performance. Iso-Ahola 
concludes that player's self-concept regarding ability is maintained 
and stable regardless of past or present performance. He asked only 
whether the factor existed but not whether it was important to the 
outcome, whether they blamed or whether they credited each factor.
The present study proposes to go beyond a single uni-dimensional 
analysis to include importance, credit, and blame.
One important factor to be considered is the age of Iso-Ahola's 
subjects. As with Roberts'(1975) sample. Little League players were 
studied (mean age 11.3 years). Comparisons to a university aged sample 
used in the present study must be carried out with caution. Subjects 
in both Roberts and Iso-Ahola's studies were male, while the present 
study involves both males and females respondents.
Sample size and type used by McAuley and Gross (1983) seem closer 
to those in the present study. Their study involved causal-team 
attributions.
Undergraduate students who were physical eduction majors at the 
University of Iowa took part in table tennis competitions. They found 
that attributions made by winners were more internal,stable,and controllable 
than those by losers. In addition to between-group analyses, within- 
group analyses were carried out. Both winners and losers were internal 
and controllable as well as somewhat unstable in their attributions.
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The important point made here is that they examined not just who was 
more internal or external (winners or losers), but also how internal 
or external each group was. The type of questions seem to be causal- 
team attributions and should therefore be considered to tap a different 
area from Iso-Ahola's self-quantity attributions. It should be noted 
that this study assessed outcome rather than personal performance, 
as the present study assesses.
Both of these studies, although somewhat different from the 
present study, reached the same conclusion - that a motivational 
rather than non-motivational approach applies to attributions. Results 
of these and other studies listed in Figure 2.1 lead to the same 
conclusion - that attributional responses are biased in a self-serving 
manner.
Nicholls' (1975) research examined attributions and is discussed 
here in terms of methods used. The task involved was an angle- 
matching task in which 9 year-old males and females participated.
His work will be examined by looking at each factor (ability, effort, 
and luck) as they are presented in his study. Nicholls proposed that 
all subjects appeared to put effort into the task so both approaches 
would predict higher attributions to success than failure for effort.
He proposed that the distinction between an information-processing 
and self-serving bias approach would be clear when ability and luck 
attributions were examined. If success attributions were greater for 
ability than failure, then a self-serving bias would exist. On the 
other hand, if attributions were the same as for success and failure, 
then an information-processing model would be supported. If luck 
attributions were greater for failure than success, again a self- 
serving bias would be evidenced. Nicholl's findings supported 
a self-serving bias in each case. Success attributions were greater 
for ability than failure, and failure attributions were greater for 
luck than success. The present study will examine success vs. failure 
attributions so that comparisons can be made to Nicholl's work and 
this will be explained in the Statement of the Problem section of this 
chapter. While Nicholl's work is interesting in terms of its methods, 
Reiss and Taylor's (1984) work is interesting in terms of its results 
and conclusions. They offered support for a non-motivational rather
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than motivational explanation on attributional bias. Alpine skiers 
aged 14-26 were categorized into five ability levels. The importance 
of races was used as 'natural manipulation* of ego-involvement. 
Ego-involvement was not found to be a factor in their attributions.
This information, plus the fact that subjects made more internal 
attributions.to ability and effort when they did well rather than 
poorly, led to conclusions regarding a non-motivational approach.
External attributions (to task difficulty and luck) were not affected 
by outcome. Thus, in these two studies, similar results appear to 
be interpreted differently. Reiss and Taylor (1984) found winners 
attribute more to ability than losers and although this would 
appear to be self-serving, they claim that this supports a non- 
motivational approach. Nicholls (1975) found ability attributions 
higher after success than failure and claims that this supports a 
motivational approach. Reiss and Taylor used a different task (Alpine 
ski racing) to Nicholls (an angle-matching task). One was competitive, 
while the other was not. Also, age differences exist as Figure 2.2 
shows. While these differences could have an effect, a more likely 
explanation is that the same findings were merely interpreted differently 
Both establish the same results, but because they found that ego- 
involvement was not related to attributions, Reiss and Taylor conclude 
that a motivational explanation is not the reason for internal 
attributions following success. Perhaps Ross and Taylor's assumption 
that using a hierarchy ranking the importance of competitions as a 
criterion for ego-involvement should be questioned, because ego- 
involvement was not proven to be related to the importance of races. 
Therefore, although ego-involvement may be a good criteria, it is 
unclear that this is the criteria actually tested. Finally, it should 
be noted that the questions asked in the two studies differ, with Reiss 
and Taylor asking for causal-self attributions and Nicholls asking 
for causal-team attributions. The present study asks for both, as 
causal-self is further broken down into absolute and relative (self) 
factors which credit and blame.
The study which most clearly defines and isolates areas of 
attributional study is one carried out by Scanlon and Passer (1980).
As previously mentioned, they examined team-causal areas which will also 
be examined in the present study. Their work paves the way for clearer
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classification systems in attribution research. In their study,
Scanlon and Passer asked 11-12 year-old male soccer players 16 
questions. Some questions such as, "How much did you try today?" 
assess effort and are quantity-self attributions. Other attributions 
assess performance, asking questions such as, "Was how much you tried 
important to the way you played?" (causal-self attributions). Winners 
were found, for example, to rate ability and effort as more important 
as a causal determinant of personal performance than losers (causal- 
self attributions), and winners judged ability and effort to be more 
important determinants of game outcome than losers (causal-team 
attributions). It is also interesting to note that winners did not 
feel that they had better ability but did feel they had put in more 
effort than losers (quantity-self attributions); while winners did 
feel that their team had better effort and ability than losers (quantity- 
team).
Attributions to task difficulty and luck were examined by Scanlon 
and Passer in the same clear and precise manner as ability and effort. 
Causal-self attributions showed winners and losers not to differ in 
difficulty or luck attributions. Causal-team attributions showed no 
differences in difficulty, but winners rated luck as more important 
than losers. Quantity-self responses showed no differences in 
difficulty, but winners believed they had had better luck than losers.
Quantity-Hteam responses showed no difference in difficulty, but again 
winners believed they had had better luck.
To summarize work which has in the past attempted to distinguish 
motivational and non-motivational explanations: most studies have 
supported the motivational explanation ; most studies have used a 
'between-group* approach, comparing either winners vs. losers or 
successful vs. non-successful subjects. Others utilize a within-group 
approach and study each group separately.
The only study which did not lend support to a motivational approach 
was carried out by Duqin (1977). Her study involved 500 subjects aged 
11-14 who were questioned following football, soccer, and volleyball matches 
The main problem in interpreting Duqin's results is the lack of clarity 
about her areas of study. It is unclear whether her questions were, in
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fact, causal-team or quantity-team questions. After close examination, 
it was assumed that causal-team questions had been asked Ci^ e. subjects 
must have been asked to state why they had won or lost at their sport).
This can only be assumed, as the questions were not included in the 
article.
The responses to open-ended attributional questions were coded 
according to content. She coded the response, "We were great" as 
an internal-stable attribution, and she labelled it 'ability*.
She labelled, **We are the best team** as ' ability comparison', and 
placed this in the internal-stable category along with 'specific ability* 
attributions, such as, "We know how to spike".
Duqin's internal-unstable category included attributions to effort, 
mood, injuries, and 'played well or poorly'. The last of these (played 
well or poorly) gives rise to much debate. First, is this really an
internal attribution? . Is it safe to assume that these 11-14 year olds
consider their performance only relative to their own potential? Or 
perhaps the category would better be described as 'relative* than 
'internal*, eliminating the internal/external dichotomy. This would take 
into account subjects who felt that they had played well relative to 
their opponents
'Task comparison' was listed as an 'external/stable' category and 
included responses such as, "The other team was better". Again, category 
allocation needs to be questioned for similar reasons.
The final category used by Duquin was 'external/unstable', including 
responses such as cheating, referees, and luck.
Two major drawbacks exist in Duquin * s work. One is the lack of
clarity regarding the 'area* (whether questions were causal-team or 
quantity-team), and the second is the problems associated with category 
allocation. These two drawbacks must be considered when examining results. 
She found that, "Most children attributed both success and failure 
internally (p. 462)**, and concluded that an information-processing approach 
was therefore supported.
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No definitive conclusions can be drawn from Duquin’s results, 
because it is unclear how she arrived at these conclusions. Were 
winners compared to losers, and no differences found in success 
attributions because both groups attributed internally?; or were 
subjects who won and lost examined together, with, comparisons made 
between their success attributions and failure attributions?
It is clear that, as with many other studies in sport, this study 
was not precise in the attributional area studied nor were enough 
details reported to make results easily understood. For this reason 
further studies are needed which clearly delineate categories and areas 
of study.
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2.2.3 Group Serving Cor Team-SerV'Cng) Bias
Work, regarding group-serving bias has been carried out in 
non-sporting and sporting contexts (see Figure 2.2). Hewstone, Jaspers 
and Lalljee C1982), for example, found group-serving bias evidenced in 
an academic setting, as pupils from private vs. state schools felt luck 
was the main reason for their group differentiation. Both comprehensive 
and private schoolboys were asked to write an essay explaining what 
similarities and differences they felt existed between schoolboys 
from comprehensive and private schools. Although there was some 
agreement in their perceptions, there was also some disagreement. While 
both groups agreed that those from public schools had better prospects 
for the future, they differed in the types of characteristics felt to 
describe the group. Public schoolboys, for example, described themselves 
as 'hard-working* and 'disciplined*, while comprehensive schoolboys 
described those from public schools as 'snobbish*. Attributions also 
showed interesting results when analysed, as the main reason for 
differentiation between groups was luck.
What this all leads to is the idea that attributions are group- 
serving, and equally important, that attributions are made in a social 
context. This aspect of Hewstone et al's study will be further discussed 
in Chapter 4,which examines social aspects of attribution more closely.
In a sport setting, Taylor and Doria (1981) did work which is 
typical of much team-serving bias research. They proposed that biases 
exist because personal and team successes were attributed internally, 
while personal and team failures were both attributed externally. These 
results support both a self-serving and team-serving bias. Players in 
the study were more likely to credit the team for success than to blame 
the team for failure. Male and female university-aged subjects participated 
by completing questionnaires after games of either ice hockey, basketball 
or volleyball.
Like those by Taylor and Doria (1981), other studies have evidenced 
the use of team-serving biases. Interesting work by Gill (1980) shows 
a pattern with different results.
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Her findings can most easily be described in two parts. First, 
she examined attributions to the team and to the opponent. As many 
other studies have found,a motivational approach was employed - winning 
teams assigned responsibility for success to their own team, while 
losing teams assigned responsibility for a loss to opponents. This 
*ego-centric' finding seems quite straightforward. Then Gill examined 
how members of the winning team assign responsibility (to the self or 
to the partner in a two person maze-task). Following this. Gill 
examined members of the losing team. These results showed a 'reverse 
ego-centric' approach. Members of winning teams assigned responsibility 
to the teammate, while members of losing teams assigned responsibility 
to the self.
Two explanations could account for these findings. First, Gill 
was examining a two-person 'team' and asking for attributions to self 
and partner. Perhaps explanations given publicly may be those which 
others might expect. It is more acceptable to credit a partner 
outwardly than to criticize them. The second point to be made is 
that to give credit to a partner may not be considered 'external'.
Gill sees attributions to self as internal and attributions to the 
partner as external. To say that a winner gives credit to their partner 
may not mean that that person is being external. The subject is involved 
as a member of the team, and group identity may be involved. The subject 
may, in fact, be crediting his partner, but because they are partners, 
be crediting internally rather than externally. Gill may be inaccurate 
in considering partners as totally external in a task which is explained 
as a team venture. The results of Gill's findings would not, therefore, 
be in contrast to proposals presented in the present study.
Gill's (1981) work with basketball teams came to the same conclusions 
as her work with the maze-task exercise. The first problem with Gill's 
study is a lack of clarity regarding what area is investigated. Members 
of 10 male and 10 female basketball teams completed questionnaires 
immediately following a league game which asked them to chopse either 
"myself or my teammates" as being responsible for the outcome. Thus 
a team-causal attribution appears to be elicited here. The subjects 
were also asked to choose either "our team or the opposing team" as 
being responsible - another team-causal type attributional question.
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Neither question is very clear about what specifically had caused 
the win or loss. To attribute to the 'team' seems to cover many 
areas such as the team's ability, the team's effort, and so on. To 
ask about the - team' seems a bit vague. In any case, teammates were 
assigned more responsibility than the self for both a win and a loss. 
Teammates were credited for a win and blamed for a loss. Results 
for the "team vs, opposing team" choice shows that the team was chosen 
more often for both a win and a loss. Gill concludes that the 
'self vs. teammates' choices shows a reverse ego-centricism while the 
'team vs. opposing team' choice shows ego-centricism. She concludes 
that these results are in Conflict with previous findings and concludes 
that assignment of responsibility, at least in sports teams, does not 
conform consistently with a widely supported ego-centric model. Her 
results point to a "team-serving." or "team-enhancing" bias.
Two important points need to be made regarding these two works 
by Gill, Firstly, both show a motivational as compared to non-motivational 
approach, and secondly, the 'team' is evidenced as extremely important, 
possibly more so than the self. Her reverse ego-centric findings can 
be easily explained as resulting from threatening causal attributions.
It is hardly surprising that when asked who was more responsible for 
the outome - you or your teammates -subjects would answer teammates.
With eleven players on the pitch, to believe that one (even the self) 
has more influence than the other ten on the game outcome might be 
unrealistic. The present study addresses this issue by asking players 
to rate, on a scale of 1-4 which was more important to the outcome: 
the self, teammates, opponents, or luck. It is expected that self 
would be rated third by both winners and losers. It is further 
expected that winners will rate teammates first and opponents second; 
while losers will rate opponents first and teammates second (in an 
attempt to protect the self-image of the team). These results would 
not confirm Gill's findings that winners and losers rated teammates 
more responsible, but a threat would exist to the team (and consequently 
the self) if they were held responsible for the loss.
Gill's findings that teammates were blamed for the loss 
contradicts an information-processing explanation that more information 
is available and therefore attributions are made based on the amount 
of information in a logical manner. One would expect more attributions
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to the teammates than opponents, which was not the case. These 
findings therefore contradict Miller and Ross's (1975) argument that 
the amount of information available causes what is often interpreted 
as bias.
The reasons Gill gives for her reverse ego-centric results is 
that sports teams do not conform consistently to an ego-centric model. 
The present study assesses whether an ego-centric or reverse ego­
centric pattern emerges, and uses 'threat' as the determiner of bias.
If Gill's subjects were not threatened by attributing blame to 
teammates, further examination of her subject sample would be warranted. 
Perhaps the teams had exceptionally good self-concepts which allowed 
them to blame their teammates without feeling threatened themselves. 
Details of exactly why her sample might not feel threatened are not 
apparent in her study, however not enough information was given about 
the standard of the teams, their past performances, etc. to rule out 
the possibility that bias did not occur because no threat was present.
Two other approaches have been utilized in examining team-serving 
bias. Roberts (1978) has examined 'past history' of wins and loses 
to build a case for investigating motivational vs. non-motivational 
theories, and others have examined 'salience' as an important factor. 
These two approaches will now be reviewed.
Roberts (1978) asked Little League baseball players why they 
had won or lost. Two separate questionnaires were handed out - one 
to the winners and one to the losers, asking causal-team questions. 
Roberts found that in team sports self-attributions were more 'ego- 
involving' than team-attributions, and therefore more self-serving. 
Results showed self-serving bias in self-attributions, but information 
processing for team attributions. Roberts' results are based on work 
regarding the history of win-loss experience of the teams for the 
past four games. Those who had won the last four games were considered 
as having a past history of success, while those who had lost the 
last four were considered as having a past history of failure. While 
the self-serving bias found in self-attributions has been widely 
supported, the findings of an information-processing model for team 
attributions warrants further investigation.
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Roberts support for an information-processing model for teams 
came from the fact that teams with a past history of winning that won 
attributed less to effort than teams with a history of losing that won. 
Also, the hypothesis stated that a loss following previous losses 
would be attributed to low ability more than a loss following previous 
wins. This hypothesis was supported. To summarize, then, Roberts found 
that players ignored previous win-loss history of the team when making 
self-attributions, but did take past history into account in team 
attributions. Roberts concludes that, "...the team nature of basket­
ball may have reduced the degree of ego-involvement of players when 
attributing responsibility of team outcome. The attribution of 
responsibility for outcome to the team allows the player to diffuse 
his own responsibility for the outcome. The attribution of outcome 
to the team becomes more of an external causal attribute than does 
self-attribution. Therefore, the players were able to adopt a more 
rational and information-processing approach to team causal attributions: 
allocation of responsibility to the team is less ego involving because 
of the diffusion of responsibility" (p. 158). These comments are inter­
esting in light of the concept of threat relative to attributions.
Those in Roberts’ study would not feel as threatened when the blame is 
on the team and would therefore be less ’ego-involved’ and attribute 
using less bias. One important point to bear in mind is that Roberts’ 
subjects were Little League players (approx. age 11), while the present 
study involves club hockey players. The ego-involvement of an 11 
year-old may be different from that of a club player who has chosen 
to remain a part of a team for years. If a club player were ’more’ 
involved in the team,then attributions to the team might be more 
biased than those of younger players.
A follow-up study by Roberts increased ego-involvement to see what 
the effect would be on attributions. A novel motor task was carried 
out by pairs of boys. The boys (aged 9-12) were assigned to one of 
four treatments (1) boys who succeeded but had previously failed 
(2) boys who continuously succeeded (3) boys who failed after previous 
success, and (4) boys who continually failed. The two-person relay 
game was used in order to increase the ego-involvement, as each child’s 
contribution was important. Within this greater ego-involvement, 
the study supported a self-serving position for both team and self-causal
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attribution. More ego-involvement in this competitive situation resulted 
in subjects attempting to maintain self-esteem as might be expected.
It does seem difficult at times to interpret Roberts’work, 
especially in terms of clarity of areas of study. The following is 
an example of how causal-team and quantity-team attributions can be 
confounded, making interpretation of results difficult. Roberts Cp. 155) 
states, ’’...teams with a history of winning, that just lost the current 
game, responded that they considered the task reliably less difficult 
than did teams with a history of losing, that also just lost the game,
F (1,36) = 10.561, p ^  .01. Teams with a history of losing who
also lost the present game considered the task to be reliably more 
difficult that teams with a history of losing who had just won their 
present game, F (1,55) = 5.31, p ^  .05. Teams with a history of
winning did not differentially attribute task difficulty as a reason 
for the outcome, regardless of whether they won or lost’’.
Roberts does not make clear the exact wording of questions. It 
appears from these statements though that Roberts has asked two quantity- 
team questions and made one causal-team conclusion. It appears that 
he asked how difficult the game was and then assumed that winners would 
see this as a 'reason' for the outcome. The point to be made is that 
researchers should clarify areas of research and be aware of the hazards 
of such assumptions as those made by Roberts. Perhaps they did see 
difficulty as an important reason for outcome, but the only way to 
know is to ask a causal-team question.
The present study attempts to make clear which areas it is testing. 
Causal-team conclusions are made from responses to causal-team questions 
in an attempt to clarify results. The present study also uses similar 
methods to those of Roberts, asking for responses to attributional 
questions and then examining winner's and loser’s responses. The present 
study does not, however, use past history as a basis for argument, but 
instead examines those aspects which caused a player to do well compared 
to aspects which caused them to do poorly. Roberts' work is, however, 
interesting as it shows how motivational vs. non-motivational theories 
can be tested in different ways.
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Yet another approach has been taken in the final group of studies. 
Because this approach is quite different in approach to the others, 
it has not been included in Figure 2.2. The approach involves 'salience' 
which has been touched on earlier in the discussion of Gill's work 
(1980, 1981). An example of work which uses 'salience' as a criteria 
for distinguishing motivational and non-motivational approaches is 
that done by Ross and Sicoly (1979). Adult groups (discussion groups, 
married couples, groups assembled in the lab, and basketball teams) 
were all found to recall more frequently their own personal contribution 
to joint products than others. Individuals also accepted more responsi­
bility for the end product than others attributed to them. Basketball
players, for example, felt that their team was responsible more often
for the turning point in the game. These findings support a self- 
serving bias according to Ross and Sicoly.
Brawley (1984) also found salience to be a good predictor of 
biases. He proposed that subject's own input to team effort was more 
easily and more frequently remembered than that of other's input.
Regardless of outcome, subjects remembered their own input more often.
The use of salience as a criterion is arguable. While results 
such as those mentioned above could be said to support self-serving 
bias, they could also be explained in terms of an information-processing 
model. Those who support a non-motivational approach could argue that 
the self is more salient because more information is available to the 
player about the self than about others. Therefore, it could be 
considered logical to remember events regarding the self more rapidly 
and easily (see Jones and Nisbett, 1972).
The problem presented here could also be applied to past work in 
areas other than salience. Take Iso-Ahola's (1977) work as an example.
He compared attributions of self to team and found that player's 
judgements of their own ability and effort were not affected when team 
outcome was negative, but the judgement's of the team*s effort and 
ability were reduced when faced with failure. Again, Little League 
players' ages may influence findings, as with work by Roberts (1978).
But the main point is that players would have more information available 
regarding themselves than regarding the team and would, therefore, have
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more support for a good self-image for the self. When faced with 
failure and a lack, of information regarding the team, a player might 
attribute to poor ability or effort on the part of the team. On the 
other hand, depending on the level of involvement they may have, 
more information regarding team’s ability and effort may therefore 
maintain a positive image of the team even in light of a poor outcome.
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2.3. SUMMARY OF INTRODUCTION AND RELEVANT LITERATURE
1. Attributional areas have been identified in the past as quantity 
and causal CScanlon and Passer, 1980). Quantity attributions 
ask "how much" of each factor exists, and can be asked regarding 
the self (quantity-self) or the team (quantity-team). Causal 
attributions ask whether the factor influences personal performance 
(causal-self) or the outcome (causal-team).
2. The present study proposes an area to be added to those of Scanlon
and Passer, assessing whether the factor is credited or blamed
for personal performance. ’Absolute' questions are those which 
are concerned with a single factor, and ’Relative’ questions are 
concerned with factors which interrelate with others.
3. The present study proposes sub-dividing areas of ’success’ into 
three parts: Personal success, team success, and outcome.
4. The present study proposes a study of ’aspects’ of one’s success
and failure which result in overall success or overall failure -
those aspects which caused the player to do well and those which 
caused the player to do poorly.
5. Past research shows inconsistencies which can be explained as 
being caused by (a) attributional areas being unclear, or 
comparisons made of different areas; (b) subject samples being 
different and conclusions being drawn without regard to these 
factors (such as sex and age); (c) differences in methodology
as some studies are tested between-groups and others within-groups. 
Still others use different criteria such as past-history or salience;
(d) differences in interpretation of comparable results.
6. The majority of studies have supported a motivational approach, 
although a few have supported an information-processing approach. 
Those that supported a motivational approach showed differing 
results - some supported self-serving and team-serving biases, 
while others supported only self-serving bias. Suggestions of 
possible reasons and relationship to the present study are discussed.
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2.4 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The present study examines motivational and non-motivational 
theories based Oh the responses of winners compared to losers. The 
results which one would expect to find if an information-processing 
model were employed are discussed first, followed by the results one 
would expect if a self-serving bias model were employed.
If an information-processing approach were employed, winners and 
losers would be expected to differ in attributional responses. Winners 
would feel that ability, for example, was more important to the outcome 
of the game than would losers. Winners would credit their own ability 
more for personal success than losers, and losers would blame their own 
ability for their poor personal performance more than winners. In 
other words, causal-te am attributions (regarding importance) would 
differ between winners and losers, as would absolute (self) attributions 
(which credit and blame individual factors for personal success and 
failure) if an information-processing model were supported. Attributions 
labelled relative (self) would also show differences between winners 
and losers, as winners would credit their own and their teammates 
ability relative to opponent's ability and the difficulty of the task 
which results from such a comparison.
To summarize an information-processing, or non-motivational 
approach, then, one would expect both winners and losers to process 
information in a purely logical manner, giving themselves credit for 
their own and their team's ability, while losers would be expected to 
see their own and their team’s lack of ability as responsible for poor 
personal performance. This is the only logical inference because to 
say that ability causes one team to win also means that it caused one 
team to lose. If winners win because of relative abilities, then losers 
must lose because of relative abilities. Winning and losing are mutually 
exclusive, and one factor causes one result. If relative ability 
levels caused the outcome, then it caused one team to win and the other 
to lose.
Thus a pattern of attributing winning to superior ability (relative 
to the opponent) must coincide with the pattern of attributing losing to
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inferior ability (relative to the opponent) if a purely information- 
processing model were supported. The present study proposes, conversely, 
that a motivational approach would, show losers not admitting to the 
fact that their ability is not good. It is proposed that they will 
instead believe the opponents are better, but I am not worse. If this 
is supported, a self-serving bias will be supported.
If a self-serving bias exists and a motivational approach employed, 
attributions would not differ between winners and losers. Winners 
would credit their own ability, and losers would do the same, because 
to not credit the self would be egO-threatening. Important findings 
by Scanlon and Passer (1978) clearly demonstrate that among soccer 
players the game was ego-involving (significant increases were found 
in state anxiety after a loss and decreases after a win), and that a 
team loss was 'internalized and personally threatening' to the player's 
self-esteem. This research, plus an evaluation of socially accepted 
characteristics, could help clarify the picture.
To have good ability and to try hard are characteristics which many 
people in our achievement orientated society would undoubtedly like to 
possess. Socially approved, these characteristics might be seen to 
boost the ego and enhance self-esteem. Conversely> to lack ability 
or to not try are characteristics which might be less socially desirable. 
Weiner and Kukla (1970), for example, found shame associated with 
failure and pride with success. Further studies by Weiner (1981) 
found guilt to be associated with failure because of a lack of effort, 
feelings of incompetence related to failure because of lack of ability, 
and feelings of surprise associated with failure because of bad luck. 
These findings support the contention that attributions which are 
negative may prove to be threatening. To label oneself as having 
poor ability or not putting forth effort could be threatening and could 
lower self-esteem if the task is an important one. It would be 
understandable, then, that one would be hesitant to accept such labels.
It might be found that participants, like those in the present study 
who choose to participate in sport, might like to feel that they have 
good ability, have put in the effort, and have good luck.
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Thus, a self-serving bias approach would find winners processing 
information in a purely logical or in a seIf-enhancing manner, but 
losers would be illogical, employing ego-protective techniques and 
biases if they felt a threat to their self-esteem was posed. While 
winners processed information logically, losers would feel threatened 
if they admitted that they had done poorly because of poor ability.
Obviously luck is slightly different from ability and effort in 
that it has often been labelled 'external* while ability and effort 
have been labelled 'internal*. For the purposes of this study, luck 
has been examined, as have ability and effort,as a self-attribution 
rather than an 'external* factor. The 'absolute vs. relative* 
distinction helps to clarify the reasons for this. Rather than 
examining 'internal' and 'external' factors, the present study
examines 'absolute' and 'relative* factors. One's own ability, 
one's own effort, and one's own luck are 'absolute* factors, while 
'relative* factors are those which examine these as they relate to 
other people. The 'relative* factor of luck would include one's 
own luck, one's teammates' luck, and one's opponent's luck, as well 
as the difficulty or ease of the game which is a result of these luck 
factors. A factor matrix investigation will be carried out to see 
whether these factors do, in fact, create a scale which can collectively 
be examined as one 'relative* luck factor. It is on this assumption 
that the present hypotheses are created. It may be found, as expected,
that luck is threatening in 'relative* terms but not 'absolute*. The
present line of reasoning is testing the idea that threat and resulting 
bias come from threats to the ego.
To blame bad luck for poor performance would have little influence 
on the self-image of the participant. A person would probably not 
feel responsible for luck, and therefore bad luck would not have a 
bearing on the person's self-image. This is in contrast to self­
attributions. When failure is attributed to one's own ability, for 
example, responsibility is attached and the image of the person may 
be altered. How others see the person as well as the person's self- 
image might be affected by the belief that one's ability is not up 
to standards (either to one's own standards, or to the standards of 
opponents). If one's self-image is 'threatened* bjr attributions to
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negative aspects of the self, then perhaps these attributions will not 
be made. Perhaps, other attributions will be made which shed a more 
positive light on the self-image. Rather than being self-critical, 
perhaps the person will be more self-serving by making self-serving 
attributions, the person can protect the self from any threat which 
might exist to the self-image.
By making positive self-attributions in situations which would 
seem to warrant negative self-attributions, evidence would be found 
for a self-serving bias. While crediting luck would not be self­
enhancing, crediting one’s own ability could be. Similarly, blaming 
bad luck would not threaten the self image, but blaming one’s own 
poor ability might.
It is expected,then, that when ’enough’ threat occurs, bias exists. 
When there is no threat to the self-image, no bias exists. The question 
of what the cut-off point is remains. Perhaps the answer is 
dependent on various factors, including personality. Perhaps those with 
a positive self-image would be less threatened than those with a negative 
self-image. These aspects of threat will be addressed in the next two 
chapters.
As attributions to luck would pose less of a threat if blamed for 
failure than ability or effort, less bias might be expected in both 
absolute and relative terms. To have done poorly because of bad luck 
would be more socially approved than lack of ability or effort and little 
threat would be involved in admitting that one had done poorly because 
of bad luck during a game. Similarly, good luck would probably not 
boost one's self-image. Luck would pose less of a threat, and there­
fore might result in less bias than ability and effort attributions. 
Nonetheless, luck attributions (relative) would pose less of a threat 
than absolute factors, and this is the area of concern in the 
present study.
Task difficulty has been purposely omitted from the discussion 
thus far. Classification of the term ’task difficulty* has posed 
problems in the past in sports research. Most researchers have 
included task difficulty in the category of stable rather than unstable
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(Weiner, 1972, 1974). It has been alternatively proposed by Roberts 
and Pascuzzi (1979) to be an unstable factor in a sport setting. They 
argued that classification as a sport setting may differ from classification 
in an academic setting. As the present study does not dichotomize along 
stable/unstable or internal/external dimensions, this problem may at 
first sight seem irrelevant. However, because of the absolute/relative 
distinction, the area needs to be examined.
Two points need to be emphasized with regard to task difficulty 
in the present study. First, the term 'task difficulty' actually could 
mean one of two things, rather the 'ease of the game' or the 'difficulty 
of the game' . Previous research has asked questions like whether the 
subject agrees with the statement, "The outcome was dependent on task 
difficulty". Some subjects might agree that outcome was dependent on 
the ease of the game, while others might agree that the outcome was 
dependent on the difficulty of the game - clearly two separate responses.
To examine attributions to personal performance, points even more 
clearly to ambiguity of the term 'task difficulty'; To ask whether one's 
personal performance was dependent on 'task difficulty' would clearly 
group those who felt that they had done well because the game was easy, 
those who felt they had done poorly because the game was easy, those 
who felt they had done well because the game was difficult, and those 
that felt they had done poorly because the game was difficult. These 
four are clearly separate questions, and one question would misconstrue 
informational responses. Even to ask whether one agreed that they had 
done well because of task difficulty fails to differentiate those who 
did well because the game was easy and those who did well because the 
game was difficult. In order to make comparisons to past research, 
the present study asks questions regarding 'ease of the game' and 
questions regarding 'difficulty of the game' . By separate analyses 
more information can be gathered and exact meanings understood. Also, 
in order to make comparisons to past research, all possible meanings 
can be examined. Analysis can easily be carried out on various 
combinations of factors. For example, analysis could be quite easily 
carried out to see whether winners credit ease of the game more than 
losers blame difficulty of the game. Using separate categories, 'ease' 
and 'difficulty', allows for greater flexibility as well as greater 
understanding.
The second point to be emphasized regarding task difficulty in 
the present study is how heavily dependent the factor is on other 
components. One could argue that 'ease of the game* was both internal 
and external, as it relates one's own internal factors (ability and 
effort) to those of an external force (an opponent's ability and effort). 
Particularly in competitive team sports, internal/external distinctions 
are difficult to make. The role of teammate's ability and effort may 
also play an important part in the ease or difficulty of the game, as 
may luck. As previously mentioned, the stable/unstable dimension is 
also difficult to clarify. One's own ability and effort may play a 
part as may one's opponent's ability and effort. Rosenbaum's classifi­
cation system discussed in the literature review clearly shows the 
complexity of the stable/unstable internal/external dimensions 
involving ability and effort of self and others.
To summarize, 'task difficulty' is a much more complex term than 
past research maintains. Interactive effects need to be evaluated and 
results employed in order to properly analyse the phenomenon. The present 
study proposes, therefore, an examination of interactive effects 
by a factor matrix examination of attributions. Those components 
which group together to form scales will show what interactions exist 
in the image of 'ease' or 'difficulty of task*. The present study 
proposes that task difficulty is more of a complex analysis of the 
'state of affairs' than one simple, straightforward attributional 
component, and needs to be examined as such. Therefore, only factor 
matrix results are included which treat task difficulty as it 
relates to other factors. The analyses of 'ease of the game* and 
'difficulty of the game' have also been carried out and will be 
included in the appendix for those who have an interest in inter­
preting results in an absolute manner.
Keeping these two important points in mind (the dichotomy of 
task difficulty and its classification problems), analyses of 
attributional responses will be carried out.
Before discussing specific hypotheses, the logic of the argument 
leading up to those hypotheses will be discussed. This approach has 
been used in describing self-serving biases earlier in this Statement
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of the Problem section, and a similar approach will now be used to 
describe the logic behind hypotheses regarding group-serving biases.
The present study expects both self-serving and team-serving 
biases to be found in attributions regarding hockey. In order to 
prove the existence of team-serving bias, then, winners and losers 
should attribute similarly when making attributions to themselves 
and their team. Winning team members for example should attribute 
the outcome to their good ability, effort, and luck. Teams which 
lost would also attribute to their good ability, effort and luck, 
for to do otherwise would be personally threatening.
Certain images exist regarding 'the team'. Like the self-image, 
the team's image is also open to threat. To criticize the team 
is to criticize the players in the team, and therefore any threat 
to the team may be taken as a personal threat by members of that team.
It is proposed that team members will feel threatened by making 
negative team attributions (i.e. attributions to the team's poor 
ability and effortX. Team members will instead make positive team 
attributions regardless of the outcome.
To criticize the team would pose a threat to the team's image 
only if that threat were felt to be under the team's control. If 
the negative attributions were blaming bad luck, for example, rather 
than the team's ability or effort, this may be felt to.be a factor 
for which the team is not responsible. If the team's image were not 
affected as it was beyond their control, no lessening of their image 
would occur if the factor were blamed. For this reason, negative 
luck attributions may pose less of a threat and show less bias than 
ability or effort.
Attributions to opponents may also be factors out of one's own 
control. To be critical of the self or one's team is threatening to 
one's self-image, however to be critical of the opponent is not.
To criticize an opponent would not be hurtful to the self and there­
fore not threatening to the ego. Attributions involving opponents 
(relative attributions) would therefore differ between winners and 
losers regardless of whether a motivational or non-motivational approach 
were employed.
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In order to justify an information-processing model, then, 
winners and losers would differ in all areas of attribution studied - 
that is in causal-team attributions, and in absolute and relative 
attributions. Winners would credit ability, effort, and luck more 
than losers; while losers would blame ability, effort, and luck more 
than winners. Regardless of whether these factors were absolute or 
relative, differences would be found if an information-processing 
(non-motivational) approach was employed.
Thus, the motivational vs. non-motivational dilemma will be at 
the heart of an examination of attributions. Also of concern in 
the present study is how attributions change or do not change over 
time. Expectations are considered in the present study to be important 
in information-processing. Expectations are proposed to exist before 
outcome information is available as input. These expectations are 
proposed to exist pre-game, and will be found not to be dependent 
on outcome information. Two types of expectations will be examined: 
expectations regarding outcome and expectations regarding attributions. 
The former of these is an area previously researched by others, 
while the latter is previously unresearched. In other words, players 
have been asked in the past whether or not they expect to win, but 
have not been asked whether they expect the outcome to be dependent 
on their prospective ability, effort, or luck. All attributional 
questions in past studies have been asked post-game. The important 
point here is that post-game there is different information available 
than at half-time or pre-game in terms of the score. Conditions 
range from 'total uncertainty' pre-game, to 'partial uncertainty' 
at half-time, and 'total certainty' post-game. The present study 
examines attributions under each of these conditions. Pre-game 
expectations are examined which have been neglected in past research, 
and comparisons made to causal attributions at half-time and post­
game (under varying levels of certainty).
The present study proposes that expectations regarding attributions 
exist pre-game. Pre-game, certain factors (for example ability, 
effort, or luck) are believed to be important to outcome. The question 
is then, whether these factors are assessed at half-time and post-game 
to be of equal importance to pre-game. If factors believed to be 
important to the outcome pre-game are the same as those believed to be
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important post-game, than expectations may be influencing causal 
attributions. If, for example, the player believes that a'winner' 
tries harder than a 'loser', then casting themselves into the category 
of a 'winner' may lead to the causal attribution that good effort 
caused success.
Thus, the idea that stereotypes may exist with regard to 'winning' 
and 'losing' is introduced. If responses under conditions of 
uncertainty (pre-game) and under conditions of certainty (post-game) 
are similar, an examination into the possible effects of stereotyping 
on attributions would be called for in a subsequent experiment. The 
present study, therefore, proposes that an image of what is a winner 
exists in the minds of those who will go on to become winners on the 
day and those who will go on to become losers. These 'stereotypes' 
are proposed to exist, and support for their existence will be found 
in similar pre- and post-game responses. Schemata are proposed to 
exist in the minds of players pre-game regarding winning and losing, 
which includes their conception of factors common to all members of 
the 'winning' or the 'losing'class. As the game is played, information 
regarding outcome becomes available and is processed as input, as are 
expectations (in the form of stereotypes or schemata). As information 
becomes available one of two things can happen : either the schema may 
be retained and supported, or a different schema may be substituted 
to account for new or conflicting information. When the game is 
complete, the player receives final information regarding the outcome
and places him/herself in the category of a 'winner' or a 'loser',
making causal attributions accordingly. Thus, attributions are made 
throughout the information-processing process. They exist before, 
during, and after the game.
Work done by Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and Nisbett and Ross (1980)
show that initial beliefs are quite often persistent, even in the face
of conflicting information. Expectations regarding the importance of 
ability, effort, and luck may also be resistant to change, even in 
the face of new information.
One final area to be examined is expectations with regard to 
outcome/success. Expectations as previously noted, will be examined 
in two aspects: with regard to attributions and with regard to outcome/
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success. The latter will now be discussed. Expectations regarding 
outcome as well as personal and team success are proposed to exist 
pre-game, leading to input. Expectations of winning, of personally- 
succeeding, of team success, and of perceived difficulty will be 
examined pre-game, at half-time, and post-game, as will psychological 
variables (motivation and frustration). As the present study involves 
only experienced players, the results are expected to show differences 
in perceived personal and team success between winners and losers, 
but no significant differences between motivation or frustration 
levels. If no motivational differences or frustration differences 
occur, further experiments will examine these areas more closely 
when non-players and players will be tested.
In order to test these proposals, several hypotheses are proposed. 
These hypotheses are presented here, at the end of discussions because 
of the complexity of the number of factors to be examined. In order 
to make the hypotheses easily understood, they are presented according 
to factors. Hypothesis 2.1 includes ability attributions; Hypothesis
2.2 includes effort attributions; and Hypothesis 2.3 includes luck 
attributions.
Looking first at Hypothesis 2.1, six sub-sections are included.
The hypothesis states the following:
Hypothes'is 2,1 (Ab'it'ity)
(a) Attributions to the importance of ability to outcome made by 
winners will not differ from those of losers.
Cb) Attributions to the importance of ability to outcome made by 
winners will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, 
nor will those of losers.
(c) Attributions crediting one's own ability for good personal 
performance will not differ for winners or losers, nor will 
attributions blaming one's own ability for poor performance.
67
(d) Attributions crediting one’s own ability for good personal 
performance made by winners will not change pre-game to half- 
time to post-game, nor will those of losers (also true for blaming 
poor performance).
(e) Attributions crediting factors relative to one’s own ability (i.e. 
opponent’s ability and task difficulty resulting from a comparison of 
one's own ability to opponents) for good personal performance will 
differ for winners and losers, as will attributions blaming relative 
factors for poor personal performance.
(f) Attributions crediting factors relative to one's own ability made 
by winners will not change from half-time to post-game, nor for 
losers (also true for blaming poor performance).
Sections a and b assess causal-team attributions. If MANOVA results 
show no group differences between winners and losers regarding the 
importance of ability to outcome, a self-serving bias would be evidenced 
and a motivational approach supported as Hypothesis 2.1 (a) suggests.
An information-processing approach would result in winner/loser differences 
in causal-team attributions. Causal-team attributions regarding ability 
are also examined for changes over time. Hypothesis 2.1 (b), if accepted, 
would support a 'schema-based' theory of information-processing, as 
proposed. Rejection of Hypothesis 2.1 (b) would show results not 
supporting a schema-based approach with regard to causal-team 
attributions.
Similar proposals are made regarding absolute and relative 
attributions. Hypothesis 2.1 (c) tests absolute attributions of a 
causal type. Expectations of results of these attributions should 
follow a pattern similar to causal-team attributions. That is, 
results are expected to show support for a motivational (self-serving 
bias) approach, as winners and losers are expected to credit their 
own ability for good personal performance in a similar manner.
Hypothesis 2.1 (d) states this, as well as pointing out that attributions 
blaming one's own ability for poor performance will be similar for 
winners and losers. (An information-processing, non-motivational 
approach would be supported if winners differed from losers with regard
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to these absolute attributions). Hypothesis 2.1 (e) if supported 
would support a 'schema-based' theory of information-processing.
Rejection of 2.1 (e) would show results not supporting a schema-based 
approach with regard to absolute attributions.
Different winner/loser results are expected regarding attributions 
because these attributions are now examined in a 'relative' rather than 
'absolute' context. Hypothesis 2.1 (e) will show support for a motivational 
approach if winners and losers do differ. While absolute attributions 
are expected not to show differences between winners and losers, relative 
attributions are expected to show significant differences. The reason 
for such explanations has been explained earlier, and is a result of 
differences in the ability of a player to be objective. While players 
are quite logical regarding the opponent, they are quite illogical with 
regard to the self and the team. Biases creep in to their information- 
processing techniques and resultant attributions show ego-protecting 
and self-protecting tendencies with regard to self and team which do 
not show up in attributions to relative factors, including opponents.
Finally, Hypothesis 2.1 (f) shows similar expectations for relative 
as absolute and causal-team attributions. Factors relative to one's 
ability are expected to remain unchanged from pre-game through to post­
game, supporting a 'schema-based' theory.
To summarize the interpretation of possible results, the following 
is proposed:
Support for a Motivational Support for a Non-Motivational
Approach
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (a) 
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (c) 
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (e)
Approach
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (a) 
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (c) 
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (e)
Support for a Schema-based Support for a Non-Schema-based
Theory
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (b) 
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (d) 
Accept Hypothesis 2.1 (f)
Theory
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (b) 
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (d) 
Reject Hypothesis 2.1 (f)
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The remaining two hypotheses regarding attributions are Hypothesis ,
2.2 and Hypothesis 2.3.^ Both mirror Hypothesis 1, using six sub-divisions. 
The only difference exists in the fact that Hypothesis 2.1 asks questions 
regarding ability, Hypothesis 2.2 asks questions regarding effort, and 
Hypothesis 2.3 asks questions regarding luck. As previously explained, 
all three areas expect the same results to be found, and are presented 
as such. Details of Hypotheses 2.2 and 2.3 can be found in the section 
of this study entitled Hypotheses, and because of the repetitive nature 
of these three hypotheses, they are not included in detail at this time.
To summarize Hypotheses 2.1-2.3., then, the following are expected:
1. A motivational approach will be supported, as winner's and loser's 
causal-team attributions will be the same; their absolute-self 
attributions will be the same ; and their relative-self attributions 
will differ.
2. Attributional expectations regarding outcome (pre-game) will be 
similar to causal attributions at half-time and post-game.
Findings for attributions regarding ability, effort, and luck 
will bear out these results, as will attributions of causal-team, 
absolute and relative-self type. These results will support a 
schema-based approach.
While the three attributional hypotheses 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are 
the major areas of concern in this chapter, two other hypotheses are 
also presented. These include expectation regarding outcome/success 
(Hypothesis 2.4) and the effect of psychological variables on attributional 
responses (Hypothesis 2.5). Before discussing hypotheses which are 
included, however, one hypothesis which was not included will be discussed. 
Sex differences are not included in a hypothesis due to the fact that 
the proportion of male/female respondants heavily favoured the females 
(86 females and 16 males participated). The study was concerned mainly 
with ladies' hockey, and the inclusion of men in the study was made 
in order to see whether they assessed the game and made attributions 
differently from the women. Because of the differences which exist 
between the ladies* game of hockey and the men's game resulting from 
possible sex differences (speed, strength, stamina, etc.), the men's
70
game was virtually eliminated from this study. The only men involved 
were those who participated in mixed hockey matches. This was done in 
order that the female and male perspective could be compared in the same 
context rather than comparing ladies' responses to a ladies' game to 
men's responses to a men's game. Even the presence of men in a mixed
match changes the style of play and makes it different from the ladies'
\
game. Therefore, full ladies' sides were tested and compared to mixed 
sides. As no significant differences were found in ladies' responses 
during mixed matches and ladies' matches, it can be assumed that their 
responses in mixed and ladies' matches are similar, and therefore their 
responses were assessed collectively. In attempting to take into account 
sex differences, then, an unequal number of males and females were tested, 
As the number of males is quite low (N = 16), any conclusions which are 
drawn may be misleading and should be cautiously interpreted. When 
interesting findings were found regarding sex differences, they have 
been included in the sections that follow although no hypothesis is 
included about them here.
The two additional areas which are included as hypotheses will now 
be discussed. Hypothesis 1 examines expectations which players have 
before the game regarding their chances of winning, of personal and 
of team success. It is predicted that pre-game, teams will believe 
that they have ah equal chance of doing well, but as the score becomes 
apparent and outcome information becomes available, they will change 
their expectations depending on the score. Those who are winning at 
half-time will expect to go on to win and to succeed personally, and 
as a team. Those who have won will feel that they personally succeeded 
more than those who lost, and they will feel that their team has 
succeeded more as well. This hypothesis points to the fact that 
expectations exist before outcome information is available. This 
information enters as input as does information regarding outcome.
Thus, expectations and outcome information are processed as input and 
causal attributions are consequently made. The statement of Hypothesis
2.4 reads as follows:
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Eypothes^s 2,4 CExpeotatzons Regarding Outcome/Success and 
Ferce'Cved D'Cfficutty).
Winners and losers will be similar in expectations of winning, of 
personal success, of team success, and of perceived difficulty pre-game, 
but will differ in each by half-time and post-game.
The final hypothesis (2.5) predicts no differences between winners 
and losers at any time (pre-game, at half-tme or post-game) with regard 
to the psychological variables of motivation and frustration. As all 
subjects were skilled performers who had been playing hockey with well 
established clubs in the South of England, they could easily be classified 
as ’experts'. Because of their commitment to the game and experience, 
no differences are expected in terms of motivation or frustration.
They are expected to be quite highly motivated and low in frustration 
regardless of the outcome or stage of the game. Hypothesis 2.5 then is:
Hypothes'is 2,5 CPsychoZogt-caZ Var-iobtes ~ Motz-Vat'Con and FTustratzon)
Winners and losers will be similar in motivation and frustration 
levels pre-game, at half-time, and post-game.
Thus concludes the presentation of hypotheses and statement of the 
problem proposed in Chapter 2. A complete list of hypotheses as well 
as details of the field experiment now follow.
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2.5 HYPOTHESES
Hÿpôthes'Cs. 2,1 (Ab'Ctity),
(a) Attributions to the importance of ability to outcome made by
winners will not differ from those made by losers.
(b) Attributions to the importance of ability to outcome made by
winners will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game,
nor will those of losers.
Cc) Attributions crediting one’s 6wn ability for good personal
performance will not differ for winners and losers, nor will 
attributions blaming one’s own ability for poor performance.
Cd) Attributions crediting one’s own ability for good personal
performance made by winners will not change pre-game to half-time 
to post-game, nor will those of losers. (Also true for blaming 
poor performance).
(e) Attributions crediting factors relative to one’s own ability 
(i.e. opponent’s ability and task difficulty resulting from a 
comparison of one’s own ability to opponents) for good personal 
performance will differ for winners and losers, as will attributions 
blaming relative factors for poor personal performance.
(f) Attributions crediting factors relative to one’s own ability made 
by winners will not change from half-time to post-game, nor will 
they for losers. (Also true for blaming poor performance).
Hypothes'is. 2,2 CEffort).
(a) Attributions to the importance of effort to outcome made by
winners will not differ from those made by losers.
(b) Attributions to the importance of effort to outcome made by
winners will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, nor
will those of losers.
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Ce) Attributions crediting one's own effort for good personal
performance will not differ for winners and losers, nor will attribu­
tions blaming one's own effort for poor personal performance.
Cd) Attributions crediting one's own effort for good personal performance 
made by winners will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, 
nor will those of losers. (Also true for blaming poor personal 
performance).
(e) Attributions crediting factors relative to one's own effort
(i.e. opponent's ability and task difficulty resulting from a 
comparison of one's own effort to opponents) for good personal 
performance will differ for winners and losers, as will attributions 
blaming relative factors for poor personal performance.
Cf)_ Attributions crediting factors relative to one's own effort made 
by winners will not change from half-time to post-game, nor will 
they for losers. (Also true for blaming poor performance).
Hypothesiis 2,3 (Luck)
(a) Attributions to the importance of luck to outcome made by winners 
will not differ from those made by losers.
(b) Attributions to the importance of luck to outcome made by winners 
will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, nor will 
those of losers.
Cc) Attributions crediting one's own luck for good personal performance 
will not differ for winners and losers, nor will attributions 
blaming one's own luck for poor personal performance.
Cd) Attributions crediting one's own luck for good personal performance 
made by winners will not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, 
nor will those of losers. (Also true for blaming poor performance).
(e) Attributions crediting factors relative to one's own luck (i.e. 
opponent's luck and task difficulty resulting from a comparison
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of one's own luck to opponents) for good personal performance 
will differ from winners to losers, as will attributions blaming 
relative factors for poor personal performance.
(f) Attributions crediting factors relative to one's own luck made
by winners will not change from half-time to post-game, nor will 
they for losers. (Also true for blaming poor performance).
Hypothesis 4 (Expeotations Regcœding Outoome/Success and Ferce'Cved 
Difficulty)
Winners and losers will be similar in expectations of winning, 
of personal success, of team success, and of perceived difficulty 
pre-game, but will differ in each by half-time and post—game.
Hypothesis 5 CFsychological Variables -  Motivation and Frustration)
Winners and losers will be similar in motivation and frustration 
levels pre-game, at half-time, and post-game.
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2.S THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF ATTRIBUTION IN SPORT
2 .6 .1  Subjects
102 club hockey players, stratified by sex,representing 12 teams 
participated. 86 female and 16 males were sampled, aged 17 to 46.
Both mixed and ladies matches were examined.
2 .6.2 Apparatus
No special apparatus was needed. The author merely attended matches 
and administered questionnaires to players after receiving permission 
from both captains.
2.6.3 Methods and Procedures
Pre-game, at half-time, and post-game, questionnaires were completed 
assessing attributional responses as well as perceptions regarding the 
game. (See Appendix A).
Pre-game, subjects were 'under conditions of uncertainty'.
'Expectations' regarding factors expected to be important to the outcome 
were assessed. At half-time, subjects were aware of the score, but 
not the final outcome, and were, therefore, under * limited conditions 
of certainty'. At full-time subjects were aware of the outcome,
'under conditions of total certainty'.
While pre-game responses asked what they expected to be important, 
half-time and post-game responses asked not only what had been important, 
but also what was responsible for their doing well or poorly. Attributions 
to ability, effort, task difficulty,and luck were assessed.
Weiner's (1972) categories were used, following open-ended questions 
which were grouped in pilot studies prior to the field experiment. Subjects 
who failed to complete all three sections were not included in analyses.
All questions were answered on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 
strongly disagree to strongly agree (see Appendix A). Statements such as
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"My team will probably win today", "My team will probably succeed today", 
and "I will probably succeed today" assessed expectancies (pre-game) 
and evaluations (at half-time and post-game). Verb tense was changed, 
as the question was repeated at each of the three times during the 
game. For example, "My team succeeded today" was asked at full-time,
"My team has succeeded thus far today" was asked at half-time, and 
"My team will probably succeed today" was asked pre-game.
Motivation levels were assessed by answers to three questions.
"It is important to me to do well today", "It is important to me to 
win today", and "I am interested in playing today's game".
Assessment of the game in terms of its difficulty was found in 
answers to the following: "Today's game will probably be difficult".
As with all questions, this was repeated at half-time, "Today's game
has been difficult thus far", and post-game, "Today's game was difficult",
Frustration levels were assessed by asking for responses to "Today's 
game will probably be frustrating", "Today's game has been frustrating 
thus far", and "Today's game was frustrating".
Attributional responses were examined in four factors. Each factor 
(ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck) was rated in terms of 
importance to outcome (pre-game, at half-time, and post-game). Task 
difficulty was divided into two parts : questions regarding 'easy' 
tasks were separate from questions regarding 'hard' tasks. Factors 
were also examined for their impact on personal success and failure as 
well as their importance to the outcome. In other words, how much each 
was credited or blamed was also assessed.
Attributions to opponents and teammates were assessed in the same 
way that their ability, effort, task difficulty, and luck were examined. 
Winners and losers were identified based on team results (outcome).
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2.7 RESULTS
MANOVA*s were used for statistical analysis of group (winners and 
losers), and group x time (winners and losers over pre-game, half-time, 
and post-game). See Appendix B for full results. When significant 
results were found using MANOVA's, then t-tests examined winner/loser 
differences at a given time. Both paired and group T-tests were used 
and can be found in Appendix C.
Results are reported with ability first, followed by effort, luck, 
task difficulty, opponents, and other factors including motivation and 
frustration. How the subject perceived the task in terms of difficulty, 
their personal success, and their team success were also assessed.
2.7.1 Ahitity
All mean scores can be found in Table 2.1. See MANOVA and T-test 
results in Appendices B and C.
Results: Hypothesis 2,1 Ca)
Manova group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
how important ability was to outcome, winners and losers Were similar 
in their responses F (1,97) = 0.61943, P = 0.433.
Results: Hypothesis 2,1 Cb)
MANOVA group x time results confirm the proposed hypothesis 
F (1,97) = 0.12711, P = 0.881. Attributions to the importance of ability 
to outcome made by winners did not change pre-game to half-time and 
post-game.
Results: Hypothesis 2,1 (c)
MANOVA group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
to credit their own ability for good personal performance, winners snd 
losers were similar in their responses F (1,93) = 1.51036, P = 0.222, 
as they were in blaming F (1,92) = 3.59288, P = 0.061.
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Results: Hypothesis 2,1 Cdl
MANOVA group x time results confirm the proposed hypothesis. 
Attributions crediting one's own ability for good personal performance 
made by winners did not change pre-game to half-time to post-game nor 
did those of losers F (1,93) = 0.00360, P = 0.952. Blaming showed the 
same results F (1,92) = 2.59069, P = 0.111.
Results: Hypothesis 2,1 Cel
In order to assess factors relative to ability, a Varimax rotated 
factor matrix was employed to produce a scale involving attributions 
(see Appendix D). The first scale, called 'Difficulty because of opponents- 
credit' was made up of responses to the following:
"When i did well, personally, it was because..
1 .
2.
3.
4.
5.
my opponents were less skilled 
my opponents put in less effort
the game was easy for me
the game was hard for my opponents
the game was easy for my teammates
Reliability for half-time scores showed an alpha = 0.7914 and 
post-game alpha = 0.69876. A second scale included responses to blame 
questions (alpha = 0.68423 at half-time and 0.78219 full-time). The 
following questions were included in the 'Difficulty because of opponents- 
blame' scale :
'When I did poorly, personally, it was because..
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
my opponents were more skilled 
my opponents put in more effort
the game was hard for me
the game was easy for my opponents
the game was hard for my teammates
The means of these were examined using MANOVAs. Supporting the 
proposed hypothesis, significant group differences were found for the 
'Difficulty because of opponents' scale in both credit and blame conditions
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F (1,98). = 10.65651, P = 0.002. T-test results show that winners more 
often credit factors associated with ability (The difficulty because 
of opponents - credit scale) more than losers at half-time (T = 3.07,
P = 0.003) and full-time CT = 2.54, P = 0.013). Mean scores can be 
found in Table 2.1. As expected, losers more often blamed factors 
associated with, ability (Th_e difficulty because of opponents- blame scale) 
T = 2.55, P =0.013 at half-time and T = 2.73, P = 0.008 at full-time.
To summarize, winners saw the game as easy because the opponent 
was less skilled and put in less effort. Losers, on the other hand, 
blamed the game for being difficult, and blamed their poor performance 
on the fact that their opponents were more skilled and put in more effort. 
Support was, therefore, found for Hypothesis 2.1 Ce). Both credit and 
blame are attributed to the opponent and task difficulty. In both cases 
no threat was involved.
Results: Hypothesis 2.1 (f)
Scores compiled from the scales (Difficulty because of Opponent 
credit and blame) were also examined to see whether responses changed 
from half-time to post-game. As expected, no changes were found.
MANOVA group X time effects were not significant under conditions of 
credit or blame F (1,98) = 0.34890, P = 0.556 for credit and F (1,98) =
0.05472, P = 0.816 for blame.
Table 2.1 - A Comparison of Mean Scores for Attributions to Ability
Causal-Team and Absolute Factors
IMPORTANCE OF ABILITY CGausal-Teara Attributions)
Pre-game Half-time Post-game
L 3.0244 2.8750 2.9024
W 3.1803 3.0656 3.0164
CREDITING ABILITY (Absolute-Self Attributions)
L 3.0250 3.1750
W 3.2586 3.3770
BLAMING ABILITY CAbsolute-Self Attributions)
L 3.2000 3.2750
W 2.7627 3.0000
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
Relative Factors CScores on a scale of relative factors)
CREDITING RELATIVE ABILITY (Relative-Self Attributions)
Half-time Post-game
L 11.0488-^^^ 11.0488
W 1 3 . 2 7 8 7 1 2 . 8 0 3 3
BLAMING RELATIVE ABILITY (Relative-Self Attributions)
L 13.5310-^^ 13.8293
W 11.5410^"'^ 11.6230
* sig. at < .05 level (T-test results show winners and losers
** sig, at K .01 level to be significantly different)
Each group numbers between 40 and 61 subjects.
2 . 7.2 Effort
All mean scores can be found in Table 2.2. All MANOVA and T-test 
results are in Appendices B and C.
Results : Eypothes'Cs 2.2 (a),
MANOVA group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
how important effort was to outcome, winners and losers were similar in 
their responses F (1,96) = 1.42129, P = 0.236.
Results: Hypothesis 2.2. Cb)
MANOVA group x time results confirm the proposed hypothesis.
F (1,97) = 0.02169, P = 0.883. Attributions to the importance of effort 
did not change pre-game to half-time to post-game.
Results: Hypothesis 2.2. Co)
MANOVA group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
to credit their own effort for good personal performance, winners and 
losers were similar in their responses F (1,94) = 0.01112, P = 0.916, as 
they were in blaming F (1,93) = 1.96604, P = 0.164.
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Results: Eypothes'Cs 2.2 Cdl.
Manova group x time results confirm the proposed hypothesis. 
Attributions crediting one’s own effort for good personal performance 
made by winners did not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, 
nor did those of losers F Cl,94) = 0.17692, P = 0.675. Blaming 
showed the same effect F (1,93) = 0.38057, P = 0.539.
Results: Eypothes'Cs 2.2 Ce) and (f)
Factors found to be associated with effort were the same as those 
associated with ability. See Results: Hypothesis 2.1 (e) and Cf) 
for results.
Table 2.2 - A Comparison of Mean Scores for Attributions to Effort
Causal-Team and Absolute Factors
IMPORTANCE OF EFFORT (Causal-Team Attributions)
Pre-game Half-time 
L 3.4878 3.1026 
W 3.6721 3.3443
Post-game
3.2683
3.4426
CREDITING EFFORT (Absolute-Self Attributions)
L 3.6500 
Vr . 3.7119
3.6750
3.6557
BLAMING EFFORT (Absolute-Self Attributions)
L 3.1250 
W 2.8000
3.0250
2.8305
Relative Factors (Scores on a scale of relative)
CREDITING RELATIVE EFFORT (Relative-Self Attributions)
L 11.0488\^ 11.0488x^**
W 13.2787^^ 12.8033^
BLAMING RELATIVE EFFORT (Relative-Self Attributions)
L 13.5610x* 13.8293^>**
W 11.5410-^ 11.6230
* sigr. at < .05 level (T-tests show winners and losers
** sig. at < .01 level to he significantly different)
Each group numbers between 40 and 61 subjects.
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2.7.3 Lucie
All mean scores can be found in Table 2.3. All MANOVA and 
T-^ test results are in Appendices B and C.
Results: Rypothes'is 2,3 CaJ
MANOVA results confirm th.e proposed hypothesis. When asked how 
important luck was to outcome, winners and losers were similar in 
their responses F (1,97) = 0.71371, P = 0.400.
Results: Rypothes'is 2,3 Cb)
MANOVA group x time results reject the proposed hypothesis 
F (1,97) = 3.14607, P = 0.045. Subsequent paired comparisons however, 
show.no significant differences pre-game, at half-time, or post-game 
(T = -0.55, P - 0.585; T = 0.98, P = 0.332; and T = 1.75, P = 0.083 
respectively). Mean scores can be found in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3 
below.
Figure 2.3 - Mean Scores for Attributions to the Importance of Luck
3.0
2.8
2.6 —o-o-
4
2.2
2.0
Pre-game Half-time Full-time
• winners 
o losers
Results: Hypothesis 2, 3 Cc)
MANOVA group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
to credit their own luck for good personal performance, winners and losers 
were similar in their responses F (1,94) = 0.53379, P = 0.467, as they 
were for blaming (1,91) = 1.25136, P = 0.266.
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Results: Eypothes'Cs 2,3 Cc)
MANOVA group results confirm the proposed hypothesis. When asked 
to credit their own luck for good personal performance, winners and losers 
were similar in their responses F (1,94) = 0.53379, P = 0.467, as they 
were for blaming (1,91) = 1.25136,P = 0.266.
Results: Rypothes'is 2,3 Cdl
Attributions crediting one's own luck for good personal performance 
made by winners did not change pre-game to half-time to post-game, nor 
did those of losers. F (1,94) = 1.7380, P = 0.192. Blaming showed 
the same results F = (1,91) = 0.82938, P = 0.365.
Results: Rypothes'is 2,3 (e)
In order to assess factors relative to luck, a Varimax rotated 
factor matrix was employed to produce a scale involving attributions 
(see Appendix D for matrices). The first scale, called 'Difficulty 
because of luck - credit' was made up of responses to the following:
"When I did well, personally, it was because...."
1. ... of my good luck
2. ... of my teammates' good luck
3. ... of my opponents' bad lUck
4. ... the game was difficult for my opponents.
Reliability at half-time was 0.61564 and full-time 0.74891. A 
second scale included responses to blame questions (alpha = 0.65017 
at half-time and 0.78106 at full-time). The following questions were 
included in 'Difficulty because of luck - blame':
"When I did well, personally, it was because...."
1. ... of my bad luck
2. ... of my teammates' bad luck
3. ... of my opponents' good luck
4. ... the game was easy for my opponents.
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The scores from the 'Difficulty because of luck scales' were next 
examined using MANOVAs. The results only partially supported the proposed 
hypothesis, as winners and losers credited factors associated with luck 
in similar ways F (1,98) = 2.11283, P = 0.149, but blamed these factors 
differently F (1,98) = 4.20561, P = 0.043. As expected, losers were 
more likely to blame factors associated with luck than winners (T = 2.02,
P = 0.047). See Table 2.3 for means. T-test results failed to reach 
significance for crediting luck (T = 1.86, P = 0.066).
To summarize, losers blamed luck factors more than winners but 
the two groups credited luck in a similar manner.
Results: Eypothes'Cs 2,2 (f)
Scores compiled from the scales (Difficulty because of luck - credit 
and blame) were examined for changes over time. As expected, no changes 
were found, as group x time effects were not significant under credit 
or blame conditions. F (1,98) = 1.9947, P = 0.161 and F (1,98) = 0.65086, 
P = 0.422 respectively.
Table 2.3 A Comparison of Mean Scores for Attributions to Luck
Causal-Team and Absolute Factors
IMPORTANCE OF LUCK (Causal-Team Attributions)
Pre-game Half-time 
L 2.5122 2.5500 
W 2.6393 2.3279
Post-game
2.6585
2.2951
CREDITING LUCK (Absolute-Self Attributions)
L 2.7500 
W 2.7458
2.9000 
2.5902
BLAMING LUCK (Absolute-Self Attributions)
L 2.6316 
W 2.5254
2.7500
2.4828
Table 2.3 (Continued)
Relative Factors CScores on a scale of relative factors)
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CREDITING RELATIVE LUCK (Relative-Self Attributoons)
L
W
Half-time
9.5854
9.1967
Post-game 
10.1951 
9.0000
BLAMING RELATIVE LUCK (Relative-Self Attributions)
9.9024
9.1311
10.1220
8.8033> *
* s±g. at K.05 level (T-tests show winners and losers to be
significantly different)
Each, group numbers between 40 and 61 subjects.
2 .7.4 Outoome/Success and PerQeived Dzff'Ccutty
Results: Hypotheszs 2.4
T-test results confirm 9 of the 10 situations tested, as winners 
and losers differ at half-time and post-game in outcome, personal success, 
team success, and perceived difficulty. Post-game findings again 
confirm the proposed hypothesis as winners and losers are significantly 
different in all areas (see Table 2.4). Finally, as expected, pre-game 
winners and losers were similar in expectations regarding outcome, success 
(personal and teamX as well as perceived difficulty. The only unexpected 
finding is a significant difference pre-game between winners and losers 
(see T-test results in Appendix C). Those who eventually go on to win 
expect to win more often than those who go on to lose.
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Table 2.4 - A Comparison of Mean Scores for Expectations and Assessments
of Outcome, Personal Success. Team Success, and Perceived
Difficulty
Pre-game Half-time Post^game
WINNING (OUTCOME)
My team will probably win today
L 3.2195^^**
w 3 .7377/
2.9268^>**
4.2295^ -
TEAM SUCCESS
My team will probably succeed today
L 3.7561 
W 3.8689
3'3415.>**
4.2131^
2.7805->**
4.3770^
PERSONAL SUCCESS
I personally will probably succeed today
L 3.5854 
W 3.433
3.0732^** 
3.6557 ■
2.9024^*,
3.7541"^
PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY
Today's game will probably be difficult
L 3.7317 
W 3.4918
3.0976^>*
2.5738^
3.3250K^^*
2.6885^
* sig. at <C.05 level (T-test results show winners and losers 
** sig. at <C .01 level to be significantly different}
Each group numbers between 40 and 61 subjects.
2 .7 .5  Motivational Factors
Results: Hypothesis 2,5
T-test results show, for the main part, support for the proposed 
hypothesis. As expected, no differences were found in motivation between 
winners and losers at any of the three points of the game (see Table 2.5) 
Also, in two of the three tests of frustration no differences were found 
(pre—game and post-game). Only at half-time were losers more frustrated 
(T = 2.22, P = 0.029).
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Table 2.5 - A Comparison of Mean Scores for Psychological Variables 
(Motivation and Frustration)
It is important to me to do well today.
It is important to me to win today.
I am interested in playing today's game.
(Motivation is a combination of scores from the three questions above. 
See the Appendix for Pearson Correlations between these three).
MOTIVATION
Pre-game Half-time Post-game
L 12.1463 11.2927 10.7073
W
FRUSTRATION
11.7705 11.4918 11.3934
Today's game will probably be frustrating
L 2.8780 3.2683>^
2.7213/
3.4146
W 2.9836 3.0164
* sig. at K. .05 level (T-test results show winners significantly
different from losers)
Results: Sex Differences
All MANOVAs were carried out using group x sex interactions. These 
results can be found in Appendix B. Results show that causal-team 
attributions are not significantly different for males and females, 
nor are any absolute-self attributions.
However^ significant group x sex effects were found in relative 
attributions. When 'Difficulty because of opponents - credit' was 
examined, sex factors seemed to play a part F (1,98) = 5.13403, P = 0.026. 
When 'Difficulty because of opponents - blame' was examined, these differences 
were not found F (1,98) = 0.07455, P = 0.785. \7hen 'Difficulty because 
of luck credit' was examined, sex was not a significant factor 
F (1,98) = 0.00109, P = 0.974, while for 'Difficulty because of luck - 
blame’, it was F (1,98) = 4.13603, P = 0.045. T-tests help to clarify 
these results.
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Female winners differ from female losers in crediting relative 
attributions to opponents, for example (T = -3.48, P = 0.001). Female 
winners'mean score was 13.4074 while losers'was 10.6250. Similar 
results were found as female losers (mean = 13.9688) blamed difficulty 
because of opponents more than female winners (mean = 12.0000) T = 2.21, 
P = 0.031. Male winners credited in a similar manner to losers, and 
blamed in a similar manner. T = 1.04, P = 0.325 and T = 1.62, P = 0.143.
With regard to 'Difficulty because of luck. - blame', male losers 
(mean 5. 0  0 0 0 )  b l a me d  f a c t o r s  a s s o c i a t e d  wi th l u c k  m o r e  t h a n  m a l e  wi nn e r s  
(mean 11.0000 and T = 3.90, P = 0.004), while female winners and losers
blamed factors associated with luck similarly (T = 0.800, P = 0.428). .
Female mean scores were winners 9.2963 and losers 9.8750.
Results: ^Difficulty* and 'Ease' of the Game
In order to show the reasons why task difficulty is not used as a
factor itself, results of analyses are included here regarding these 
areas of research. Questions were asked regarding the importance of 
'ease of the game' to outcome, and MANOVA results show, as expected, 
no differences between winners and losers F (1,95) = 2.02106, P = 0.158. 
However, if the question is repeated asking for the importance of the 
'difficulty of the game', significant differences are found F (1,97) = 
4.00464, P = 0.047. Group x time MANOVA results are as expected 
in both cases and are therefore not included here. Another point is that 
when asked to credit 'ease of the game' for good personal performance, 
winners more often agreed F (1,94) = 5.55386, P = 0.021, and winners also 
blamed poor personal performance on 'ease of the game' F (1,94) = 6.85659,
P = 0.010. However if 'ease of the game' is replaced by 'difficulty of
'V
the game' no significant differences are found for either credit of blame. 
(See results of manovas and T-tests in Appendices B and C). Finally, when 
asked to credit or blame 'ease of the game', the same answers appear 
pre-game as at half-time and post-game. Responses do not vary over 
time for either credit or blame in either 'ease' or 'difficulty' conditions.
From these results, it is clear that results regarding 'ease' of the 
game and those regarding * difficulty'of the game are in conflict, supporting 
the contention that task difficulty should not be included in attributional 
studies as a factor in and of itself.
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2.8 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
Hypothesis 1. Winners, and losers made similar attributions to:
2.1 a - their own ability (as important to the outcome)
2.2 a - their own effort (as important to the outcome)
2.3 a - - their own luck (as important to the outcome)
2.1 c - their own ability (as credited for good personal performance)
2.2 c - their own effort (as credited for good personal performance)
2.3 c - their own luck (as credited for good personal performance)
2.1 c - their own ability (as blamed for poor personal performance)
2.2 c — their own effort (as blamed for poor personal performance)
2.3 c - their own luck (as blamed for poor personal performance)
2.3 e - Factors such as task difficulty caused by luck
(as blamed for poor personal performance)
Hypothesis 2. Winners and losers made different attributions to:
2.1 e - factors such as task difficulty caused by the opponents'
ability and effort (Winners more often credited these for 
good personal performance and losers more often blamed 
them for poor personal performance)
2.2 e - factors such as task difficulty caused by luck
(Losers more often blamed these factors for poor personal 
performance)
Hypothesis 3. Attributions made pre--game remained unchanged throughout
the game with regard to :
2.1 b - their own ability (as important to outcome)
2.2 b - their own effort (as important to outcome)
2.1 d - their own ability (as credited for good personal performance)
2.2 d - their own effort (as credited for good personal performance)
2.3 d - their own luck (as credited for good personal performance)
2.1 f - their own ability (as blamed for poor personal performance)
2.2 f ■ - their own effort (as blamed for poor personal performance)
2.3 f - their own luck (as blamed for poor personal performance)
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Hypothesis 4. Attributions made pre-game changed throughout the game with
regard to:
2.3 b - their own luck (as important to outcome).. (Although
winners and losers saw luck as equally important pre-game, 
at half-time, and full-time; luck became less important 
to winners as the game progressed while remaining virtually 
unchanged for losers).
2.4 5. Expectations of personal success, team success, and perceived
difficulty were similar pre-game, but by half-time and 
full-time winners expected both personal and team success 
as well as an easier task than losers. On the other hand, 
winners expected to win more often pre-game ^ d  also at 
half-time and post-game.
2.5 6. No significant differences were found regarding motivation
or frustration between winners and losers.
See Figure 2,4 for a summary of results of the field 
experiment.
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2.9 DISCUSSION
Genevat Dïscuss'ùon
The purpose of the present chapter is to present the field exper­
iment and examine results in light of past research, particularly with 
respect to motivational vs non-motivational explanations regarding 
attributional responses.
The majority of past research has supported a motivational 
approach as does the present study. Results of the field experiment 
support a self-serving and team-serving bias, thus supporting a 
motivational theory of information-processing and failing to support 
a non-motivational information-processing theory.
The manner in which these conclusions were made is different from 
approaches in the past. Rather than examining the winner's responses 
and classifying these as success attributions and then examining loser's 
responses and classifying these as failure attributions, the present 
study examines player's attributions when they do well vs when they do 
poorly. Then winners' responses were compared to losers'. The main 
reason for this approach is to examine crucial areas missed - such as 
what a winner feels is to blame for those aspects of his/her performance 
which were poor ; or what a loser credits for those aspects of his/her 
performance which were good. To look at only the crediting of winners 
and the blaming of losers does not concentrate on areas of attribution 
which could be crucial to excellence in performance.
In line with results of researchers utilizing other methods, 
the present study found support for a motivational approach. Using 
terms originating from work by Scanlon and Passer (1980) the present 
study examined causal-team attributions. Like Nicholls (1975),
McAuley and Gross (1980) and Scanlon and Passer (1980), findings here 
support a'motivational approach'. These past studies all found winners 
more internal than losers, supporting a motivational approach. The 
present study also supported a motivational approach, by examining 
what winners credit for those aspects of their performance which is 
good and comparing these to losers. Because winners and losers were 
similiar, not only in what they credited but also what they blamed.
94
two conclusions can be reached. First, a motivational approach is 
supported because there was a winner/loser distinction with regard 
to relative factors (such as opponents) but not with regard to 
absolute factors (self and teammates). Because the losers did not 
blame their own ability, effort or luck more than winners, but they 
did blame their opponent’s ability and effort,one would be justified 
in saying that a bias exists which protects the self and team. To say 
that the opponent's better but my team's not worse is hardly a logical 
explanation. The present study proposes the idea that threat is the 
factor which leads to bias. The question then remains to be answered 
regarding what causes threat to the self which results in bias.
An examination was carried out in an attempt to examine bias - 
to establish when it did and when it did not exist. When answers 
to the question of 'when' they occur are. answered, then the question 
of 'why' they occur can be addressed.
Resulting examinations showed that for the most part winners and 
losers are alike in their attributions. For example, winners and losers 
think alike about what causes good performance and what causes bad 
performances. They think alike about what is important to winning 
and what is important to losing. What they don't think alike about 
is the opponent. The reason that they think alike is propos ed to 
be because of a schema which exists pre-game in the form of an image 
of winning - a full scenario about what'winning'and 'losing' is all 
about. These preconceived ideas are persistent during the game and 
are quite often the same for winners and losers. To further test 
this idea a second experiment will be undertaken which will examine 
schema and stereotypes regarding winners and losers. This experiment 
will compromise Chapter 3 and shed more light on this subject.
The image of themselves and their teammates is that of doing no 
wrong and of having neither particularly good or bad luck. The 
factor which they see differently is their opponents. Losers might 
feel threatened by a criticism of themselves or their team, but 
a criticism of opponents is less threatening. Subjects were able to 
be logical in their attributions regarding the opponent's ability 
and effort. Losers were able to attribute their poor performance
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to the difficulty of the task caused by the opponent ' s good ability and 
effort- and likewise, winners were able to attribute their good 
performance to the ease of the task caused by their opponent's poor 
ability. It would appear, then, that the opponents are considered 
better but the teammates nor the self are considered worse. Even luck 
is not blamed, but instead opponents are seen as the cause of good on 
bad performance.
The answer to when biases occur then is whenever attributions 
are to the self or to the teammates, but not to opponents. All 
absolute factors and factors of a relative nature relating to crediting 
luck showed biases. No bias was found when 'blaming luck' was examined. 
Losers more often blamed bad luck than winners.
Attributions to luck have been examined in the past, but in terms 
of internality/externality. It has been labelled an external factor, 
and results usually have showed losers blaming and winners crediting 
luck factors. The present study examines luck instead, in absolute/ 
relative terms. The examination of luck attributions is carried out 
in the same manner as attributions for effort on ability. In terms 
of its reported importance, luck was seen similarly by winners and 
losers, although as time progressed there was an interaction of group x 
time which showed significant differences. This result was unexpected, 
as the schema-based approach predicted all factors including luck 
would be stable over time. The explanation for the unexpected luck 
findings was not to be found in sex factors nor in the degree of 
reliability which is less at half-time than full time. (Males' and 
females' responses were the same, and half-time and full-time results 
showed losers blaming luck more). The explanation for the two unexpected 
findings is credited to the fact that luck, although seen as similarly 
important by winners and losers, is relatively unimportant to both groups. 
When asked to rate their opponents, their team, themselves, and luck 
in terms of importance to outcome, luck was rated last by both winners 
and losers. Winners felt their team was the most important and losers, 
felt their opponents were the most important cause of outcome.
Also, in terms of threat, to attribute blame to either luck or 
opponents is likely to be less threatening than to attribute blame to 
one's own ability or effort or to one's team. Crediting luck would not
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enhance the image of self, so winners would not necessarily credit 
factors associated with luck more. One final, interesting fact 
reinforces the importance in examining absolute/relative factors.
This fact is that the absolute factor of luck was blamed in a 
similar way by losers and winners, while the relative factor was 
blamed more by losers. The importances of this finding is that 
results show that the threat to self-image comes in comparisons with 
others and not in the externality of the factor alone.
To summarize then, as expected, winner's and loser's attributions 
are similar and stable over time, the exception being attributions 
regarding opponents, and to a certain extent to luck which varies over 
time. Similarity is seen as a result of motivational bias, while 
stability is seen as a result of a schema-based approach.
CHAPTER 3
REVIEW OF LITERATURE: PERCEPTION OF THE SELF
AND OTHERS
(PERSONALITY, STEREOTYPES, AND SCHEMATA)
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3. REVIEW OF LITERATURE; PERCEPTION OF THE SELF AND OTHERS 
(Personality, Stereotypes, and Schemata)
Earlier chapters have examined attribution theory and supported 
a motivational approach (biases of a self-serving type were evidenced 
in attributional responses). Biased responses were found to be most 
common in situations where outcome information was negative and negative- 
self attributions were expected. Because of the threatening nature of 
negative-self attributions, subjects chose instead to make positive- 
self attributions.
The present chapter further examines self-serving bias. In order 
to fully understand why attributions are self-serving, further examination 
is needed of the self. The nature of the self and the effects of threat 
on the self will be addressed in an attempt to explain motivational biases 
An understanding of the self is necessary in order to see how the self 
is threatened. This understanding is the aim of the present chapter.
3.1 THE SELF AND THE SELF-CONCEPT
The present study proposes that causal attributions are influenced 
by threat to self-esteem. In order to understand the part that threat 
plays in motivational bias, the concept of the self must be delineated.
Breakwell's (in press) model conceptualizes the structure and process 
of identity in an attempt to clarify the distinction between identity 
and self-concept. Her model is presented as follows (p. 5):
Process - Self 
Person Conception (Identities)
Structure - Self-Concept
Efficacy
Evaluation
Worth (Esteem)
Gecas* (1982) definition of self as "...the process of reflexivity 
which emanates from the dialectic between the *1* and the 'Me' (p. 3)", 
is used by Breakwell in her model when she dichotomizes process and 
structure. The self-concept is then seen as the 'product'of this process.
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A further dichotomy then emerges between conception and evaluation.
This distinction between conception (identities) and evaluation 
(self-efficacy and self-worth) are of prime importance in an under­
standing of motivational bias in causal attributions.
Breakwell (p. 4) describes self-conception as being, "...concerned 
with the meaning of the characteristics associated with the individual.
It is a compilation of the individual’s experiences; a product of 
social interaction and social position". Self-conception, then consists 
of various identities.
The ’evaluation’ is seen as the, "...subjective value placed upon 
the self-conception (p. 5)". This distinction (conception vs. evaluation) 
form the second of three dichotomies, with the third dichotomy distin­
guishing between two types of evaluation - one based on self-efficacy 
and the other on self-worth. Self efficacy is seen to be based on 
performance, while self-worth (or self-esteem) is based on social 
approval from others.
The present study proposes that such evaluation is the key to 
attributional biases in sport. The identity of sportsmen/women must 
be examined along with the evaluative dimensions, as these act as 
a catalyst for attributional bias. If feelings of self-efficacy 
and self-worth are threatened, causal attributions will reflect this 
threat in the form of self-serving bias.
Identity can be associated with membership in a group; so a team 
sports participant’s self-concept may include the image of the self 
as a sportsman/woman. The conception is then established. This 
conception of the self as a sportsman/woman is also open to evaluation. 
While some might argue that being a sports participant is to be valued, 
others might not. This is of particular importance because bias is 
believed to be associated with threat, and threat is believed to 
exist in situations where value is placed on category membership.
It would be far less threatening, for example, for someone to be told 
that they have lost a game because of poor skills if that person 
believed that skills were unimportant than if they believed there was 
value in skill at sport.
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Motivation, then, should be a key factor, and individuals who 
are motivated to do well in sports should evidence more bias than 
non-motivated individuals. If the self is reflected in ’personality', 
then 'personality' should also be tied to motivation. Those who value 
winning will have a 'winning' type personality. For this reason 
personality in sports is tested in an attempt to further examine the 
'self' in self-serving bias.
Two important aspects must therefore be addressed in the present 
study. First, the conception of self-concept relative to sport needs 
to be examined, followed by an examination of the evaluative aspects.
Past research has examined the first but not the second of these 
aspects. Related literature will now be reviewed covering sports 
literature on personality. The evaluation aspect will be assessed 
in the next chapter, as no studies have examined this aspect of self- 
concept in sport.
3.2 STUDIES IN PERSONALITY IN SPORT
Investigations previously carried out in sports (relative to 
the self-concept) include the following: the effect of sports partici­
pation on personality, investigations into what factors of the personality 
relate to superior sports performance, and investigations into the 
personality of those who participate and those who do not participate 
in sports.
The limitations of the literature in sports are apparent, emphasizing 
the need for further research in this area.
Five studies are included which highlight personality. Those felt 
to be most relevant to the present study are included, as a complete 
examination of personality research would be lengthy and extraneous.
The studies of personality most relevant to the present study are 
those which deal with hockey. The first is a study by Tripathi (1980) 
comparing participants and non-participants. Male Indians, aged 16-20, 
were given the Hindu version of the 16 PF. The study compared 30 non­
players to 30 players (10 hockey players, 10 cricketers, and 10 footballers)
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As with most studies which examine personality and sport, differences 
were found between players and non-players. Players were more outgoing, 
emotionally stable, assertive, sober, expedient, shy, though-minded, 
practical, conservative, group-dependent, undisciplined, and relaxed. 
Thus, on 13 of the 16 factors, players and non-players differed, although 
no differences occurred in intelligence, shrewdness, and in how forth­
right they were. Tripathi concluded that differences in personality 
could be used for selection purposes. Although reliable statements 
may be made regarding personality variables, to use these for selective 
purposes is a separate issue not addressed in his study.
He goes on to make comparisons between the three sports : hockey, 
cricket, and football, finding no differences between personalities 
of those involved in these games. However, analyses of these three 
groups need to be made with care, as only 10 players represented each 
group, a number too small for making definitive conclusions.
Three studies examine personality profiles of women hockey players 
of varying levels of ability. Morris (1975) studied female Canadian 
players who were competing for places on the National team. Those who 
were selected were compared to those not selected. In the second study, 
Bobb (1977) compared female club and college players and also examined 
selected vs. not selected players. The third study was carried out by 
Johnson (1972) who compared hockey players to basketball players, 
bowlers, and golfers.
A closer examination of each of these three studies will now be 
carried out. They support findings in other sports which show that, 
generally, personalities are consistent within sports but do vary 
slightly according to level of skill, Morris (1975) examined differences 
between selected and non-selected players and found that the seven 
players selected to the Canadian National team, as compared to the 
13 not selected, were more aggressive, desirous of leadership and 
higher on decision-making. Obviously, the number of subjects is quite 
small, and to draw conclusions regarding the National team based on 
seven subjects could be misleading. She concludes that selected 
players were not easily upset and were 'mentally tough'. Her work 
was based on the Athletic Motivation Inventory (Ogilvie, Lyon, and
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Tutko, 1969) which, sets questions in a sports context. Respondents 
are asked what they would do or how they would feel in a given sport 
situation. The following are then assessed: Drive, Self-Confidence, 
Aggressiveness in sport, Coachability. Determination, Emotional Control, 
Conscience Development (playing within the rules), Trust, Responsibility, 
Leadership, and Mental Toughness (able to profit from criticism).
The criticism of the AMI as a choice of instrument was defended by 
Morris (1975, p. 137) who said, "Since there was no intention in this
study to make comparisons to norms, the lack of AMI norms on suitably
/<•
large populations of female athletes was of no serious consequence".
The obvious solution to this problem would have been to compare AMI 
to 16 PF results as the 16 PF has been tested on large numbers, plus 
it has been used in other studies and could be used for comparison.
The reason given for not making such a comparison was, "limited time 
in the tournament schedule available for collecting data. (Morris,
1975, p. 137)". It appears that Morris, in attempting to cut corners, 
has jeopordized the results of what had the potential to be a good 
research study.
The 16 PF was used, instead, in Bobb's (1977) study,when 177 subjects 
at a summer camp were tested. College players were more reserved and 
trusting, while club players were rated higher on intelligence and were 
more conservative. These findings were explained by Bobb as possible 
natural consequences of maturation, as the club players were slighter 
older than the college players. The second part of Bobb's study 
compared players selected to representative teams (Associations, Sections 
or their National team) with non-selected players. The selected players 
were more tense, while non-selected players were higher in self-control. 
Perhaps, then, the personality profiles are overall quite similar, as 
those who play college hockey may go on to play club hockey after college, 
and may therefore be similar.
One final point which Bobb makes shows the importance of studying 
areas of sport which have been previously unresearched. She says, 
"Although field hockey was the first sport played competitively by 
women in modem times, it has been virtually unnoticed by researchers.
No research could be found which concerned differences in personality 
traits and attitudes of players on college and club teams or differences
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in players who had been selected to representative teams and players 
who had not been selected (1977, p, 6)". Bobb's point regarding the 
need for studies in women's sport is well taken, although she had 
obviously not been aware of work previously carried out by Morris in 1975.
The third study (Johnson, 1972) compared profiles of hockey 
players with other sports. In this study the CPI was used to test 
79 inter-collegiate women. Significant differences were found between 
participants of hockey, basketball, bowling, and golf on 12 of the 18 
variables, with no differences between groups in terms of socialization, 
sense of well-being, good impressions, communality, flexibility, and 
femininity. Bowlers, hockey players and golfers were more alike, but 
basketball players' profiles scored 'consistently lower in most scales' 
of the CPI. Johnson concludes (p. 409), "The general picture for the 
basketball group was one of inhibited, somewhat shy and awkward social 
behaviour, and immature intellectual and social behaviour".
Findings of profiles of male hockey players were compared to 
findings in other sports (Williams and Parkin, 1980). Like Tripathi's 
(1980), Williams and Parkin's subjects were male hockey players. The 
number of subjects was larger than Tripathi's, as 85 subjects participated 
(18 Olympic gold medalists, 33 club players, and 34 provincial players).
An examination of this, the last study regarding hockey, is included 
because of the comparisons made to studies in other sports.
To include here all studies regarding sports and personality would 
be quite cumbersome, and therefore only those related to hockey are 
included. One final study of hockey by Williams and Parkin (1980), a 
study of male hockey players, will be examined next. Their findings 
on the 16 PF show that International player's profiles differ from those 
of average levels of achievement. The personality factors 0 (confident - 
apprehensive), B (intelligence), and H (shy - bold) are compared by 
Williams and Parkin to Kroll and Petersen's (1965) findings where the 
same three factors were discriminators between five college football 
teams. Two of the three were also found by Williams C1975) to discrimi­
nate amongst rowers: B and H. Interestingly enough, (causal - controlled) 
was not a contributor in the study by Williams and Parkin (1980), but 
emerged in the other two studies as a discriminator. Thus, these areas
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of personality need to be further studied in order to establish whether 
personality factors that distinguish successful athletes from unsuccess­
ful athletes are similar for a number of sports. It is also important 
that researchers report where personality profiles differ. For example, 
in Williams* (1975) study, the factors found to discriminate between 
oarsmen in terms of proficiency were E (humble/assertive)., N (forthright/ 
shrewd), H (shy/bold), (group adherence/self sufficiency), F (tough/ 
tendermindedness), B (intelligence), G (expediency/conscientiousness), and 
Qg (causal/controlled). The study by Williams and Parkin (1980) shows 
distinguishing factors among hockey players to be: 0 (confident/apprehensive), 
B (intelligence), L (trusting/suspicious), C (emotionally less stable/emotion­
ally stable), H (shy/bold), F (sober/enthusiastic), and I (tough-tenderminded) 
Upon closer examination, then three factors: B, H, and I are common to 
both groups; however nine factors are not common. Thus, it can be said 
that Olympic hockey players are quite different from club players, and 
that more proficient oarsmen are quite different from less proficient 
oarsmen. Although some discriminating factors are the same for oarsmen 
and hockey players, others are different. It is clear that the within- 
sport and the between-sport characteristics need to be examined separately.
Thus, in the 1970*s, sport psychologists tried to examine both 
within- and between-group differences in personalities in hope of 
predicting who would and who would not be successful in their sport.
Later in the 1970s and into the 1980s, criticisms have abounded regarding 
these studies (Martens, 1975, and Morgan, 1980). Criticisms of these 
early studies are generally on the grounds of problems in methodology, 
selection of the 16 PF as a measure, lack of replication, and premature 
interpretations. A review by Browne and Mahoney (1984) examines these 
issues and summarizes findings in sport personality, as does a less 
recent, but thorough review by Ogilvie (1968).
Most of the research into personality in sport has examined 'traits'.
They have examined personal characteristics of successful individuals, 
seeing what characteristics they have in common with others who are also 
successful. Researchers have also examined traits to see how they relate 
to certain measures of success. Take, for example, numerous studies 
which have examined aggression. Rather than asking athletes to rate 
themselveson a scale according to how much they believed themselves to be
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aggressive, several researchers have used measures which they themselves 
believe show aggression. For example, McCarthy and Kelly (1978) felt 
that penalties in ice hockey were a 'measure of aggression*, and 
examined those players with a high number of penalties to see whether 
they also scored goals. Their findings showed that those rated high 
in aggression scored significantly more goals than players low in 
aggression. The problem with this approach is that they equate breaking 
the rules and getting caught to aggression, neglecting the player who 
may be aggressive but plays within the rules.
Lefebvre and Passer (1974) make similar assumptions while assessing 
aggression. The Belgian National Soccer League was analyzed and 'aggressive 
acts' were designated by 'either a yellow card or penalty'. They predicted 
that losers would display more aggressive acts than winners, that visitors 
would be more aggressive than the home team, and that players in the 1st
division would be more aggressive than in other divisions. The fact
that general support was found for their predictions is again masked 
by their definition of 'aggressive acts*.
This attitude toward aggression seems to prevail, however, across 
various sports. While McCarthy and Kelly examined aggression in ice 
hockey, and Lefebvre and Passer examined soccer, Harrell (1980) examined 
basketball. He also measured aggression in terms of fouls, but his 
results show that field and free-throw shooting percentages were not
related to frequency in fouls.
These studies show how a characteristic can be isolated and examined 
on its own. In these examples, aggression was the characteristic studied. 
Rather than being a self-rating, however, the evaluation was based on a 
measurement determined by the researcher.
The problem with studies of personality is that behaviour varies 
from situation to situation. A high rating on one factor of the 16 PF, 
for example, may not mean that the person behaves in such a manner on 
different occasions. Trait theory assumes that behaviour is consistent 
and does not account for the interaction between the person and other 
variables.
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Social learning theory, in contrast to trait theory, emphasizes 
the importance of other variables such, as the environment or situation. 
The environment is seen to help to shape behaviour through learning, 
as TV viewing of aggression is believed by many to be related to 
aggressive behaviour. So, to understand aggression, or to predict 
which athlete has a better chance of success, one must understand not 
only the characteristics involved, but also the interaction of these 
characteristics with the environment. The environment, through learning, 
affects our personality, which in turn, through our behaviour, affects 
the environment. Social learning theorists believe that people are 
consistent in their behaviour if the situation is the same, so an 
athlete may act aggressively in most ice hockey matches, but may not 
act aggressively toward family and friends off the ice. They might 
argue that, through experience, aggression has been learned. The 
athlete may have learned that to fight on the ice is part of the game, 
even to the point of having different penalties for different aggressive 
acts. The athlete similarly may have learned that fighting with parents 
is not socially acceptable. The question, then, is to what extent 
characteristics which athletes use to describe themselves are consistent 
in different situations, and to what extent motivational traits predict 
behaviour. Trait theorists would argue that traits are very important, 
while social learning theorists would emphasize the interaction of these 
traits with other factors.
The present study is based on the assumption that, in similar 
situations, people behave consistently, and that people interact with 
others and behave in ways based largely on past experience. Each person 
has a self-concept and each behaves in ways consistent with that self- 
concept. If information is in conflict with self-concept, one feels 
threatened, as would an athlete who has a positive self-image and loses. 
When faced with this situation, the person may respond by using biased 
attributional responses, as discussed in the previous chapter. Thus 
the personalities of athletes will be examined in the present study, as 
will those of non-athletes, in order to examine their effect on attribu­
tions .
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Not only will the present chapter examine characteristics 
associated with the self in sport, but it will also examine characteristics 
associated with others. Stereotypes of those who are successful at 
sport may be just as important as self-concepts in sport. Thus, the 
present chapter examines 'stereotypes' - those characteristics associated 
with those who win and of those who lose.
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3.3 STEREOTYPES
Even as far back as 1922, stereotypes were understood and studied 
by people such as Lippmann who said (p. 89),"....modern life is 
hurried and multifarious... There is neither time nor opportunity for 
intimate acquaintance. Instead we notice a trait which marks a well 
known type, and fill in the rest of the picture by means of the stereo­
types we carry about in our heads. He is an agitator. That much we 
notice or are told. Well, an agitator is the sort of person, so 'he' 
is this sort of person...". Thus Lippmann identifies economy of effort 
as one reason why we hold onto our stereotypes. A second reason for 
holding onto stereotypes is (p. 95), "The system of stereotypes may be 
the core of our personal tradition, the defences of our position in 
society. They are an ordered, more or less consistent picture of the 
world, to which our habits, our tastes, our capacities, our comforts 
and our hopes have adjusted themselves. They may not be a complete 
picture of the world, but they are a picture of a possible world to 
which we are adapted. In that world people and things have their 
well-known places, and do certain expected things. We feel at home 
there. We fit in. We are members. We know the way around.... No 
wonder, then, that any disturbance of the stereotypes seems like an 
attack upon the foundations of the universe". Lippmann, then, seems 
to foreshadow Heider's theories, as he does in this statement regarding 
stereotypes; "It is not merely a way of substituting order for the 
great blooming, buzzing confusion of reality. It is not merely a 
short cut. It is all these things and something more. It is the 
guarantee of our self-respect; it is the projection upon the world of 
our own sense of our own value, our own position, and our own rights.
The stereotypes are, therefore, highly charged with the feelings that 
are attached to them. They are the fortress of our tradition, and 
behind its defences we can continue to feel ourselves safe in the 
position we occupy" (p. 96).
In this work. Public Opinion, Lippmann (1922) goes on to describe 
stereotypes as preceeding the use of reason - a form of perception which 
he says 'imposes a certain character' on data before it reaches the 
intelligence. He goes on to say that,"....spoken words, evoke stereo­
types as actual sensations and preconceptions occupy simultaneous
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consciousness".
Lippmann says Cpp• 99-100), "If what we are looking at corresponds 
successfully to what we anticipated, the stereotype is reinforced...
If the experience contradicts the stereotype, one of two things happens.
If the man is no longer plastic, or if some powerful interest makes it 
highly inconvenient to rearrange his stereotype, he pooh-poohs the 
contradiction as an exception that proves the rule, discredits the 
witness, finds a flaw somewhere, and manages to forget it. But if 
he is still curious ^ d  open-minded, the novelty is taken into the picture, 
and allowed to modify it".
Perhaps the most striking of Lippmann's early ideas is a clear 
example of the co-variation principle (p. 154): "The more untrained a 
mind, the more readily it works out a theory that two things which catch 
its attention at the same time are causally connected".
Thus, Walter Lippmann seems to have been a man before his time who 
had many theories which would later be further investigated. The main 
emphasis of his work, here, is with regard to the effect which stereo­
types have on our attention and how our reason is subject to defenses.
As he concludes (p. 154), "....public opinions are still further beset, 
because in a series of events seen mostly through stereotypes, we readily 
accept sequence or parallelism as equivalent to cause and effect.
To relate Lippmann*s ideas to the present study, then, specific 
stereotypes need to be examined, particularly those stereotypes which 
relate to sports.
The reasons for the use of stereotypes are important in understanding 
self-serving bias. Stereotypes allow the individual to draw conclusions 
based on small amounts of information. The problem arises when their 
stereotypes, or schema, are illogical or unfounded. In this case, 
conclusions drawn may also be inaccurate and misleading. It is there­
fore important that stereotypes of sports participants be identified as 
these may affect the evaluative aspects of the self-concept. It is 
important to know the content (perhaps the individual sees themself 
as a successful hockey player) and also the evaluative dimension associated
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with, the content (perhaps th.e individual believes that being a success­
ful hockey player is positively valuedl. In this case both aspects need 
to be considered. If the individual attaches value to being successful 
at hockey, they might feel threatened by information which does not 
support their self-concept (that is, they might feel threatened by 
losing, and in an attempt to protect themselves they may employ biased 
attributions regarding their performance). It is with these ideas in 
mind that stereotypes are examined in sport.
Several studies have been carried out regarding stereotypes of 
athletes. Most have emphasized masculinity/femininity and athlete/non- 
athlete dimensions. Most do this by giving details of a stimulus 
person who is described as male or female, an athlete or non-athlete, 
etc.; and then the stimulus person is rated in terms of characteristics 
such as extraversion/introversion, masculinity/femininity, intelligence/ 
non-intelligence, etc. Findings generally show that differences were 
based on sex and athleticism. Three studies will now be examined which 
show these trends.
Wiese (1978) tested 277 undergraduates made up of four groups; 
male athletes, female athletes, male non-athletes, and female non-athletes 
These undergraduates were asked about their perception of 12 concepts;
’the ideal man', 'the ideal woman', 'the stereotypic male sportsman 
and female', and the 'stereotypic sports participant' described as a 
basketball player, gymnast, swimmer, tennis player, or track athlete.
Each of these concepts was assessed by using twelve pairs of bi-polar 
adjectives rated on a seven-point continuum. Wiese »s results showed 
significant differences in the adjectives used to describe the under­
graduates based on sex and sport. Sex differences occurred in six of 
twelve concepts. Total mean scores for the concepts of the female 
basketball player, the female swimmer, the male swimmer, and the male 
track athlete were significantly different.
Wiese (1978) also found significant athlete/non-athlete differences. 
In terms of 'favourable' characteristics, for example, athletes 
perceived the concept of the male basketball player more favourably 
than did non-athletes. Interaction effects were found when each of 
the four groups (male athlete, female athlete, male non-athlete, and
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female non-athlete) were examined separately. Female athletes, for 
example, perceived a more favourable concept of the female basketball 
player than did any of the other three groups.
McMartin and Klay (1983) asked undergraduates to rate a stimulus 
person who was described to them as either an athlete or non-athlete 
and as either male or female. These undergraduates rated athletes as 
more healthy, extraverted, assertive, competitive, and athletic than 
non-athletes. No differences were found in ratings of intelligence 
between athletes and non-athletes. Their responses were made on 11 
five-point, bi-polar scales. Other adjectives which did not reach 
significance between athlete and non-athletes were inhibition and 
conservativeness. Finally, sex differences were examined, and female 
athletes were compared to female non-athletes, while male athletes were 
compared to male non-athletes. The only significant difference was that 
female athletes were considered to be more healthy compared to non­
athletes than were male athletes when compared to male non-athletes.
They explain their results as follows: "Perhaps this interaction is a 
manifestation of Kelley's distinctiveness criterion in his theory of 
attribution (1967). Until very recently it was more common for a 
man than a woman to be identified as an athlete. To the extent that 
this assumption is still prevalent, then when a woman is identified 
as an athlete this information is more distinctive than it is for a 
man. Subjects may have inferred that such a female athlete must be 
healthy relative to women in general since so few women engage in sports" 
(McMartin and Klay, 1983, p. 689). To state that because so few women 
engage in sports, they must be healthy is still erroneous. They assume 
that participation in sport equals health. Many non-participants in 
sport are healthy; and many participants are not healthy.
The final study to be examined regarding stereotypes of athletes 
is Harris and Hall's (1978) work. Again, undergraduates read descriptions 
of a stimulus person. This time the stimulus person was a college 
applicant who was either male or female, masculine or feminine, and either 
a non-athlete, a team sport athlete, or an individual sport athlete.
Each 'applicant' was rated on 12 nine-point scales: sociable/not sociable, 
aggressive/not agressive, masculine/feminine, extraverted/introverted, 
conservative/liberal, self-confident/not self-confident, intelligent/
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not intelligent, conventional/unconventional, warm/cold, competent/ 
incompetent, hard-working/not hard-working, and should/should not be 
accepted for college. Results showed that the person's masculinity/ 
feminity was more important in how they were perceived than their sex.
Team athletes were assessed as most masculine, followed by individual 
athletes, and non-athletes. In terms of acceptance to college, warm 
and aggressive subjects were chosen more often, as were applicants of 
the opposite sex.
These findings show that clear stereotypes exist regarding athletes, 
and that the masculinity/feminity dimension is a major determiner.
Studies have been limited, however, in the types of areas studied and 
none have touched on stereotypes regarding successful vs. non-successful 
athletes, or, as the present study proposes, the differences between 
winners and losers.
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3.4 SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Stereotypes have been studied in sport only as lists of character­
istics. It is obviously important to define and clarify the stereotypes 
which exist and to examine the characteristics which the individuals who 
are targets of the stereotype believe they possess.
In order to understand stereotypes, one must understand the role 
of stereotypes. As previously stated in Lippmann’s (1922) work, economy 
of effort and as a 'defense* of our positions in society are reasons 
for stereotyping.
Lippmann (1922) introduced the idea relative to social groups, 
and other psychologists have since examined the function of social groups. 
Moscovici's (1981) 'Social Representations' are not merely lists of 
characteristics, for example, but are related to belief systems and 
myths. Also, Doise (1978) points out tliree functions of social represent­
ations. They are used for selective purposes such as the desirability 
of the in-group and the undesirability of the out-group, for 'justifi­
catory' purposes such as stereotypes of 'inferior' groups which help to 
maintain 'social distance' and 'economic subordination', and for 
'anticipatory' purposes which predetermine group interaction.
Hewstone, Jaspars, and Lalljee (1982) discuss these three functions 
in their work, and consider two additional functions. Social representations 
also serve an 'attributional' function which is described by Hewstone, 
Jaspars, and Lalljee as, the manner in which "representations influence 
or determine explanations of social behaviour" (p. 243). Their second 
point is that social representations also serve the function of 'social 
identity'. Pointing out that people define themselves not only in terms 
of themselves and others, but also in terms of their 'category memberships'. 
They conclude that people seek a positive identity. "They achieved this 
by comparing their own group with other groups in such a way that the in­
group is differentiated from the out-group in positively valued dimensions" 
(p. 243).
In terms of the present study, then, stereotypes are expected to exist 
regarding successful and non-successful athletes (winners and losers), and
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these stereotypes serve the functions not merely of listing character­
istics, but also economy of effort and 'defense' of our position in 
the sports world. Social representations would exist and the desirability 
of being a winner or a loser would be assessed. The winners would 
justify their position and maintain social distance and subordination 
from the losers. Each group would be able to anticipate interactions, 
and each would explain their success accordingly. Finally, winning- 
type people and losing-type people would define their success in terms 
of personal characteristics and in relation to others, as well as in 
terms of the 'category' they belong to, maintaining a positive self- 
identity and group-identity throughout.
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3.5 THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF ATTRIBUTION
Several studies in the past have looked at attributions in relation 
to stereotypes. Although none have been carried out in sport linking 
attributions to stereotypes, studies have been carried out in other 
areas (see Tajfel, 1982). Many studies have shown that beliefs and 
values are important in determining behaviour, and many of these 
involve studies on ethnocentrism and attribution. Group members tend 
to favour their own group to others who are members of the out-group, 
resulting in bias in attribution.
Duncan (1976) asked white college students to view videotapes 
of blacks and whites interacting, to rate behaviour when one pushes 
the other, and to attribute the behaviour in terms of the stimulus, 
situation, and person. When the protagonist was black the behaviour 
was classed as 'violent' by 75% of the respondents, but when the 
protagonist was white, only 17% labelled the behaviour as violent. 
Attributions when the protagonist was black were to stable characteristics 
of the person, while attributions when the protagonist was white were to 
external constraints.
In another study of ethnocentrism, Taylor and Jaggi (1974) 
predicted that Hindus would internalize attributions to in-group members 
(other Hindus) for acts which were desirable, and externalize attributions 
which were undesirable. A scenario was presented to adults where they 
were asked to imagine that Hindus or Muslims were behaving in a certain 
way toward them. Then, as expected, they made attributions which 
internalized desirable acts (such as sheltering the subject from the 
rain) and externalized undesirable acts (such as refusing shelter).
These two studies show quite clearly that group identity affects 
attributions. Similar results were found when Hewstone et al (1982) 
compared public and comprehensive school groups. As reported earlier 
in this study, 40 school boys, aged 16, were asked to write an essay 
on the 'similarities' and 'differences' between public and comprehensive 
schoolboys. The two groups agreed on the better 'future prospects' and 
'superior social background' of those from public schools. ('Shared' 
social beliefs were found, as there was general agreement within groups).
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Quite different representations occurred regarding their group and the 
others (between groups).
Results of this study showed that public schoolboys emphasized 
their own positive characteristics (i.e. hard-working, disciplined, 
etc.), while comprehensive schoolboys emphasized the negative character­
istics of the public schoolboys (i.e. their ’snobbish' attitudes and 
'posh' speech). Public schoolboys also acknowledged the more disciplined 
environment at school, and were more able to see negative in-group 
aspects than comprehensive schoolboys. Results were interpreted as 
being the result of a positive self-image on the part of the public 
schoolboys which allows for both a positive and negative evaluation of 
their own group. Hewstone, Jaspars and Lalljee (1982) emphasize the 
social functions, then, of attributions rather than simply seeing 
attributions as a 'purely cognitive phenomena' which is 'divorced from 
social reality'.
Deschamps (1973-74) also discussed the social nature of attributions, 
pointing out that 'social categorization' is the heart of attribution.
He shows that in intergroup relations, individuals associate themselves 
with a group or social category. He calls this ’social attribution', 
arguing that (p. 173), "cette théorie de l'attribution semble s’appliquer 
a un sujet isolé, détaché de tout contexte social, passif vis-à-vis du 
monde qui l'entoure. La dimension sociale de l'attribution n'est pas 
envisagée". What Dechamps goes on to point out is that behaviour must 
be examined in terms of not only characteristics of the individual, but 
also based on the group of the actor and the group of the observer.
Tajfel (1973) emphasized the role of stereotypes in attribution, 
explaining that a 'system of causes' are created which allow us to 
understand our social world, and to protect our self-image. Individuals 
are stereotyped and groups become 'personalized'.
An emphasis of the social aspect of stereotypes and attributions 
is common to the views of these psychologists. One final study will 
now be examined. Stephan (1977) emphasizes the social role of attributions, 
plus takes account of the actor/observer differences in his study. He 
expected that (p. 255), "Out-group stereotypes generally consist of less
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favourable dispositional attributions than in-group stereotypes which 
consist largely of positive dispositional labels". The study tested the 
effects of 'group membership' (in-group vs. out-grpup). and 'type of 
outcome* (positive vs. negative). Fifth and sixth grade students (Blacks, 
Chicanos and Anglos) were asked to rate adjectives as positive or negative 
and to rate his own and the other ethnic groups on each pair of adjectives. 
Both negative and positive questions were asked such as (p. 260), "If a 
. student decided not to wait for a friend, it would probably
be because 1) he is impatient or 2) he had to go home";or "if a __________
student worked hard on a project, it would probably be because 1) he 
is industrious or 2) somebody made him work hard". Subjects answered 
about his own ethnic group first, then about the other two ethnic groups. 
Results showed that observers used dispositional attributions, but the 
degree depended on the type of behaviour evaluated. As negative behaviour 
may have been seen tP be unintentipnal it was attributed tp the situatipn, 
while positive behaviour was attributed to the person. Anglos perceived 
people to be more responsible for behaviour which is positive than the 
others did. Results of the Chicanos gave partial support to his hypothesis, 
while Blacks did not show support of the hypothesis at all.
These results show the importance of group membership in studies 
of attribution, and mirror the results of Taylor ^ d  Jaggi (1974).
Hewstone and Jaspars (1982) sum up the (p. 117) "Locus of Attribution 
^  a function of type of Behaviour and type of actor" as pictured in 
Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Hewstone and Jaspars (1982, p. 117) Interpretation of 
Locus of Attribution
Type of Actor
Types of Behaviour In-group Out-group
Positive Dispositional Situational
Negative Situational Dispositional
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These studies show the importance of the group as well as the 
behaviour in attributions. The attributions are examined and conclusions 
then made about the group and social identity. These studies re-emphasize 
the need for inclusion of the social aspect of attributions.
118
3.6 SCHEMATA
Schema theory was originally a concept developed by Kant and 
supported by Bartlett in his 1932 work. The term 'schema* relates to 
the internal representations of experience. A schema is the 'know­
ledge framework' which gives meaning to what happens in the world.
People form consistent representations by actively selecting and 
organising experiences, and then forming representations of them.
The representations are useful because of the limitations of memory.
Lee (1986) discusses four main processes involved in constructing 
schemata (relative to understanding energy). The processes include: 
selectivity, abstraction,interpretation, and integration. Selectivity 
involves selecting new information (about coal for example) which is 
important and relevant to the existing schema he brings to bear (p. 9). 
Abstraction is the discarded 'surface detail* which gives way to 'meaning*. 
This meaning is then 'construed* in a way consistent with existing schema 
(interpretation). Finally, the meaning is integrated with material 
which at that time is activated (integration). In this way schema are 
modified.
Lee (1986, p. 10) goes on to say, "the term schema is used mainly 
to describe the knowledge component; this frequently exists on its own 
account, but if and when it acquires a complex of associated emotions 
(or at least, good/bad evaluations), together with behavioural dispositions, 
it is labelled 'attitude'." He points out that emotions and behavioural 
dispositions are subject to the four processes (selection, abstraction, 
interpretation, and integration) in much the same way as cognitions.
Thus, one may have an image of coal as warm, black, and slow to burn.
Lee lists these as 'factual attributes' which can be verified. He also 
points out non-verifiable attitudes may also be held (for example, that 
supplies are inexhaustible). The emotions involved may be positive or 
negative and are part of the 'attitude' about the concept.
People's attitudes toward sport are subject to these four processes, 
as are their attitudes toward those who participate in sport or those 
who excel in sport. Internal representations exist about sports partici­
pants, and non-participants, as well as winners and losers. There is an,
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evaluative element involved as well, through.which emotions are involved.
In order to understand the schemata that people have of winners and 
losers, one needs only look at the ways in which they represent winners 
and losers, or how they 'describe* them. Descriptions may be in the
form of 'traits* or 'characteristics' of those who win or lose. A
close examination of explanations for winning and losing may also shed 
some light on the concept of winners and losers. Schema may pre-exist 
which associate certain characteristics with winners/losers, participants/ 
non-participants, etc.
Although no literature has, in the past, examined schemata in sport,
studies have been carried out in other areas.
Schemata regarding groups are often called stereotypes. Stereotypes 
are the result of processing social information in a schematic manner.
We use these stereotypes, or schemata, to fill in information which is 
missing when we process information. As shown earlier, stereotypes 
exist regarding race. They also exist regarding sex.
Sandra Bem (1981) makes use of the term 'Schema* in discussing how 
we lea m  to organize the world based on male/female distinctions. Her 
'gender schema theory’ proposes that some people use a gender schema to 
organize their perceptions more than others. Sex-typed individuals were 
found to differ from non-sex-typed individuals in terms of their masculinity/ 
femininity, and also in how much they used a 'gender schema*. This study 
was based on her earlier Sex-Role Inventory in which people were identified 
as either masculine, feminine, or androgynous (Bem,D1975 and Bem et al, 1976), 
When asked to recall lists of words, such as names where half were male and 
half female, sex-typed individuals grouped words according to gender more 
than non-sex-typed individuals. Thus, the gender schema was employed by 
these individuals. It was concluded that non-sex-typed individuals 
encoded the words using a schema other than gender.
What Bem did was to have subjects list characteristics typical of 
males and females. Then those characteristics most distinctive were used 
in a scale. Individuals then rated themselves on each item of the scale. 
Scores were then compiled which categorized the person as masculine.
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feminine, or androgynous. A similar task will be undertaken in the next 
chapter regarding winners and losers. Subjects will be asked to list 
characteristics generally associated with, winners and losers. Those 
characteristics most distinguishing will be formed into a scale on which 
individuals will rate themselves. Scores will then be compiled which 
categorize the person on a continuum. They will then be assessed for 
attributional responses.
In order to relate stereotypes, schemata, and attributions, an 
examination of Kelley’s (1973) work provides the best picture. In 
order to understand Kelley’s ideas regarding schema, a look back to 
principles described earlier in this study will make the point more clear.
Kelley’s (1973) analysis of variance explanation of attribution 
theory includes a discussion of schemata. The phenomenology of attribution 
validity has been described in the Person x Entity x Time framework. That 
is, a response to a certain stimulus is valid if there is distinctiveness, 
consensus, and consistency. Kelley (p. 112) explains that, "The three 
criteria of validity - distinctiveness, consensus, and consistency - 
suggest a means of indexing an individual’s ’level of information’ regard­
ing any portion of his external world. An attributionally appropriate 
index consists of the between-entity distinctions of which he is capable 
to the within-entity variance among his own responses and those of 
other persons - a ratio analogous to the familiar F ratio in statistics". 
The Person x Entity x Time framework is Kelley’s proposed approach to 
this 'systematic analysis'. This framework is the context within which 
observations are interpreted. However, when time or motivation is 
lacking, Kelley points out that single observations rather than multiple 
observations may be the basis for a causal inference. This observation 
may be present or plausible, and may also be tied to similar events 
which had been observed before. Some 'notions' about causes which 
could be relevant may already exist and may be related to the effect.
If more than one plausible cause exists, according to Kelley, the 
discounting principle may affect how the individual thinks. "The role 
of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other 
plausible causes are also present (p. 113)". The external cause may 
be either "inhibitory" or "facilitative" in nature. Kelley's augmentation
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principle (1971) may apply, and attributions may he made more to the 
actor if sacrifices or risks, etc. were known to exist.
This leads to the concern which.Kelley (1973) had regarding the
distinction between facilitative and inhibitory external causes. There
are certain classes of instances in which ambiguity exists about 
whether a cause is assumed to be either facilitative or perhaps 
inhibitory. Kelley’s example (1973, p. 114) is whether an outrigh.t 
payment to perform an immoral act is assumed to be a facilitative or
\
inhibitory cause. If facilitative, payment would reduce the attribution 
of an immoral act to the actor, while if inhibitory, attributions to 
the actor would be increased.
Thus, the discounting and the augmenting principles would give 
different ways of taking information into account. One would ask whether 
there are ’other’ ways to take all causes into account, while the other 
would want to known what ’all’ of the possible forms might be. These are 
the concerns with which Kelley deals in his 1972 paper. In the paper 
he examines the ’ways a person may take account of causes in relation 
to effects*. He defines the way a person thinks about causes in relation 
to some given effect as a "causal schema".
A causal schema then, is the means of making attributions when 
only limited information is available. Kelley (1972, p. 2) defines 
causal schema as, "...a conception of the manner in which two or more 
causal factors interact in relation to a [givenj effect. A schema is 
derived from experience in observing cause and effect relationships, 
from experiments in which deliberate control has been exercised over 
causal factors, and from implicit, and explicit teachings about the 
causal structure of the world... The mature individual has a repertoire 
of [such] abstract ideas about the operation and interaction of causal 
factors. These conceptions [enable him to make] economical and fast 
attributional analysis, by providing a framework within which bits and 
pieces of relevant information can be fitted in order to draw reason­
ably good causal ’inferences’." Thus Kelley links his analysis of 
variance and schema ideas (1973, p. 115) as he views causal schema as 
"an ’assumed pattern of data’ in a complete analysis of variance frame­
work". Thus, an observation is made and is then interpreted in light
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of this configuration. "Given information about a certain effect and 
two or more possible causes, the individual tends to assimilate it to 
a specific assumed analysis of variance pattern, and from that to make 
a causal attribution (Kelley, 1972, p. 2)".
An example provided by Kelley (1973, p. 114) is how the discounting 
principle implies a ’multiple sufficient cause schema’. His example is 
based on Thibaut and Riecken’s (1955) experiment which demonstrated 
’behavioural compliance’. They found that compliance by a lower status 
person is attributed less often to him than a similar compliance evoked 
in a high status person. Both the lower and high status people are 
asked to comply to a request by a subject. The assumption is that the 
subject believes that there are different plausible causes for compliance. 
Kelley (1973, p. 113) makes assumptions about the ’subject’s’ assumptions. 
The subject is believed by Kelley to see the low-status person as comply­
ing either because of internal or external forces (either he is helpful 
or because of force applied by the subject) or both. However, it seems 
more plausible that the high-status person is complying because of external 
forces only as he is assumed to be ’more powerful’ than the subject. ’He’ 
may attribute his compliance, however, to his internal qualities. Kelley 
ties this to the discounting principle by noting that external reasons 
for the low-status person are plausible and therefore the low-status 
person's internal properties are inferred less than the high-status person.
Thus in this example, the discounting principle applies and implies 
a multiple sufficient cause schema, according to Kelley. He explains that 
the subject assumes that ’either’ external or ’internal’ factors are 
adequate to result in compliance. If the effect and the external cause 
are both absent, an internal attribution is made, without reservation. 
However, when the effect and external cause are both present, uncertainty 
as to whether an internal cause was present exists. Kelley's representation 
(Figure 3.1) shows the certain attributions (solid arrow) and uncertain 
attributions (dotted arrows) which apply.
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Figure 3.1 Kelley's Representation of Causal Schema for Multiple 
Sufficient Causes (1973, p. 113)
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Another example of Kelley's (p. 114) involves Frank, who succeeds 
at a difficult task, compared to Tony, who succeeds at a moderately 
difficult task. Kelley proposes that, "The presence of a cause counter­
indicative of success (the difficult task) provides a basis for a stronger, 
more confident attribution of ability to Frank than to Tony". Therefore, 
Kelley calls this the 'compensatory cause schema'. It is shown in 
Figure 3.2. The effect (success) depends on high ability or low task 
difficulty, and occurs if either is 'maximally favourable' or if both 
are 'moderately so’.
Figure 3.2. Kelley's Causal Schema for Compensatory Causes 
(1972, p. 114) (E = Success)
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Thus, if the task is difficult, the internal cause (ability) is 
inferred, while in moderate difficulty, implications regarding ability 
are ambiguous,
Kelley's work, here, is particularly relevant, not just as a back­
ground for the definition of causal schema, but also in relation to the 
field study presented in Chapter 2 of the present study. In this research, 
ability and task difficulty were found to be dependent on the opponent. 
Ability, therefore, was not considered an 'internal' factor, nor was 
task difficulty considered an 'external' factor. One's own ability, 
the team's ability, and the opponent's ability (a combination of factors 
internal and external to the player) were compared and this resulted in 
a perception of difficulty (also internal and external, comprised of one's 
own difficulty, the team’s difficulty, and the opponent’s difficulty). 
These results show that Kelley may be over-simplifying the relationship 
of task difficulty and ability, at least as it relates to the present 
study. As discussed in Chapter 2, perhaps task difficulty in a sport 
setting is more complex than in a non-sporting context. Although Kelley's 
theories may not coincide exactly with the present data, the important 
point is the idea of the existence of schema, and the attempt to try to 
identify different schemas which may exist.
Other types of schema are described by Kelley such as the ’multiple 
necessary cause schema’, depicted in Figure 3.3. Both causes must exist 
in order for the effect to occur. Figure 3.4 shows Kelley’s pattern of 
attributions to the Entity X, and to Person B.
Figure 3.3. Kelley’s Causal Schema for Multiple Necessary Causes 
(1973, p. 115)
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Figure 3.4 Kelley’s Person-Entity Schema Showing (a) Entity Attributions 
and (b) Person Attributions
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It is with this background in mind that a series of studies are 
undertaken in Chapter 3 which attempt to identify schema regarding 
winning and losing which result in biased attributions, by examining 
stereotypes and their effect bn the attributions.
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3.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3
1. The self (the process), and the self-concept (the product of this 
process) are discussed relative to Breakwell’s (in press) model.
The conception and evaluation of the self-concept are examined 
in sports literature which addresses the conception but not the 
evaluation of the self-concept.
2. The bias evidenced in earlier chapters is proposed to be the 
result of both the identity and the evaluation of the self-concept, 
as personality is believed to be an important variable in producing 
bias, as is the motivation of the individual.
3. Personality studies have been carried out on hockey-playing popula­
tions. Findings show that slight differences occur within the 
hockey population, and at different skill levels that hockey 
profiles are similar to other sportsmen/women but quite different 
from non-sportsmen/women.
4. Certain characteristics, such as aggression, have been related to 
success (in terms of goals scored).
5. Social learning theory, in contrast to trait theory, emphasizes 
the importance of other variables such as the environment or 
situation.
6. Stereotypes have been discussed as early as 1922 by Lippmann who 
described them as 'ideas we carry about in our heads' (p. 89)
7. Stereotypes of athletes have been studied regarding the ideal 
male and female, the stereotypic male and female, and on various 
personality factors.
8. No studies were found which assess stereotypes regarding hockey 
nor regarding winners and losers in sport. Also, no studies were 
found which relate sport's stereotypes, schemata, or personality 
to attributions.
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9. Social representations are not merely lists of characteristics
but 'belief systems and myths' (Moscovici, 1981). They are used 
to select desirable aspects of the in-group, to justify the 
status of inferior groups and to maintain social distance, to 
anticipate group interaction, to influence attributions, and to 
help in the forming of a 'social identity* (Doise, 1978 and Hewstone, 
Jaspars and Lalljee, 1982).
10. Studies which link stereotypes to attribution have centred largely 
around two areas: ethnocentrism and Bem's sex roles. The idea of 
social categorization as a key to attribution was championed by 
Deschamps and examined by others who found that the social aspect 
of attributions has long been overlooked.
11. 'Schemata' regarding groups are often called stereotypes which are 
in fact the result of processing information of a social nature
in a schematic manner. Kelley's (1973) work is based on the belief 
that schema play a major role in attributions, an idea supported 
in Bem's 'gender schema theory' (1981),
CHAPTER 4
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: PERCEPTION OF THE SELF 
AND OTHERS IN SPORT 
(PERSONALITY, STEREOTYPES, AND SCHEMATA) 
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ATTRIBUTIONS
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4.1 AIMS OF CHAPTER 4
1. To assess the Impact of sports personality Cas measured by a sports
. personality inventory) on perceptions and attributions.
2. To examine a self-serving bias (motivational) approach to information-
processing in sport.
■
3. To examine a schema-based approach to information-processing in sport.
4. To develop an information-processing model for sport.
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4.2 INTRODUCTION
The understanding of information-processing in sport is the main 
concern of this chapter and the essence of this study. Chapter 3 
examined related literature regarding self-perception and perception 
of others, and found that characteristics which distinguish individuals 
constitute one's personality and influence how one views the world.
Chapter 3 also examined how certain impressions, in the form of 
stereotypes, exist about groups of people. These stereotypes may, 
or may not, be based on facts. Stereotypes about those who participate in 
sports have been studied by others, but none have identified stereotypes 
of those that 'excel* in sports. The present chapter examines such 
stereotypes in an attempt to clarify information-processing techniques 
in sport. Items believed to be typical of 'winners' and 'losers' in 
sport will be identified and developed into à self-rating scale designed 
to measure 'sports personality*. The influence of sports personality 
will be examined on two fronts: one, in terms of expectations about
the game, and, two, in terms of the types of attribution made. Sports 
personality is expected to be predictive of both expectations/perceptions 
about the game and attributional responses.
It may, therefore, be possible to predict causal attributions based 
on personality in much the same ways that locus of control or achieve­
ment motivation have been used to predict attributions in the past.
With this in mind, a sports personality inventory will be developed 
and assessed in Chapter 4.
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4.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The first aim of the present chapter is to examine the relationship 
between self-perception (sports personality) and expectations about the 
game. Self-perception is examined through the use of a scale devised 
for this purpose which assesses 'sports personality'. The three main 
sections of the present chapter are item identification, item selection, 
and the use of the resulting sports personality inventory in an 
experimental setting.
The development of the scale is based on the assumption that 
stereotypes exist regarding those who generally win or lose at sport.
This assumption has previously been untested and must be proven in 
order to identify items for use in the scale. It is further assumed 
that individuals will be able to rate themselves according to these 
characteristics. These assumptions will be the basis of developing a 
reliable scale, the results of which can then be compared to expectations 
and attributions. It is expected that personality is related to game 
perceptions. One example of this relationship might be that an individual 
whose profile most closely matches a stereotypic 'winner* may also be 
one who is less anxious about playing a game and less threatened by it.
This individual may be more inclined to make attributions typical of
winners - that is, they may attribute more often to opponent's poor 
ability and effort than those whose personality types more closely 
matches the 'losing-type*.
Regarding the relationship of self-perception to expectations about 
the game and attributions, the following two hypotheses are proposed
HypothesirS 1: (Fevsonal'ity and Expeotat'Cons/Percept'Cons)
Individuals with a personality most like a 'winner* will be more 
likely :
(a) to be challenged by the game now and in the future;
(b) to be motivated about the game (i.e. be interested in the game
and feel it's important to win);
Cc) to be confident;
(d) to expect to win;
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Ce) not to feel anxious about the game and about life in general;
Cf) not to feel worried about the game, about what others think of
them, about what others think of their game, about failing to
live up to expectations in the game and in life in general.
Eypothes'Cs 2: CPersonat'Cty and Attvvbutvons)
Sports personality will be responsible for variation in attributional 
responses.
The remaining aims of this chapter are to give further support to 
self-serving biased and schema-based approaches to information-processing, 
and to develop an information-processing model for sport. The logic 
behind the proposed bias is the same as that utilized in the field work 
reported in Chapter 2, Like that study, the present study asks individuals 
to attribute performance to positive and negative aspects of their own, 
and their opponent's ability, effort, and luck, as well as the difficulty 
of the task. However, the study in the present chapter involves subject's 
reading a scenario which asks them to imagine that they are about to 
play a hockey match. The scenario differs for three groups which are 
given different information regarding outcome: Group 1 is given no outcome 
information. Group 2 is given information telling them they've lost, 
and Group 3 is given information telling them they've won. Except for
these differences, the scenarios are the same.
In order to support a self-serving bias approach, the three groups 
are expected to differ in how they attribute to opponents. However, they 
are expected to attribute similarly to the self, as losers are expected 
to protect their self-image by not blaming themselves. It is further 
expected that outcome information is processed and does affect attributions. 
These findings were supported in Chapter 2, where a self-serving bias 
occurred as a result of threat to the self.
Two differences can be seen between the experiment in Chapter 2 and 
this one. Subjects in the field experiment were experienced, while subjects 
in this study consist of both players and non-players. Therefore,
experience will be an area of investigation.
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The second important point is that less threat may occur in a 
hypothetical setting, which may lead to less threat to the self, and 
therefore less self-serving bias. The extent to which this is true 
will be revealed in the amount of bias which occurs. Suffice it to 
say that less bias is expected in this study than was found in the field 
experiment because of less pressure, as the subjects are not actually 
participating in front of others.
It is proposed here that bias will be found, even in an imaginary 
setting. The fact that the game was never played is not expected to result 
in different attributions to those made in the field, because schemata 
and stereotypes are believed to exist regarding winning and losing which 
allow individuals to make explanations based on outcome information.
These explanations bear out the schemata and stereotypes. If it is 
generally believed, for example, that winners put forth more effort than 
losers, then attributions of those who are told they’ve won will be to 
their good and their opponent’s bad effort. They do not have to see, 
or even be told, that their opponent's effort was poor, because the fact 
that they lost brings a losing schemata into play, which says that 
losers put forth less effort, and those that put forth less effort often 
lose. In this way, information is processed, but enhanced by schemata.
The remaining hypotheses predict that subjects who are told they've 
won will attribute more often to negative relative factors regarding 
their opponents. A factor matrix is expected to produce scales of 
factors regarding the opponents. As in previous findings (see Chapter 2), 
no scales are expected to be found regarding the self or absolute factors.
The analysis of attributional scales is expected to reveal differ­
ences between groups similar to those found previously (i.e. those given 
winning outcome information will attribute more to negative factors, 
while those given losing information will attribute more to positive 
aspects of the opponent's play).
It is further expected that attributions to the self will not show 
such differences. It is assumed that if winners are better, then 
losers are worse - unless, of course, the loser is the self. In this
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case, self-protection occurs in the form of bias, not allowing individuals 
to admit that they are worse. It’s more likely that individuals 
believe the following: the opponent’s better, but I am not worse.
In an imaginary setting such as the one proposed in the present 
chapter, little threat to the self-image may occur, and losers may be 
more inclined to agree that their ability or effort was not so good.
In that case, they may respond with less biased attributions than in 
the case of an actual game, as their performance would not be on 
display as would those actually taking part.
The proposed hypotheses expect these patterns to be similar to 
those found in the experiment reported in Chapter 2, as threat is 
believed to be inherent in sport regardless of whether it's imaginary 
or real. Hypothesis 3 therefore states :
Eypothes'Cs 3: (Self-Serv'Cng B'Cas).
Attributions to opponents will differ for the three groups. The 
group given winning information will attribute more "to the opponent's 
poor ability and effort than those given losing information; while 
those given losing information will attribute more to opponent's positive 
ability and effort than those given winning Outcome information.
Attributions to the self will be the same for the three groups.
Finally, there is an additional dimension in the present chapter not 
available in the Chapter 2 experiment. There is a group in this chapter 
who do not have any outcome feedback. Those who are not given outcome 
information are an interesting addition and are expected to rely on 
schemata and stereotypes to make attributions as information is unavailable 
to them. They are expected to make attributions which give credit to 
their own good qualities and to blame their opponent's bad qualities, 
much as winners do, in an attempt to enhance self-esteem. The no­
information group will attribute to their own good ability and effort 
in much the same way as those who were told they'd won.
Attributions to opponents are also expected to enhance self-esteem 
again for the no-information group. They will attribute to their opponent's
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bad ability and effort, in a way similar to the winning information 
group and different from the losing information group.
Schemata exist in the minds of the no-information group which 
will result in attributions being made which are similar to the winning 
group.
Finally, regarding the self, the no-information group is expected 
to credit their own good ability and effort in a manner similar to winners 
Because of the threatening nature of attributions to one's own bad ability 
and effort, the pattern is expected to be similar for winners and those 
given no outcome information. Figure 4.1. summarizes expectations 
regarding ability and effort.
Figure 4.1 A COMPARISON OF PREDICTED LEVELS OF ATTRIBUTIONS (ABILITY 
AND EFFORT) BY GROUP +
GOOD BAD
Own Ability N (high)
L (low) 
W (high)
Own Effort N (high)
L (low) 
W (high)
1
Opponent's Ability N (high)
L Clow)
W (high)
Opponent's Effort N (high)
L (low)
W (high)
GROUP
N = No Outcome Information 
L = Losing Outcome Information 
W = Winning Outcome Information
Comparisons are predicted here between groups, rather than within groups 
For example, a high level of attribution to one’s own good ability by 
winners means that the level is higher than those reported by the losers
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It does not imply that it is higher or lower than levels reported for 
bad ability.
Hypothesis 4 tests for a schemata-based approach. If supported, the 
no-information group would be employing a winning schemata in order to 
establish cause/effect relationships in the absence of outcome information. 
If these attributions are of a positive-self/negative-opponent nature, 
further support will exist for a motivational approach to information- 
processing. The Fourth hypothesis, then, states:
Eypothes'Cs 4: (Schema-Based Approach)
Those given no outcome information will make similar attributions 
to those given winning outcome information. Their attributions will 
be positive regarding their own ability and effort, and negative regarding 
their opponent’s ability and effort (relative to those given losing 
information).
Attribution theory was defined in Chapter 1, field tested in 
Chapter 2, examined in relationship to personality in Chapter 3, and 
now tested in an imaginary setting relative to personality in Chapter 4.
The relationship between personality, expectations/perceptions about 
the game, and attributional responses are addressed in this chapter, 
as a scale is developed to assess these areas.
In this chapter, the scale is developed, first by identifying the 
items associated with participants, non-participants, winners, and losers, 
then by selecting the items which most distinguish winners and losers; 
and finally in preparation and presentation of the study using the scale 
itself. Each of these three sections (item identification, item selection, 
and the sports personality inventory) will now be presented in a separate 
section because different subjects, methods, and procedures were used in 
each of the three sections.
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4.4 HYPOTHESES
Eypothes'Cs 1: CPersonat'Cty and Expeotat'Cons/Percept'Cons of the Game!
Individuals with a personality most like a 'winner* will be more 
likely:
Ca) to be challenged by the game now and by games in the future;
(b) to be motivated about the game C±.e, be interested and feel it is
important to win);
Cc) to be confident ;
(d) to expect to win;
(e) not to feel anxious about the game and life in general;
(f) not to feel worried about the game, about what others think about
them, about what others will think about their game, about failing 
to live up to expectations in the game and in life in general;
(g) not to feel physically threatened by the game.
Eypothes'Cs 2: (PersonatCty and AttrCbutCons)
Sports personality will be responsible for variation in attributional 
responses.
Eypothes'Cs 3: (Setf-ServCng BCas)
Attributions to opponents will differ for the three groups. The 
group given winning information will attribute more to the opponent's 
poor ability and effort than those given losing information; while those 
given losing information will attribute more to the opponent's positive 
ability and effort than those given winning outcome information. 
Attributions to the self will be the same for the three groups.
Eypothes'Cs 4: (Schema-Based Approach)
Those given no outcome information will make similar attributions 
to those given winning information. Their attributions will be positive 
regarding their own ability and effort, and negative regarding their 
opponent's ability and effort (relative to those given losing information)
137
4.5 CONSTRUCTION OF THE SPORTS PERSONALITY INVENTORY
The purpose of this section is to identify items for use in the 
sports personality inventory. This sports personality inventory will 
then be used to examine the relationship between self-perception and 
attributions.
4.5.1 Subfeats
Subjects were 52 undergraduate students at the University of Surrey 
(23 males and 29 females). The subject sample included both participants 
and non-participants, as well as participants skilled at team sports and 
individual sports.
4.5.2 Methods and Prooedures
Subjects were individually asked to complete a questionnaire 
comprised of four open-ended questions. The first of the four questions 
asked, "In general, what characteristics (psychological, personal, social, 
etc.) do you associate with sportsmen/women?". The second asked, "In 
general, what characteristics do you associate with those who do not 
normally participate in sports?". The third asked, "What characteristics 
do you think people have who normally win at team sports?". And, finally, 
the fourth asked, "What characteristics do you think people have who 
normally lose at team sports?". A section was also included for 
’additional comments'. (The questionnaire can be found in Appendix E).
In addition to identifying items from the questionnaire, other 
items were selected from newspaper sports pages. It was felt that some 
items may not have been recalled but may be recognized as distinguishing 
between winners and losers. Therefore, additional items from newspaper 
reports were compiled. Adjectives were listed which described sportsmen/ 
women, non-participants, winners, and losers in newspaper articles. For 
three weeks, six newspapers were read and adjectives were compiled.
The newspapers included The Telegraph, The Guardian, Today, The Mail,
The Express, and The Times. The list of characteristics was then 
added to the list compiled through the use of the questionnaire.
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4.5.3 Results
A list of 309 characteristics was compiled and then reduced to 
154 when synonyms were eliminated along with frivilous and non-sensical 
responses. These results were formed into an alphabetical listing which 
was used in the second questionnaire for item selection (See Appendix F). 
Because the adjective pairs are listed in the questionnaire in Appendix 
F, a list of the results of the item identification section are included 
there, and not elsewhere as a list of results.
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4.6 ITEM SELECTION
Having identified 154 adjectives which distinguished winners in 
sport from losers(In the minds of a university sample),the selection 
process attempted to reduce the number of adjectives to a workable 
number to be included in the sports personality inventory. The 
inventory will include only those adjectives which most distinguish 
stereotypic winners and losers.
4.6.1 Subjects
Subjects were 76 undergraduate university students from the 
University of Surrey (29 males and 47 females). Of the sample, 52 
considered themselves to be sports 'participants’ and 24 considered 
themselves to be'non-participants'. Also, 21 considered themselves 
to be skilled at team sports and 55 did not; while 32 considered 
themselves to be skilled at individual sports and 44 did not.
4.6.2 Methods and Procédures
As in the item identification task, subjects were asked to complete 
a questionnaire which described people who normally win at team sports 
and those who normally lose. Unlike the first questionnaire which was 
open-ended, the item selection task was forced choice. Subjects 
were asked to rate characteristics on a scale of 1 (never) to 7 (always) 
according to how true each characteristic was of people who normally 
win and those who normally lose. The questionnaire is located in 
Appendix F.
T-tests were carried out to determine characteristics associated 
with winners and losers (i.e. to identify which characteristics were 
most distinguishing). All subjects were asked to distinguish between 
winners and losers, and then the male responses were analysed separately 
from the female responses. Participants were examined separately from 
non-participants. Only those characteristics which distinguished between 
winners and losers in the minds of males, females, participants, and 
non—participants were included in the sports personality inventory.
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It is predicted that stereotypes exist which distinguish winners 
and losers. T—tests identified which characteristics were more descriptive 
of these two groups.
4.6.3 Results
2Q items were selected to include in the sports personality inventory. 
Characteristics which had the highest mean differences were chosen when 
the number with significant T-test levels (of significance Z .05) numbered 
132. Of the 132, 107 were more descriptive of winners, and 25 were 
more descriptive of losers. Therefore, in order to establish a working 
number for use in a scale, mean difference was chosen as the selection 
criteria. The number thought to be most workable was 20 items. In 
order to have a total of 20 items, 10 were chosen from the rank ordering 
of characteristics describing winners, and 10 were chosen from the rank 
ordering of losers. The T-test results can be found in Tables 4.1 and 
4.2.
The following items were found to be most descriptive of winners 
and were therefore included in the sports personality inventory: envied, 
praised, skilled at sport, believes in own ability, jubilant, confident, 
proud, admired, has good sports ability, and successful. The items 
included here which were found to be most descriptive of losers are: 
disappointed, feels things are against you, apathetic, disillusioned, 
frustrated, has a difficult time in sport, apologetic, depressed, 
embarrassed, and hesitant.
Each item was examined separately for males and for females. The 
items included were checked to be sure that they were significant for 
males and for females separately , which they were. Similar checks were 
made which examined sports participants vs. non-participants, and 
again findings were significant for both groups. Results of T-tests 
can be found in Appendix G.
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Table 4.1 Stereotypes: Characteristics Describing Winners
Adjective Mean SD SE MD T DF Prob.
Envied (W) 5,3288 1.202 0.141 3.5068 16.83 72 0.000 
(L) 1.8219 0.948 0.111
Praised (W) 5.6000 1.065 0.123 2.9867 14.97 74 0.000 
(L) 2.6133 1.240 0.143
Skilled at 
sport
(W) 6.2000 0.753 0.087 2.8800 16.18 74 0.000 
CL) 3.3200 1.275 0.147
Believes in 
your own 
ability
CW) 6.1333 0.741 0.086 2.8667 16.25 74 0.000 
CD 3.2667 1.308 0.151
Jubilant (W) 5.5270 1.037 0.121 2.8514 12.83 73 0.000 
(L) 2.6757 1.148 0.133
Confident (W) 6.0667 0.759 0.088 2.8133 16.92 74 0.000 
CL) 3.2533 1.140 0.132
Proud (W) 5.6133 0.884 0.102 2.8133 15.31 74 0.000 
(L) 2.8000 1.115 0.129
Admired CW) 5.3243 1.183 0.138 2.7973 13.68 73 0.000 
(L) 2.5270 1.185 0.138
Has good 
sports ability
(W) 6.2973 0.697 0.081 2.7703 15.39 73 0.000 
CL) 3.5270 1.357 0.158
Successful (W) 5.8000 0.854 0.099 2.7067 13.49 74 0.000 
CD 3.0933 1.141 0.132
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Table 4.2 Stereotypes: Characteristics Describing Losers
Adjective Mean SD SE MD T DF Prob
Disappointed
Feels things 
are against 
you
Apathetic
Disillusioned
Frustrated
Depressed
Has a difficult 
time in 
sport
Apologetic
Embarrassed
Hesitant
CW
CL
(W
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
CW
CL
2.7333 1.528 0.176 -2.6133 - 9.96 74 0.000
5.3467 1.157 0.134
2.4865 1.150 0.134
4.9324 1.064 0.124
1.8533 0.926 0.107
4.0133 1.300 0.150
2.5600 1.348 0.156
4.6933 1.115 0.129
2.6849 1.177 0.138
4.7945 1.213 0.142
-2.4459 -13.24 73 0.000
-2.1600 -11.80 74 0.000
-2.133 - 9.39 74 0.000
-2.1096 - 9.43 72 0.000
2.3108 1.084 0.126 -2.0270 -11.04 73 0.000
4.3378 1.997 0.116
2.9730 1.452 0.169
4.9865 1.164 0.135
2.2297 1.014 0.118
4.1892 1.477 0.172
-2.0135 - 8.18 73 0.000
-1.9595 - 9.87 73 0.000
2.3973 1.064 0.125 -1.9452 -11.02 72 0.000
4.3425 1.145 0.134
2.3973 1.024 0.120 -1.9041 -11.74 72 0.000
4.3014 1.009 0.118
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4.7 THE SPORTS PERSONALITY INVENTORY
Having described the construction of the inventory, the next step 
was to use the inventory in the main phase of the study which assessed 
the impact of stereotypes and personality profiles on attribution and 
incorporated theories into a model of information-processing in sport.
4.7.1 Subjects
120 university undergraduates at the University of Surrey partici- 
ated (GO males and 60 females). Of the sample, 28 considered themselves 
as participants and 92 did not; 57 considered themselves as skilled at 
team sports and 63 did not; and 65 considered themselves skilled at 
individual sports and 55 did not.
Subjects were divided into three quasi-experimental groups consist­
ing of 20 males and 20 females in each. The groups received different 
outcome information which will be described in the Methods and Procedures 
Section which follows.
4.7.2 Methods and Procedures
Subjects were asked to complete the sports personality scale, rating 
themselves on 5-point scales for each of the 20 items (not all to *a lot*). 
Next, subjects were given a scenario asking them to imagine themselves 
as being a university-level hockey player preparing for the first match 
of the season. The subject was then asked a series of questions assessing 
expectations and feelings of anxiety and threat. The 3 groups of subjects 
were then given the completion of the scenario.
Three different scenarios were presented. These were the same, 
except for outcome information. Group 1 was given no outcome information 
at all. Group 2 was told they had won, and Group 3 was told they had lost.
A series of attributional questions followed, and subjects were asked 
to explain their performance in terms of their own and their opponent's 
ability, effort, luck, and the ease or difficulty of the game. Subjects 
were given the option of using combinations of factors (such as my good 
luck and my opponent's bad luck) in their explanations as well.
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Background information was also collected regarding the subject's 
sex, whether they were a sports participant, and whether they were 
skilled at individual or team sports. (See Appendix H for questionnaire)
145
4.8 . RESULTS
4.8.1 Introduct'Con
The sports personality inventory was developed with the hope of 
finding a reliable test of personality which could be used to predict 
attributional responses. In fact, the hypotheses were developed based 
on the assumption that the inventory would be reliable.
A Varimax rotated factor matrix revealed one reliable personality 
scale (alpha = 0.83077). Because of the small number of items in each 
sub-scale, only one sub-scale was used in subsequent analyses.
The personality scale was identified and used as a variable in a 
multiple regression in order to identify those factors most responsible 
for differences in attributional responses. Outcome information (i.e. 
experimental group) was included as a variable, as was sex.
Further analysis of personality and attributional responses were 
carried out in the form of Pearson Correlations which examined the 
relationship between sports personality (as measured by sports personality 
inventory) and causal attributions.
Varimax factor matrices also identified scales regarding expectations 
and perceptions about the game and relative attributional responses.
Finally, a self-serving bias was expected. Those given losing 
information regarding outcome were expected to protect the self by making 
positive attributions to the self. An analysis of variance was used 
to examine attributions relative to information given.
Attributions of males and females were compared using T-tests, as 
were participants and non-participants.
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4.8.2 Eozpeotat'Cons/Perceptions About the Game: Anxiety
Three major areas were examined in the present study; expectations/ 
perceptions about the game, personality, and causal attributions. In 
order to assess their interaction, measures of each were required. 
Therefore, three Varimax rotated factor matrices were produced to define 
factors for use in scales.
Each matrix produced at least one reliable scale. A total of 
three main scales were developed (assessing expectations/perceptions, 
personality, and attributions). Also, sub-scales were identified for 
personality, two types of anxiety (general anxiety and sport anxiety) and 
for attributions to opponents. Rotated factor matrices are reported in 
Appendix I.
One main scale (Anxiety) was found to be reliable regarding expect­
ations and perceptions. Also, the two sub-scales which emerged from the 
responses to questions about game expectations/perceptions were a General 
Anxiety scale and a Sports Anxiety scale. Other scales were found to 
have either too few items (factor 4) or to be responsible for too little 
of the variation (factors 3 and 5) and were therefore eliminated.
The Anxiety scale as a whole was reliable (alpha = 0.82715) and 
was comprised of responses to 11 questions. Six are listed below as 
the sub-scale General Anxiety, four are listed as the sub-scale Sports 
Anxiety, and the one in neither sub-scale is: ’I feel physically 
threatened by today’s game'.
The first sub-scale (General Anxiety) was reliable (alpha = 0.84611) 
and included responses to six questions which asked to what extent the 
subject agreed with the following statements :
1. I feel anxious today because of factors other than the game.
2. I generally feel anxious about life.
3. I feel anxious about living up to expectations in today's game.
4. I feel anxious about living up to expectations in general.
5. I worry about what others think of my performance in the game.
6. I worry about what others think of me in general.
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The second sub-scale, Sports Anxiety, was also reliable (alpha =
0.83820. and involved responses to the following:
1. I am worried about today's game.
2. I feel anxious about today's game.
3. I feel anxious about next week's game.
4. The other players feel anxious about today's game.
4.8.2.1 The Effect of Sports Participation on Anxiety
Results of group T-tests shown in Appendix J showed that participants 
and non-participants did not differ on any of these scales, although 
those skilled at sport differed from non-skilled in general anxiety. 
(Sports anxiety was similar for the skilled and not-skilled groups).
First, responses to anxiety scales showed participants to be similar 
to non-participants overall (T = 0.33, P = 0.745), in general anxiety 
(T = 0.59, P = 0.558), and in sports anxiety (T = -0.26, P = 0.798). 
However, skilled individual sports participants (mean = 27.0545) were 
less anxious overall, and less anxious generally (mean = 14.4364) than 
those who considered themselves not to be skilled overall (mean = 30.3385) 
and in general anxiety (mean = 17.6615). Overall results showed 
T = 2.18, P = 0.032 and for the General Anxiety sub-scale T = 2.35,
P - 0.021. Scores on sports anxiety were not found to differ for those 
skilled and those not skilled in individual sports (not skilled mean =
11.9385, skilled mean = 10.9455; T = 1.43, P = 0.155).
Team sports showed similar results with regard to anxiety. Those 
who considered themselves to be skilled were no different overall 
(T = 1.89, P =0.061). However in General Anxiety, skilled team players 
(mean = 14.7460) were less anxious than those not skilled (mean = 16.6667; 
T = 1.99, P = 0.049). No differences occurred in sports anxiety (not 
skilled mean = 11.9123, skilled mean = 11.0952; T = 1.18, P = 0.242).
Full T-test results are located in Appendix J.
4.8.2.2 Sex Differences in Anxiety
Females were found to be similar to males in all 
aspects of anxiety. No significant differences were found overall
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(T = -1.63, P = 0.107), nor in general or sports anxiety CT = -1.39,
P = 0.167 and -1.79, P = 0.076, respectively).
Having examined responses to the two scales regarding expectations/ 
perceptions, factor matrices will next be examined which include responses 
to the sports personality inventory.
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4.8.3 Sports Personality Inventory: Results
The sports personality inventory results will be reported in much 
the same manner as the perceptions/expectations section, Attributional 
analyses will also be included regarding the personality scales, as a 
cluster analysis was carried out. Responses will be analysed by sex 
and experience in a manner similar to analyses previously reported.
Then, based on the scales produced, hypothesis will be tested which 
compared personality profiles to expectations and perceptions about the 
game.
Thus, the aim is to assess the impact of sports personality on 
attributions, using a scale developed to rate personality. With this 
goal in mind, a Varimax rotated factor matrix was created which is 
reported in Appendix I. Results showed that responses to the 20 questions 
formed a reliable scale (alpha = 0.83077).
The subjects were asked to describe themselves regarding the following 
characteristics:
1, Envied 11. Confident
2. Disappointed 12. Has a difficult time in sport
3. Praised 13. Proud
4. Feels things are against you 14. Apologetic
5. Skilled at sport 15. Admired
6. Apathetic 16. Depressed
7. Believes in your own ability 17. Has good sports ability
8. Disillusioned 18. Embarrassed
9. Jubilant 19. Successful
10. Frustrated 20. Hesitant
(Even numbered responses were re-coded)
Most sub-scales were found to either be responsible for a small percentage 
of the variance or to have a small number of items, and sub-scales were 
therefore not used in subsequent analyses. One sub-scale was reliable 
(alpha = 0.74984) and was labelled 'Self-doubt/trust'. The nine items 
forming the sub-scale included:
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1. Feels things are against you
2. Apathetic
3. Believes in your own ability*
4. Frustrated
5. Confident*
6. Apologetic
7. Embarrassed
8. Successful*
9. Hesitant * Responses were re-coded.
A further study of personality items was conducted in an attempt to 
see how the items clustered together. (See Appendix K).
An agglomerative hierarchical clustering procedure was carried 
out on the sports personality data. This procedure linked responses 
in the agglomeration process and provided proximity measures in terms 
of an agglomeration schedule, and also a vertical icicle plot.
The process involved examining responses to the questions regarding 
personality, and computing proximities between the responses. The 
responses were then combined to form clusters, and then the proximities 
of these clusters were computed. This process resulted in a hierarchy 
of clusters presented in the form of a denogram (Figure 4.2).
The aim of clustering personality variables was to find groups 
of variables which were homogeneous, to see how the variables related 
to one another in terms of these groups, and ultimately to further 
understand personality in sport. Relationships between items became 
clear through an examination of the cluster analysis results. (Cluster 
analysis results are reported in the denogram in Figure 4.2 which shows 
how items cluster together).
Figure 4.2 shows quite clearly that the odd-numbered items clustered 
together in the top half of the scale, and the even-numbered items 
clustered in the bottom half. This shows that stereotypes of winners 
(the odd-numbered items) and the stereotypes of losers (the even-numbered 
items) can be converted into self-rating scales which dichotomize along 
the same dimensions.
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Figure 4.2 Cluster Analysis of Personality Factors
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To summarize, cluster analysis makes clear the relationships 
between personality items. This clarifies and broadens the understanding 
of personality, particularly as it is defined in the sports personality 
scale.
The personality scale will next be examined in much the same manner 
as were the previous anxiety scales. They will first be examined to 
see the effect of sports experience on personality, and then to see 
what sex factors need to be considered.
4.8.3.1 The Effect of Sports Part'Covpat'Con on Personality
Results of group T-tests reported in Appendix J showed that sports 
participants did not differ from non-participants in sports personality 
or self-doubt (T = 0.38, P = 0.708 and T = 0.85, P = 0.398). Skilled 
team participants were similar to non-skilled team participants in 
personality (T = -0.23, P = 0.815), but non-skilled team participants 
were more likely to be sélf-doubting (T = 2.73, P = 0.007; mean for 
skilled = 20.9524 and non-skilled = 23.6316).
Those who considered themselves skilled at individual sports were 
different in both sports personality and self-doubt (from those who 
Considered themselves not skilled). Skilled individual sports participants 
had personality scores more like 'winners' than non-skilled participants 
(skilled individual sports participants' mean = 58.9091, while the non- 
skilled group mean was 55.8000; T = -2.05, P = 0.043). Non-skilled 
individual sports participants were higher in self-doubt than the 
skilled group (T = 3.11, P = 0.002; means: non-skilled 23.6154 and 
skilled 20.5818).
Those who believed themselves to be skilled at individual sports 
had personalities similar to the stereotyped image of a winner. Those 
who did not believe themselves to be skilled at individual sports were 
more similar in personality to the stereotypic loser and more self-doubting,
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4.8.3.2 Sex Differences in Personality
Finally, personality scores showed no sex differences. Males and 
females were not significantly different on the personality scales 
CT = 1.27, P = 0.205) or on self-doubt (T = -1.72, P = 0.089). Perhaps 
the fact that university students were tested accounts for these results
Perhaps the female university student is more similar to the male 
university student in terms of personality than might be found in the 
general population. The female who attends university may be more  ^
confident, self-assured, and hopeful than females who do not attend 
university. In any case, sex differences which may have been expected 
were not found in terms of personality, as males and females scored 
similarly on both measures. Full details of T-test results are located 
in Appendix J.
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4.8.3.3 Sports PeTSonalï-ty and Expeotatzons/Peroept'ùons About the Game
This study established a measure of sports personality. There were 
effects of experience in sports on these measures, although sex 
differences did not exist. Keeping this in mind, the first aim of 
the present chapter was addressed - to assess the impact of sports 
personality on perceptions about the game. Results of each sub­
division of Hypothesis 1 were tested separately, beginning with 
Hypothesis 1 (la):
Hypothes'is la: Those with a personality most like a 'winner' will
be more likely to be challenged by the game now and in the future.
This hypothesis was rejected.
Pearson correlations showed no significant relationship between 
scores on sports personality and challenge either today (-0.0185,
P = 0.421) or next week (-0.0115, P = 0.451). No differences were 
found in self-doubt either today (0.0056, P - 0.476) or next week 
(-0.1446, P = 0.108).
The second hypothesis (lb) concerned motivation. Like the field 
experiment reported in Chapter 2, findings showed a high correlation 
(0.3213, P = 0.000) between the following two responses:
I am interested in today's game.
It is important to me to win today.
The second hypothesis uses the term motivation and is a combination 
of these two scores.
Hypothesis lb reads as follows:
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Hypothes'is lb: Those with a personality most like a 'winner* will
be more likely to be motivated. This hypothesis was rejected. Pearson 
correlations showed neither interest CO.0171, P = 0.427) nor importance 
(0.0455, P = 0.311) to covary with personality scores. See Appendix M 
for correlation results. Also, self-doubt scores did not covary with 
either interest (-0.0326, P = 0.362) or importance (-0.1393, P = 0.065).
The next hypothesis (Ic) reads as follows;
Hypothes'is lo: Those with a personality most like a ’winner* will
be more likely to be confident. This hypothesis was partially accepted. 
Scores on the personality scale were not found to correlate with reported 
confidence levels (-0.0993, P = 0.140). However self-doubt scores 
(-0.3137, P = 0.000) correlated with confidence. Self-trusters were 
more likely to be confident about the game.
Hypothesis Id reads:
Hypothes'is Id: Those with a personality most like a 'winner* will
be more likely to expect to win. Hypothesis Id was also partially accepted 
Pearson correlations show that personality did not correlate with expect­
ations of winning (-0.0820, P =0.187). However, self-doubt scores 
correlated with expectations of winning (-0^2339, P = 0.005). Subjects 
high in self-trust were more likely to expect to win.
Hypotheses le. If and Ig all deal with feelings of anxiety, 
specifically worry: about the game, life in general, what others think 
of them and their game, and the physical threat involved in the game.
As reported earlier, in addition to an overall scale, two anxiety 
sub-scales were found when factor matrices were analysed (one labelled 
general anxiety and the other labelled sports anxiety). Some of the 
items in these two scales are included in the analyses of Hypotheses 
le. If and Ig. It would obviously be tedious to analyse each item 
separately throughout this chapter, and therefore scales are used to 
simply information and make it easily understood.
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It is also important to the purpose of this study to carefully 
scrutinize th.e concepts of threat because of its proposed relevance 
to self-serving bias. Because of its importance, the different 
aspects of anxiety are analysed separately here in order to assess 
exactly where the threat to self-image lies.
Because 'threat' is a major concern of this entire study, the 
various aspects of anxiety and threat have been assessed, beginning 
with Hypothesis le with assesses anxiety about the game and life in 
general. It reads:
Hypothesis le: Those with a personality most like a 'winner' will
be less likely to feel anxious about the game and life in general. 
Hypothesis le was accepted. Results were analysed using the Anxiety 
scale rather than using responses to individual questions. Overall 
anxiety scores did covary with personality (0.2497, P = 0.003) and 
with self-doubt (0.5201, P = 0.000).
Subjects whose personality most nearly matched the stereotypic 
winner were less anxious overall. Their ianxiety (generally) was lower 
than 'losing type' individuals (0.3110, P = 0.000), although no 
covariation occurred between personality measures and sports anxiety 
(0.0762, P = 0.204). Scores for self-doubt however correlated with 
both general anxiety and sports anxiety (0.3280, P = 0.000).
Thus, it can be said that 'winning-type' individuals were less 
likely to be anxious than 'losing-types', except possibly with regard 
to the game at hand. Sport-specific anxiety seemed not to covary with 
measures of sport personality.
Self-trusters are more likely to be less anxious generally, and 
in sport.
The next hypothesis (If) dealt with specific worries (about the 
game and about what others think of the subject). Hypothesis If reads 
as follows:
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Hiivothesis If: Those with a personality most like a 'winner' will
be less likely to feel worried about the game, about what others think 
about them, about what others think of their game, and will 
feel least anxious about failing to live up to expectations in the 
game and in life in general.
Hypothesis If was accepted. Correlation results showed that 
general measures of anxiety covaried with self-doubt and personality, 
as reported earlier.
It was clear from these results that 'winners' were less likely 
to be worried about the game, were less likely to be worried about what 
others think of them in general and about their game, were less 
anxious about living up to expectations in the game, and were less anxious 
about living up to expectations in general.
Finally, hypothesis Ig examined the idea of threat as it related 
to physical threat in the game. It was proposed that personality would 
be related to perceptions of physical threat in the game.
Hypothesis Ig reads as follows:
Hypothesis Ig: Those with a personality most like a winner will
be more likely not to feel physically threatened by the game.
Hypothesis Ig was accepted. Results reported personality scores 
to covary with anxiety scores, including physical threat. Pearson 
correlations showed that those subjects who had winning type personalities 
felt the least threatened physically by the game. Physical threat was 
included in the anxiety scale and assessed accordingly.
Overall, then, hypotheses included in the sub-sections of Hypothesis 
1 showed that when personality was measured by the self-doubt scale, 
personality did relate to perceptions and expectations about the game.
An overview of results of Hypothesis 1 can be found below:
Hypothesis
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la
lb
le
Id
le
If
Ig
(challenged)
(motivation)
(confidence!
Cexpect to win)
Canxious about the game 
and life)
(worried about the game, 
others impressions and 
expectations) 
(physically threatened)
rejected
partially accepted 
partially accepted 
partially accepted 
accepted (general anxiety) 
rejected (sports anxiety) 
accepted (general anxiety) 
rejected (sports anxiety)
accepted (general anxiety) 
rejected (sports anxiety)
When the two scales, general anxiety and sports anxiety, were used 
in the correlation matrix along with the personality scale, significant 
correlations were found, again supporting the contention that personality 
is related to game perception. Results of correlations based on scales 
can be found in Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 Pearson Correlations of Personality and Expectations/ 
Perceptions about the Game
Overall
Anxiety
General
Anxiety
Sports
Anxiety
Sports 0.2497* 0.3110* 0.0762
Personality ( 120) ( 120) ( 120)
P=0.003 P=0.000 P=0.204
Self-Doubt 0.5400** 0.5201** 0.3280**
(119) ( 120) ( 120)
P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000
* £ .05
.01
The relationship between sports personality and game perceptions has 
been identified, as the first aim of the chapter was addressed and 
the impact of personality on perceptions identified.
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Although no covariation was found between personality measures and 
challenge, confidence, and motivation, covariation was found between 
these factors and anxiety measures Csee Appendix M for full correlation 
results).. Those scoring high on measures of sports anxiety were more 
likely to see the game as a challenge now and in the future (0.2464,
P = 0.003 and 0.2021, P = 0.014). Winning is more likely to be 
important to those with high sports anxiety as well (0.2592, P = 0.002).
These results point out the importance of the sub-scales: general 
and sports anxiety. No significant correlation was found between 
overall anxiety scores and challenge, for example (0.1343, P = 0.072 
today’s challenge, and 0.0623, P = 0.251 next week’s challenge).
However, as reported earlier sports anxiety scores did covary with 
both measures of challenge.
Similarly, motivation (as measured by how important it was to win) 
also covaried with sports anxiety, but not with general anxiety (0.1380,
P = 0.066). Overall anxiety scores also covaried with motivation (0.2213, 
P = 0.008).
Also, subjects who were generally less anxious were more likely to 
be confident in the game (-0.1567, P = 0.044). Such was not the case 
with sports anxious subjects. No covariation was found between sports 
anxiety and confidence (-0.0712, P = 0.220), nor between overall anxiety 
scores and confidence (-0.1339, P = 0.072).
Finally, it should be pointed out that subjects who were generally 
anxious were more likely to also be sports anxious (0.5115, P = 0.000).
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4.8.4 Attributions
The final section of results deals with attributions. The chapter 
aims to assess the impact of sports personality on attributions in a 
way similar to the assessment made of perceptions/expectations about 
the game. This was carried out by using the sports personality 
inventory scales, and relating scores on the personality scale to 
causal attributions. The chapter further aims to give support to a 
self-serving bias and schema-based approach to information-processing, 
by investigating the impact of outcome information on attributions.
As with the two previous sections (expectations/perceptions and 
personality), the first step involved finding an accurate tool with 
which to measure attributions. To assume that the scales used in the 
field experiment in Chapter 2 would again be reliable would have 
been premature, as the present study differs from the previous study 
on grounds previously discussed. The only accurate way to assess 
attributions here was to form a Varimax rotated factor matrix on the 
present data, and use these scales for analysis.
Certain results were expected to be similar to those found in 
the earlier chapter. Those subjects given winning information here, 
for example, were expected to attribute similarly to those who won in 
Chapter 2. They were expected to attribute more often to relative 
factors regarding their opponents than those given losing information. 
Two scales were found in Chapter 2 from the factor matrix; one positive 
scale (regarding opponent’s good ability, effort, and luck) and one 
negative scale (regarding opponent’s poor ability, effort, and luck). 
Also in Chapter 2, no scales were found of absolute factors or factors 
relating to the self.
When a Varimax rotated factor matrix was formed (Appendix I shows 
results of the factor matrix), one main scale and one sub-scale were 
formed which were reliable, and responsible for a reasonable percentage 
of variance.
A relative attribution scale was identified from the Varimax 
rotated factor matrix. The scale was found to be reliable (alpha =
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0.63837) and consisted of the following eight items;
To what extent do you agree that the following factors were 
responsible for your perform^ee =
1. your poor ability
2. your poor effort
3. your good luck.
4. your bad luck
5. your opponent's bad effort
6. your opponent's good luck
7. your opponent's bad luck
8. the ease of the game
Of the five sub-scales, four either had too few items or were 
responsible for a small percentage of the total variance. Only one 
sub-scale, called 'Attributions to Opponents', was retained for further 
analysis. The four items comprising this scale include attributions 
to the following (Reliability = 0.76353).
1. your good luck
2. your opponent's bad ability
3. your opponent's bad effort
4. your opponent's bad luck
4.8.4.1 The Effect of Sports Participation on Attributions
Before addressing the final hypotheses, an assessment of the effects 
of sports experience and the importance of the sex differences must 
be made. Beginning first with experience in sport, results showed that 
experience had little effect on either relative attributional scale. 
T-tests reported in Appendix J showed no significant differences between 
participants and non-participants (T = -0.26, P = 0.281; and T = 0.03,
P = 0.977), or between those skilled vs. non-skilled at team sports 
(T = 1.05, P = 0.295; and T = 0.98) in attributions to relative factors. 
On the other hand, when individual sports were considered, variation 
in attributional responses was evident as those skilled at individual 
sports OI = 19.9818) attributed less to relative attributions than 
those not skilled (M = 22.3077; T = 2.38, P = 0.019). No differences 
were found between the skilled and not skilled groups regarding the 
opponent's game (T = 1.53, P = 0.130).
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Self-attributions Cto one's own ability and effort) were not 
affected by participation, but skilled participants made different 
self-attributions than non-skilled participants. Those not skilled 
at individual sports attributed to their own poor ability more than 
skilled individuals (T = 2.57, P = 0.011). Results of the individual 
non-skilled group also differed in their attributions to other 
aspects of their opponent's play. (The non-skilled group attributed 
more than the skilled group to relative attributions including 
their own poor ability and effort, their opponent's poor effort, and 
luck factors (T = 2.38, P = 0.019). See Appendix J for T-test results.
Again, sports participation vs. non-participation showed no 
differences in attributions of a relative type (T = -0.26, P = 0.281), 
to opponents (T = 0.98, P = 0.332), nor in attributions to positive' 
ability (T = 0.55, P = 0.582), positive effort (T = 1.05, P = 0.294), 
negative ability (T = -1.01, P = 0.315), or negative effort (T = -0.75,
P = 0.425).
Team skilled participants were not different from non-skilled team 
participants in any attributional area tested: relative attributions 
T = 1.04, P = 0.295; attributions to opponents T = 0.03, P = 0.977; 
attributions to positive ability T = -1.00, P =  0.319; attributions 
to positive effort T = 0.13, P = 0.894; attributions to negative ability 
T = 1.96, P = 0.053; and attributions to negative effort T = 0.86,
P = 0.890.
4.8.4.2 Sex Differences in Attributions
Males and females did not differ significantly in any attributional 
area testfed. No differences were found in attributions either to 
relative factors (T = -0.72, P = 0.472), to opponents (T = -0.25,
P = 0.806), to good personal ability (T = 0.96, P = 0.339), to 
good personal effort (T = -0.85, P = 0.396), to poor personal ability 
CT = -1.14, P = 0.257), or to poor personal effort (T = 0.09, P = 0.953). 
(See Appendix J for T-test results).
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4.8.4.3 Assessing the Impact of Sports Personality on Attributions 
Using a Self-Serving^ Schema-Based Approach
The next concern, then, was to examine hypoth.eses regarding 
attributions. The present chapter aims to assess the impact of 
personality on attributions using the sports personality inventory, 
to test a self-serving model, and also to test schemata-based approach 
to information-processing. Three further hypotheses were therefore 
proposed: Hypothesis 2 addressed the relationship between personality
and attributions. Hypothesis 3 addressed the motivational/non-motivational 
dilemma, and Hypothesis 4 tested for a schemata-based approach.
Hypothesis 2: (Personality and Attributions)
Sports personality will be responsible for variation in attributional 
responses.
Hypothesis 2 was partially accepted. It was established that a 
relationship existed between personality and attributions, as Pearson 
correlations showed absolute attributions to relate to self-doubt, but 
not sports personality overall. Self-trust was found to correlate with 
attributions to one's own good ability or effort (see Table 4.4). Subjects 
who trusted themselves attributed more often to their own good ability 
than those who scored high on self-doubt (-0.2404, P = 0.004).
However, attributions of a relative nature did not correlate with 
overall sports personality, nor did attributions to opponents or 
attributions to poor effort or ability. See Table 4.4 for results.
Neither did attributions of a relative nature correlate significantly 
with self-doubt measures. Self-doubt was also found not to covary with 
attributions to opponents as seen in Table 4.4.
Multiple regression results showed that neither self-doubt, personality, 
nor outcome information were responsible for variations in attributions 
to opponentsi
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Table 4.4 Pearson Correlation Results (Personality by Attributions)
Sports Personality Self-Doubt
Attributions to:
One’s own good ability 0.0390 -0.2404**
( 118) ( 118)
P=0.338 P=0.004
One’s own good effort 0.1045 0.1404
( 118) ( 117)
P=0.130 P=0.066
One's own poor ability -0.1119 -0.0362
(117) ( 118)
P=0.115 P=0.349
One's own poor effort -0.0543 0.0566
( 117) ( 117)
P=0.281 P=0.272
Relative attributions 0.0250 0.0443
( 120) ( 120)
P=0.393 P=0.315
Attributions to opponents 0.0063 -0.0179
( 120) ( 120)
P=0.473 P=0.423
** £  .01
It is however interesting to note the effect of personality on expect­
ations/perceptions about the game. Subjects with winning personalities 
and self-trusters were more likely to be found to be highly anxious in all 
respects according to correlation results (see Appendix M). It is also 
interesting to note that expectations/perceptions about the game did predict 
attributional responses. Attributions made to one’s own poor ability 
and poor effort were attributed to more often by subjects who were 
generally anxious than those who were not (0.2033, P = 0.014, and 0.1658,
P = 0.037).
Again, multiple regression results did not show expectations/perceptions 
to be responsible for variations in relative attributions or attributions 
to opponents, as anxiety was not responsible for variations in attributions 
in either case; but variations did occur in absolute attributions based
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on anxiety levels.
Thus, it has been established that personality does affect 
attributions. Personality also affects perceptions/expectations about 
the game. Of particular relevance are factors which are most vulnerable 
to threat - i.e. attributions to one's own ability and effort.
The next hypothesis. Hypothesis 3, proposes support for a self- 
serving bias model. First, the three groups (Group 1 who received no 
outcome information. Group 2 who received losing outcome information, 
and Group 3 who received winning outcome information) were examined.
If the proposed hypothesis were to be supported, differences in attributions 
to opponents should exist. Results of a multiple regression did not, 
in fact, show group differences for relative attributions or for attributions 
to opponents.
In order to ascertain how groups made attributions to opponents, 
a one way analysis of variance was carried out. In the analyses of 
variance, attributions to opponents were found to show significant 
group differences (see Appendix L ).
The first part of Hypothesis 3, then, was supported, as winners 
attributed more to opponent's positive aspects than losers, and losers / 
attributed more to opponent's negative aspects than winners. The second 
part of the hypothesis addressed absolute attributions, and was not 
supported. The Hypothesis reads as follows:
Hypothesis 3: (Self-Serving Bias)
Attributions to opponents will differ for the three groups. The 
group given winning information will attribute more to the opponent's 
poor ability and effort than those given losing information; while 
those given losing information will attribute more to opponent's 
positive ability and effort than those given winning outcome information. 
Attributions to the self will be the same for the three groups.
Hypothesis 3 was only partially supported. As cited previously, 
attributions to opponents met expectations, but self-attributions did
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not. Groups differed in attributions to their own ability and effort, 
with losers blaming themselves (a result which was not found in the 
earlier study reported in Chapter 2). In that study losers gave 
themselves credit for good ability and effort, just as winners did.
Analyses of variance were carried out which showed group differences 
in self-attributions in the present study. An analysis of variance 
result showed attributions to one's own good ability and effort were 
made more often by the winning group (F 1,117) = 7.140, P = 0.0012.
Mean scores can be found in Table 4.5.
Attributions to one's own poor ability were made more often by 
those given losing information F (1,116) = 4.730, P = 0.0106 than 
those given winning information (see Table 4.6 for means). Similar 
results were found for one's own poor effort, with losers attributing 
more often to their own poor effort than winners F (1,116) = 4.557,
P = 0.0125.
Attributions to positive effort showed similar group differences 
F (1,117) = 15.845, P = 0.0000. Complete analysis of variance results 
are located in Appendix L, and means are located in Table 4.5.
As predicted, attributions to opponent's poor ability F (1,115) = 
6.613, P = 0.0019 showed group differences, as did attributions to 
opponent's effort F (1,114) = 4.889, P = 0.0092.
Bias, then, was not found in attributional responses. One of 
two explanations seem plausible. It is possible that threat was not 
evidenced in an imaginary setting as it was in a 'real' setting. It 
is also possible that bias did not occur in an imaginary setting, or 
outside of the actual context, regardless of threat involved. If 
the latter is the case, most attributional research would need 
to be questioned, as the vast majority of studies involve asking 
for attributions regarding a hypothetical setting.
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Table 4.5 Mean Scores for Ability and Effort - Attributions by Group 
(High Scores Indicate More Agreement)
POSITIVE SELF
Your Good 
Ability**
Your Good 
Effort**
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
3.7250 
3.0000 
3.6000 
3.4492
H
L
H
4.1000 
3.2895 
4.2250 
3.8814
NEGATIVE OPPONENT
Your Opponent's 
Bad Ability*
Your Opponent * s 
Bad Effort*
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
3.1026
2.4324
3.1750
2.9138
2.8718 
2.2803
2.8718 
2.6783
R
L
H
NEGATIVE SELF
Your Poor 
Ability*
Your Poor 
Effort*
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
2.7500
2.9459
2.2500
2.6410
2.3846 
2.7896 
2.0250 
2.3932
POSITIVE OPPONENT
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
Your Opponent’s 
Good Ability**
3.750
3.8205
3.1000
3.5546
Your Opponent’s 
Good Effort
3.7692 
3.7105 
3.4750 
3.6496
H = Expectations that attributions would be high relative to the other 
groups
L = Expectations that attributions would be low relative to the other 
groups
* = sig. of F ^  .05 
** = sig. of F ZL .01
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Further experiments in sports tasks are called for to assess 
attributions in the lab. Such further experiments are proposed in 
future chapters of this study. If subjects evidence bias following 
participation in a lab experiment, support would be given to the 
contention that bias results from active participation (which does 
not necessarily need to be content-specific). If subjects were not 
given feedback, and if their results were unknown to others, any 
threat involved would be self-inflicted, rather than involving 
outside pressure. Perhaps threat, then, is felt when the task seems 
relevant, but not when the task seems superfluous. Further examination 
of motivational levels might help to clarify the relevance of the task.
Returning to results of the present experiment. Hypothesis (4) 
predicts that a schemata-based approach is utilized by the group given 
no information. Hypothesis 4 reads as follows:
Hypothesis 4: (Schemata-Based Approach)
Those given no outcome information will make similar attributions 
to those given winning information. Their attributions will be positive 
regarding their own ability and effort, and negative regarding their 
opponent's ability and effort (relative to those given losing information)
Hypothesis 4 was accepted, and a schemata-based approach supported. 
The pattern predicted in Figure 4.1 was supported, showing expected 
attributions for the three groups. Self-attributions of the group 
given no outcome were similar to the group given winning outcome 
information, and different from the group given losing information.
More specifically, attributions to one's own good ability showed 
group differences, according to an analysis of variance (F (1,117) =
7.140, P = 0.0012). Mean scores for the winning information group
(M = 3.6000) and the no information group (M = 3.7250) were significantly
higher than the losing information group (M = 3.0000).
Negative opponent attributions also show expected differences in 
an analysis of variance F (1,115) = 6.613, P = 0.0019). Again, mean 
scores showed the winning information group (M = 3.1750) and the no
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information group (M = 3.1026) to be significantly higher in attributions 
to the opponent's poor ability and effort than the losing information 
group QA = 2.4324).
Clear support, then, was found for the no information group's use 
of schemata. This results in similar cause/effect explanations being
made by the no information group to the winning information group.
Details of the relevance to a schemata-based approach will be discussed 
in the following Discussion section.
To summarize, then, the majority of expectations were confirmed. 
Hypotheses 1 and 3 were partly supported, while only Hypothesis 2 was 
rejected.
The only unexpected finding was with regard to self-blame. Subjects 
utilized an non-motivational approach, rather than a self-serving 
bias approach. A limited amount of threat stemming from the imaginary 
nature of the task was given as the explanation for unexpected findings, 
emphasizing the need for relevant, realistic tasks in experimentation.
One final area to be examined in this section of results involved 
so-called 'external' attributions i.e. attributions to luck and task 
difficulty. Because the self-serving approach was evidenced in self­
attributions, attributions to luck and task difficulty were not included 
in hypotheses in this chapter. However, it is in the interest of the 
study to examine all aspects of attributions in order to correctly 
interpret those results believed to be relevant.
Luck was one of the factors included in both the relative attribution 
and the attributions to opponent scales, and is therefore an important 
consideration in the study of relative factors. In both scales reported 
earlier, luck was an important factor. For example, poor effort and 
ability, good and bad luck, the opponent's bad effort, along with the 
ease of the game, formed a reliable scale. Similarly, one's own good 
luck was a factor in the negative opponent's scale, along with the 
opponent's bad ability, bad effort, bad luck, and your good luck.
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It appears that subjects considered themselves to be lucky if the 
opponent was bad, and in that case, the losers attributed more often to 
these factors than winners.
Ease of the game was similarly included in the scale which assessed 
opponent's weaknesses. It appears that when the opponent was weak, the 
subject was also lucky, and the game was easy. It seems clear that 
subjects expected certain relationships to exist between task difficulty 
and other factors. (One who saw that the opponent was weak believed then 
that the game would be easy and luck would play a part).
If luck and task difficulty played an important part in relative 
attributions, what then could be said about absolute attributions?
First, outcome information did influence all attributions to luck. In 
each case (your good luck, your bad luck, your opponent's good luck, 
and your opponent's bad luck), the pattern was the same. Those with no 
outcome information had mean scores between winners and losers. (See 
Table 4.6).
Patterns of responses from the other two groups showed expected 
trends as well. Winners attributed more to their own good luck and 
their opponent's bad luck than losers; while losers attributed more to 
their own bad luck and their opponent's good luck (your good luck F (1,118) 
=10.911, P = 0.0000; your bad luck F (1,116) = 4.603, P =0.0120; 
your opponent's good luck F (1,116) = 5.563, P = 0.0050; your opponent's 
bad luck F (1,115) = 9.297, P = 0.0002). Full analyses of variance 
results are located in Appendix L/.
Finally, task difficulty attributions of an absolute type showed 
significant differences between the three information groups based on 
ease of the game F (1,117) = 3.575, P = 0.0312, but no difference when 
'difficulty of the game* was the criteria F (1,115) = 1.607, P = 0.2051. 
These results confirmed earlier recommendations that the term task 
difficulty be sub-divided into 'ease' and 'difficulty' of the game, as 
responses to these two areas may differ.
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Table 4.6 Mean Scores for Luck and Task Difficulty by Group 
(High Scores Indicate More Agreement)
LUCK - SELF
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
Your Good Luck*
2.8750 
2.4103 
3.4750 
2.9244
Your Bad Luck**
2.5897
2.8684
2.2250
2.5556
LUCK - OPPONENTS
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Total
Your Opponent's 
Bad Luck** 
2.6154 
2.1892 
3.1750 
2.6724
Your Opponent's 
Good Luck** 
2.7949 
3.1579 
2.3750 
2.7692
TASK DIFFICULTY
No information 
Losing information 
Winning information 
Tot al
Ease of the Game*
3.4250 
2.8158 
3.1750 
3.1441
Difficulty of 
the Game 
3.3250 
3.5000 
3.1250 
3.3103
* - sig. of F £  .05 
** = sig. of F £- .01
To summarize results of 'external' factors, then, outcome information 
was found to influence attributions in the areas of luck and task difficulty, 
and responses formed logical, well-defined patterns of attribution.
Overall, 'external' attributions of both relative and absolute 
types conformed to expectations, and showed winners to attribute more 
to their own good (and opponent's bad) luck, while losers attributed 
more to their bad (and opponent's good) luck. The winner also saw the 
game as easier than losers.
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Those with no information drifted somewhere in between in both cases, 
clearly a different picture from the one painted of attributions to 
the self (in which the no information group formed attributions similar 
to the winning information group). The explanation again stems from 
the threat to the self which did not occur in attributions to luck or 
task difficulty. This adds further support to the self-serving approach 
to information-processing.
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4.8.5 Svimcœy of Results
1. Those winning sports personalities were more likely to:
Hypothesis
la - not be more challenged by the game.
lb - not be more motivated regarding the game (interested
in the game and felt it important to winning); 
but self-trusters were more likely to be motivated.
Ic - not be more confident in the game; but self-trusters
were more likely to be motivated.
Id - not expect to win more often; but self-trusters
are more likely to expect to win.
le - not feel anxious about the game and life in general;
self-trusters are also less likely to feel anxious.
If - not be worried about the game and about life in
general, not be worried about what others think of 
their game and about them in general, not be anxious 
about living up to expectations in the game and 
in life ; self-doubters are also less likely to feel 
these worries.
2. Sports personality was not predictive of absolute attributional 
responses although self-trust/distrust was. Neither measure was 
responsible for a significant variation in relative attributions. 
Subjects high in self-doubt attributed more often to their own 
poor ability than self-trusting subjects, and generally anxious 
subjects attributed more often to their own poor ability and 
effort then less anxious subjects.
3. Attributions to opponents differed for the three groups. The group 
given winning information attributed more to the opponent's poor 
ability and effort than those given losing information; while 
those given losing information attributed more to opponent's 
positive ability and effort than those given winning information. 
However, support for self-serving bias was not found, as losers 
attributed more to negative self-attributions (their own poor 
ability and effort) than winners.
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4. A schemata-based approach was supported. Those given no 
information regarding outcome attributed similarly to winners. 
These findings support both a schemata-based and motivational 
approach to information-processing.
5. Other findings are summarized in Figure 4.3 which, examines the 
effects of sports experience on personality, expectations and 
attributions.
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4.9 DISCUSSION
Subjects in th.e present study were rated in terras of tHeir sports 
personality. Tire sports personality inventory was developed which 
was a self-rating scale. Subjects were found to be either raore of 
a winning-type, losing-type, or they fell soraewhere in between on 
the scale. The losers described theraselves as raore disappointed, 
apathetic, and disillusioned. They were also raore frustrated, apologetic, 
depressed, embarrassed and hesitant than winners. They considered 
theraselves to be less confident, less envied, less praised, less 
skilled at sport, less jubilant, less proud, less admired, less success­
ful, and they believed things were against them. They were less likely 
to feel that they had good sports ability. In fact, their belief in 
their own ability overall was less, and they made fewer attributions 
to their own good ability as well. The personality extremes could 
be shown as follows:
LosersWinners
Sports Personality
Losers were generally raore anxious about life. Their anxiety was 
far-reaching. Many different factors caused anxiety, including factors 
’other than the game'. What others think of them in general, and living 
up to expectations, are two areas of their anxiety. They seem to be 
concerned with their self-image, and they feel that their self-image 
is dependent on what others think of them.
The worry and anxiety which losers feel is evidenced in sport as 
well. They report being worried about the game today, and about the 
game next week. This worry causes feelings of anxiety about the game 
and how they will perform. They are worried about what others will think 
of their game and about living up to expectations regarding the game.
They don't see that anxiety about the game is limited to theraselves 
either ; they believe that others worry about the game as well.
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These worries and fears extend not only to emotional feelings of 
threat, hut also to physical feelings of threat. Losing-types reported 
being more physically threatened by the game than winning-types.
Anxiety is therefore included in the flow chart, which shows that 
winning-type individuals are lower in anxiety than losing-types;
Low Anxiety High Anxiety
Sports Personality
Losers CSelf-Doubters)Winners (Self-Trusters)
The perceptions and expectations of losers, as might be expected, 
shows little trust in themselves. The anxiety-prone individuals are 
also less confident about the game. Those who are high in self-trust 
also expect to win more often, are more motivated and confident.
In Chapter 2 those who expected to lose usually did lose - perhaps 
a self-fulfilling prophesy. Adding expectations to the flow chart, then, 
results from the present study confirmed earlier findings;
Low Anxiety
Expect to Win
High Anxiety
Expect to Lose
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The next question is whether experience in sport is related to 
the sports personality of the subject. In fact, participation in 
sports did not distinguish- doubters from trusters, but skill in sport 
did. Those who are skilled at sport are generally less anxious and 
more self-trusting than those who are not skilled (regardless of whether 
the skill is in a team or individual sport.) Adding the effects of 
sports participation to the model, then, makes the following changes to 
the flow chart:
Sports Personality
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
Lack of 
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
Winners
Self-Trust
Losers
Self-Doubt
High AnxietyLow Anxiety
Expect to Win Expect to Lose
Although direction of causality can only be inferred based on logic, 
the proposed model is supported by results. It seems then that those 
subjects who admit to being ’skilled’ are more likely to see themselves 
as confident, successful, etc. They are also more willing to take 
credit for their own good ability. The non-skilled group are more 
likely to see themselves as frustrated, hesitant, etc. They are generally 
more anxious, and they attribute more to their own poor ability and 
effort than their relaxed counterparts. The addition of attributional 
elements to the attributional model thus forms the following flow 
chart:
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Low Anxiety High Anxiety
Expect to Win Expect to Lose
Winners
Self-Trust
Losers
Self-Doubt
Sports Personality
Lack of 
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
Positive 
Initial 
Attributions 
to Self
Negative 
Initial 
Attributions 
to Self
The initial attributions may later be influenced by bias if a 
threat to self-esteem is evidenced, and may therefore differ from final 
attributions to self.
It is proposed that a vicious circle occurs, as expectations lead 
to events which lead to attributions Call of which depend on the sports 
personality of the individual). Some researchers might argue that to 
change the attributions will change the expectations, and thus inter­
vention is called for in order to break a negative cycle. Others might 
call for a change in expectations which would lead to a change in 
attributions. Internal-external change techniques were discussed in 
detail in Chapter 1, and could be studied further in relation to sports 
personality by those with an interest in more practical applications 
of this work. The present study is mainly concerned with establishing 
a theoretical base and therefore foregoes practical aspects for the 
time being. The flow charts sum up the theoretical view of sports
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personality and explain how personality, expectations, and attributions 
form a relationship.
What needs to be added to the picture is the concept of threat.
Some doubters may feel that admitting to their own poor ability would 
be threatening, so these individuals would alter attributional responses 
and give biased accounts of their own good ability. Other doubters 
may have a poor self-image which already encompasses an image of them­
selves as having poor ability. To these subjects, even being given 
information in the experiment that told them they had good ability was 
not enough to convince them. Perhaps their self-image was so weak that 
they couldn't even imagine themselves to be skilled. Then, if that were 
the case, their poor ability would not be threatening, but would fit 
into their existing image of themselves as a 'loser*. Therefore, their 
attributions would be to their own poor ability.
In the field experiment in Chapter 2, it was probably the case 
that club players were more often trusters than doubters. The players 
who opt to play for a club are probably fairly confident and successful, 
or they might have dropped out of the sport. Those teams studied in 
Chapter 2 were all 1st XI team members which also would lead to the 
expectation that they would be either 1. trusters or 2. doubters who 
would feel threatened by making self-attributions to their own poor 
ability. Perhaps this is why results of the previous experiment showed 
no significant differences in attributions to one's own ability. Bias 
might have been the result of threat which is clearly evidenced in 
feelings of anxiety and worry in both studies.
The next step then is to examine results in terms of anxiety and 
responses to questions about threat. Self-doubters have been shown to 
feel more physically threatened by the game than those who score high 
on the self-trust scale. The threat is also evidenced by greater anxiety 
about the game and their performance. Therefore it is safe to say that 
certain amounts of threat can be 'internal' to ther person — i.e. caused 
by the individual's personality.
Threat is also apparent in external forms as well. Outcome 
information can be threatening. Examples might be a winner who fears
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success, or a high, achiever who loses. In eith_er case, outcome 
information could lead to threat. Both self-doubters and trusters are 
open to threat. Both may feel threatened by either internal or 
external factors. When threat occurs, bias creeps into the attributional 
process, as the individual attempts to maintain their self-image.
Thosesubjects whose initial attributions were positive will feel 
largely unthreatened because of their positive self-image.
The self-trusters will attribute to positive causes more often 
than self-doubters because their personality allows them to see them­
selves in a positive light regardless of outcome. The winners would 
have no reason to feel threatened by success unless they were in the 
minority of subjects who might fear success. CIt is assumed the number 
would not influence results). Losers who were self-trusting would 
probably feel threatened by the thought of losing, would make initial 
attributions to negative aspects of the self, and would then bias 
responses to maintain the self-esteem and make positive-self attributions
To summarize, most self-trusters will make positive attributions 
to the self because little internal threat is present, based on 
personality. Those who do feel threat will bias responses in favour of 
a positive self-image. External threat in terms of losing outcome 
information may be present, but will again be utilized and then biased 
in favour of positive self-attributions. The flow chart would look 
like this, beginning from the positive initial attributions:
Initial
Attributions
Internal/External
Threat
Threat
Bias
Attributions
P = Positive Attributions
I = Internal Threat 0 Absent ® Present
E = External Threat 0 Absent ® Present
I I Bias Absent 
Bias Present
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The self-doubters, on the other hand, were found to report both 
internal and external threat to a greater extent than self-trusters. 
They felt more threatened by the game and anxious about it as well.
The feelings of threat were internal and inherent in their personality. 
If a non-motivational technique rather than a motivational 
technique was employed the flow chart would have looked like this for 
self-doubters:
/\ A
□ □ □ □
N N N N
However, results did not confirm this. Instead, results showed 
the following:
N
/\ /\
O ' ®  0 #
□
N
□
N
These results supported a motivational bias. The self-doubters 
attributed more often to negative aspects of their ability than self- 
trusters. Anxious subjects also attributed more to their own poor 
ability than low anxious subjects. These findings are supported by 
the model which follows:
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□
0 0 0
□
P P P P
E
A  / \
0 9 0 0
1 I I nm a
N P N P
The importance of the task to the individual may be crucial in determining 
whether or not threat exists. Certain levels of threat may be tolerated, 
while more threat may lead to bias. The individuals' personality may 
be a factor in how much threat can be tolerated before resorting to 
bias in order to protect the self-esteem.
Figure 4.4 summarizes the proposed model in full, explaining the 
information-processing components tested in this chapter.
Looking at the results of outcome information, it appears that those 
given winning information made positive attributions to one's own ability, 
while those given losing information tended to make attributions to their 
poor ability. This appears to be in conflict with the results of the 
experiment in Chapter 2 where both winners and losers attributed to 
positive ability. The proposed explanation for these differences lies 
in the perception of threat. If winners and losers are shown in the 
following model, the effects of threat can be seen:
Threat
Bias
0
/ \  
0 9
□
□
/\ 
0 ®
□
P P N
W
L
Winners
Losers
Figure 4.4 Attributions Based on Personality, Anxiety, 
Expectations and Threat
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Factors Factors Factors Factors
□ □ □
N
□
N
ExternalInternal Internal External
Personality
Low
Anxiety
High
Anxiety
Expect
to
Lose
LOSERS
Self-Doubt
WINNERS
Self-Trust
Expect
to
Win
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
Lack of 
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
No Threat 
Threat
G  = No Bias 
= Bias
P = Positive Attributions 
to Own Ability
N = Negative Attributions 
to Own Ability
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In both, cases (the 'real' situation or the 'imaginary’ one) threat 
can be a factor. The difference in results may be due to results of 
the losers. Those club players who lost may have experienced more threat 
than the imaginary losers who filled out the questionnaire. Therefore 
more 'actual' losers may have experienced threat and produced positive 
attributions as a result of bias. The 'imaginary' losers may have 
felt less threat and evidenced less bias in their attributional responses, 
leading to more negative attributions. To simplify the presentation of 
these ideas, the following relationship will be incorporated into the 
information-processing model in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5 The Effects of Personality on Attributions
Skilled at Sport
Expectations
Initial Attribution
Bias
1f
Alter
Initial
Attributions
No Bias
Maintain
Initial
Attributions
Some differences occurred between results of overall sports 
personality scale and the self-doubt/trust scale.
The two differ in areas such as levels of confidence and expect­
ations about winning. While doubters expected to lose, overall sports
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personality did not find this to be the case. Doubters had less 
confidence and expected to win less often. Doubting subjects showed high 
degrees of anxiety, and anxiety influenced attributions. Subjects high 
in anxiety attributed more often to their own poor ability and effort 
than those low in anxiety.
The important point, then, about sports personality is that it has 
dimensions, and can be measured using various criterion. Self-doubt, 
for example, can be used to measure personality. Regardless of 
whether the sub-scale is used, however, certain principles apply.
The model. Figure 4.5, shows how threat that is experienced may lead 
to bias and ultimately to alterations or maintainence of initial attributions 
as proposed. Other dimensions may exist regarding personality which may 
be relevant, but self-doubt was the dimension identified in the present 
study.
The present study, then, examined personality to assess the impact of 
sports personality on expectations and perceptions about the game. It was 
also the aim of the present study to establish the relationship between 
self-perception and causal attributions using the sports personality invent­
ory .
All that remains, then, is to examine the motivational vs. non.-motiva- 
tional dilemma in more detail, particularly regarding the hypotheses 
proposed in the present study and relative to earlier findings in Chapter
2. Of particular interest are results of the group herein given no 
outcome information and implications these results may have in terms of 
the utilization of schema when information is unavailable.
With this in mind, further examination of attributions was undertaken 
relative to outcome information.
When outcome information is available, it is generally used to make 
attributions. At the end of an actual game the winners make different 
attributions from losers. The experiment in Chapter 2 found opponent 
attributions to vary according to outcome.
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In the present experiment subjects were asked to imagine that
they'd played a game, and again those given winning outcome information
differed in attributions from those given losing outcome information.
In the'imaginary' setting, though, even greater variation occurred.
Winners and losers still differed in attributions to opponents, and they
also differed in attributions to the self, to luck, and to task difficulty
»
Winners tended to credit themselves, and losers tended to blame them­
selves in the imaginary setting; while both groups credited themselves 
in a real game. In other words, more bias occurred in the real than 
in the imaginary setting. The explanation for greater bias lies in the 
fact that more threat occurs in a 'real' than 'imaginary' situation, 
causing more bias in attributions.
Thus, the effect of threat on self-esteem is responsible for 
attributional patterns. An example of this can be seen in ability 
attributions. In the field, winners credited their good ability, and 
so did losers. But in the imaginary setting, losers admitted to poor 
ability. Although the example seems quite simple and straightforward, 
the implications in terms of information-processing are far-reaching.
These results show that being given the same types of information does not 
always result in the same types of attribution.
If a purely non-motivational technique were employed, the 
real and imaginary responses would be the same. Both were given outcome 
information, but responses to this information were different. The 
threat inherent in exposing oneself to evaluation by others was evident 
in subject's responses to questions about anxiety, lending further 
support to the contention of greater threat in the field.
The other aspect to be considered in comparisons of field work and 
scenarios is that more information is available to those who have actually 
played the game. Taking this one step further, that also means that less 
information is available to the 'imaginary' group. If less information 
is available, it could be expected that more use would be made of causal 
schemata in an attempt to form relationships between causes and effects.
Developing Kelley's (1973) concept of causal schemata as priori 
beliefs about such relationships, one might expect subjects to draw on
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preconceived beliefs about what generally causes people to win or to 
lose. If this were the case, the ’imaginary' group would make greater 
use of causal schemata than those in the 'real' setting, as less 
information would be available to them. If, for example, the schemata 
of what it takes to lose involves one's own poor ability, then it 
would be the case that attributions in the imaginary setting would be 
made more often to one's own poor ability than attributions in the 
actual setting. This was, in fact, found to be the case.
To take this line of argument one step further, one would also _ 
expect the no-information group in the imaginary setting to make more 
use of schemata than those in the winning information 'imaginary* group 
or the losing information 'imaginary* group. Because this group was 
given no outcome information at all, they would need to rely more on 
causal schemata in order to form cause/effect relationships. However, 
they did not have any outcome information and would therefore be 
unsure of whether to use a losing or a winning schemata. Without 
information telling them they had lost, many might prefer to protect 
their self-image and assume they had won, or at least draw on a 
winning schemata. If this were the case, the no-information group 
would make self-attributions in a manner similar to the winning 
information group, which they did. Similarly, they also both attributed 
to the opponent's poor ability more than losers. Their causal schemata 
then would appear as in Figure 4.6.
Figure 4.6 Causal Schemata for Winning and Losing
Your
Ability
Good W
Your
Good W
Poor L
Effort
Poor L
Poor Good Poor Good
Your
Luck
Your Opponent's 
Ability
W = WIN
Your Opponent's 
Effort
L = LOSS
Good
Poor
Poor Good
Your Opponent's 
Luck
Figure 4.6 further introduces winning and losing effects of effort and 
luck. Results of the present experiment showed that those with winning
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information made more attributions to their own good ability, effort, 
and luck, as well as to their opponent’s poor ability, effort and luck, 
as expected. Incidently, they also saw the game as easier than losers 
as well, which may have been the result of comparisons of ability 
levels, effort, and so forth, between the self and the opponent.
Results showed that losers more often attributed to their own poor 
ability, effort, and luck, as well as their opponent's good ability 
and luck. (The mean for opponent’s good effort (M = 3.7692) was also 
higher than the mean for winners (M = 3.4750) but did not reach signifi­
cance) .
Overall, then, results confirmed the causal schemata regarding 
winning and losing, at least for those groups given outcome information. 
The next step is to examine the no outcome information group. As 
previously stated, it is expected that those with no information would 
attribute in a manner similar to winners regarding the self, in an 
effort to protect self-esteem. Results of Hypothesis 4 showed that they 
did make self-attributions in a self-enhancing manner. They attributed 
to their own good ability and effort, as did the winners. It was also 
expected that they would attribute to opponent's poor ability and effort 
as results also confirmed.
The no-information group did not use a 'losing' schemata. They 
did not make attributions to their own poor ability and effort in a 
manner similar to losers (see Hypothesis 4). They also did not make 
attributions to opponent's good effort like losers did.
They did, however, make attributions to the opponent's good ability. 
This could be for three reasons. First, it is not a threat to Credit 
the opponent's good ability. Second, information was given to all 
groups that they were playing for a university team against a neighbouring 
university team. Perhaps, they assumed ability levels of the opponent 
to be good, based on this information. The third possibility is that 
results were in the projected direction, but merely failed to reach 
significance.
190
To summarize, then, results showed that the no-information group's 
attributional patterns were similar to the winning information group. 
Those without information attributed in a manner which was motivational, 
which was self-serving, and which utilized a causal schemata.
The results of the experiment in Chapter 2 showed that even those 
given losing information utilized a winning schemata in order to protect 
their self-esteem. Discussion earlier, regarding the personality of 
those club players, may be one factor in their choice of winning rather 
than losing schemata.
In the present study, the fact that the losing information group 
did make negative self-attributions led to the rejection of Hypothesis 3, 
and the conclusion that less self-serving and more non-motivational 
methods were utilized in this situation than in a more threatening 
situation in the field.
However, a motivational approach need not be totally eliminated,as 
the no-infbrmation group's results contradicted a purely non- 
motivational technique. The fact that they elected to attribute in a 
self-serving manner shows motivational support.
In order to further clarify the relationship between schemata and 
attributions, then, the following is proposed:
Input
Schemata
Initial
Attributions
Outcome information
Outcome information is processed as input, as evidenced by differences 
in responses between winners and losers. Schemata exist in the individual's 
minds regarding winning and losing, and this schemata is particularly 
important to those with no outcome information. Cause/effect relation-
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ships are then processed as input based on schemata regarding winning 
and losing. Then causàl attributions are formed, which may later be 
modified before final attributions are made.
To combine the findings regarding personality with findings regarding 
outcome, then, the information-processing model is developed in Figure 4.7
Figure 4.7 The Information-Processing Model
Personality
Expectations/ 
Perceptions 
About The 
Game
Experience
Input Outcome Information
Schemata
Initial
Attributions
Threat?
Bias?
Final
Attributions
When applied to the self-doubt/trust aspects of personality, as 
described in the present experiment, the model would appear as in Figure 
4.8.
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Figure 4.3 A Practical Application of the Information-Processing Model
Personality
WINNERS LOSERS
Self-Trust Self-Doubt
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
High Expectations 
of Winning
Outcome
Unknown/Win/Lose
Bias
No Need to 
Alter 
Initial 
Attribution
Low Expectations 
of Winning ^
Outcome
Unknown/Win/Lose
Losing 
Schemata
Winning
Schemata
Positive Negative
Initial Self- Initial Self-
Attributions Attributions
No No
Threat Threat Threat Threat
Bias BiasBi as
Maintain
Initial
Attribu­
tion
Alter
Initial
Attribu­
tion
Maintain
Initial
Attribu­
tion
Lack of 
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
N
P = Positive N = Negative
193
Further additions could be made to expand the model. These would 
include areas previously discussed such as internal vs. external threat 
or high vs. low anxiety levels. If these were included, anxiety would 
be included in the perception/expectations section, and the internal/ 
external threat would expand final attributions to include eight 
attributional categories as opposed to four as used in Figure 4.8.
The aims of Chapter 4 have thus been met, and the four hypotheses 
tested. The sports personality inventory has proven to be a useful 
measure in assessing information-processing techniques. Results of 
the chapter show that personality is an integral part of this information- 
processing technique. Like locus of control measures, sports personality 
measures are predictive of attributional responses. Personality also 
affects the subject's expectations about the game and their feelings 
of anxiety and threat which may eventually lead to bias in the 
attributional framework.
Causal schemata are found to exist regarding winning and losing, 
and are utilized in a self-serving manner by those with no outcome 
information. These schemata were more strictly adhered to and less 
bias resulted in the present study than the study reported earlier in 
Chapter 2. In an imaginary setting, with less information available 
and less threat from evaluation by others, attributions were made in 
a manner which demonstrated the use of schemata. Support was not found 
for an motivational Cvs. non-motivational) model, and explanations 
were given for these results which showed a lack of threat to be the 
main reason for a lack of bias.
Finally, a model was proposed for information-processing in sport 
based on results from this experiment.
CHAPTER 5 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE : 
PERCEPTION IN SPORT
5. REVIEW OF LITERATURE: PERCEPTION IN SPORT
Having established what attributions are in Chapter 1 and 
examined the type of attributions made by players in a real setting 
(Chapter 2) as well as in an imaginary setting (Chapter 4), much can 
be said about various aspects of attributions. It has become clear 
in Chapter 2 that winners and losers differ in attributions, and in 
Chapter 4 that the personality of the individual affects their 
explanations. A motivational approach has been supported in both of 
these Chapters. Chapter 4 also established that schema exist regarding 
sport and specifically, winning and losing. The processes of explaining 
have thus been scrutinized in order to better understand how information 
is processed. A model has been proposed which links the various aspects 
of information processing into one easily understood concept.
5.1 ATTRIBUTIONS AND PERCEPTION
The final step which is carried out in Chapters 5 and 6 is to 
examine the perceptual aspects of the game to see whether explanations 
regarding the mental game (those found in the lab) show similar 
motivational biases to those found in the physical and imaginary game 
(in the field). In order to assess attributions following perceptual 
tasks, an understanding of thé perception and the factors which lead to 
perceptual success must be identified. Chapter 5, therefore, delves 
into the literature regarding perceptions, while Chapter 6 carries out 
a series of experiments in the lab which involve perceptual tasks and 
subsequent attributions.
The model of information processing is therefore expanded to include 
actual success at perceptual tasks in sport which will later be related 
further to attributions:
Personality
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Expectations/Perceptions 
about the game
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5.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF PERCEPTION AND THE ÜÆNTAL GAME : NATIVIST vs 
EMPIRICIST'S VIEWS
The importance of the mental game in sport has had much attention 
in the past decade. Sportsmen and women have come to accept the concept 
of body and mind unity, making the dichotomy of the physical and mental 
game a thing of the past. Training programmes of serious athletes include 
both physical and mental training, as techniques in both areas provide 
evidence of attempts to improve performance.
In order to justify this new-found belief in the importance of 
perception in sport, various steps must be taken by researchers, such 
as examining the rationalization of mental techniques and making 
proposals in areas which have too often in the past been reliant on 
common sense rather than empirical studies.
A clear definition of components in perception is, thus, the 
first step in understanding sport's perception. Researchers need to 
examine, as some have already done, whether perceptions in sport can 
be improved through learning. Examination of experience vs genetic 
factors is the logical progression in identifying the degree to which 
innate factors affect the rate and success of learning.
Following a definition of processes involved and their component 
parts, those deemed significant in sport heed examination. The effect 
of visual unity, peripheral vision, and depth perception need to be . 
examined as do skills in attention, short- and long-term memory, 
decision-making, and anticipation.
Factors which might affect perception, such as sex and experience 
levels in sport, as well as the usefulness of practice, are more practical 
applications of knowledge.
Finally, research carried out in sport psychology is examined 
as relevant to the present study. Practical suggestions are examined 
through the related literature.
It is with these ideas in mind, that this related literature 
section examines research in perception. As no past studies have
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related attributions to perceptual skills in sport, this literature 
review is limited to a survey of research purely in perception. The 
relationship between these studies and the attributional work carried 
out in the present study will, therefore, be examined in Chapter 6 
which ties findings of past research to results of Chapters 2 and 4.
The first step in an understanding of perception in sport is to 
examine two theories : The Nativist and The Empiricist views. The
nativist view maintains that our perception is the result of abilities 
to perceive which we are born with, while the empiricist view maintains 
that we learn to perceive through experience. Many believe, in fact, 
that a combination of these two views is more realistic, believing 
that perceptual capacity is innate, but the degree to which this 
capacity is utilized is a function of past experience.
It is a well-known fact that individuals have different levels 
of ability and different levels of skill, causing different rates of 
motor development and different potentialities. As Whiting (Whiting, 
Hardman, Hendry, and Jones, 1973, P.4) stated^ "Subjects come to any 
skill learning situation with different backgrounds of experience which 
will affect their skill development". He saw early perceptual motor 
experience as an interaction between experience and genetic predisposition.
Another proponent of the importance of experience, Tichener (1916), 
developed a "core-context" theory which looked at the dynamic qualities 
rather than the static qualities of the mechanical processes. "According 
to Tichener, perception consisted of a core of immediate sensations and 
of secondary sensations contributed by past experiences. The learned 
context of the experience, therefore, was felt to vary considerably 
from individual to individual, whereas the immediate core remained 
relatively stable" (Cratty, 1973, P.53). Tichener felt that variations 
occuring in meanings could be "mainly" attributable to the individual's 
past experience in similar situations.
Other proponents of the importance of experience are Cratty (1973) 
and Boring (1950) who support the core-context theory. Cratty (1973, P.54) 
said, "Although visual perceptions were initially dependent on the 
retinal size of the image (the core), exact estimation of size, distance, 
speed, and the like, depended on the learned aspects of the context or 
the relationship to other objects". Helson pointed also to the importance
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Of learning and experience. "Pooling" is a term used by Helson (1951) 
who stated that past experiences pool together and influence judgement.
He pointed to three factors important in the perceptual process:
1. The stimulus or object which gains attention, 2. other objects 
in the immediate background, and 3. the effects of objects in past 
experiences which form the 'pool' or 'residual stimuli'.
Emphasising, on the other hand, innate qualities, Jones et. al.
(1972, p. 105)contended that, "Some people may have an innately 
superior nervous system". If success at sport is at least partly innate, 
then a superior nervous system would lead to success in sport. It is 
these differences, plus the effects of experience, which are the focus 
of much related literature.
Several stages are involved in processing information in sport.
It is these stages which are the basic outline for this Chapter. First, 
certain aspects of the environment are attended to. Those which are 
considered relevant are picked up by the senses. This information is 
organized and interpreted through a process generally known as 
'perception'. The information is encoded, stored in memory, and then 
retrieved for use. These three stages: attention, memory and retrieval 
are the major headings of Chapter 5,
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5,3 ATTENTION
Many stimuli are present during a sports game like hockey.
It is the task of the player to select stimuli to attend to which, 
through the senses^ become available as input. Some information is 
processed without conscious attention being paid to details, while 
other information is. processed with purposeful attention.
Much information is available, and only relevant stimuli is 
attended to in a conscious manner. What information is selected is 
a major factor in perceptual success in sports. Both internal factors 
(such as expectations or motivation) as well as external factors (such 
as the size, colour and shape of stimuli) determine the stimulus to 
which we attend.
Exactly which determinants of selection are utilized is of 
primary interest in the studies in Chapter 6 which assess how cues 
are utilized in perceptual skills in hockey. Subjects will be asked 
to view slides and explain which cues were used for attention. Therefore, 
studies in determinants of selection will now be examined. Studies in 
the past do not agree, however, as to which cues afe most used or most 
successfully used. Location, shape, and colour are the most important 
cues in the majority of studies.
Kolers (1972, p.134), for example, believes that information 
regarding location has a 'lower threshold' than information regarding 
brightness or colour. He explains, "One can tell where something is 
on the basis of less information than one can tell what something is; 
and one can tell what a shape is before one can make a correct state­
ment about it's brightness or colour". He points to three aspects; 
location, shape, and colour as means by which input can be analyzed.
Location has been found to be the best cue for looking by many 
researchers. It is believed to be superior to other cues of colour, 
brightness, shape, size and orientation. (Von Wright, 1968, 1970, 1972; 
Keren, 1976; and Bongartz and Scheerer, 1976).
Colour is the preferred cue by others like Underwood (1978) who 
compared colour, shape, brightness and category; Cockerill and 
MacGillivary (1981) who compared colour, brightness, size, and sound ;
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and Smith and Thomas (1964) who compared colour and shape.
Other determiners felt to be of prime importance are shape 
(Vernon, 1966 and Rosinski and Faber, 1980); location and distance 
information, acceleration, direction, and velocity (Stelmach, 1974); 
and a variety of modes of perception pointed out by Pick and Saltzman 
(1978) including texture, linear perspective, aerial perspective, 
superimpositioning, relative size, flatness and depth.
The interest with regard to the present study is to assess which 
determiners hockey players use, and whether those who are successful 
use different cues, culminating in a study of attributions regarding 
the perceptual task. The following Chapter also assesses the effect 
of prior cueing on the ability to remember positions of hockey players 
in game slides. Three areas of interest will be presented; li which 
cues are most commonly used, 2. which cues are most successful and,
3. what effect prior cueing has on perceptual success. The effects 
of prior cueing will also be examined in terms of psychological variables 
such as frustration and motivation and attributions.
The purpose of examining attentional cues in the present study 
is to further understand information-processing success in order to 
explain attributional biases which occur in the process. The effects 
of information going in as input will be interpreted in light of 
expectancies and psychological variables as portrayed in the following 
aspects of the proposed information-processing model;
Personality
vV .
Expectations About
Performance
i
Input
i
Schemata
i
Initial Attributions
i
Threat
I
Bias
i
Final Attributions
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Again, personality causes certain expectations about performance. 
Some will expect to succeed in the perceptual tasks more than others. 
Information will be interpreted in light of a winning schemata. Again, 
attributions will be made, and if the initial attribution threatens 
the individual’s self-concept, bias will be employed, resulting in 
final attributions which are self-serving.
Schemata may also play a part in success at perceptual skills.
Past hockey experience may provide players with more information than 
that available to non-players. Players may utilize different schema 
in processing information than non-players. Thus, the type of 
information utilized, plus the manner in which it is utilized is 
important. Because no past literature has examined attributions 
following sports perceptual tasks, only literature about the means 
of success in perceptual tasks can be examined. The explanations for 
success obviously need further study.
In the past, researchers outside of sport have found certain 
limitations to be responsible for errors in information-processing or 
in failing to remember. These limitations have been shown to sometimes 
be associated with span of attention. Early studies showed how varied 
attention span can be either due to innate deficiencies or failures 
to learn to attend.
Early works in the span of attention date back to as early as 
1887, when Jacobs (1887) reported that subjects could repeat with 
complete accuracy, on average, ten random digits. The subjects were 
in their late teens. Later, Cardozo and Leopold (1963) found that 
subjects could report six digits "every time". They found averages 
to be between seven and eight digits recalled 50% of the time.
Alphabet letters were found to be less in both cases.
When discussing the number of objects which can be apprehended, 
it is important to look at Woodworth (1938) who wrote about a lecture 
by Hamilton in 1859. He said, "How many of several objects can the 
mind simultaneously survey not with vivacity, but without absolute 
confusion?... You can easily make the experiment for yourselves, but 
you must be aware of grouping the objects into classes. If you throw 
a handful of marbles on the floor, you will find it difficult to view
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at once more than six, or seven at most, without confusion; but if 
you group them into twos, or threes, or fives, you can comprehend as 
many groups as you can units; because the mind considers these groups 
only as units."
Fitts and Posner (1973 p. 61) discussed Hamilton's work 
saying, "Hamilton had a conception of both a limit to the number of 
separate items which can be grasped simultaneously, (span of attention), 
and the importance of the role of active grouping in determining this 
limit". The role of 'grouping' will be addressed later in the present 
Chapter in the section on memory.
Attention span is obviously dependent on the amount of information 
available and the time available. The span of attention is dependent 
upon exposure time according to Averbach (1963), and Fitts and Posner 
(1973). Dots were presented for a 100-milisecond viewing, then subjects 
were asked to report the number of dots present. Fitts and Posner 
(1973, p. 62), reported, "The level of accuracy increases at the 
rate of one item every ten miliseconds until a total of eight items 
is reached." Glanville and Dallenbach (1920) found that, "The average 
number of objects reported with complete accuracy were as follows: 
number of dots, 8.8; number of letters, 6.9; number of geometric 
forms, 3.8; number of forms identified by both shape and colour, 3.0.
It is clear that the more information that was called for, the fewer 
the number of objects that were reported correctly" (Fitts and Posner, 
1973, p. 61).
The type of information to be reported influences success as 
well. Mackworth (1964) found that letters, digits, shapes, and colours 
could be read aloud at various rates, with digits fastest, letters 
next, then colours and shapes. The number of each which could be 
reported after a brief exposure was also greater for digits and 
smaller for shapes. The conclusion is that "the faster the items 
could be named, the greater the number of them reported" (Fitts 
and Posner, 1973, p. 62). This points to the importance of the 
type of information available for input.
On a more practical note, Jones et.al. (1972) pointed out that 
sports performance can be improved by improving selective attention, 
emphasizing the role of the coach in pointing out those parts of the
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display to which one should be Orientated. She points to three 
main points to consider (p. 106) "1. Whether the player has the 
'ability' to attend selectively to the most useful sources of 
information.... 2. the amount of information in the display... and
3. the time available.
Factors felt to influence 'effectiveness' of attention include 
arousal levels, habituation, distraction, stress, and individual 
differences such as personality factors. It is clear then, that 
attention depends on attention span and also on an interaction of 
various other factors which could lead to efficient or inefficient 
information-processing.
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5.4 MEMORY
Failure to perceive a hockey situation correctly can come not 
only from a failure to attend to relevant aspects of the stimuli, but 
also from failure of the memory processes to encode or store the 
information properly. Limitations may exist innately which limit the 
ability to remember information;a limited memory-span, like a limited 
attention span can be responsible for processing defects.
Ebbinghaus (1913) was the first to study memory scientifically.
He learned information, relearned it at a later date, then measured 
the amount of information forgotten and plotted this on what he called 
a ’forgetting curve’.
Two other theorists, Broadbent (1958) and Miller (1956), were 
largely responsible for contributions which marked the beginning of the 
modern study of memory in the I960’s.
Broadbent’s (1958) filter theory was based on the belief that a 
’filter’ exists at the entrance to the nervous system which allows 
only certain stimuli to pass. Stimuli that are intense physically, 
of great biological importance, or are novel are given priority. When 
stimuli compete for priority, performance decrements occur. This idea 
was in contrast to a stimulus-response approach in explaining information- 
processing.
Others, such as Treisman (1964), have argued for not so much of 
an all-or-none approach to the type of ’switch’ used, but more 
’attenuating’ irrelevant signals; as unattended signals receive less 
processing than attended signals.
While Broadbent explained memory in filter-theory terms. Miller 
(1956) explained memory in terms of ’chunking'. Building on early 
work by Ebbinghaus who found his own memory capacity to be seven items. 
Miller (1956) carried out work on what he called the 'magic number 
seven'. He found that the average person has a limit of seven items, 
plus or minus two. While some can remember only five items, others 
can remember nine. Miller (1956, p. 81) said that, "There seems to be 
some limitations built into us either by learning or by the design of
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our nervous systems".
The memory span is generally assessed by psychologists (showing 
either letters, words, or numbers to subjects and asking them to recall 
as many of the items as they can). The maximum number they recall is 
called their 'memory span’. Because of the very short amount of time 
given, the subject’s short-term memory, as opposed to long-term memory, 
is tested.
Thus, short-term memory is, "A system which loses information 
rapidly in the absence of sustained attention". (Fitts and Posner,
1973, p. 65). Most would agree that short-term memory involves about 
the first sixty seconds after a new stimulus is presented. After this 
time, the information is either lost or entered into long-term memory.
Memory span can be increased with practise. Fitts and Posner 
(1973) claimed that memory span can, with practise, be increased to 
include ’up to ten or twelve items’. Miller (1956, p. 93) explained 
how this can be done using a procedure called ’chunking’: "Since the 
memory span is a fixed number of chunks, we can increase the number 
of bits of information that it contains simply by building larger and 
larger chunks, each chunk containing more information than before".
The information is recoded into units called ’chunks’. Memory span 
then includes more information, as the capacity is seven chunks, plus 
or minus two.
Thus, by grouping items, such as those in a telephone number, it 
is possible to remember more numbers than if they were remembered as 
a list of individual numbers, rather than groups. To remember 
0483577447 would be difficult, but to chunk the information 0483-577447 
allows for easier recall. These numbers would be particularly easy to 
remember if information in long-term memory could be utilized. If the 
fact that all numbers in the in the town of Guildford began with 0483 
were pulled from long-term memory and utilized, along with the know­
ledge that the person being phoned lived in Guildford, the person would 
have only to remember the last chunk of the number. Even the person 
unaware of the Guildford code would be better able to remember the 
number if it were ’chunked’ than if it were not.
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Chunking is an important phenomena in sport and may explain why 
studies show athletes to have superior perceptual skills. The interesting 
thing about these studies is that when the 'meaning' or 'structure' 
was taken away, non-atheletes were equally successful,
Allard, Graham and Paarsalu (1980) studied perception in sport. 
Female university students (basketball players and non-players) were 
asked to recall slides of basketball games in which half of the slides 
were 'structured' game slides (representing offensive plays), while 
half showed 'unstructured' game slides (such as a turnover or a 
rebound).
The results showed that players were superior in recall to non­
players for structured slides only. The authors concluded that,
"perhaps an actual perceptual difference exists between players of 
varying ability levels in a sport" (Allard, Graham and Paarsalu, 1980, 
p. 14). They emphasized the link between 'skill in performing' 
and 'skill in perceiving' in sport. Thus, the span of memory is 
important, and so too is how this information is interpreted.
It must be decided then, whether a subject's ability to see 
details is separate from their ability to give meaning to visual 
representations. Klatzky (1975, p. 99) said it is "...difficult to 
separate effects of number of slots from the ability to chunk 
information".
Several studies have been carried out in which players were asked 
to remember configurations of chess pieces. de Groot (1965) found, 
for example, that expert chess players were better at remembering 
configurations but no better at remembering randomly placed chess 
pieces than weak players. Klatzky (1975, p. 311) explained these 
type of findings in the following manner:"Less experienced players 
would undoubtedly be far less able to recognize and encode clusters 
of pieces as chunks, and this would mean that their reproductive 
capacity would suffer".
Cermak- and Graik (1979) said that chess experts and novices looked 
at the same board and saw different things. They pointed out that the 
expert saw not only chess pieces but also relationships between pieces.
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strengths and weaknesses of these positions, their advantages and 
disadvantages, plays which might be possible, and what the outcome 
of the game might be, while the novice saw only 'a scattering of 
strangely shaped pieces'.
Studies in bridge as well as chess (Charness, 1976, 1979) showed 
that players' recall was superior to individuals of less skill, as did 
studies in the game of Go (Goldstein, 197S) . Again, the explanations 
were presented in terms of 'chunking' abilities. Goldstein ( 1979, p.41) 
pointed out that "...expert chess and Go players apparently store old 
positions and games in their memory, and analyze new positions, in 
terms of larger 'chunks' or perceptual units, than do weaker players". 
Although they forgot isolated moves, experts used and remembered plans 
and patterns. The experts did not have 'high general intelligence', 
but had the ability to "acquire new ideas rapidly, to create and handle 
novel positions, to recognize and quickly evaluate similarities and 
differences between various complex situations, and to isolate the 
core of a difficult problem without much hesitation" (Goldstein, 1979 , 
p. 39).
They also showed continuous re-evaluation which was rare in 
weaker players. Proficiency is gained through feedback of the strengths 
and weaknesses of plans in games. It is also interesting to note that 
the better chess players were found to be more self critical, resulting 
in the conclusion that an over-reliance on rules can lead to stero- 
typed play and 'prove disasterous' in chess.
Superior perceptual skills of experts have also been found in 
other areas. For example. Van Schoyck and Grasha (1981) found that 
superior tennis players were able to attend to larger amounts of 
information than lesser skilled players. As skills increased, 
players were able to attend to more stimuli, although an overload 
occurred at all skill levels which resulted in an inability to 
concentrate on stimuli. Individuals of differing skill levels 
differed in the types of stimuli which they could attend to, as better 
players have learned to sample wider ranges of stimuli without over­
loading. They concluded that sport-specific measures were more 
precise than general assessments of attention and should be used for 
assessment purposes.
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In another study, Chase and Simon (1973) found master chess 
players used larger chunks than novices. 75% of all of the chunks 
were found to be sorted into three categories. They concluded that 
using larger chunks, and using fewer chunks, resulted in * low memory 
demands'. It is interesting to note as well that the chunks were 
defined non-visually, as experts were found to label patterns verbally.
One final study regarding chunking was carried out by Wolff et. al. 
(1984). They found experts at the game of Othello to be superior at 
recalling meaningful game configurations, but not at recalling random 
positions. They also found that experts could learn a sequence of 
moves more rapidly than non-players. Chunking behaviour was also 
evidenced, as experts and non-players perceived different patterns of 
piece clusters.
The overall pattern of results from these studies shows that 
chunking is used by players in a different manner than non-players, 
resulting in superior perceptual abilities in sport or game-specific 
contexts. Strategies and schemata are utilized in organizing information 
received as input. This input is organized in terms of information that 
has gone before and which is in long-term memory. As Reed (1972, p. 72) 
so aptly puts it,"We recall the original items. The schemata, of 
course, are themselves the dynamic integration of items of information".
From these results, it might be expected that hockey players pre­
sented with slides of a game would have superior skills in recognition 
and recall of positions of players, and that they would also be better 
able to interpret videotaped matches of hockey matches than non-players. 
This will be tested in Chapter 6.
The important point not considered in previous research but 
examined in Chapter 6, is to examine the subject's attributions to see 
what they feel to be responsible for their perceptual success or 
failure. Most would not be expected to explain their performance in 
perceptual tasks as a psychologist would, by saying that they had 
'chunked' information in a different way, or that there was not enough 
information in their long-term memory to draw on in order to form 
these chunks. It is more likely that subjects would make attributions 
to factors which they traditionally associate with success at sport -
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that they hadn't tried hard enough, for example, or that they'd 
had bad luck. It is an examination of these attributions which is 
the aim of thé remaining Chapters.
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5.5 RETRIEVAL
The final section of perceptual studies, retrieval, is intimately 
linked to storage, as forgetting may be due to the information either 
not being in storage, or being there but not being retrieved. Failure 
to retrieve information may be similar to trying to find a phone 
number in a telephone directory. Just because you can not find it, 
does not necessarily mean its not there. The name may be spelled 
differently than expected, or the person may be living in another 
town. In this case the problem is retrieval. If the person had no 
phone at all and therefore no number in the directory, the problem 
would be in storage, as the number was never entered as input at all.
Information in storage can be recalled more easily if a 'cue' 
is involved. Knowing the name or the city of the person to be phoned 
helps in finding a phone number. Retrieval cues are therefore important 
to success at retrieving information. In recognition tasks, these 
cues are available in the form of possible alternatives which are not 
available in recall tasks. Subjects generally score lower on recall 
than recognition because of this. Davis, Sutherland, and Judd (1961) 
found this to be true. Because there were a larger number of altern­
atives in recall tests, they claimed that subjects would do better at 
recognition tasks. They found that when differences caused by chance 
guessing were eliminated, differences in recall and recognition 
scores were 'partly or wholly eliminated'.
These results are particularly important to the present study 
which assesses both recognition and recall tasks in hockey. In 
Chapter 6 subjects will be asked to choose from diagrams which match 
a slide in the recognition task, and to draw a diagram in the recall 
task. The majority of past research, including work by Spoehr and 
Lehmkuhle (1982), would lead to the expectation of superior performance 
in recognition than recall. The interest in the present study is geared 
more towards success of players vs non-players than recognition vs 
recall, so studies emphasizing experience are included.
Also, the literature is discussed here which relates to sport.
One study in sport assessed recognition vs recall, as Gomez and Gagnon (1980) 
asked 72 college ice hockey players to shoot at a goalie 10 times.
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and then later to fill out a questionnaire regarding the 'type of shot', 
'point of origin', and 'point of arrival of the puck'. Subjects 
remembered more about the origin and arrival of the puck in the 
recognition than the recall test, although type of shot showed no 
differences. These results could be predicted from previous recognition- 
recall studies and seemed to add very little to our knowledge of 
information-processing (apart from extending studies into a sports 
context).
Work previously mentioned which was carried out by Allard,
Graham, and Paarsalu (1980) also examined recognition and recall, 
using slides of basketball matches. As reported earlier, players 
were superior in recall for structured, but not unstructured slides. 
However, in recognition tasks, players were superior in both structured 
and unstructured slides. This interesting finding was explained by 
the authors as a function of 'encoding information to a deeper level 
than non-players' - an interesting but vague explanation. The present 
study examines this issue in a hockey context.
Three reasons seem plausible in accounting for superior recall 
skills as compared to recognition. First, as previously mentioned,
'cues' may facilitate retrieval, as there is less guess work involved. 
Second, it is possible that players organize the information differently 
because of schemata which result from past experience, and third, it 
is possible that the type of code used may be different in recognition 
than recall tasks.
It has been reported that, "a verbal code is utilized in tasks 
requiring the reproduction or recall of patterns, whereas a visual 
code is utilized in tasks requiring the recognition of patterns"
(Reed, 1973, p. 6). Most studies, as Reed discussed, showed that 
visual cues were utilized in recognition and verbal cues were utilized 
in recall. He proposed that visual cues may be accurate enough in 
recognition, but not in recall tasks. Perhaps, then, the coding 
results in performance differences, or perhaps it is a combination of 
one or more of these factors.
To summarize, it has been found that using a 'cue' facilitates 
retrieval. This is supported by the fact that recognition skills
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were usually superior to recall skills. Limited support for this 
contention has been found in studies of ice hockey and basketball, and 
the two tasks (recognition and recall) will be assessed in the sixth 
Chapter of the present study. The examination of the effects of 
experience on both types of tasks, rather than comparing success at 
recall to success at recognition will be emphasized.
Further studies in sport are needed because the number of studies 
which actually look at perceptual skills in sport are limited. Their 
findings do not always confirm findings in non-sports contexts.
Mandler and Parker's (1976) work is a case in point. They found 
no differences in performance for organized and unorganized slides. 
Results appeared to be in conflict with work reported by Allard, Graham 
and Paarsalu (1980), which has been previously discussed.
Mandler and Parker examine what types of information a subject 
extracted from a picture. They found that three types of memory-relevant 
information were involved:
1. an inventory of the main items in the picture,
2. the physical appearance of these items, and
3. the location of these items, including the relative spatial
relationships between them.
Their results did not show (as Allard, Graham, and Paarsalu's 
did) that organized material was more easily remembered than unorgan­
ized material, although they did feel that organization of pictures 
influenced memory. Then concluded that organization did help subjects 
to remember spatial information in pictures.
Some might argue that the medium affects perception - that 
perception of pictures may not be the same as slides (or as assessing 
the situation on the field). This does not seem to be a reason for 
differences in the findings of these two studies, however, as there 
is no evidence of inferior perception as a result, except when drawings 
were used.
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5.6 TESTING PERCEPTION
Slides, pictures and the ordinary environment result in similar 
perceptual results according to Hagen (1980, p. 25) who reported that, 
"There is almost no evidence in either the developmental or the cross- 
cultural literature to suggest any inferiority with object recognition 
in pictures relative to object recognition in the ordinary environment". 
She did point out that drawings were inferior to real scenes, however, 
although slides and prints were not different from 'the ordinary environ­
ment * .
Not only is the medium a consideration in interpreting results of 
the two studies mentioned earlier, but it is also important in terms 
of the next Chapter of the present study which examines perception by 
using slides and videotapes. These results will be compared to the 
results of Chapter 2 which took place in the field, or 'ordinary 
environment'.
Others who have discussed the medium are Nelson, Metzler,and 
Reed (1974), Loftus and Bell (1975), and Spoehr and Lehmkuhle (1982).
The first of these. Nelson, Metzler and Reed (1974), found that 
subjects who saw photographs, embellished, and unembellished line 
drawings did equally well, with all showing better than 85% 
recognition after seven weeks. Attempts by Loftus and Bell (1975) 
to replicate the study failed to show the same results.
Although they found no differences between the two line drawings, 
photographs were remembered better. Procedural differences between 
the two tests may have affected the results, as Nelson et. al. 
used a 10-second exposure, while Loftus and Bell used a tachistoscopic 
exposure of one second. As Spoehr and Lehmkuhle (1982, p. 181) put it, 
"information appears to be more easily extracted from a photograph 
than from a drawing, so that memory performance is better for photo­
graphs than drawings at short, yet equal, exposures".
Findings regarding different mediums are relevant to the present 
study, which as explained, will make use of drawings (in the form of 
diagrams) and pictures (in the form of slides). Any effect which 
the type of medium may have on perceptual success is therefore important.
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One particularly relevant study was carried out in sport which 
compared abstract figures to ’realistic’ pictures. Sport psychologists, 
Vanek and Hosek (1970), devised tests to study athlete's judgements 
in a sports context. Subjects were presented with a visual picture 
of a team game via a tachistoscope, and then they were asked to answer 
questions. Questions were asked such as the numbers of players, 
where they were going, where the ball was, what had happened before, 
what will happen after, and what they would do in the situation.
Findings showed that abstract figures were not good indicators, 
while 'realistic' pictures were. The present study employs a similar 
situation in the experiments in Chapter 6. Subjects will be asked 
to view slides in one experiment and video in the other, and questions 
will be asked in order to assess perceptual skills.
One important difference in the present study, also involving 
medium differences is the effect of movement in the video section 
of the next Chapter as compared to the slide section.
It appears from an examination of related literature that the 
question cannot be answered yet whether the visual system groups 
elements into figures similarly in moving and in stationary displays 
(see Kohlers, 1972). Some, including Sanderson (1972), feel that 
there is 'little relationship' between dynamic and static measures. 
Experiments in Chapter 6 assess both dynamic and static measures 
of perception in order to shed light on this question.
5.6.1 Time and View'ing Positions
The amount of time allowed and the viewing angle and distance
are other factors found to affect performance and are also important
variables in perceptual success. The present study must take these 
three variables into consideration in preparing the experiments to 
be carried out in Chapter 6. The amount of time, as shown in Loftus
and Bell's results, can be a crucial variable .
Time can be a tool for measuring perceptual success, as can 
accuracy. The perceptual experiments to be carried out in the present 
study use accuracy as a measure of success, being concerned more with
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who remembers correctly rather than who remembers fastest. Time is 
a factor to the extent that in some experiments, subjects will be given 
10-second viewing times, while in others subjects will be given one 
minute.
The time factor is not, however, used as a measure of success 
as it has by others (see Cratty, 1973). Measuring success by 
’correctness of response'was found by Arnoult, Gagne and Vanderplas 
(1951) to show clearer differentiation than time of response. They 
found correctness of response in visual discrimination of shapes to 
be the most differentiating of four methods:
1. Measuring correctness of response after tachistoscopic presenta­
tion of 10 to 200 m sec.
2. Measuring the time of response when pairs of stimuli were 
terminated by the subject.
3. Measuring the time needed to respond 'same' or 'different' after 
one exposure.
4. Measuring the number of .02 second exposures needed in succession 
to find the correct answer.
Based on these results and the fact that many other studies use 
correctness of response as a tool for measuring perceptual success, 
it was chosen for this study as the most appropriate method. Time can 
be manipulated in the method, as proposed in the present study, but not 
be used as a measure of success. The amount of time allotted, if 
varied, results in different tasks, and this too must be kept in mind.
For example, as early as 1951 Fitts used the terms 'visibility 
tasks' and 'legibility tasks'. Later, Hake (1966, p. 146) expanded 
on this by explaining that in visibility tasks, the subject can 
'take all of the time he needs' for perceiving and responding, while 
legibility tasks are when the subject is 'instructed to minimize the 
time required' to complete the perceptual task. He pointed out that 
both accuracy and speed are important.
The present study will examine both visibility and legibility 
tasks. In one experimental condition to be presented in the next 
Chapter, subjects will be given one minute to complete the task, and in
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another they will be allowed 10 seconds. (Pilot studies showed one 
minute to be the maximum amount of time desired). As viewing time 
is a crucial variable, its effects will be examined in this way.
Viewing angle and distance are two variables which will be held 
constant in the next Chapter's experiments. These two variables 
were considered and felt to be important because as Hagen pointed out, 
"If one changes the position of the viewing point relative to the 
photo, these angular relationships are altered and the pictured 
space is geometrically transformed" (1980, p. 25). It seems important, 
therefore, that viewing angle and distance be considered and that 
if viewing is done in groups, numbers remain small so as to allow for 
as little variation, angle and distance as possible.
5.6.2
The age of the perceiver could obviously have an effect on 
perceptual skills and therefore the present study will assess skills 
of university-aged subjects only. Two studies which have examined the 
effects of age on information-processing skills as part of motor 
development support the contention that maturation is responsible for 
differences (Welford, 1961 and Connolly, 1976). Both studies involved 
children’s perceptual and motor abilities, as did a study carried out 
by Chi (1978) which concluded that maturation is not as much the cause 
of differences in perceptual skills as are strategies. Here a different 
'process' was found to be used as the knowledge utilized differed.
As age is held as a constant in perceptual tasks in the present 
study, findings of studies related to children may seem irrelevant. 
However, they are interesting in their assessment of strategy 
formation, as different strategies can be predicted in perceptual tasks 
even within the same age group.
Strategies have, for example, been found to appear to go through 
processes ranging from: a total absence, often called 'mediational 
deficiency'; to the use of strategies when instructions are given to 
do so, called 'production deficiency'; to spontaneous generation of 
strategies appropriate to the task at hand (Cermak and Craik, 1976).
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It is interesting to consider that through experience in sport, 
athletes may also proceed through stages similar to those which 
children go through in order to form strategies. If such were the 
case, experience in hockey would lead to superior perceptual skills 
in hockey-related tasks as strategies appropriate to the task 
would be formed much as those in the final stages of strategy forma­
tion described above. Through sports experience, players may have a 
variety of strategies available to them which they can use.
Other psychologists have found that during an experiment many 
different strategies may be used (Stelmach, 1974), as subjects may 
perceive their own performance and then decide whether to switch 
to a different strategy. When one finds a strategy does not work, 
they may try another. As Cermak and Craik (1979, p. 144) saw it, 
"One is likely to change retrieval strategies several times in the 
performance of a single task, upon finding that a given strategy 
fails to yield additional information and if one has a reason to 
believe that additional information is in store."
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5.7 STRATEGY FORMATION IN INFORMATION-PROCESSING
It has been shown that strategies for retrieval of information 
change with age. Another factor found to lead to efficient retrieval 
of information is past experience. Underwood's (1978) book covers 
many of the aspects of strategy change, pointing out the importance 
of experience. Having faced similar problems helps in decision- 
making. Decisions are based on information retrieval. This has 
practical implications in a sport such as hockey where players are 
faced with making decisions based on information available through 
the environment and through information held in storage in long-term 
memory.
Players also have a need to assess their performance and make 
explanations not only for their performance but also the outcome.
Here again, information is processed - perhaps not in order to
produce motor tasks, but to evaluate motor performance. It can be
seen, then, that information-processing in sport has been grossly 
neglected in terms of research.
The majority of past research involving information-processing 
in sport has examined how information is processed in order for players 
to make decisions on the field. The present study examines how
information is processed about those decisions and the performance
which results. It examines how information, mainly regarding outcome 
and performance, is processed. Decision-making also plays a part in the 
present study in a different sense when subjects are asked to watch 
video segments of hockey matches and decide whether the play will be 
successful. The purpose of asking this is to further evaluate the 
subject's attributions for their performance. The actual success 
at the task is investigated, but as a means to an end rather than an 
end in itself. This distinguishes this study from others and adds 
an extra dimension to perceptual studies in sport.
Studies examining how outcome information and performance 
information are evaluated have been described in Chapter 1, which tells 
how information of this type is processed. The next area of concern, 
then, is how other information is processed in sport. Those studies, 
which have already been described, used 'accuracy' in perceptual tasks
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as a measure of good information-processing skills. Others to be 
presented here, used 'speed' as a measure of good information- 
processing skills, claiming that in a sport setting one must not only 
be able to process information, but one must be able to process it 
quickly. This leads to the next area of related literature to be 
examined - speed as a meaure of information-processing.
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5.8 SPEED OF INFORMATION-PROCESSING
The number of studies utilizing speed as a measure of information- 
processing success are far too numerous to discuss in detail here, 
especially considering the fact that speed is not the measure chosen 
in this study. However, it is important to examine sports studies 
using speed as a measure of perceptual success for two reasons:
1. To be sure that accuracy rather than speed should be used here to 
measure success and,
2. to compare results found using speed to those using accuracy in 
order to tell whether any important differences exist.
It is with these two purposes in mind that an examination of information- 
processing skills is carried out.
Most studies which use speed as a measure, like those which use 
accuracy, have found that experience in sport leads to better information- 
processing skills. Some explain their success by saying that different 
cues are used. Similarly, others explain it by expectations and 
contextual information learned from experience which leads to anticipa­
tion of certain stimuli, and subsequent attention to that stimuli.
Finally, these differences have been explained as a result of differences 
in acquired abilities such as superior depth perception, peripheral 
vision, and even inter-pupillary distances. Others believe that an 
innate channel capacity is larger in better athletes which results in 
superior information-processing. Each of these explanations will be 
discussed in detail later in the Chapter.
Before examining the all-important reasons for superior perceptual 
abilities in athletes, it is well worth examining the types of studies 
carried out, and the logic behind the use of speed as a measure.
Zusne (1970, p. 62) explained that, "One measure of the ease of a 
perceptual task is reaction time". As early as 1952, Hick claimed that 
reaction time was 'linearly related' to the amount of transmitted 
information. The majority of researchers agree with the principle 
involved, that reaction time is a measure of perception.
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This logic has led to numerous studies of reaction time in sports, 
many of which tie the concept of 'uncertainty' to reaction time, 
claiming that a reduction of uncertainty decreases reaction time. It 
is interesting that these studies were so popular, considering the 
fact that, "laboratory measures of reaction time have little value in 
predicting one's level of performance in many ball games" (Hutt, 1972, 
p. 249). Hutt. pointed out in his article that athletes generally had 
faster reaction times than non-athletes, but findings did not show 
subsequent superior performances.
Support for Hutt's contention came from several sources. Olsen 
(1956) supported the claim that reaction times of athletes were better 
than non-athletes, while Youngen (1959) supported the claim that no 
significant relationship exists between ability in sport and reaction 
time.
A leading sport psychologist more recently reviewed studies in 
which basic perceptual abilities were unrelated to motor skills. Cratty 
(1983, p. 12) discussed anticipation saying, "Researchers suggest 
that this type of ability may be somewhat independent of basic motor 
abilities exhibited by an individual performing alone". In this review, 
he discussed how anticipation of the movements of the opponent may be 
independent of one's own motor ability.
If it is true that speed of response leads to superior perceptual 
skills, but not superior motor skills, then one must ask whether 
superior perceptual skills lead to superior motor skills. If not, 
then perhaps the study of speed of response has no bearing on sports 
ability. The underlying assumption that speed equals success needs 
to be questioned.
Perhaps speed of perception (or anticipation skills) does not 
lead to superior motor ability, but perhaps it does lead to superior 
perceptual performance which in turn leads to superior performance.
Vanek and Cratty earlier claimed that, "Good tacticians are 
generally the more rapid performers" (1970, p. 61). They made two 
important points, when they said (p. 67): "The tasks involving a 
combination of reaction times, or movement speed of the total body to
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a reasonably complex stimulus array, were predictive of good sports 
performance, however, tests of simple reaction times were not". The 
two points are:
1. that reaction time and movement speed interact, together being 
predictive of good performance and
2. that 'motor ability' (as discussed in the 1983 work) may be separate 
from good 'sports ability', a confusion often found in sports 
literature.
Experiments carried out by Jegupov are cited in Vanek and Cratty's 
work (1970, p. 61) as proof that 'good tacticians' are more rapid 
performers. Experiments were carried out with slalom skiers. The 
skiers performed memory tasks about the course before descending 
the hill, and results showed that the best performers in the slalom 
performed best on the memory task. In this study, rather than using 
speed as a measure of perceptual success, accuracy was, in fact, the 
measure of perceptual success on the memory task, and speed was the 
measure of performance success in the slalom. Judgement time was also 
used as a measure of perceptual success and was found to correlate 
with 'tactics employed by the performers'.
One problem brought to light in this study is associated with 
the use of the term 'speed'. In Jegupov's study, speed was used as 
a measure of motor success while accuracy was used as a measure of 
perceptual success. It is important not to confound his results with 
results of others who use speed as a measure of perceptual success.
Speed has been used to measure success in perceptual tasks, and is 
a common measure of success at motor tasks as well. The term 'speed' 
has been used in sports literature as synonymous with reaction time, 
and movement time, and decision time. Speed has also been used as 
a synonym for speed of detection, speed of decisions, and speed of 
response. In fact, most processes in sport have been measured by 
speed.
The problem occurs when statements are made about speed which 
do not clearly distinguish among these. Speed, for example, may be a 
good thing in the 100-metre dash, but may lead to a loss of accuracy
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in perceptual tasks leading to a decrease in performance. To 
automatically assume that speed equals success may be misleading.
For these reasons, speed was not selected as a measure of 
perceptual success in the present study, but accuracy was. It is 
acknowledged,however, that speed and accuracy of perceptual response 
often interact to produce success, and speed should therefore be 
considered.
To summarize, the findings of studies of perception in sport 
show that the best athletes have the best perceptual skills when speed 
is used to measure success. Although good perceptual skills do not 
necessarily lead to good motor skills, they do lead to success in 
the performance of the sport. This is based on the assumption that 
performance in sport is not merely 'motor', but also involves perception 
(such as decision-making). The slalom skiier may, for the sake of 
arguement, be faster skiing a slalom because of the route he chooses 
rather than because of his basic ability to ski. In this case speed of 
perceptual skills would lead to success in sport.
Argyle and Kendon (1967) described 'skill' as an organized, co­
ordinated 'chain' of sensory, central and motor mechanisms. Similarly, 
Whiting (1972b, p. 60) also pressed for a general definition of skill, 
saying, "In many ways - and particularly from an explanatory point of 
view - the designation motor skills is a misnomer since it would be 
difficult to think of any skilled behaviour in which only efferent 
activity is involved".
Support comes from others as well, like Cratty (1972, p. 51) 
who said,"A reasonably strong case can be made for the fact that all 
voluntary movement is under-girded by perceptual processes. This kind 
of statement receives substantial support if the definition of percep­
tion includes the duration, intensity, and/or velocity of movement".
The majority of psychologists in sport agree, then, that perceptual 
and motor skills are one process in sport which together lead to success 
or failure. The emphasis here is on the elimination of the idea that 
motor skills are independent of perceptual processes. Fitts and Posner 
(1967) gave further support to this idea, as did Welford (1968) who
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found it difficult to 'completely differentiate' the two.
Having now established the logic behind studies of speed, the next 
step is to further examine the types of studies carried out and their 
results. Athletes, for example, have been found to be faster in 
detection skills than non-athletes. These results are explained as 
a consequence of experience, as skill is learned by participation in 
sport.
Allard and Starkes (1980) found that players were faster in 
detecting the absence or presence of a volleyball in both game and 
non-game slides. Further experiments were reported by them which 
confirmed that speed of detection was not the result of players being 
faster in searching in non-volleyball stituations. These results 
are explained in terras of experience. Players had learned, through 
sports participation, to be faster in detection in a volleyball 
context.
Allard and Starkes' results are interesting in two further aspects. 
First, players and non-player's accuracy of response did not differ, 
while their speed did. Second, the speed of detection did not seem 
to be merely a difference between athletes and non-athletes, but was 
specific to volleyball players only. Their experiments tested volley­
ball players, hockey players, and swimmers. All were asked to detect 
volleyballs in slide presentations, and volleyball players were sign­
ificantly faster than hockey players or swimmers.
Allard and Starkes attribute success to visual search speed 
specific to the ball, but they do not explain how this occurs. They 
also do not examine the psychological factors involved. Perhaps 
volleyball players felt the task was more relevant to them than hockey 
players or swimmers. Perhaps motivation, then, was a variable. Or 
pehaps frustration was a factor, as hockey players and swimmers may 
have found themselves frustrated in a volleyball context. These 
two factors need to be considered, and are therefore included in the 
experiments in Chapter 6.
By comparing Allard and Starkes' (1980) basketball results to 
Allard, Graham and Paarsalu's (1980) volleyball results reported
225
earlier, similarities can be seen. In recognition tasks, both 
basketball players and volleyball players were faster than non­
players (in both structured and non-structured slides). The basket­
ball study also tapped a different resevoir by examining recall 
skills, in which players were better only at structured slides but 
not unstructured ones. Task complexity could be seen as the reason 
for differences in recognition and recall tasks in their study. The 
volleyball study unfortunately did not examine recall skills, which 
would have allowed comparision of results across sports contexts.
Finally, regarding work by Allard and Starkes, the finding that 
speed and accuracy produce differing results is a bit concerning.
The purpose of examining studies of speed was to find support for 
the contention that accuracy was a superior measure. However, if 
findings using the two measures yield differing results, explanations 
are needed. Findings by Allard and Starkes (1980) showed accuracy of 
players and non-players to be similar, although speed differs.
Their experiments involved detection tasks, which leads to two 
possible explanations. First, it is possible that other studies might 
fail to replicate the findings, and in fact, players might be found 
to be more accurate in later stages of information-processing. Perhaps 
athletes and non-athletes are equally successful at detection, but 
athletes utilize the information better, in for example decision-making. 
It is these two possibilities which are addressed next.
The first possible explanation for the findings of Allard and 
Starkes (1980) is that their findings may not be supported by other 
research. No research was found which either confirmed or rejected 
claims that players and non-players were similar in detection skills.
The only other studies which investigated perceptual success in sport 
were carried out by Bard and Fleury (1981) and Fleury, Bard and Carrière 
(1982), and these involved decision-making. This leads to the second 
of the two explanations, leaving the first still unclear and in need 
of further study.
The second explanation is that players and non-players differ in 
decision-making. As the related literature did not clearly establish
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detection superiority of athletes, the literature v/as next examined 
to establish whether decision-making superiority existed for athletes.
In order to establish this, two studies were examined.
The first of these two studies was carried out by Bard and Fleury
(1981) who investigated problem-solving in basketball and ice hockey. 
Experts and beginners were shown slides of sports situations, and experts 
were found to react faster. They looked for different things in 
the slides, which was felt to be the reason for the faster results.
The cues that they used were found to be different in both cases 
as well. Expert basketball players looked for the location of players, 
while beginners looked more at the open spaces. Expert ice hockey 
players looked at the stick as a cue, while beginners looked at the
puck and made decisions after the puck was in flight.
Visual fixations were measured and differed based on experience. 
Expert basketball players were found to have fewer fixations than 
novices, and their fixations were on different aspects of the 
environment; Experts fixated more often on opponents, while beginners 
favoured the teammates. __
It can be seen quite clearly from Bard and Fleury's results 
that experience affects perceptual skills, particularly with regard to 
cues used for visual search.
A year later, Fleury, Bard and Carrière (1982) conducted another 
experiment, this time in basketball, assessing speed of processing 
information. Experts and non-experts were compared in a task involving 
a multiple-choice decision task. Again, differences were found, with 
the interesting result that both speed and accuracy were better amongst 
experts. They claimed that stimulus 'encoding differences' and 'short­
term memory' differences were responsible for experts' superiority.
They concluded that performance differences occured in speed, accuracy, 
and variability of response, as experts showed less variability of 
response in skill-specific basketball contexts.
227
So, unlike Allard and Starkes (1980) who found no accuracy 
differences in perceptual skills of athletes and non-athletes,
Fleury, Bard and Carrière (1982) found differences. This finding 
lends support to the use of accuracy as a measure of success in this 
study. The other finding of particular interest is that experts 
used different cues. The present study will examine, in Chapter 6, 
the cues used in recognition and recall tasks in hockey, in order to 
establish whether certain cues lead to better perceptual performance.
Bard and Fleury would like to see coaches use their results in 
coaching schemes. When cues are identified as either successful or not, 
they can then be taught as part of a training programme for problem­
solving.
Many coaches have instinctively supported the idea that cues are 
important in hockey, although none have actually tested this aspect.
The present study will add to this discussion and either confirm or 
reject the idea of perceptual training through the use of cues. Two 
aspects will be examined: 1. The cues used will be examined to see
if there are 'successful' and 'unsuccessful' cues, and 2. Cues will 
be given before the perceptual task in order to examine the effects 
of prior cueing on perceptual success. If experience teaches which 
cues to attend to for success, then a coach should be able to teach by 
prior cueing, perceptual success.
It is expected conversely, that differences occur not in 
'attention', but rather in how the information is stored and retrieved, 
and in how the information is utilized. If this is the case, players 
and non-players would not differ in perceptual success based on cue 
given or on cue used, although being given a cue may lead to less 
frustration on the part of a non-player who is viewing a scene.
This would be in conflict with the general belief by many coaches 
that cues are vital to success and should be taught. Whiting (1969), 
for example, said that 'the number of cues and hence the number of 
choices' decreased with coaching and practise. He claimed that the 
player learned better responses which improves performance .
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Csahadi (1963, p. 255), a soccer coach, stated that, "Tactical sense
is to some extent a matter of talent; it can be developed to a
considerable degree by suitable activities, coaching, and practise".
Even the U.S.A. Manual for Coaches (1979, p. 49) advocated 
coaching perceptual skills, although it was not clear exactly how this 
should be carried out. The manual discussed 'reading the game*, 
defined as "understanding what is happening at the moment and the ability 
to anticipate what will happen next or develop next. Some have it 
naturally while others must be taught what to do and why". They 
concluded that, "Coaches and players must be able to read the game if 
they are to play an authoritative role in the outcome of the match"
(1979, p. 49). This objective analysis was said to come from the 
coach answering questions ranging from the skill of the individual 
to mental qualities and playing principles. Exactly which qualities
and principles were not identified.
Other coaches have ascribed to perceptual qualities. Kentwell 
(1976) who coaches hockey claimed that hockey players must be aware 
of events happening around them and must anticipate what will happen 
next. Kentwell felt that the coach can help athletes develop these 
qualities. He claimed that anticipation, awareness, and quick 
thinking were qualities of a good player; and it was up to the coach 
to make practises functional, with an emphasis on decision-making.
He stated (1976, p. 46) that the coach, "must continue to coach, 
drawing player's attention to the vital perceptual cues in the game 
environment..." The specific cues were not identified, although he 
claimed that cues must constantly be emphasized as understanding is 
increased.
These quotes show that coaches are aware of the importance of 
perceptual skills and that they have not identified the various aspects 
of perception in hockey through research. They also agree that it is 
up to the coach to help the player'read the game', although^ this 
concept remains a vague image, not yet clearly defined. Perhaps the 
concept is not as simple as it appears. Perhaps it is not one cue, 
but an interaction of cues. As Woodworth (1958, p. 403) pointed out, 
"perception is dynamic and meanings are continually interacting, as are 
cues, and this dynamic aspect is particularly important in open skills".
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In an open skill such as hockey, the athlete must select cues 
from a constantly changing environment, and this must be considered 
in developing a model for information-processing. The model proposed 
in the present study is relative to the open skill of hockey, a 
dynamic skill.
Like Woodworth, others have also pointed to the importance of 
distinguishing between open and closed skills (Hayes and Marteniuk, 
1976). As Newell put it, "The nature of the skill, whether open-closed, 
gross-fine, discrete-serial-continuous, etc., together with its 
complexity, may well interact with the skill level of the performer in 
determining the rate of information-processing and the difficulty of 
the task". (1981, p.205). The present study does not propose to 
make statements about skills other than skills in hockey, and therefore 
generalizations to closed skills would be unfounded.
To conclude the examination of coaches’ perceptions, suffice it 
to say that the related literature was found to be lacking in specific 
research in perception. Studies have been carried out regarding cues 
and perceptual success using speed as a measure of success, but these 
have not been carried out in hockey, nor have they been incorporated 
into specific coaching techniques. Too often coaches refer only to the 
importance of "learning to read the game, and anticipate what is likely 
to happen" (Read, 1971, p. 27) without research to back them up.
Read exemplifies this in her book. Better Hockey For Women, when 
she suggested,"When playing, always be alert, watch the opposing 
players and try to seek out any weaknesses they may have and try to 
anticipate their actions. You will also need to watch your own 
team carefully so that you can plan what to do with the ball should 
it come to you" (Read , 1971, p. 27). More research into the details 
of perception in sport is obviously needed to either substantiate or 
disconfirm coaches’ ideas.
Some coaches are on the right track when they emphasize the role 
of the player in perceptual learning. In addition to emphasizing the 
coach’s role,some have emphasized the player’s role. "Players must 
show their initiative in problem solving" (Cadman and Van Heumen, 1978, 
p. 8). Others have said that perhaps 'dogmatic coaching suggestions'
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have deprived players of the advantage of individually solving 
problems. Barnes and Kentwell (1979, p. 232) said this and suggested 
that coaches prepare players to "execute stratagems during the stress 
of the game and under many and varied conditions". This seems 
particularly important considering how changeable the situations 
are in hockey.
Wein (1968) seems to sum up the player-orientated point of view, 
suggesting that the player must know several ways of solving problems, 
and that choices should be allowed to the players.
The problem with either a coach or a player-orientated approach
to problem solving is the same. Both approaches lack research as a 
foundation on which to build programmes for improvement. Those 
coaches who suggest a player-orientated approach need to know how to
help the players to help themselves. This help needs to be based on
fact as well.
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5.9 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE NATIVIST vs EMPIRICIST'S VIEWS
To summarize then, it is safe to conclude that, for one reason 
or another, players of sport are not only more accurate, but faster 
than non-players at perceptual tasks specific to their sport. The 
reasons for this need to be identified. It is possible either that 
those who excel in sport have superior innate perceptual abilities 
to process information which allow them to be more successful o£ 
that through sports participation, superior information-processing skills 
are learned. It would be difficult to distinguish one from the other, 
and both approaches are advocated by psychologists.
Some believe that skill in sport is dependent on the size of 
the channel capacity. Mowbray and Rhoades(1959) for example, carried 
out a study in choice reaction time and used speed as a measure of 
success. Their study involved a task with two choices. Information 
was given, and the individual was asked to choose the best response 
rapidly. They found that CRT (the delay caused by a search for one 
response among possible responses) was faster for highly skilled 
athletes than lesser skilled athlètes. They stated that channel 
capacity of the decision mechanism was high if he chose rapidly; while 
if he took a great deal of time (possibly 400-500 M sec.) his channel 
capacity was small. Therefore, highly skilled athletes were found to 
have large channel capacities, while lesser skilled athletes had 
smaller capacities.
Thus, Mowbray and Rhoades claimed that channel capacity is 
responsible for success. However, they also showed that channel 
capacity was not totally innate. Their results showed that CRT 
decreased with practise for both groups, with differences in CRT 
between the choices eventually being eliminated.
The present study examines the perceptual process at it's 
later stages - after the information has been received, and the 
individual is then concerned with selecting the best response.
Marteniuk (1975, p. 13) saw it this way, "When the decision mechanism 
is occupied in processing information concerning the selection of an 
appropriate response, no other perceptual response arriving from the 
perceptual mechanism will be processed until the former analysis has 
been completed. This means a delay or refactory period somewhere in the
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neighbourhood of 200-300 m sec". He felt that even when the athlete 
was aware of an event, he could not respond until he had handled the 
previous information. He concluded that the decision mechanism dealt 
sequentially with information and was single-channeled.
Others believe that experience and training are more responsible 
than innate channel capacities. Chi (1976), for example, believed that 
deficits in information-processing as well as attention capabilities 
seemed to be due to lack of experience and lack of training as opposed 
to lack of capacity to process. Marteniuk showed how channel capacity 
could 'seem' large as a result of experience. The more skilled the 
performer, the more redundancy there was of information. He explained 
that skilled athletes anticipated future happenings and gave less 
weight to environmental stimuli of less importance.
Skilled athletes gain information from the environment. "A skilled 
individual has to sample a little information to identify the character­
istics of a relatively complex display... If he takes full advantage 
of expectations and contextual information, he may need only to sample 
incoming information when something goes wrong" (Marteniuk, 1975, p. 11). 
This makes his channel capacity seem large. Lesser skilled athletes 
may have fewer expectations and cannot gain as much information from 
the context of the situation, thus leaving to chance the correct 
selection of information.
Like others, Marteniuk had advocated coaches and teachers establish­
ing a 'rudimentary' set of items which may be pertinent. He proposed 
help in the early stages of information-processing - that is, using 
selective attention to reduce the total amount of information to be 
processed.
Work by Schubert (1981), in fact, found that the searched area could 
be narrowed by using pre-signals by 'intellectual analysis of input' 
which reduces reaction time and improves anticipative performance.
Thus, like Marteniuk, Schubert proposed that the 'reduction of uncertainty' 
through learning allowed the subject to reduce the amount of information 
gained. The signal which was anticipated carried little information, as 
it was expected, Marteniuk summed up the idea that channel capacity was
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relatively fixed. He said, "Through practice individuals tend to reduce 
uncertainty in the stimuli they process, thus appearing to increase 
information" (1975, p. 10). Further analyses along these lines were 
also discussed in Kay's (1962) article "Channel Capacity and Skilled 
Performance".
Thus the two basic theories. The Nativist's and the Empiricist's, 
are both supported, and often combined to explain success at perception. 
Some believe that those who excel in sport have superior perceptual 
abilities innately, while others believe it is learned.
It is still unclear whether those who choose to participate are 
those who have faster reaction times, or whether sports participation 
leads to faster reaction times.
When using reaction time as a measure, an additional question arises. 
Some individuals who participate in sports, such as runners or those 
who play racquet sports, have superior cardiovascular systems, which 
has been argued to contribute to their success in reacting to stimuli 
quickly.
Spirdusb and Clifford (1978) contend that older men who regularly 
play racquet sports expose themselves daily to those conditions which 
require quick decisions, thus stimulating the central nervous system.
In order to examine whether this type of competitive sports participation 
influences reaction time, a comparison was made between racquetball players 
and non-competitive sportsmen (runners). The runners were still quite 
active, although without the same decision-making as racquetball players.
A non-active group was also included. Two age groups were examined - 
a young group (Mean age 22.2) and an old group (mean age 64.2). Thus, 
six groups participated, categorized by age (young/old) and activity 
(racquet sports/running/non-active).
Standard CRT apparatus were used, and results showed that age and 
activity levels main effects were significant. Older men who were active 
were found to react and move faster than peers who were sedentary, and 
they were fotind to react and move as quickly as sedentary men who were 
40 years younger. Obvious age differences occurred; young active men
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were faster than old, active men. They concluded that, "Chronic physical 
activity in the form of either daily racquet sports participation or 
running, may play an important role in maintaining the effeciency of 
the central nervous system function, at least in terms of simple 
responses to relatively uncomplex stimuli" CSpirduso and Clifford,
1978, p. 29).
Two explanations could be made for these findings. Firstly, it 
is possible that active men are more motivated than non-active men. 
However, old active men were still slower than young active men, so 
cardiovascular differences may have had an effect.
The second possibility then is that, "the nutritive function of a 
healthy cardiovascular system, emanating from a life style of physical 
activity, postpones the decrement in neuro-muscular function that 
is generally attributed to aging" (p. 29).
The final and very important point to be made is that the type 
of activity affected the reaction times - racquetball players were faster 
than runners. This could lead to the expectation that decision-making 
experience and practice leads to success at decision-making.
Results of another study by Ohlsson (1976) also showed that cardio­
vascular fitness was an important factor in maintaining information- 
processing skills in elderly people. Attention, reaction time, back­
ward counting, sorting, and categorization were tested using 63-78 
year old males. Two groups were labelled: 'trained' if they belonged 
to a sports club and 'untrained' if they had not participated in 
regular physical training except in school or in the military. Results 
showed 'trained' males to be superior in 8 of the 16 variables tested.
These two tests show that activity helps reduce the deterioration 
of skills in information-processing. From these findings certain 
expectations could be founded with regard to the present study. If 
activity helps maintain information-processing skills, hockey players 
would be expected to be superior to non-participants in perceptual 
tasks. Those who played other team or ball sports would be expected 
to do quite well also, probably better than those who participate in
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non-decision making sports such as running, who would still be better 
than non-active individuals. These expectations will be examined in the 
experiments to be carried out in the next chapter.
Thus, those who lean toward an empiricist's view believe that 
practice affects perceptual skills. As Vanek and Cratty (1983, p. 61) 
put it, "....various perceptual discriminations which athletes make 
become more acute with continual exposure to practice and competition".
An interesting experiment carried out by Leavitt (1979) examined 
the effect of sports experience on perceptual skills in ice hockey.
Subjects were asked to identify geometric figures on a screen while 
skating and stick handling on the ice. The secondary task of identifying 
the geometric figures while skating interferred with the speed of 
skating and also produced errors in stick handling. However, players 
with eight years of previous hockey experience did not show interference.
Leavitt believed that the solution to the problem for the inexperienced 
was to change the demands, which was done by using a larger puck. Less 
interference was found when a larger puck was used, as less time and 
space was needed for processing the information.
Although Leavitt's study examined motor skill success, it is important 
because it examined the interaction of perceptual and motor skills which 
is an area in need of further examination. Results showed a practice 
effect which is also important. How much of the effect was due to 
increases in motor ability rather than perceptual ability remains to 
be seen. Whether the younger skaters changed their perceptual strategies 
or merely improved their motor skills allowing more time to perceive 
also remains to be seen. Further studies in these areas which examine 
perceptual strategies need to be undertaken.
It is proposed in this study that perceptual skills are responsible 
for success in sport. It is obvious that athletes are faster to react 
than non-athletes. The reasons for this are the main concern in this 
study. Several areas previously researched can only be touched on here. 
Athletes,for example, have been found to have superior depth perception, 
peripheral vision, and visual apprehension, all of which are beneficial
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in information-processing. As the long-time U.S. hockey coach, Vonnie 
Gros, put it, "Tactical decisions cannot be made without vision. The 
player dribbling freely must lift her head often to view the whole field. 
Under pressure she must also use peripheral vision to view the action 
on all sides of her, while focusing on the immediate vicinity of the ball. 
Decisions are based on these observations" (1979, p. 18).
Other coaches instinctively agree. Csanadi (1963, p. 228) wrote 
about soccer players, "A player's ability to switch from central to 
peripheral sight and visa versa according to the situation is, to a certain 
extent, an indication of his technical experience".
Examining these areas in related literature shows some support for 
coaches' statements. Although most studies show no differences in stereo­
scopic vision (see Sanderson, 1972), studies generally do show athletes 
to be superior in depth perception, peripheral vision, as well as 
visual apprehension.
An early study by Olsen (1956) found college athletes to score 
higher in measures of depth perception and visual apprehension than 
non-athletes. This early study led to others, most of which agree that 
depth perception is superior in skilled athletes, at least in tennis 
and soccer (see Sanderson, 1972). However, some, like that carried 
out by Winograd (1942) on baseball players, showed no correlation between 
depth perception and batting averages or RBI's.
One possible explanation for different findings is that they involved 
different tasks with resulting differences in the types of information- 
processing required. The other factor is the measure of success used. 
Batting averages and RBI's are one measure of success in baseball, but 
it is common knowledge that pitchers often have the worst batting averages, 
but may be the most valuable asset to the team. Perhaps thé measure of 
success ; then, needs to be examined. Other sports also need to be 
examined (both open and closed sports) to assess the influence of type 
of sport on perception.
The question therefore remains regarding the Nativist and Empiricist's 
views. Regarding depth perception, Hagen (1978, p. 25) stated that,
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"Pictural depth, perception is an acquired ability". However, most have 
not addressed the issue, but merely examined differences between groups, 
like those which examined athlete/non-athlete or male/female differences.
It was found by Straub (1980) that females had better peripheral 
vision, for example, than males. This is an interesting finding which 
would lead to the expectation that females would process information 
more rapidly and accurately than males. As this has not been the case, 
one can only assume that females'information-processing is different 
from males in another way. The present study proposes motivational 
differences and personality differences to account for male/female inform­
ation-processing differences.
Differences in peripheral vision have been found between athletes 
and non-athletes which persist "after weeks of practice" (Gill, 1955). This 
finding was supported by others such as Stroup (1957) who studied college 
basketball players and non-players. This experiment is particularly 
interesting because it involved motion-perception, a skill necessary in 
both basketball and hockey. Stroup pointed to the ability to perceive 
individuals or objects on the periphery of the field as 'an asset' in 
fast-moving team sports. McCain (1950) studied a younger group and 
found only 'slight differences' between athletes and non-athletes of 
school age in peripheral vision.
Both a Nativist and Empiricist's view could explain these findings. 
College players would probably be more skilled in sport and also would 
have more experience. Those with innate abilities would choose to carry 
on playing, while those who barely get by on a school team might drop 
out at the college level. Thus, findings show consistently that athletes 
have superior peripheral vision, but the reasons are still unclear as 
to why this occurs.
A review by MacGillivary (1980) examined perceptual styles relative 
to physical performance. In searching for answers for human performance 
differences, several theories were developed. In these theories, 
perceptual styles were identified and examined in terms of performance 
in perceptual motor skills.
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The present study is concerned only with considering the effects 
style might have on perceptual studies to be carried out in the next 
chapter. As these styles will not be the major emphasis of these studies, 
only brief mention will be made here. MacGillivary's review is useful 
in delving into the background of each theory.
Perceptual styles relevant to hockey will be discussed here as they 
relate to the sport. For example, Weir (1967) discussed field articula­
tion and pointed to R.G. Gardner's (1968) relevant headings: extensiveness 
of scanning, leveling and sharpening, and tolerance of unrealistic 
experiences.
Field articulation is defined as, "the capacity to concentrate 
totally on the central problem and to pay no attention to anything that 
is irrelevant" (Weir, 1967, p. 57). She pointed out that field 
articulation was important in hockey, particularly to goal keepers, 
sweepers, and backs. The extensiveness of scanning was also important 
as were the differences between levelers and sharpeners (those who 
minimized differences between stimuli presented and those who accentuated 
differences). Also important was the difference between reducers and 
augmenters (those who were tolerant of pain and reduced sensations 
and those who were intolerant of pain and increased sensations).
It is also important to consider fieId-dependent and field-independent 
styles (a continuum from one who is unable to perceive parts of a field 
of vision from the whole to those who can separate field and background). 
These areas have been examined in research in the past and have been 
found to be related to personality as well as performance. They are 
interesting areas which might shed light on the Nativist-Empiricist 
question, but are beyond the scope of the present work. These areas 
could be examined in other research in order to add to the understanding 
of perceptual processes.
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5.10 PROBLEMS IN PERCEPTUAL RESEARCH
It can be seen from this related literature section that problems 
exist in perceptual research, and many questions remain unanswered, 
emphasizing the need for further research. "The major problem, however, 
is to discover how the selection of material is brought about and where 
or at what stage in the perceptual process it occurs. Much of the 
research has been directed towards clarifying these problems, but the 
results are not always in agreement" (Whiting, et al, 1973, p. 24).
He also said that the major problem for psychologists was to discover 
how information was selected. He claimed that the answer to this 
question had not yet been found (1972b).
Others saw similar problems, including the fact that subjects 
themselves did not understand their perceptual processes. Goldstein 
(1979, p. 38) talked of master chess players who often did not know 
where they've made mistakes. Their explanation of moves was vague 
as well. He concluded that, "our current knowledge of basic principles 
of human learning, thinking, and problem solving is not sufficient to 
explain how these intuitive, poorly articulated judgements are made".
Finally, Knapp (1963, p. 134) pointed out problems, as he stated 
that man's interactions "affect not only his present but also his future 
actions for he will anticipate on the basis of his perceptions. Exactly 
how this is done is not known".
From these statements, it is apparent that much more research is 
needed to clarify conflicting results and to answer these unanswered 
questions. Much of the research which exists was carried out in the 
60s and 70s. Research needs to be updated and revived.
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5.11 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 5
1. No past research was found which related attributions to perceptual 
skills in sport. Consequently, this literature review covers studies 
of perception in sport only.
2. Two views have been proposed which explain perception. The Nativist's 
view contends that our perception is the result of innate abilities, 
while the Empiricist’s view contends that we leam to perceive 
through experience. The majority of research leads to the conclusion 
that a combination of the two may be more accurate.
3. Three major aspects of perception are discussed: Attention, Memory, 
and Retriveal.
4. Attentional cues have been studied and location was generally the 
best cue for looking when compared to shape, colour, brightness, 
and category. The present study will examine cues in hockey.
5. Attention span is limited, as is memory span. Limitations may be
innate or learned.
6. Broadbent's (1958) filter theory and Miller's (1956) work on chunking 
explain limitations in memory.
7. With practice, memory span can be increased. Although capacity is
relatively fixed, practice can reduce uncertainty and appear to
increase information.
8. Chunking is an important phenomena in sport and may explain why 
studies have found athletes to have superior perceptual skills to 
non^athletes. In fact, when 'structure' is taken away from the 
stimuli, differences do not occur.
9. Information in long-term memory may result from experience and be 
drawn on in order to form chunks, resulting in superior perception 
in sports.
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10. Failure to retrieve information may lead to deficiencies in 
information-processing. Using a cue has been found to help in 
retrieval.
11. Tests of perception must be carried out with consideration for the 
medium involved, the time allowed and viewing distance, and the 
age of the subjects.
12. Decision-making in sport has been tested mainly by examining how 
decisions are made by players on the field. The next chapter 
will assess information-processing of videotaped matches in 
order to evaluate success and examine attributions,
13. Accuracy, as opposed to speed, has been chosen to use in the present 
study because of the following reasons: the numerous different 
speed measures which are often confounded, the fact that various 
studies show different results using speed (some show accuracy
and speed superiority of athletes, while others show only accuracy 
superiority), the fact that speed is often used as a measure of 
motor skill success as well as perceptual success, and most importantly, 
the fact that speed of perception may not lead to superior motor 
skill success.
14. It is generally accepted that experience in sport leads to faster 
and more accurate perceptual skills. This is discussed in terms of 
whether those who participate are innately superior or whether 
participation in sport leads to good perceptual skills, a matter 
still unclear.
15. Coaches seem to have intuitive ideas about teaching and learning
perceptual skills, but these are not generally based on research
nor are they specific enough to be practical.
16. Various questions, like the Nativist vs. Empiricist’s views, remain
unclear. Much research is needed in all areas of perception in
sport to answer questions.
CHAPTER 6
EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES IN PERCEPTUAL SKILLS 
AND ATTRIBUTIONAL RESPONSES
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6.1 AIMS OF CHAPTER 6
1. To test a self-serving bias (motivational) approach to information- 
processing in sport.
2. To test a schema-based approach to information-processing in 
sport.
3. To test the information-processing model for sport.
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6.2 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 6 involves experimentation carried out in an attempt to 
test a motivational; schema-based approach to the processing of 
information in sport. It is predicted that a motivational bias exists 
in causal attributions following a perceptual task in sport. The 
overall understanding of information-processing in sport is again the 
main concern, as it has been throughout.
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6.3 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The first aim of the present chapter is to examine causal attributions 
in the lab in order to test a motivational, self-serving biased approach 
to information-processing. When asked whether their own ability or 
effort is responsible for their success or failure at the given perceptual 
task, subjects are expected to give similar responses regardless of 
their actual success. Again, the line of argument is that those who 
have done poorly will protect their self-esteem by making attributions 
which enhance their self-image. Similarly, attributions to effort are 
expected to be the same regardless of actual success.
Although actual success at the perceptual task will be assessed, 
the results will not be shared with the subject. In fact, no feedback 
will be given to the subjects regarding their success. The reason for 
withholding success information is to further examine the concept of 
schema.
The present chapter deals exclusively with subjects who do not have 
outcome information available to them; earlier chapters dealt with groups 
who had information and those who did not. In Chapter 2, for example, 
attributions were made pre-game when no information was available, at 
half-time when limited information was available, and post-game when 
full information was available. Then causal attributions were compared 
under the various conditions. In Chapter 4, attributions were examined, 
and again groups were examined, some of which were given outcome inform­
ation while others were not.
In both of these chapters, attributions were not dependent upon 
outcome information. This was seen as evidence of a schema-based 
approach, where pre—conceived images were responsible for causal attributions 
This argument is further examined herein, with the emphasis on attributions 
made under conditions of total uncertainty.
The second aim of Chapter 6 is, then, to test a schema-based approach 
to information-processing by showing that attributions in sport are 
similar under conditions of certainty and uncertainty. Attributions 
made in the lab are expected to show similar biases in response to
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attributions made in the field. This is particularly important because 
findings of lab work undertaken and reported in Chapter 4 did not lend 
total support to a motivational approach. Whether this is due to the 
unrealistic 'imaginary' setting remains to be seen. If this is the 
case, experiments of this type should be discouraged in the future, 
and only field work undertaken. As the vast majority of attributional 
research involves imagining a situation, this is an extremely important 
issue.
The following 'winning* schemata are proposed regarding attributions 
to one's own ability, effort, and luck:
My Own Ability/Effort
High
Low
Low High
Success
My Own Luck
High
Low
Low High
Success
It can be seen that the 'winning* schemata are all self-serving. 
Attributions regarding ability and effort do not reflect the same 
pattern as luck because of the lack of threat involved in luck attributions
If an information-processing model were employed the attributions 
to ability and effort would show the same pattern as luck.
It is the aim of this chapter to test for each schema by examining 
attributional responses.
246
The final aim of the chapter is to test the information-processing 
model for sport as proposed in Chapter 4. This process will involve 
many of the same areas of concern, namely the effects of experience 
in sport, expectations/perceptions, and psychological variables such 
as frustration and motivation on attributions. The effect of threat 
and bias on final causal attributions will also be examined. It is 
only in these areas that results of related literature proved helpful, 
as studies in the past have tried to decide who is more successful 
(experienced or non-experienced players).
Other studies have identified the components of success, and 
proposed different views of why some are successful while others are 
not (Nativist vs. Empiricist's views, the effects Of techniques such 
as prior cueing and chunking, etc.). The area so far neglected and 
addressed here in Chapter 6 is not only who is successful at perceptual 
tasks and what techniques they use, but also what their explanations 
are for their perceptual performance. All of these areas will be 
addressed, with particular emphasis on explanations.
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6.4 HYPOTHESES
In order to test assumptions, then, several hypotheses are 
proposed. The first hypothesis Cl) examines a self-serving bias approach 
and reads as follows:
Hypothèses 1 CSetf-Sevvvng Bias I
Negative-self attributions will be the same regardless of actual 
success at the perceptual task. Attributions will be similar regarding:
(la) One's own ability (memory, quickness, intelligence, and understanding 
the directions).
(lb) One's own effort.
The same hypothesis involves a schema-based approach and reads as 
follows:
Hypotheses 2 CSchema-Based Approach)
Attributions will be positive regarding the self (own ability and 
effort) regardless of success.
The final area of concern is to test the proposed model for sport. 
Several aspects will be examined in an attempt to test the model.
These areas are examined in terms of past literature as well as the 
proposed model. This involves an analysis of who was successful and 
why. In order to test the model and expand it, Hypothesis 3 is proposed:
Hypotheses 3 (Testeng the Informateon-Processeng Model)
The following results will be found:
(3a) Subjects with experience at hockey will be more successful at
perceptual tasks regarding sport than those with less experience.
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(3b) Subjects with experience at hockey will have different expectations 
and perceptions about th_e task. They will be more motivated but 
less frustrated and worried about the task than subjects with 
less hockey experience. Similar results will show that expectations/ 
perceptions will be related to actual success at the perceptual task.
Hypothesis 3 will therefore test the following aspects of the 
proposed model:
Input
Skilled
Experience
Actual Success 
at Perceptual 
Tasks
Expectations/ 
Perceptions about 
the Task
Hypotheses 1 and 2, meanwhile follow the model through to its 
conclusion, examining schemata, and the effects of threat and bias 
on attributions. They examine the following:
Bias
Input
Threat
Schemata
Final Attributions
Initial Attributions
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Each, hypothesis will be tested in three experimental conditions. 
First each.hypothesis will be tested following an analysis of a video­
taped hockey match. Then each hypothesis will be tested following an 
analysis of slides Of hockey matches. Subjects will be asked to 
match slides to diagrams with the slide in view (matching) and without 
(recognition). Finally, each hypothesis will be tested following 
an analysis of slides of hockey matches in which subjects will be 
asked to create diagrams from slides (recall). Each of these three 
experiments will be reported separately, each with their own subject, 
method, and procedure sections.
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6.5 AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF PERCEPTUAL SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTIONS:
VIEWING AND ASSESSING VIDEOTAPED HOCKEY MATCHES
The purpose of this experiment is to examine success at interpreting 
videotaped hockey matches in order to test for motivational bias in 
attributions. The ultimate concern is to test again for a motivational 
approach and also a schema-based approach, as well as expanding the 
proposed model.
6.5.1 Sub ejects .
70 university students, stratified by sex, participated in a lab 
experiment. 20 had no hockey experience, 25 had school experience, 
and 25 had university or club experience. 37 females and 33 males
participated.
6.5.2 Methods cmd Procedures
Subjects were tested in groups of 10, as they viewed six, 10- 
second video segments of international hockey matches. A sample 
segment was provided to familiarize subjects with the procedure 
involved. Four multiple-choice questions were asked about each 
segment, assessing what had happened, in what direction the ball would 
go, what the player with the ball would do next, and whether the play 
would be successful. A Likert-type questionnaire was then completed, 
assessing attributional responses. The questions were developed 
from open-ended responses to a pilot study. The directions are 
included in Appendix N, and the answer sheet in Appendix 0.
Correct answers were totalled to give a success score, and analyses 
were carried out using the following factors: success, relative
attributions, motivation, frustration, sex, and hockey experience.
One way analyses of variance examined absolute attributions as in previous 
experiments. Finally, Pearson correlations were carried out on various 
factors as well.
The apparatus for the video experiment consisted of a u-matic 
videotape machine, two half-hour videotapes, a portable battery pack.
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camera, videotape player, and a colour television monitor with the 
numbers 1-4 taped on the top, bottom, and sides.
6.5.3 Results
6 .5 .3 .1  Se If Serving Bias : Video Results
The first hypothesis examined the motivational vs. non-motivational 
dilemma by proposing support for a motivational approach. The first 
hypothesis was accepted. Pearson correlations showed no significant 
correlation between negative absolute attributions and success. When 
asked to what extent they agreed with the following: ’’When I failed, 
it was because I have a poor memory”, correlations of response to 
success at the task were not significant (0.0804, P = 0.254). All 
Pearson correlations can be seen in Table 6.1. Other ability attributions 
also showed no significant correlation with success at the task. These 
included:”When I failed, it was because I’m not quick enough” (0.0617,
P = 0.306); ’’When I failed, it was because I have a poor memory” (0.0804,
P = 0.254); ’’When I failed, it was because I’m not intelligent enough” 
(0.0025, P = 0.492); and ’’When I failed, the directions seemed clear 
to others but I didn’t understand them” (-0.1463, P = 0.113).
Although attributions of a negative type showed no significant 
correlation to actual success, attributions of a positive type did 
not always show the same pattern. When asked why they succeeded, 
the more successful they were, the less likely they were to credit 
their own effort (-0.2443, P = 0.021). Perhaps those who had more 
difficulty with the task felt that they had had to try harder than 
others. The correlation between success at the task and attributions 
to one’s own good memory did not show a significant result (-0.1834,
P = 0.064).
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Table 6.1 Pearson Correlations: Attributions and Video Success
Success at 
Video
When I failed to answer correctly, it was 
because I had too little time
0.1412 
C 70) 
P=0.122
When I failed, the directions seemed clear 
to others, but I didn't understand them
-0.1463 
( 70)
P=0.113
When I succeeded, it was purely by chance -0.2618* 
( 70)
P=0.014
When I failed, it was because I was not 
intelligent enough
0.0025 
C 70) 
P=0.492
When I failed, it was because I have never 
been taught to play hockey
-0.2314* 
( 70)
P=0.027
When I succeeded, it was because I tried 
very hard
-0.2443* 
( 70)
P=0.021
When I failed, it was because the test 
causes you to be nervous
-0.1356 
( 70)
P=0.131
When I failed, it was because I am not 
quick enough
0.0617 
C 70) 
P=0.306
When I succeeded, it was because the test 
was well constructed
0.1833 
( 70)
P=0.064
When I failed, it was because I have a 
poor memory
0.0804 
C 70) 
P=0.254
* P Z  .05
* p ^  . 05 
** P ^  .01
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Success at 
Video
When I failed, it was because the directions 
were poor
0.0804 
C 70) 
P=0.254
V/hen I succeeded, it was because I have a 
background in sports
-0.2927** 
C 70) 
P=0.007
When I failed, it was because I have never 
been taught the rules of hockey
-0.1763 
( 70)
P=0.072
When I failed, it was because I don't 
concentrate well
0.2344* 
( 70)
P=0.025
When i succeeded, it was because I have a 
good memory
-0.1834 
( 70)
P=0.064
When I failed, it was because my inadequacies 
made me frustrated
-0.1701 
( 70)
P=0.086
When I failed, it was because the difficulty 
of the test made me frustrated
-0.2135* 
( 70)
P=0.038
When I succeeded, it was because I was 
lucky
-0.3302** 
( 70)
P=0.003
Relative attributions -0.1085 
( 70)
P=0.186
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It appears that subjects were again unwilling to blame themselves, 
an attributional pattern borne out in earlier experiments and again 
supported here. A similar pattern emerged when relative attributions 
were examined (attributions did not correlate with actual success).
To examine relative attributions more closely, a Varimax rotated factor 
matrix was developed using the absolute attributions (see Appendix P 
for matrix results). The factors which comprised the scale (alpha =
0.7664) included the following:
When I did poorly, it was because...
. I didn't understand the directions.
. the test causes you to be nervous.
. the directions were poor.
. my inadequacies caused me to be frustrated.
. the difficulty of the test made me frustrated.
No significant correlation was found between scores on this scale 
(called 'Relative Attributions') and actual success at the video task 
(-0.1085, P =0.186). Table 6.1 includes correlation results in full.
The results of this rotated matrix showed clearly the problems 
associated with using task difficulty as an attributional factor on 
its own. It can be seen from these results that task difficulty is 
the result of several factors, rather than being an entity unto itself. 
It is also clear that a sharp internal/external dimension does not 
exist regarding task difficulty. Personal frustration and inadequacies 
(internal factors) are intimately related to the difficulty of the test, 
directions, etc. (external factors). Personal ability and task 
difficulty are therefore considered jointly under the heading of 
'relative' attributions.
Because no threat is attached to attributions regarding luck, no 
bias was expected. Results confirmed that luck attributions were 
related to success at the video task. When asked whether they had 
done well because they were lucky, those who agreed were less success­
ful than those who disagreed (-0.3302, P = 0.003). Similarly, 
significant correlations were found when subjects were asked how far 
they agreed with the following statement: "V/hen I succeeded, it was
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purely by chance" C-0.2618, P = 0.014). See Table 6.1 for full 
correlation results. ,
other factors held responsible for either success or failure at 
the video task included factors which might be considered by some to 
be 'external' factors (i.e. attributions to factors associated with 
the test). These factors were not significantly related to actual 
success. For example, subjects were asked to what extent they agreed 
with the following:
When I failed, it was because I had too little time
(0.1412, P = 0.122).
When I failed, it was because the test causes you to be nervous
(-0.1356, P = 0.131).
When I succeeded, it was because the test was well constructed
(0.1833, P =0.064).
When I failed, it was because the directions were poor
(0.0804, P = 0.254).
Pearson correlations showed no correlation between actual success 
and attributional responses. The only other so called 'external'factors 
to consider will be discussed relative to Hypothesis 3 as they involve 
expectations/perceptions. These include attributions made regarding 
frustration and also attributions regarding experience such as, "When 
I failed it was because I have never been taught the rules of hockey". 
These will be discussed relative to the third hypothesis and the 
proposed model of information-processing in sport.
To summarize, then, self-serving bias was found, as subjects 
made negative-self attributions which were unrelated to actual success.
6 . 5 . 3 . 2  Sohema-Based Approach: V'tdzo Results
The second hypothesis examined attributions to see whether evidence 
of schema was found. The Hypothesis was accepted.
Significant correlations were found between success and luck 
C-0.3302, P = 0.003) but not between success and ability or effort
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as results in section 6.5.3.1 found. Thus, results supported a 
motivational bias as predicted,
6 . 5 .3 .3  Testing the Informat'Con-Proaess'Cng Model: Video Results
Several aspects of the information-processing model are discussed 
relative to results of this experiment. These include the effects of 
experience on actual success at the task, and the effect of experience 
on expectations/perceptions such as motivation, frustration and worry.
Hypothesis 3a was accepted and 3b partially accepted. Success 
at the perceptual task was found to be related to hockey experience 
according to results of a one-way analysis of variance. See Table 6.2 
for results.
Table 6.2 One Way Analysis of Variance Results: Video Success by
Experience Group
Source DF SS
Between Groups 2 86.7881
Within Groups 67 350.1998
Total 69 436.9879
Mean
No Experience 16.9000
School Experience 16.3600
University
Experience 18.8800
Total 17.4143
MS F.Ratio F.Prob
43.3940 8,302 0.0006
5.2269
Results show that the university/club group was significantly more 
successful than either of the other two groups (those with school 
experience or no experience). '
These results confirm the model as proposed, as experienced subjects 
were more successful. The second part (3b) of the third hypothesis 
extends the model in the other direction: examining the effects of 
experience on expectations/perceptions about the task.
Hypothesis 3b was supported in terms of motivation, as levels of 
experience in hockey correlated with motivation (0.3627, P = 0.001), 
however Hypothesis 3b was not supported in terms of frustration, as
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level of experience did not correlate significantly with, frustration 
C-0.0863, P = 0,239). See Table 6.3 for correlation results.
Table 6.3 Pearson Correlations: Expectations/Perceptions, 
Experience, and Video Success
Motivation
Experienced 
at Hockey 
(Level of Experience)
0.3627**
C 70)
P=0.001
Success at 
Video
0.3241** 
( 70)
P=0.003
Frustration
* P Z .05 ** P Z  .01
-0,0863 
( 70)
P=0.239
-0.2550* 
( 70)
P=0.017
A further examination of expectations/perceptions showed that 
success at video correlated with both motivation (0.3241, P = 0.003) 
and frustration (-0.225, P = 0.017), which supports the proposed model
Having thus examined each of the three hypotheses, the following 
conclusions can be drawn:
1. A self-serving bias is evidenced.
2. A schema-based approach is evidenced.
3. The information-processing model is mainly supported. (The 
only unexpected finding was that level of experience and 
frustration did not correlate).
Several further questions were asked of the subjects regarding 
their experience. Subjects were asked how recent their hockey experience 
had been and how regular it had been. Responses were grouped according 
to recency (experience within the past year, the past 2-3 years, 
the past 4-6 years, the past 7-9 years, and the past 10 years).
Regularity was similarly grouped (experience has never been regular, 
experience has been regular for 1-3 seasons, for 4-6 seasons, for 
7-9 seasons, or for 10 or more seasons). When recency and regularity 
of experience were assessed, both correlated with success at the video 
perceptual task (-0.3324, P = 0.002 and 0.2667, P = 0.013 respectively).
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Those with more recent experience were more successful, as were those 
with regular experience.' Appendix Q shows correlation results. Those 
with more recent experience were also more motivated and less frustrated 
(-’0.2852, P = 0.008 and 0.2331, P = 0.026 respectively). This gives 
some added support to Hypothesis 3b which did not show a significant 
correlation between experience (level of experience) and frustration.
To further examine the effects of experience, those who had played 
other sports were compared to those who had not ; however, frequencies did 
not lend credence to results as 64 had played other sports, and 6 had not. 
Because this information could not be used, experience in team sports 
was examined, and those who had team sports experience were not found 
to be significantly different from those who had not in terms of success 
(0.0139, P =0.455). It was felt that football players may have had 
experience similar to hockey players, but again they were not significantly 
more successful than those who had not played football (0.1396, P = 0.124). 
See Appendix Q for further correlations between football and team 
experience and other factors such as frustration, motivation, and 
attributions.
Although experience in areas other than hockey did not correlate with 
success, experience in hockey did. It is also interesting to note that 
experience in hockey is one of the factors to which subjects made 
attributions regarding their success or failure. When asked to complete 
open-ended statements in pilot studies, subjects responded with the 
following:
When I succeeded, it was because I have a background in sport.
When I failed, it was because I’ve never been taught to play 
hockey.
When I failed, it was because I've never been taught the rules 
of hockey.
These questions were then used in the experiment and although the 
questions regarding rules of hockey did not seem to distinguish success­
ful subjects (-0.1763, P = 0.072), the other two statements did. Those 
who were more successful were less likely to say that they had succeeded 
because of a background in sports (-0.2927, P = 0.007). The less successful
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the subjects, on the other hand, the more likely they were to say that 
they had failed because they had never been taught to play hockey 
C-0.2314, P = 0.027).
A final analysis was carried out which again examined attributions 
in a further attempt to clarify the partial rejection of Hypothesis 3b.
While more successful subjects were less frustrated by the task, they 
also made more attributions regarding their frustration. The less 
successful the subjects, the more they attributed their failure to the 
difficulty of the test and frustration (-0.2135, P = 0.038).
It seems, then, that subjects who are experienced are successful, 
and those who are not successful blame their lack of experience. Similarly, 
subjects who are less frustrated are more successful, and those who 
are not successful blame their frustration. Perhaps more attributional 
studies should examine attributional responses in this way.
6 .5 . 3 . 4  Sex Differences: Video Results
According to T-test results, no significant sex differences were 
found regarding success at perceptual tasks (T = -1.87, P = 0.065).
See Table 6.4 for T-test results.
Although mean success scores for males (m = 18.000) were higher than 
females (m = 16.8419), differences failed to reach significance. Also, 
males and females were not significantly different in motivation 
(T = -0.20, P = 0.812), frustration (T = 0.66, P = 0.511), level of 
experience (T = 0.99, P = 0.327), recency of experience (T = 1.04, P =
0.301), or regularity of experience (T = 1.95, P = 0.055). See Table
6.4 for T-test results.
Also, no sex differences were found in attributional responses 
to relative factors. T-test results showed males and females to attribute 
similarly to relative factors (T = -0.24, P = 0.810). However, differences 
were found between males and females in attributions to absolute factors.
As most related literature shows, females attribute their success more 
often to luck than males. When asked to what extent they agree, females 
agreed more often than males with the following: "V/hen I succeeded, it 
was purely by chance" (T = 2.30, P = 0.025).
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Table 6.4 T-Tests: Video Results Showing Sex Differences 
Variable Mean SD SE T
Video Success
Females
DF Prob
16.8919 2.331 0.383 -1.87 68 0,065
Males 18.0000 2.622 0.456
Motivation
Females
Males
9.1081
9.2121
2.233
2.103
0.367
0.366
—0.20 68 0.842
Frustration
Females
Males
0.5946
0.5152
0.498
0.508
0.082
0.088
0.66 68 0.511
Experience (Level)
Females
Males
1.5676
1.2727
1.259
1.232
0.207
0.214
0.99 68 0.327
Experience (Recency)
Females
Males
1.3243
0.9343
1.600 
1.478
0.263
0.257
1.04 68 0.301
Experience (Regularity)
Females
Males
1.5405
1.0000
1.169
1.146
0.192
0.199
1.96 68 0.055
Relative Attributions
Females
Males
13.9730
14.0606
1.518
1.519
0.250
0.265
-0.24 68 0.810
Absolute Attributions
When I failed, the directions
seemed clear to others,
but I didn't understand them
Females
Males
1.9730 0.897 0.147
1.5455 0.617 0.107
2.30 68 0.025*
* P Z .05
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Variable
Absolute Attributions (cont.)
When I succeeded, it was 
purely by chance
Females
Males
Me an SD SE
2.4865 0.932 0.153
2.0000 0.829 0.144
DF Prob
2.30 68 0.025*
When I failed, it was 
because I have a poor memory
Females
Males
2.9459 0.970 0.160 -1.36
3.2727 1.039 0.181
68 0.178
When I failed, it was 
because I don't concentrate 
well
Females
Males
3.0811 1.010 0.166 -2.05 68 0.044*
3.5758 1.001 0.174
When I failed, it was 
because my inadequacies made 
me frustrated
Females
Males
2.0000
1.6667
0.882 
0 . 736
0.145
0.128
1.71 68 0.093
When I succeeded, it was 
because I was lucky
Females
Males
2.7568 1.065 0.175
2.4545 0.971 0.169
1.24 68 0.221
* P Z. .05
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Two other attributional responses showed significant sex 
differences. They were:
When I failed, it was because...
.... the directions seemed clear to others, but I didn't 
understand them CT = 2.30, P = 0.025).
.... I don't concentrate well CT = -2.50, P = 0.044).
Females attributed their failure to their inability to under­
stand the directions, while males attributed to their own failure to 
concentrate.
To summarize, then, four points can be made :
1. Females attribute more often to luck and chance.
2. Females attribute more often to their inability to understand 
directions.
3. Males attribute more often to their own poor concentration.
4. No sex differences were found in relative attributions.
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6.5.4 D'ùscuss'Con
Attributions were found again to be self-serving as negative 
self-attributions were unrelated to success. Again, no absolute, 
negative attributions were related to success. Subjects were again 
unwilling to blame themselves for their poor performance.
Threat is again seen as the determiner of bias. Luck, which 
has been shown to have little bearing on the self-image, was again 
found to be attributed to more Often by those who were least successful. 
The less successful they were, the more likely they were to feel that 
they had done well because of luck. These findings confirmed results 
reported in Chapter 2 regarding attributions to luck in which losers 
more often blamed bad luck than winners. Results also confirmed 
Chapter 2 findings which showed all other absolute attributions to 
be unrelated to success.
The reason absolute attributions are unrelated to success is 
because subjects who were not successful attempted to protect their 
self-concept by making attributions which were self-protecting.
A schema-based approach was again supported, and the following 
schemata identified based on causal attributions:
My Own Ability/Effort
High
Low
Low High
Success
My Own Luck
High
Low
Low High
Success
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This schema was employed by subjects in earlier experiments as 
well. Both winners and losers employed this 'winning' schema in 
Chapter 2, and the imaginary winners in Chapter 4 also utilized this 
schema, as did those given no outcome information. The only group 
not found to utilize the schema was the imaginary losers in Chapter 4. 
The schema employed by this group, a 'losing' schema, looked like this:
Ability/Effort/Luck
High
Low
Low High
Success
All three absolute attributions followed the above pattern with 
low success attributed to poor ability, effort, and luck. These 
results confirmed a non-motivational process due to lack of threat 
to the self-image inherent in the 'imaginary' nature of the task.
It is important that the results of the video experiment supported 
a motivational process, because experience was then eliminated as a 
cause for bias. In Chapter 2, for example, subjects were all 
experienced players who might have valued their identity as a successful 
player. The fact that non-players and less experienced players also 
employed a 'winning' schema in a setting outside of the actual game 
is extremely important. With these results supporting a motivational 
approach, it can be concluded that not enough threat is inherent in 
an imaginary setting to warrant subject's use of bias in attributional 
responses. Bias was found in an active lab situation, as well as on 
the pitch, leading to the conclusion that æiy valued sports task of 
a competitive nature can elicit bias. This is true regardless of 
whether 'physical' participation or 'mental' participation occurs, 
and regardless of whether outcome feedback is given or not.
The extremely strong support for the schema-based, motivational 
approach leads to an attempt to further clarify the information-processing 
model. The first step, then, is an assessment of the impact of sports 
experience on actual success at perceptual tasks. The model was
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supported, as results confirmed expectations that skilled players would 
be more successful at interpreting video segments.
These results confirmed past findings in other sports which found 
superior perception among the experienced group relative to non-players. 
Results showed that subjects with hockey experience were more successful 
at perceptual tasks than subjects with less experience. These findings 
supported earlier work done by Vanek and Hosek (1970) and Fleury,
Bard, and Carrière (1982) in basketball, and by Vanek and Cratty (1970) 
in skiing.
Vanek and Hosek (1970) had asked subjects to answer questions 
about basketball following tachistocopic slide presentations. Their 
results showed test scores to be good indicators of the subject's 
competency in basketball. Fluery, Bard and Carrière (1982) also found 
experts to be superior to non-experts in basketball, using speed, 
accuracy and variability of response as measures of success. Similar 
results reported by Vanek and Cratty (1970) found that better skiiers 
did better on memory tasks before skiing downhill. Both of these 
studies showed that experience in sports affected success in perceputal 
tasks.
Results of the present study used accuracy of response as a 
measure of success and showed that those with university/club experience 
in hockey were more successful at interpreting videotaped segments of 
hockey matches than school players or those with no experience. Allard, 
Graham, and Paarsalu (1980), Sanderson C1972), Olsen (1956), deGroot 
(1965), and Charness (1976, 1979) all found superior perception among 
athletes than non-athletes. Several of these contend that 'visual' 
superiority is the reason for these results (Olsen, 1956 and Sanderson, 
1972), claiming that superior depth perception may be responsible.
Others have proposed no significant differences in vision between 
athletes and non-athletes, although in areas other than depth perception 
Montebello (1953) found no differences in stereoscopic vision and 
no correlation between measures of stereoscopic acuity and success 
in baseball. Similarly, Clark and Warren (1979) found athletes 
and non-athletes to be similar in stereoscopic vision.
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Further studies are needed to further define the effect of visual 
differences on sports performance which is beyond the scope of the 
present study. The debate is presented here as a factor which needs 
to be considered in assessing perceptual success in sport.
All of these results could also be explained as due to subjects 
relating new ideas to previously mastered ones (Rothkopf, 1965). Less 
experienced subjects would lack the previous knowledge with which to 
make such comparisons. None of the previously mentioned studies have 
identified reasons for success, nor did they identify how information 
was processed in sports settings. Therefore, strategies used to 
remember sport-specific information will next be examined in an attempt 
to find these reasons.
The next study will examine skills at matching and recognition.
The subject will be asked to remember player's positions in slides of 
hockey matches. The question of who is successful will again be 
addressed, along with the question of why they are successful. Their 
explanations will be used to understand how information is processed.
Information is processed about the player's positions, and 
information is processed about the subject's evaluation of their 
performance at the task as well. In order to fully understand the 
subject's success, the totality of their situation must be viewed 
rather than taking a narrow view of the situation, as others have 
done in the past, by examining only success at memory tasks.
The present series of perceptual studies attempt to broaden 
the body of knowledge regarding 'success' in sport to also include a 
closer examination of the expectations, perceptions, and attributions 
of the successful subject.
Experience in hockey is also a key issue. It does seem to be 
a factor related to success, and attributions made by unsuccessful 
subjects blamed their failure at the task on their lack of experience. 
More unsuccessful subjects also blamed the difficulty of the test 
(due to frustration) than successful subjects, and unsuccessful 
subjects reported greater levels of frustration. So it seems that
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subjects without experience in hockey feel that their failure is 
due to their frustration and lack of experience, which in fact appears 
to be case. They see themselves as unable to perform because of 
factors which are beyond their control, such as their lack of experience.
The next step is to try to identify if having experience leads 
to the use of different strategies which are more successful. This 
is the purpose of the second perceptual experiment which will examine 
the effect of prior cueing on memory as well as the successfulness of 
various strategies for remembering.
The final area which was examined in this, the first experiment 
in sports perception, involved sex differences. No sex differences 
were found in success in this study. Because past research has not 
examined sex differences at perceptual tasks, comparison- to other 
studies is impossible.
The only study which compared the sexes in sports perception tasks 
tested peripheral vision and found females to be superior to males 
(Straub, 1980). Peripheral vision, as reported earlier, may be an 
area for further research, but is beyond the scope of the present study.
However, past research is more abundant with regard to attribution­
al sex differences. The problem is that findings in the past have shown 
conflicting results in sport. While McHugh, Duquin, and Frieze (1978) 
and Carron (1981) reported sex differences in attributions; Gill,
Ruder, and Gross (1982) found none. Such inconsistencies are largely 
due to differences in the types of females questioned. As McHugh, 
Duquin, and Frieze (1978) pointed out, high achieving females may 
make different attributions than female non-participants. Also, 
the results of sex differences in the sports personality inventory 
pointed to the fact that females tend to be self-doubters more often 
than males.
Further studies of high achieving females are definitely needed 
in order to further evaluate the relationship between personality and 
attributions in women's sports.
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In the present study, females of varying levels of achievement 
in sport were studied. Often females didn't feel that they had 
understood the directions, although they believed others had. Females 
have been found to evaluate their own ability lower than males in 
sports studies reported by Carron (1980), and the present results seem 
to confirm these findings.
Present results also confirmed findings by Carron (1981) which 
showed women more often endorsing external factors for both success and 
failure. Present findings showed females attributing more often to 
luck and chance than males. No motivation or frustration differences 
were reported between males and females either.
The next experiment will again address the issue of sex differences 
to see whether males use different strategies than females for remembering 
Males were not found to be more motivated or more frustrated by the 
task than females either, although females attributed failure more often 
than males to their own frustration.
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6.6 AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF PERCEPTUAL SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTIONS: 
MATCHING AND RECOGNITION OF PLAYER'S POSITIONS IN SLIDES OF 
HOCKEY MATCHES
All that researchers in the past have learned about perception 
in sport is that experienced players of sport are more successful than 
inexperienced players at remembering sport-specific information. No 
attempt has been made to find out why.
It is true that players are better at remembering 'structured* 
information, but not 'unstructured' or random configurements. deGroot 
(1965) found this to be true in chess ; Allard, Graham, and Paarsalu 
(1980) found it in basketball; and the previous experiment found it 
in hockey. Differences were found between athletes and non-athletes 
in basketball (Vanek and Hosek, 1970), in skiing (Vanek and Cratty,
1970), and in the present study in hockey. Experts were also found 
to be different from non-experts here and in studies by Fleury, Bard, 
and Carrière (1982). But none of these studies have explained why 
experienced sports participants are more successful at perceptual 
tasks.
In chess, success is believed to be due to encoding differences. 
Experienced players 'chunk' the information into meaningful configurations, 
which inexperienced players do not (Goldstein, 1979).
Unfortunately, research is gravely lacking in the area of perception 
in team sports. The studies which have been carried out are very 
limited in scope, as seen in Chapter 5. In fact, nu studies have 
examined perceptual skills in hockey. Thus, a mammouth task lies 
ahead for sport psychologists in identifying who is successful in 
perception and why.
Remembering positions of players in a slide presentation has 
been studied (Allard, Graham, and Paarsalu, 1980), but this is only 
one aspect of perception. This skill is only part of a vast network 
of perceputal skills which need to be examined. Equally important 
are skills of interpreting. Meaning must be given to the information.
Only then can information be utilized.
270
Memory of player’s positions, in isolation, is of little value. 
Players must use this information to make decisions in a sport setting. 
The decisions made (based on this information) may make the difference 
between success and failure in sport. The ability to remember is 
important, and it is important to examine strategies used in order to 
improve sports memory. These skills do not exist in isolation. Rather
they occur in a sports context which is social.
It is the whole, rather than the parts, which is important. It 
is not enough to say that Jane is a good sportswoman because she 
can remember where her opponents are on the field. It must also be
said that Jane uses this information well. Perhaps she uses the
position of the opponent to create an attacking strategy which leads 
to a goal. Perhaps Jane is better at remembering her opponent’s 
positions than her teammate is, because of what she focuses on, or 
what she decides to use as a cue beforehand. These are important 
considerations. But it must not be forgotten that Janes' expectations, 
perceptions about the game, and her attributions also play a part in 
her success.
Like many individuals, Jane attempts to give meaning to objects 
in her environment. She chooses salient objects on which to focus 
(perhaps the goalkeeper), and incorporates relevant information into 
plans for action (such as scoring a goal). She may expect to score 
the goal, she may expect to win the game, and she may feel little 
frustration about the task. If her sports personality is self-trusting, 
this picture may be even more accurate.
Jane's team may win the game, and Jane may attribute her team's 
success to her own superior ability. Perhaps her memory of player's 
positions played a part in her 'ability', leading ultimately to 
her team's success.
From this example, it can be seen that memory for positions is 
only one small aspect of Jane's performance and her team's resulting 
success. In order to understand why Jane is successful in sport, 
then, one must understand Jane and her values. If 'winning' is 
important to Jane, then she is likely to feel differently about
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winning than someone who feels that winning and losing are unimportant.
She may also feel disappointed when she loses, and her attributions 
may reflect this if she protects her self-image by using self-serving 
biases.
Jane is also a team member, a social being. She not only has a 
self-concept as an individual which could be threatened by losing, 
but also has an identity as part of her team. This identity is also 
open to threat. This social aspect of performance is extremely 
important and too often overlooked.
To summarize, then, two important points need to be addressed 
regarding sports perception. The first question to be answered is why 
some people are more successful at perception than others. The second 
is to examine perception in sports in its totality rather than in 
isolation, by further testing the proposed model of information-processing 
in sport. Matching and recognition skills v/ill be tested in the lab 
in an attempt to answer these questions. Memory of player's positions 
will be used to test matching and recognition skills, with accuracy of 
response being used as the measure of success.
As in the earlier video study, the aims and hypotheses test a 
self-serving, motivational approach. Finally, a schema-based approach 
will also be tested.
6.6.1 Subjects
121 university students participated in the study. Of the 121,
36 had no hockey experience, 50 had school experience, and 35 had 
university or club experience. 44 males and 77 females participated.
6.6.2 Methods and ProceduTes
Subjects were tested in groups of 10 in the university's psychology 
lab. They were asked to view colour slides of hockey matches and to 
perform two types of tasks. The first task was a matching task in 
which subjects were asked to view the slide for one minute and choose 
the correct diagram from five diagrams provided which matched the position
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of players in the slide. During the matching task, subjects could 
look at the diagram and the slide at the same time. The second task 
was a recognition task in which, subjects were asked to observe slides 
of a hockey match for 10 seconds. The screen then went blank, and the 
subject was asked to choose the correct diagram from five diagrams 
provided. A total of six slides were presented: three slides for the 
matching task, and 3 slides for the recognition task.
The total number of subjects were divided roughly in half, with 
half receiving a cue for focusing attention, and half receiving no cue. 
The cue group was then divided into three groups according to which 
cue they were given: 23 were given a colour cue, 23 were given a ball 
cue, and 24 were given a goal cue. The colour group was instructed 
to look for the colour of the uniforms; the ball group was instructed
to look for the ball; and the goal group was instructed to look for
the goal. Each of these groups was comprised of a representative 
sample, with females and males being as equally represented within 
groups as possible. Experience levels were also equated within groups.
After receiving instructions which may or may not include a cue 
for attention, subjects viewed the slide and responded on their answer 
sheet (see Appendix R for directions and Appendix S for answer sheet
and diagrams). Responses were scored as either correct or incorrect,
depending on whether the correct diagram was selected. Subjects were 
also asked to rate each slide according to its difficulty on a scale 
of 1-7, with 1 being an easy slide and 7 being a difficult one. Subjects 
were also asked to report what strategies they had used in matching 
the slide and diagram or in recognizing the diagram from the slide.
This information proved useful in assessing which subjects had utilized 
the cue given, as well as which strategies might have been more 
successful. Responses to the strategy questions were open-ended, 
allowing for combinations of factors (for example, the ball in relation 
to the goal, etc.). Finally, the same attributional questions were 
asked as in the video section. That is, subjects were asked to respond 
to a 5-point Likert-type questionnaire regarding causal attributions.
Other information gathered here which was also gathered in the 
video experiment included recency and regularity of experience, as well
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as football and team sports experience. Whether subjects had experience 
in sports vs, no-experience was not included, as this information 
proved not to be useful in the video experiment (nearly all subjects 
had some form of experience in sport).
The apparatus consisted of a Nikon 35mm camera and colour slide 
film, paper cups, string, and comer markers for making a grid to 
measure distances on the pitch, a Kodak autofocus slide projector 
with automatic changer, a stop-watch, and a dark room light enough to be 
able to see the diagrams. The reason for using cups, string and corner 
markers is explained in the following design section which describes 
how the diagrams were created for use in the experiment,
6.6.3 Design
The diagrams were designed as follows:
An empty hockey pitch was covered with white paper cups at 5 yard 
intervals throughout the pitch. 72 slides were taken of this grid 
from six different angles (see Diagram 1). Two were taken from the 
intersection of the side and end lines (A and B). Two were taken from 
the 50 yard line and the side line intersection (C and D). One was 
taken from the centre of the pitch at the 50 yard line (E), and one 
from behind the goal (F).
Diagram 1: Camera Positions for Slides
To draw an accurate diagram, the correct positions of the players 
in the slides was ascertained. This was done by placing a slide 
of the players (taken from a point shown in Diagram 1) into the projector 
along with a slide showing the paper cup grid prepared earlier. The two 
slides were placed in the projector at the same time. The players 
appeared to be standing on the cups, and by counting the number of 
cups, their position on the field was pinpointed. Diagrams were prepared.
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with, one showing the correct positions, and four showing the incorrect 
positions. These were then used in the actual experiment to test 
perceptual skills of matching and recognition.
6.6.4 Results.
6.6.4.1 Self—SeTVing Bias : Slide ' Results (Matching '.and ReQogni.tion)
The first hypothesis which examines motivational vs. non- 
motivational concerns will be tested here (see Section 6.4).
Hypothesis 1 was accepted. Pearson correlations showed no sign­
ificant correlation between negative absolute attributions and success 
at matching or recognition. Neither poor memory (-0.1341, P = 0.071; 
and 0.0597, P = 0.258), quickness (0.0802, P = 0.191; and 0.0146,
P = 0.437), intelligence (-0.0615, P = 0.251; and 0.1422, P = 0.060), 
nor understanding of the directions (0.0666, P = 0.234; and -0.0575,
P = 0.266) were blamed more often by successful subjects. See 
Table 6.5 and Appendix T, for correlation results).
As in the video experiment, attributions to success did show 
significant results. For example, attributions crediting success 
because of good effort were made more often by successful subjects 
(0.1538, P = 0.046), although the correlation was only marginally 
significant. In fact, for the recognition task, significance was 
not reached at all (-0.1212, P = 0.093). As in the video experiment, 
attributions to success which credited one’s own good memory were 
unrelated to success (0.0711, P = 0.219 for matching and -0.0965,
P = 0.146 for recognition tasks).
It again appears that subjects are unwilling to blame themselves. 
This attributional pattern has been consistent throughout this study, 
and is again supported here using perceptual sports tasks. Another 
finding which has been supported in all experiments thus far is that 
relative attributions are unrelated to success (-0.0555, P = 0.273 
and -0.0155, P = 0.433 for matching and recognition tasks).
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Table 6.5 Pearson Correlations : Attributions and Success by Matching
and Recognition
Success at 
Matching
Success at 
Recognition
When I failed to answer correctly, 
it was because I had too little time
0.0372 
C 121) 
P=0.343
-0.0738 
C 121) 
P=0.211
When I failed, the directions seemed 0.0666
clear to others, but I didn't ( 121)
understand them P=0.234
-0.0575 
C 121) 
P=0.266
When I succeeded, it was purely by 
chance
-0.0810 
( 121) 
P=0.189
-0.1462 
( 121) 
P=0.055
When I failed, it was because I was 
not intelligent enough
-0.0615 
C 121) 
P=0.251
O.1422 
( 121) 
P=0.060
When I failed, it was because I 
have never been taught to play 
hockey
-0.1212 
( 121) 
P^O.093
-0.1768* 
( 121) 
P=0.026
When I succeeded, it was because I 
tried very hard
0.1538* 
( 121) 
P=0.046
-0.1212 
( 121) 
P=0.093
When I failed, it was because the 
test causes you to be nervous
0.1030 
( 121) 
P=0.130
-0.0219 
( 121) 
P=0.406
When I failed, it was because I am 
not quick enough
0.0802 
( 121) 
P=0.191
0.0146 
C 121) 
P=0.437
When I succeeded, it was because the 
test was well constructed
0.0718 
( 121) 
P=0.217
-0 .2012* 
( 121) 
P=0.013
When I failed, it was because I 
have a poor memory
-0.1341 
( 121) 
P=0.071
0.0597 
( 121) 
P=0.258
* P Z  .05
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When I failed, it was because the 
directions were poor
Success at 
Matching
0.0871 
C 121) 
P=0.171
Success at 
Recognition
-0.0298 
C 121) 
P=0.373
When I succeeded, it was because 
I have a background in sports
-0.1722* 
C 121) 
P=0.029
-0.2165** 
C 121) 
P=0.009
When I failed, it was because I have -0.1360 
never been taught the rules of ( 121)
hockey P=0.068
-0.2032* 
C 121) 
P=0.013
When I failed, it was because I 
don't concentrate well
0.0125 
C 121) 
P=0.446
-0.0229 
( 121) 
P=0.402
When I succeeded, it was because 
I have a good memory
0.0711 
( 121) 
P=0.219
-0.0965 
( 121) 
P=0.146
When I failed, it was because my 
inadequacies made me frustrated
0.0492 
( 121) 
P=0.296
-0.0809 
( 121) 
P=0.189
When I failed, it was because the 
difficulty of the test made me 
frustrated
-0.1234 
( 121) 
P=0.089
-0.1044 
( 121) 
P=0.127
When I succeeded, it was because 
I was lucky
-0.1056 
( 121) 
P=0.125
-0.0071 
( 121) 
P=0.469
Relative attributions -0.0555 
( 121) 
P=0.273
-0.0155 
( 121) 
P=0.433
* P Z .05 
** P ^ .01
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Reliability tests were carried out on the relative attribution 
scale to be sure that the scale was reliable for this sample. Results 
showed reliability to be 0.73455.
Other failure attributions included the following and showed 
no significant correlation to success:
When I failed, it was because I had too little time
(0.0372, P = 0.343 and - 0.0738, P = 0.211).
When I failed, it was because the test causes you to be nervous
CO.1030, P = 0.130 and -0.0219, P = 0.406).
When I failed, it was because the directions were poor
CO.0871, P = 0.171 and -0.0298, P = 0.373).
Other success attributions included the following:
When I succeeded, it was purely by chance
(-0.0810, P = 0.189 and -0.1462, P = 0.055).
When I succeeded it was because I was lucky
(-0.1056, P =  0.125 and -0.0071, P = 0.469).
When I succeeded, it was because the test was well constructed
(0.0718, P = 0.217 and -0.2012, P = 0.013).
To summarize, self-serving bias was evidenced because negative 
attributional responses were found to be the same regardless of success 
at the perceptual task of matching or recognition. Factors not causing 
threat such as attributions to success or to external reasons for 
failure may not have shown the same results because less threat may have 
been inherently present in this type of attribution.
6.6.4.2 Schema—Based Approach: Stvde Results (Matchïng and Recocprit'ion)
The second hypothesis tested a schema-based approach and was accepted 
No significant correlations were found between either ability, 
effort, or luck attributions and success. These results do therefore 
support the existance of a motivational bias.
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6 . 6 . 4 . 3  Testzng the InfoTmation-Pvo ces sing Model: St'Cde Results 
(Matching and Recogn'ttionl
The information-processing model was tested, using matching task 
results and recognition task results.
Hypothesis 3a was rejected, and 3b was partially accepted.
Results of one way analysis of variance F (1,120) = 1.500, P = 0.2274 
showed that experienced subjects were not more successful at either 
matching or recognition. See Appendix U for results. Also, frustration 
was lower among successful subjects in the recognition task (-0.1805,
P = 0.024) according to Pearson correlations. As the matching task 
was easier, all subjects, regardless of frustration levels, were expected 
to do better than at the more difficult recognition task. Also, the 
recognition task involved shorter amounts of time, which also may 
have increased frustration among those who were less successful. As 
expected, success at matching did not correlate with frustration while 
success at recognition did (0.0285, P =0.378 and -0.1805, P = 0.024).
The findings regarding frustration, then, were the result of the 
complexity of the task. The important point to be made is that this 
is an example of how expectations/perceptions are related to success; 
and the unexpected finding, which fails to support Hypothesis 3b, is 
that experienced players were not less frustrated than those with less 
experience. See Table 6.6 for all correlation results.
Table 6.6 Pearson Correlations: Expectations/Perceptions, Sex,
Experience, and Success at Matching and Recognition Tasks
Perceived
Difficulty
Experience at 
Hockey 
(Level of 
Experience)
-0.1515*
(  121): 
P=0.049
Success at 
Matching
-0.2608* 
C 121) 
P=0.015
Success at 
Recognition
-0.2741** 
C 121) 
P=0.007
Frustration -0.1411 
C 121) 
P=0.061
0.0285 
C 121) 
P=0.378
-0.1805* 
( 121) 
P=0.024
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Because results of the previous experiment showed quite clear 
results regarding motivation and worry, no further studies were needed 
in these areas. The reason for including frustration in this experiment 
was to relate results to perceived difficulty.
Pearson correlation results showed that experienced players 
perceived the task as easier (-0.1515, P = 0.049). This is an example 
of how expectations/perceptions about the game are related to experience. 
The perception of difficulty was inversely related to success in both 
matching (-0.2608, P = 0.015) and recognition (-0.2741, P = 0.001).
Other questions were asked about experience, and results showed 
that recency of experience did not correlate significantly with either 
matching success (-0.1095, P = 0.116) or recognition success (-0.135,
P = 0.070). Regularity of experience correlated with success at 
matching (0.2492, P = 0.003) but not recognition (0.1148, P = 0.105).
So, unlike results of the video experiment, recent and regular experience 
did not always predict success at the task.
Subjects again made attributions about experience which were 
relative to their success at the task. When asked whether they had 
succeeded because of their background in sports, more successful 
subjects were less likely to agree (-0.1722, P = 0.029 for those 
successful at matching, and -0.2165, P = 0.009 for those successful 
at recognition). Failure attributions, like success attributions, 
related to success. When asked whether they had failed because they 
had never been taught to play hockey, those subjects who were more 
successful at recognition were again less likely to agree (-0.1768,
P = 0.026). They were also less likely to agree with the statement 
’’When I failed, it was because I have never been taught the rules of 
hockey” (-0.2032, P = 0.013).
It is of particular interest to note that when success at matching, 
rather than recognition, was used as the success variable, attributions 
to experience were not related to success. Failure attributed to 
never having been taught to play (-0.1212, P = 0.093) was unrelated to 
matching success. Neither were failure attributions blaming the 
fact that the subject was never taught the rules (-0.1360, P = 0.068).
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The pattern found in the video experiment was found again in the 
recognition task, but not the matching. Whether attributional 
pattern differences are due to the length of time allowed (one 
minute vs. 10 seconds) Or the type of task (matching vs. recognition) 
is an issue which needs to be examined in the next experiment.
The link between task difficulty and frustration was further 
developed as well. In the video experiment, successful subjects were 
less frustrated, and they made fewer attributions to the difficulty 
of the task leading to frustration and inability to do well. In the 
present study, successful subjects were again less frustrated, but 
their attributions to frustration were unrelated to success. That is, 
when asked whether they failed because the difficulty of the test 
caused them to be frustrated, no significant correlation was found 
between responses and success (-0.1234, P = 0.089 and -0.1044, P = 0,127 
for success at matching and recognition respectively).
To summarize, it again seems that experienced subjects are 
successful, and that those who are not successful at recognition 
tasks blame their lack of experience. Also, less frustrated subjects 
are more successful, although they do not make attributions blaming 
this frustration as in the previous experiment.
6.6.4.4 Sex Differences: Slide Results (Matching and Recognition)
In the earlier experiment involving videotaped matches, no sex 
differences were found in success. Similarly, in the matching and 
recognition tasks (involving slides) no significant differences occurred 
(T = 0.28, P = 0.783 and T = -0.53, P = 0.594). See Table 6.7.
Again, no significant sex differences were found regarding relative 
attributions (T = -0.05, P = 0.962), although numerous differences 
occurred between male and female absolute attributions. Of the 18 
attributional responses, males and females differed on five according 
to T-test results. Two of these were the same as in previous experiments
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When I failed, the directions seemed clear to others, but
I didn't understand them
(T = 2 .72, P = 0.008).
When I succeeded* it was because of chance
(T = 4.18, P = 0.025).
One response, to which males more often agreed in the video
experiment, showed no sex differences:
When I failed, it was because I don’t concentrate well
(T = -1.76, P = 0.081).
Two others showed sex differences which were not evident in earlier 
experiments:
When I failed, it was because my inadequacies made me frustrated
(T = 2.39, P = 0.018).
When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky
(T = 3.23, P = 0.002).
Results confirmed earlier findings that females attribute success 
to luck and failure to their inability to understand the directions more than 
males; while no significant differences occurred in attributions to 
concentration which had earlier shown sex differences.
Frustration due to inadequacies was attributed to more often by 
females than males, and females more often attributed success to good 
luck. These two additional findings lend support to the majority of 
related literature studies discussed earlier in which females attributed 
success externally and failure internally.
6.6.4.5 Pe roepti on/Expectations : Slide Results (Majbching ccnd Récognition)
The term perceptions/expectations has been used throughout to cover 
various aspects of perceptions (about the game, its difficulty, the 
frustrations involved and expectations about winning in sport, etc).
The concept to be examined here is the perception of task difficulty 
associated with matching and recognition tasks.
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Table 6.7 T-Tests: Slide Results Showing Sex Differences 
CMatching and Recognition)
Variable Mean SD SE T DF Prob
Matching Success
Females
Males
1.6364 0.902 0.103 0.28 119 0.783
1.5909 0.816 0.123
Recognition Success
Females
Males
1.6104 0.861 0.098 -0.53 119 0.594 
1.7045 1.047 0.158
Frustration
Females
Males
0.7143 0.455 0.052 1.64 119 0.104
0.5682 0.501 0.076
Perceived Difficulty
Females
Males
15.5455 3.210 0.366 2.58 119 0.011*
13.8409 3.935 0.593
Experience (Level)
Females
Males
1.3247 1.141 0.130 
1.2045 1.250 0.188
0.54 119 0.591
Experience (Recency)
Females
Males
1.1039 1.343 0.153
0.8409 1.413 0.213
1.02 119 0.311
Experience (Regularity)
Females
Males
1.3896 1.078 0.123
0.9091 1.117 0.168
2.33 119 0.022*
Relative Attributions
Females
Males
14.0779 1.412 0.161
14.0909 1.444 0.218
-0.05 119 0.962
Absolute Attributions
When I failed, the directions 
seemed clear to others, but 
I didn't understand them
Females
Males
1.9091 0.830 0.095
1.5227 0.590 0.089
* P Z .05 
** P ZL .01
2.72 119 0.008**
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Variable
Absolute Attributions Ccônt,)
When I succeeded, it was 
purely by chance
Females
Males
Me an SD SE DF Prob
2.6883 0.921 0.105 4.13 119 0.000**
2.000 0.778 0.117
When I failed, it was because 
I have a poor memory
Females
Males
2.7922 0.922 0.105 -2.27
3.2045 1.025 0.154
119 0.025*
When I failed, it was because 
I don't concentrate well
Females
Males
3.1688
3.5000
0.979 0.112
1.023 0.154
-1.76 119 0.081
When I failed, it was because 
my inadequacies made me 
frustrated
Females
Males
2.2338
1.8182
0.972 0.111
0.815 0.123
2.39 119 0.018*
When I succeeded, it was because 
I was lucky
Females
Males
3.0390
2.4318
1.006
0.974
0.115
0.147
3.23 119 0.002**
* P ^  .05
** P z: .01
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Results of Pearson correlations found in Appendix T showed that 
in matching tasks, more successful subjects saw the task as easier 
(-0.2608, P = 0.015). Similar findings occurred in recognition tasks, 
as successful subjects again saw the task as easier (-0.2741, P = 0.001)
More successful subjects, then saw the task as easier, as did males 
and experienced hockey players. Males saw the task as easier than 
females (T = 2.58, P = 0.011). While sex of the subject was found to 
predict perception of task difficulty, so too did experience at hockey. 
The more experience a player had, the easier the task seemed (-0.1515,
P = 0.049).
The final point to be made regarding perceived difficulty is that 
a significant correlation was found between perceived difficulty and 
relative attributions. Those who attributed to relative attributions 
(personal inadequacies) also perceived the task as more difficult.
This finding is of particular importance in the argument of dropping 
task difficulty as an absolute attribution to be assessed in its own 
right. It is clear that perceived difficulty is more of an evaluation 
of the state of affairs rather than a 'reason' for winning or losing.
It is a concept which should instead be examined for its relevance 
in relation to frustration which has been found to lead to less success 
and more attributions to personal inadequacies.
6.6.4.6 Cues and Strategies : Slide Success (Matching and Reoocpvition)
Subjects who were given a cue to focus on were hot more successful 
than those not given a cue. T-test results showed no significant 
differences in matching success (T = 0.70, P = 0.483) or recognition 
success (T = -1.15, P = 0.252). Table 6.8 gives T-test results.
Results of T-tests also showed that the no cue group did not 
perceive the task differently from the cue group (T = 0.14, P = 0.886), 
but those given a cue were less frustrated than the group given no cue.
Being given a cue did not lead to greater success, but it did lead 
to differences in frustration which was less when a cue was given than 
when it was not.
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Table 6.8 T-Tests: Slide Results (Matching and Recognition) for the 
Cue and No-Cue Groups
Mean SD SE T DF Prob
Success No Cue Group 1.6863 0.927 0.130 0.72 119 0.475
at Cue Group 1.5714 0.827 0.099
Matching
Success No Cue Group 1.5294 0.966 0.135 -1.17 119 0.246
at Cue Group 1.7286 0.900 0.108
Recognition
Frustration No Cue Group 0.8039 0.401 0.056 2.91 119 0.004**
Cue Group 0.5571 0.500 0.060
Perceived No Cue Group 14.9804 3.478 0.487 0.14 119 0.886
Difficulty Cue Group 14.8857 3.662 0.438
** P £  .01
Further analyses were carried out on the cue group. First, those 
using the cue were compared to those not using the cue, and again no 
differences were found (T = 0.58, P = 0.563; and T = «T.19, P = 0.238). 
Table 6.9 shows T-test results for these two groups.
Table 6.9 T-Tests: Slide Results (Matching and Recognition) for those 
using the Cue and those not using the Cue
Mean SD SE T DF Prob
Success Cue Not Used 1.6923 0.630 0.175 0.58 68 0.563
at Cue Used 1.5439 0.876 0.115
Matching
Success Cue Not Used 1.4615 0.967 0.268 -1.19 68 0.238
at Cue Used 1.7895 0.881 0.117
Recognition
Frustration Cue Not Used 0.5385 0.519 0.144 -0.15 68 0.883
Cue Used 0.5614 0.501 0.066
Perceived Cue Not Used 15.4615 4.095 0.136 0.63 63 0.534
Difficulty Cue Used 14.7544 3.582 0.474
Again, results showed that those using and those not using a cue 
were similar in rates of success. No differences occurred in frustration 
or perceived difficulty either (T = -0.15, P = 0.883 and T = 0.63,
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P = 0.534). The majority of subjects given a cue did, in fact, 
use the cue. (It should be noted also that the group who did not use 
the cue numbered only 13).
Two further analyses were carried out on the cue group. The 
first involved examining the type of cue to see whether one cue was 
more successful that the others, and the second involved examining 
the strategies used to see if any one strategy was more successful 
than the others. The only significant finding was that the group 
given a goal cue was more successful than the group given a colour cue. 
Success scores for the three groups in the matching task were colour 
(m = 1.2609), ball (m = 1.6087), and goal (m = 1.8333). A one way 
analysis of variance (see Appendix U) showed an F ratio of 3.018 and 
probability 0.0556. Using the Scheffe test, significant group differences 
were found between the goal and colour groups.
Recognition success was not, however, greater for the goal cue 
group. In fact, no significant differences were fotmd in success at 
recognition between any of the three cue groups F (1,69) = 0.083,
P = 0.9772).
The final analysis was carried out which compared strategies 
to see whether subjects using one strategy were more successful than 
those using another. Such was not the case. The three most commonly 
used strategies (colour, ball, and goal) showed no significant differences 
in success at matching F (1,69) = 0.097, P = 0.9072) or recognition 
F (1,69) = 2.746, P = 0.0714). See Appendix U for complete analysis 
of variance results.
Subjects’ responses in pilot studies to open ended questions about 
strategies used showed the same three strategies to be the most used.
For this reason they were chosen to be used as cues in the present 
experiment. Combinations of strategies were also examined, and no 
combinations were found to be more successful than other combinations 
or single strategies.
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6.6.5 Discussion
Vonnie Gros, long time coach of the United States' women's hockey 
team, pointed to the importance of memory in the game. She said,
"Good tactics and sound techniques beat opponents. Techniques have 
team value only when they are executed with accuracy, timing, and speed, 
with each player aware of the placement of teammates and opponents alike 
on the field" (1979, p. 18). However, no research has been carried 
out with regard to perceptual strategies for remembering positions in 
hockey.
Most past research which examined perceptual skills in sports has 
used speed of response as a measure of success (Allard et al, 1980;
Vanek and Cratty, 1970; and deGroot ,1965). Only Bard and Fleury (1981) 
studied perceptual strategies. They studied problem solving in basket­
ball and ice hockey, finding that experts and beginners use different 
cues in anticipating the path of the ball or the puck. Their findings 
showed that beginners made decisions while the puck was in flight, 
while experts used the stick position as a cue. They suggested, there­
fore, that coaches implemented a training programme, utilizing cues for 
problem solving.
Using Bard and Fleury's work as a starting point, then, it would 
be expected that experienced hockey players would use different strategies 
for remembering positions of players, and that these strategies could 
be incorporated into a training scheme for perceptual skills. Findings 
by Fleury, Bard, and Carrière (1982) used accuracy as a measure of 
success, and found basketball experts to be more accurate in remembering 
skill-specific stimuli.
If experts, then, are more successful, and if experts used different 
strategies (as proposed by Bard and Fleury), then one might expect that 
some strategies would be more successful than others. However, results 
of the present study do not confirm these expectations. Experts are 
more successful, but strategies experienced players used did not differ 
from those used by subjects with less experience.
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R e c o g n i t i o n  r e s u l t s ^ ,  showed that no one strategy was more successful. 
The most commonly used strategies were colour, ball, and goal strategies, 
but no one strategy was more successful. These findings do not lend 
support to previous findings in non-sporting contexts. Looking first at 
past research in sport, colour would be expected to be the most success­
ful strategy for visual search. Underwood (1978) studied visual search 
patterns and found brightness and colour to be the two dominant optical 
properties. This would lead to the expectation that colour of uniforms 
would be a successful strategy for remembering players' positions.
Vernon (1966) found shapes and forms to be important discriminators. 
This finding could be important because,in pilot studies, some subjects 
reported forming shapes or patterns of positions based on the colour 
of uniforms. However, again no support was found in the empirical 
evidence here. No combinations of factors such as shape and colour, 
or individual strategies, were more successful than others. These 
findings also contradict findings by Cockerill and MacGillivary (1981) 
which found colour to be a superior method of encoding information in a 
sports setting. They compared colour, brightness, size and sound to see
which was more successful as a strategy for remembering and found colour
to be the most successful strategy.
All of these studies involved asking subjects for strategies used 
'after' completion of a task. In this case, groups were similar to 
half of the subjects who received no cue in the present study. But 
perhaps if the strategy were presented 'before' the task was carried 
out one strategy might be more successful. With this in mind, half 
of the subjects were given a cue to focus on prior to the task. In 
this way, the 'cue' group was different from the 'no cue' group who 
generated their own strategies during the task.
Unfortunately, no perceptual studies in sport have utilized prior
cueing in memory tasks. The question therefore remained - if strategy 
did not affect success, is it safe to say that cueing would also not 
affect success? In order to answer this question, three other questions 
need to be addressed:
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1. Does being given a cue result in greater success?
(Were those given a cue more successful than those not given a 
cue?).
2. Does using the cue result in greater success?
(Were those using the cue more successful than those given a 
cue who did not use it?).
3. Does the type of cue given result in a greater success?
(Were those given either a colour, ball, or goal cue more 
successful?).
Results showed that being given a cue did not result in greater 
success, nor did using the cue; but the type of cue had an effect 
(those given a goal cue were more successful in matching tasks than 
those given a colour cue). The type of cue did not, however, affect 
success at recognition.
It appears, then, that subjects who were given a long time to 
complete a task benefitted from a goal cue. However, these benefits 
were not evidenced when only a short-time was allowed for task completion. 
Because a hockey match is fast-moving and constantly changing, the 
benefit of using a goal cue must be questioned. Therefore, no 
recommendations can be made regarding the implementation of a training 
program using strategies or cues as proposed earlier by Bard and 
Fleury (1981).
It can be said, then, that examining cues and strategies purely 
in terms of success may be short-sighted. Being given a cue may have 
an effect on the expectations/perceptions about the task, which may 
be a factor in success and may influence attributional responses (as 
proposed in the information-processing model). The proposed model is 
presented as follows;
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Bias
Input
Threat
Schemata
Experience
Final Attributions
Initial Attributions
Actual 
Success in 
Perceptual 
Skills
ExpectationsyPerceptions 
about the Task
The influence of factors such as frustration have previously been 
examined relative to success, and results showed that less frustrated 
subjects were more successful. The fact that subjects given a cue 
were less frustrated than those not given a cue may, therefore, be 
important. The impact of prior cueing can be seen to influence the 
perceptions regarding the task.
It can be concluded that being given a cue lowers frustration, 
and as lower levels of frustration have been associated with success 
in this experiment, being given a cue must be seen as advantageous. 
There must be an advantage in having a cue to focus on, regardless of 
what that cue is. liie subjects feel less frustrated when they have 
something on which to focus. Coaches may be able to help players 
who display high levels of frustration before a game by giving them a
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cue. It should be kept in mind that the type of cue seems less 
important than the fact that a cue is given.
In the past, sports perception research has grossly neglected the 
areas of frustration and perceived difficulty. No studies, in fact, 
have tested success at perceptual skills relative to these areas.
The present study attempts to take a broader view of perception in 
sport, and therefore includes the study of frustration and perceived 
difficulty. Because they are likely to affect success and influence 
attributions, these areas must not be overlooked.
Not only were successful subjects less frustrated, but they also 
perceived the task as easier. These results confirmed earlier field 
results in which winners perceived the game as easier and were less 
frustrated than losers post-game. Subjects who were successful in 
recognition also saw the task as easier and were less frustrated than 
were less successful subjects. Given a longer amount of time, however, 
less frustration was reported, and in the matching task, frustration 
was unrelated to success. This emphasizes the importance of utilizing 
tasks which are not only sport-specific, but are also similar to 
the types of tasks involved in that sport. In this case, clear 
differences can be seen in results of one^minute and lO^secohd tasks.
Because the one-minute task was a matching task and the 10-second 
task a recognition task, any differences in results could be due to 
either the differences in time allowed or differences in the type of 
task. For this reason, one final experiment will be carried out which 
will use recall tasks of one-minute and 10-seconds. Because recall 
is a more difficult task, it was chosen. Comparisons of results will 
then be carried out under one-minute conditions and 10-second conditions, 
Further discussion of frustration and perceived difficulty will be 
conducted relative to time in the next experiment.
It appears, then, that the question of who is successful cannot 
be answered based on strategies used or cues given, but can be answered 
by examining frustration. Results which showed less frustrated subjects 
to be more successful, also showed those that saw the task as 
easy to be more successful. In the video task, experienced hockey
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players were also more successful. These results were not significant 
in eith.er matching or recognition tasks, although, the mean for the 
university/club group was the highest in both instances. Perhaps the 
task there was not difficult enough to create significant results.
The next experiment will address this issue by examining a more difficult 
task (recall) under both short and long-time conditions. If experienced 
subjects are found to be more successful than less experienced subjects 
at short-time but not long-time tasks, this argument will be supported.
The question of who was successful cannot be answered by examining 
sex differences in perception. As in all previous experiments, no 
sex differences were found regarding success.
The question of why some subjects are more successful remains 
unanswered. Strategies have little bearing on actual success, and 
neither do cues, although being given a cue does lessen frustration.
The next task, then, is to examine attributions as they relate 
to frustration. Earlier experiments in video showed that less 
successful subjects more often made attributions to their inadequacies 
and frustration. In this experiment, however, attributions regarding 
inadequacies and frustration were unrelated to success. If these 
differences were due to the fact that the task was easy and, therefore, 
frustration was not a significant factor, then the next experiment 
(which will utilize a difficult task under short-time conditions) 
should show a replication of the earlier pattern. If this is the 
case, less successful subjects will again make more attributions 
to their inadequacies and frustration. The next experiment addresses 
this issue.
Other attributional responses showed expected patterns of response. 
That is, attributions were found to be self-serving, as negative-self 
attributions were the same regardless of success. This was the case 
in both the video experiment and in the field experiment. Again, 
attributions of a non-threatening nature, such as success attributions 
and ’external’ failure attributions, did vary according to success.
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In addition to supporting a motivational approach, matching and 
recognition results supported a schema-based approach. The ’winning’ 
schema proposed earlier was again evidenced.
Thus, the main aims of the chapter were addressed, and all were 
supported. Support was found for a self-serving bias approach to inform­
ation-processing; support was found for a schema-based approach; and 
support was found for the proposed information-processing model. The 
only unexpected findings were as follows:
1. Experienced subjects were not more successful at matching and 
recognition.
2. Attributions regarding inadequacies and frustration were unrelated 
to success.
Although trends are in the intended direction in both cases, results 
failed to reach significance. The final experiment addresses this 
issue by using a more difficult task, and then comparing short and 
long-time conditions. It is expected that short-time, but not long­
time results will be in the intended direction.
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6.7 AN EXPERirffiNTAL STUDY OF PERCEPTUAL SKILLS AND ATTRIBUTIONS:
RECALL OF PLAYER'S POSITIONS IN SLIDES OF HOCKEY MATCHES
The final experiment in this series of three, attempts to clarify 
results of the matching and recognition tasks. Because those tasks 
were quite easy, a more difficult task is proposed.
As previously mentioned, two conditions will prevail. First, 
subjects will be given one minute to complete a recall task; and 
second, subjects will be given 10-seconds. Comparisons of these two 
conditions are expected to lead to explanations for unexpected findings 
in the previous experiment. Since no previous research has compared 
short and long-time tasks, assumptions are based on results of the 
matching and recognition experiment which also examined short and long­
time conditions. It is proposed that given a long enough period of 
time, novices will be as successful as experts ; and that because 
hockey involves such limited time for perception, success at hockey 
may be, at least partially, dependent upon past hockey experience.
Previous research has been carried out in recall and recognition. 
Gomez and Gagnon (1980) tested ice hockey players skills at recall and 
at recognition. They found memory for recognition better than memory 
for recall. This is an expected result, as recall is generally 
considered to be the more difficult task. In their results three 
aspects of an ice hockey shot were measured: the type of shot, the 
point of origin of the shot, and the point of arrival of the puck. 
Superiority was found in recognition of spatial information. (Subjects 
were better at recognizing the point of origin and arrival than they 
were at recalling them, but no differences occurred between recognition 
and recall regarding the type of shot).
Part of the reason for these results may be explained by Reed 
(1973), who found that visual cues were used in recognition tasks, 
while verbal cues were used in recall tasks. In sport, the limited 
amount of time available may render the use of verbal cues unsuitable. 
This possibility could also be tested in a sports setting, but the 
present study is more concerned with an assessment of who is successful 
rather than why.
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6.7.1 Subjects
University students from the University of Surrey served as subjects 
(N = 51). Four levels of experience in hockey were examined as opposed 
to three in previous experiments. School players were sub-divided into 
school class players and school team players in an attempt to more 
clearly examine the affects of experience. The non-player category and 
the university/club category remained the same. Of the 51 players,
16 had no experience, 13 had school class experience, 12 had school 
team experience, and 10 had university/club experience.
Roughly half of the total sample had had hockey experience within 
the past year (N = 27), while the others had not. All subjects were 
classified according to recency and regularity distinctions mentioned 
earlier. Again participation in other sports was eliminated because 
48 had played other sports while only 2 had not. Also, because of 
inadequate numbers in the non-team category (46 had played team sports 
while 5 had not), and in football experience, categories were eliminated 
(41 had no football experience and 10 had experience).
Finally, both males (N = 11) and females (N = 40) participated. 
Because of the limited number of male subjects, conclusions regarding 
sex should be made with this in mind.
6.7.2 Methods and VTOceâuTes
Subjects were tested in groups of 10 in the university’s psychology 
lab. Subjects were asked to view 6 slides of ladies hockey matches and 
to construct a diagram of the positions of the players on the screen. 
Three slides were shown, and subjects were given one minute to construct 
each diagram. The slide was in view while the task was completed.
Next three more slides were presented, but for a shorter amount of 
time (10 seconds rather than one minute). Subjects were asked to view 
the slide for 10 seconds and then, when the screen went blank, to 
construct their diagram. Subjects were given a success score for both 
the ’long-time’ task (one—minute) and the ’short-time* task (10 seconds).
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Other questions included in the recall experiment included 
strategies used, self-ratings of frustration^ and attributional 
responses as in previous experiments. See Appendix V for the 
questionnaire used and Appendix W for the answer sheet,
The same apparatus was used as in the matching and recognition 
experiment.
6.7.3 Design
Positions of players were identified using the same technique as 
in the matching and recognition experiment (using paper cups), These 
were marked on a clear plastic sheet. This answer sheet was placed over 
the subject's answers to ease comparison, and the measure of displacement 
was calculated. The subject received a point for each player placed 
within 5 yards of the correct position. Results were then put into 
a ratio of the correct number of players to the total number of players 
in the slide. For example, if the diagram included five players, 
and the subject placed one within 5 yards of its correct position, the 
ratio was 1:5 or 20%. Only those answers with players of the same team 
were considered correct.
6.7.4 Results
6.7.4.1 Self-Serving Bias Results (Regall)
The first hypothesis examined motivational vs. non-motivational 
concerns (see Section 6.4).
Hypothesis 1 was accepted for long-time tasks, but only partially 
accepted for short-time taks. When asked whether poor memory was 
responsible for failure; no significant correlation with success was 
found under either long or short-time tasks (0.2081, P = 0.071 and 
0.0451, P = 0.377). See Table 6.10 for results.
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Tablé 6.10 Pearson Correlations: Attributions and Success at Recall
Success at Success at
Recall Recall
(Long-Time) (Short-Time)
When I failed to answer correctly, 0.0261
it was because I had too little C 51)
time P=0.428
-0.2862* 
( 51)
P=0.021
When I failed, the directions seemed 0.0715
clear to others, but I didn’t under- ( 51)
stand them P=0.309
0.0354 
( 51)
P=0.403
When I succeeded, it was purely by 
chance
0.3032* 
( 51)
P=0.015
-0.1186 
C 51) 
P=0.204
When I failed, it was because I was 
not intelligent enough
0.1170 
( 51)
P=0.207
-0.3143* 
( 51)
P=0.012
When I failed, it was because I have 
never been taught to play hockey
0.2843* 
( 51)
P=0.022
-0.1775 
( 51)
P=0.106
When I succeeded, it was because 
I tried very hard
0.0824 
( 51)
P=0.283
0.0420
5'i).
P=0.385
When I failed, it was because the 
test causes you be be nervous
-0.2057 
( 51)
P=0.074
-0.0551 
( 51)
P=0.357
When I failed, it was because I 
am not quick enough
0.1199 
( 51)
P=0.201
0.2866* 
C 51) 
P=0.021
When I succeeded, it was because 
the test was well constructed
-0.2049 
( 51)
P=0.075
-0.0992 
( 51)
P=0.244
When I failed, it was because I 
have a poor memory
0.2081 
( 51)
P=0.071
0.0451 
( 51)
P=0.377
* P ^  .05
298
%Vhen I failed, it was because the 
directions were poor
Success at
Recall
(Long-Time)
0,1183 
( 51)
P=0.204
Success at
Recall
(Short-Time)
-0.1489 
( 51)
P=0.149
When I succeeded, it was because I 
have a background in sports
0.1666 
( 51)
P=0.121
-0.1376 
( 51)
P-0.168
When I failed, it was because I have 0.2321
never been taught the rules of ( 5 1 )
hockey P=0.051
-0.3668** 
( 51)
P=0.004
When I failed, it was because I 
don’t concentrate well
0.0265 
C 51) 
P=0.427
0.0460 
( 51)
P=0.374
When I succeeded, it was because I 
have a good memory
-0.0895 
( 51)
P=0.266
0.2742* 
( 51)
P=0.026
V^hen I failed, it was because my 
inadequacies made me frustrated
0.0522 
( 51)
P=0.358
-0.2799* 
( 51)
P=0.023
When I failed, it was because the 
difficulty of the test made me 
frustrated
0.1122 
( 51)
P=0.217
-0.2436* 
( 51)
P=0.042
When I succeeded, it was because 1 
was lucky
0.0303 
( 51)
P=0.416
-0.1299 
( 51)
P=0.182
Relative Attributions -0.0686 
( 51)
P=0.316
-0.1180 
( 51)
P=0.205
* P ^  ,05 
** P .01
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Sirailarily, when asked whether failure to understand the directions 
led to failure at the task, no correlation was found with success (0.0715,
P = 0.309 and 0.0354, P = 0.403) in either long or short-time conditions. 
Responses under long-time conditions were as expected regarding attributions 
to one’s own quickness and intelligence (0.1199, P = 0.201 and 0.1170,
P = 0.207).
The unexpected finding was in short-time tasks, where success was 
found to negatively correlate with attributions regarding intelligence 
(-0.3143, P = 0.012), and positively correlate with attributions regarding 
quickness (0.2866, P = 0.021). It appears that subjects who were more 
successful at the task were less likely to attribute their failure to 
their own poor intelligence, while successful subjects were more likely 
to attribute their failure to their own lack of quickness (0.199,
P = 0.021 and 0.2866, P = 0.021).
Effort attributions were unrelated to success in both short and 
long-time tasks (0.0824, P = 0.283 and 0.0420, P = 0.385), as expected. 
Success attributions to one's own good memory were not related to success 
in long-time tasks (-0.0895, P = 0.266), but successful subjects were 
more likely to credit their own good memory in short-time tasks (0.2742,
P = 0.026).
To summarize, then, following a long-time task, subjects were 
unwilling to blame themselves - the pattern was as expected. However, 
an interesting result occurred when failure attributions were examined 
following a quite complex task (in which subjects were only given a 
short-time to respond). Here, the successful subjects felt that they 
had the intelligence, but just weren't quick enough; while those who 
were less successful felt they lacked the intelligence rather than the 
quickness. Possible explanations will be examined in the discussion 
section.
When relative attributions were examined, results showed no corre­
lation with success, a finding which has been consistent in every experi­
ment conducted thus far. '.Vhether the recall task was long-time or 
short-time, relative attributions were unrelated to success (-0.0686,
P = 0.316, and -0.118, P = 0.205).
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Reliability tests were carried out to be sure that reliability was 
acceptable for this sample. Results showed the reliability to be 
0.71537.
Other failure attributions were as follows, some or which were 
related to success (for long-time success and short-time success).
When I failed, it was because I had too little time
(0.0261, P = 0.428 and -0.2862, P = 0.021).
When I failed, it was because the test causes you to be nervous
(-0.2057, P = 0.074 and -0.0551, P = 0.351).
When I failed, it was because the directions were poor
(0.1183, P = 0.204 and -0.1489, P = 0.149).
Other success attributions include the following;
When I succeeded, it was purely by chance
(0.3032, P = 0.015 and -0.1186, P = 0.204).
When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky.
(0.0303, P = 0.416 and -0.1299, P = 0.182).
The obvious advantage of using attributional scales can be seen in 
these results. For the results of the matching task, it can be 
seen that chance is credited, but luck is not. It would be expected 
that either both, or neither response, would correlate with success 
at matching. Results, however, showed that chance did, but luck 
did not correlate significantly with success. Because the attribution 
was of an abolute type, and only involved a single response, reliability 
of response must be questioned here, and emphasis should be placed on 
the advantages of developing scales to measure attributions rather 
than relying totally on absolute responses.
To summarize, long-time tasks lend support to a self-serving 
bias approach, because failure attributions were the same regardless 
of success at the recall task. However, short-time tasks showed '
different results. Negative-self attributions varied according to 
success at recall. Successful subjects were more likely to blame 
their own lack of quickness, while less successful subjects were 
more likely to blame their lack of intelligence.
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The fact that subjects were told that in the second part of the 
experiment they would have less time may have made the 'quickness* 
factor more salient and may be the reason it was chosen by the more 
successful subjects. The less successful subjects may have discounted 
quickness because they believed that their own lack of intelligence 
was responsible. Perhaps the more successful subjects were more 
seIf-trusting and less likely to blame their own lack of intelligence 
because of their sports personality type. Possible explanations 
will be included in the Discussion section. The second hypothesis 
will now be addressed here.
6.7,4.2. Sahema-Based Approach: Recall
The second hypothesis tested a schema-based approach and was 
partially accepted. The hypothesis was accepted for long-time 
tasks in which no significant correlation occurred between any of 
the absolute attributions and success. Also no significant corre­
lations occurred between relative correlations and success.
The short-time task showed a different pattern. Results showed 
that significant differences did occur in negative self attributions. 
The following patterns represent results of both short and long-time 
attributions:
My Own Ability 
and Effort
High
Low
Low High
Long-Time 
Recall Task 
Success
My Own 
Luck
High
Low
Low High
Long-Time 
Recall Task 
Success
Hi ehMy Own Ability
Cgo od-memory, 
intelligence,
and quickness Low High
only) Short-Time
Recall Task 
Success
My Own 
Luck
High
Low
Low High
Short-Time 
Recall Task 
Success
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My Own Ability 
(Poor memory 
and concentra­
tion only)
High.
Low
Low High
Short-Time 
Recall Task 
Success
My Own 
Luck
High
Low
Low High
Short-Time 
Recall Task 
Success
Significant correlations were found not only between failure attributions 
and success, but also between success attributions and actual success 
as evidenced in Table 6.10. The failure attributions did sometimes 
correlate with success (for example, attributions to good memory, 
intelligence, and quickness), but at other times did not (for example, 
poor memory and concentration).
6.7.4.3 Testing the Informatïon-Process'ùng Model: Reoatl
Experience was tested in the third hypothesis. Hypothesis 3a 
was partially accepted, and 3b was rejected. One way analysis of 
variance results showed that experience at hockey resulted in superior 
perceptual success at short-time, but not long-time tasks. See 
Table 6.11.
The four experience groups did not differ in success at long-time 
tasks F (1,50) = 1.290, P = 0.2887. But, as expected, when less 
time was allowed, experienced players were more successful F (1,50) = 
3.807, P = 0.0160. Experienced subjects were more successful at the 
more difficult task, but not at the easier task.
Two factors distinguished between long and short-time tasks. First, 
long-time tasks involved a one minute view, while the short-time tasks 
involved 10 seconds. Second, the long-time task involved creating 
a diagram while the slide was in view, while the short-time task 
involved creating a diagram without the slide in view. Thus, time 
allowed and task complexity are important variables which should 
be considered. Figure 6.1 shows mean results of recall success under 
both long and short-time conditions for the four experience groups.
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Figure 6.1 Mean Scores for Recall Success for Four Experience Groups
Mean Success 
Scores
200
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190
185
180
175
170
165
160
155
150
145
140
135
130
125
120
115
105
100
95
90
85
80
Non-Players School School
Class Team
Players Players
University/Club 
Players
— Long-Time — —————————— — Short-Time
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Table 6.11 One Way Analysis of Variance Results: Recall Success by 
Experience Groups
Long-Time Success
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
DF SS
3 5644.5590
47 68534.1807
50 74178.7344
MS F.Ratio F.Prob
1881.5195 1.290 0.2887
1458.1738
Group 1 (no experience)
Group 2 (school class experience) 
Group 3 (school team experience) 
Group 4 (univ./club experience) 
Total
Mean SD SE
193.3125 40.3645 10.0911
165.9231 31.7056 8.7935
182.2500 46.6634 13.4706
175.8000 29.9622 9.4749
180.2941 38.5172 5.3935
Short-Time Success
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
DF SS
3 7945.2735
47 32693.7397
50 40639.0078
MS F.Ratio
2648.4243 3.807
695.6115
F.Prob, 
0.0160
Group 1 (no experience)
Group 2 (school class experience) 
Group 3 (school team experience) 
Group 4 (univ./club experience) 
Total
Mean SD SE
87.5000 16.3340 4.0835
98.1538 32.1451 8.9154
90.8333 28.5174 8.2323
121.6000 28.5704 9.0347
97.6863 28.5093 3.9921
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Hypothesis 3b was rejected. As in the matching experiment, 
frustration was unrelated to success. Neither long-time nor short- 
time task success correlated with frustration C-0.0700, P = 0.313 and 
•0.2172, P = 0.063). Also level of experience was not found to 
correlate with frustration (-0.1272, P = 0.187). See Table 6.12.
Table 6.12 Pearson Correlations: Expectations/Perceptions, Sex, 
Experience, and Success at Recall
Frustration
Experience 
at Hockey 
(Level of 
Experience)
-0.1272 
( 51)
P=0.187
Success at
Recall
(Long-Time)
-0.0700 
( 51)
P=0.313
Success at
Recall
(Short-Time)
-0.2172 
( 51)
P=0.063
Other questions asked regarded recency and regularity of 
experience showed no significant results. Success at short-time recall 
did not significantly correlate with either recency (0.0990, P =0.245) 
or regularity of experience (0.1315, P = 0.179). Level of experience, 
therefore, seems to be predictive of success more than recency or 
regularity of experience.
Finally, an examination of attributions showed that when asked 
to make attributions regarding experience, more successful subjects 
were not different from less successful ones in crediting their back­
ground in sports (0.16666, P = 0.121 for long-time success and -0.1376,
P = 0.168 for short-time). Failure attributions blaming a lack of 
experience in hockey, were made more often by subjects who were success­
ful at long-time recall tasks (0.2843, P = 0.022). Failure attributions 
which blamed a lack of knowledge of the rules, however, just fell 
short of reaching significance (0.2321, P = 0.051). Success at short- 
time recall tasks correlated with attributions blaming a lack of 
knowledge of the rules (-0.3668, P = 0.004), but not a lack of 
experience (-0.1775, P = 0.106).
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To summarize, then, in short-time but not long-time tasks, 
experienced subjects were more successful, and subjects who did poorly 
often blamed their lack of success on a lack of knowledge about the 
sport. The next step, then, is to examine levels of frustration 
reported, and how these related to attributions.
Previous findings showed successful subjects to be less frustrated, 
and to attribute to the difficulty of the task leading to frustration.
In the present experiment, however, successful subjects were not less 
frustrated, but successful subjects did make fewer attributions to 
the difficulty of the task and the ensuing frustration associated with 
it. The most important point being that levels were significant only 
in short-time tasks (correlations between success at long-time recall 
and attributions blaming the difficulty of the test and frustration 
were 0.1122, P = 0.217; while short-time success and attributions 
correlated at significant levels -0.2436, P = 0.042). Thus, 
frustration was again found to be an important factor in the study 
of information-processing in sport.
6.7.4.4 Sex iKffe’rences: Stvde Resutts . (Recall)
No sex differences were found regarding success in the video 
experiment, nor in the slide experiment presented earlier. T-test 
results of the recall task showed the same results. In the short- 
time condition, no sex differences were found (T = 1.17, P = 0.245) 
regarding success, and again, in the long-time condition no sex 
differences regarding success were found (T = 1.17, P = 0.070).
See Table 6.13 for T-test results.
As in previous findings, no sex differences were found in 
relative attributions, but significant findings were found regarding 
absolute attributions. T-test results showed two significant findings, 
both of which were found to be significant in earlier experiments as 
well. In all three experiments reported in this chapter, luck or 
chance were given as reasons for success by females more often than 
males. Responses to the following two questions resulted in significant 
sex differences:
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When I succeeded it was purely by chance
(T = 3.07, P = 0.004).
When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky
(T = 3,01, P = 0.004).
All other attributional responses showed no differences in success 
based on sex. The failure attributions in which females had earlier 
blamed the directions, showed no sex differences (T = 1.06, P = 0.116). 
No differences occurred in frustration either (T = 0.53, P = 0.602), 
Neither did attributions in which males had earlier blamed their own 
poor concentration (T = -0.07, P = 0.946).
To summarize, then, strong sex differences were found regarding 
success attributions, but not failure attributions, although sex 
differences had been evidenced in earlier findings regarding failure 
attributions. This could be due to the small number of males (N = 11) 
participating which may have led to misleading results.
,6.7.4.5 Strategïes: Slt-de Success (Recatt)
Subjects who used the strategy of looking for the ball were least 
successful in long-time recall. One way analysis of variance results 
(see Appendix Y) showed that both those using colour strategy (m = 
194,0000) and those using a goal strategy (m = 186.9444) were more 
successful than those using a ball strategy (m = 153.1429; F = 5.925,
P = 0.0050).
One way analysis of variance results showed that success at short- 
time recall was not affected by strategy used (F = 0.763, P = 0.4719).
No two groups were significantly different according to a multiple 
range test using the Scheffe procedure.
Thus, using a colour or goal strategy was more successful than 
a ball strategy when subjects were given one minute of exposure time, 
but no differences in success at short-time recall were found based 
on strategy used.
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Table 6,13 T-Tests: Slide Results Showing Sex Differences (Recall) 
Variable Mean SD SE T DF Prob
Recall
(Long-Time Success)
Females
Males
183,6000 38.995 6.166 1.17 49 0.246
168,2727 35,844 10.807
Recall
(Short-Time Success)
Females
Males
93,9000 24,676 3.902 -1.85 49 0.070
111,4545 37,726 11.375
Frustration
Females
Males
0.8250 0.385 0.061 0.71 49 0.480
0.7273 0.467 0.141
Experienced (Level)
Females
Males
1.4000 
1.0000
1.057
1.342
0.167
0.405
1.05 49 0.300
Experience (Recency)
Females
Males
0.9000
0.5455
1.033
1.214
0.163
0.366
0.97 49 0.336
Experience (Regularity)
Females
Males
1.2500
0.6364
0.981
1.027
0.155
0.310
1.82 49 0.075
Relative Attributions
Females
Males
14.1750 1.318 0.208 -0.02 49 0.988
14.1818 1.250 0.377
Absolute Attributions
When I failed; the directions 
seemed clear to others, but I 
didn't understand them
Females
Males
1.8500 0.770 0.122 1.60 49 0.116
1.4545 0.522 0.157
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Mean SD SE DF Prob
Absolute Attributions (cont.)
When I succeeded, it was 
purely by chance
Females
Males
2.8750 0.883 0.140 3.07
2.0000 0.632 0.191
49 0.004**
When I failed, it was 
because I have a poor memory
Females
Males
2.6500 0.864 0.137 -1.15 49 0.255
3.0000 1.000 0.302
When I failed, it was 
because I don't concentrate 
well
Females
Males
3.2500 0.954 0.151 -0.07 49 0.946
3.2727 1.104 0.333
When I failed, it was because my 
inadequacies made me frustrated
Females
Males
2.4500 1.011 0.160 0.53 49 0.602
2.2727 0.905 0.273
When I succeeded, it was 
because I was lucky
Females
Males
3.3000 0.883 0.140 3.01 49 0.004**
2.3636 1.027 0.310
** p z: .01
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6.7.5 Dzscuss'ùon
The two unexplained findings in the matching and recognition 
section can now be explained using results from this experiment. 
Experienced subjects in the video experiment were more successful 
at the perceptual task, while experienced players were not more 
successful at matching or recognition. The present experiment was 
carried out using a more difficult task, because the video task which 
showed significant results was more complex than the matching and 
recognition tasks which did not.
It was expected that given a long amount of time, subjects with 
less hockey experience would be equally successful at perceputal tasks 
as more experienced subjects. Results confirmed these expectations.
The university/club group was more successful at the recall task than 
the no experience and the school team experience groups under short- 
time conditions. However, given a longer amount of time, experience 
was found to have no effect on success.
The second unexpected finding in the previous experiment showed 
attributions regarding inadequacies and frustration to be unrelated 
to success. Again, results of the matching and recognition experiment 
are proposed to differ from results of the video experiment because 
of differences in task difficulty, and again, expectations were confirmed, 
as successful subjects made fewer attributions to their inadequacies 
and frustration. As expected, differences reached significance only 
under short-time (and not long-time) conditions.
Again, no sex differences were found in terms of success supporting 
results from all previous experiments. Attributions made by females 
again differed from males (females attributed success to luck more 
often than males). These findings confirmed research by others reported 
earlier.
Finally, the aims of the present chapter were addressed, this time 
relative to recall tasks. It was proposed that a self—serving bias exists 
and that a schema—based approach was employed. This was found to be 
true for all results considering the long-time task. Results from long­
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time tasks showed that all negative-self attributions were unrelated 
to success and that the 'winning' schema proposed in previous experiments 
was employed.
However, short-time task results showed only partial acceptance 
of these two hypotheses. Of the 18 attributional responses examined,
16 conformed to expectations. The two attributional responses which 
did not conform to expectations included responses to the following:
1. When I failed, it was because I was not quick enough.
2. When I failed, it was because I was not intelligent enough.
In previous experiments (video, matching and recognition), responses 
were unrelated to success, as they were in long-time recall tasks. 
However, under short-time conditions, significant differences were 
found. Results will be discussed relative to schema employed, as 
findings have a bearing on the partial acceptance of that hypothesis.
Results showed that successful subjects made attributions which 
less often blamed their lack of intelligence, but more often blamed 
their lack of quickness. This is in contrast to less successful 
subjects who attributed their failure more often to poor intelligence 
and less often to their quickness. The successful subjects have a 
positive self-image which caused them to believe that their intelligence 
was sound, and attributions did not blame a lack of intelligence.
However, they did attribute failure to a lack of quickness. This did 
not occur in earlier experiments where attributions were unrelated 
to success. The reason for these differences may lie in the salience 
of 'time'. In the directions to the present experiment, the amount of 
time allowed was mentioned. When subjects began the second half of 
the experiment, they were told that they would only have 10 seconds.
They had also been told in the long-time task that they had one minute. 
The time factor may have been salient, and this salience may have 
been responsible for attributional responses.
If the directions were the same for all subjects, then, why wouldn't 
less successful subjects also make attributions to quickness? The
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discounting principle may have been utilized by those who were less 
successful. They made attributions to their own lack of intelligence, 
and this may have caused them to discount the more salient cause of 
quickness. As Kelley (1973, p. 113) stated, "The role of a given 
cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible 
causes are also present".
The salience of the time factor, therefore, may have confounded 
results which largely supported the proposed hypotheses. The fact that 
this occurred only under short-time conditions lends even further 
support to this argument. (Quickness and intelligence attributions 
were unrelated to success under long-time conditions).
Having thus examined the first two hypotheses, the final hypothesis 
remains. The proposed model for processing information was supported 
for the short-time tasks. As discussed earlier, experience was 
inversely related to success at short-time tasks, and unrelated to 
success at long-time tasks. Results of expectations/perceptions have 
also been discussed earlier, as findings regarding frustration and 
task difficulty were discussed relative to previously unexplained 
findings.
To summarize, the effects of viewing time on success at perceptual 
tasks cannot be ignored. Attributional responses clearly showed the 
subject's awareness of time factors. AS expected, short amounts of 
time created a situation where experience may have proved to be 
beneficial to success at perceptual tasks. Given enough time, all 
subjects were successful regardless of their hockey experience.
CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
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CONCLUSION
Explanations have been the focus of the present study. By studying 
explanations a conceptual framework was established which explains 
information-processing in sport.
The main findings were two-fold. First, a motivational approach 
to information-processing was supported, and second, a schema-based 
approach was supported.
These two findings are summarized in the following model (see over­
leaf).
A sports personality inventory assessed the individual’s personality 
type, with winners and losers being shown to be those who are either 
self-trusting dr self-doubting. The expectations and perceptions 
of these two personality types differed, with the winners expecting 
to win more often and feeling less anxious.
Expectations were also found to be influenced by one's experience 
in sport. As might have been expected, skilled sportsmen/women 
expected to win more often than their lesser skilled counterparts.
The impact of outcome information was assessed and found to play 
an important part in the processing of information. Those who were 
given winning outcome information made different attributions to those 
given losing outcome information.
Schemata were identified relative to winning and losing. Individuals 
who were given winning outcome information employed a 'winning schema', 
while the losing-information group employed a 'losing-schema'. Inter­
estingly, individuals with no outcome information also utilized a 
winning schema, crediting themselves for success.
The winning schema led to positive initial attributions, while the 
losing schema led to negative initial attributions. These initial 
attributions were found to become biased in favour of positive aspects 
of the self in cases where threat to the self-image was evidenced.
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Personality
WINNERS LOSERS
Self-Trust Self-Doubt
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
High Expectations 
of Winning
Outcome
Unknown/W in/Los e
Bias
I
No Need to 
Alter 
Initial 
Attribution
Low Expectations 
of Winning
Outcome
Unknown/Win/Lose
Winning Losing
Schemata Schemata
Positive Negative
Initial Self- Initial Self-
Attributions Attributions
No No
Threat Threat Threat Threat
No
Bias
r
Maintain
Initial
Attribu-
tion
Bias Bias
Attribu­
tion
Maintain
Initial
Attribu­
tion
Lack of 
Skilled 
Experience 
in Sport
P = Positive N = Negative
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If the attributions were in agreement with the self-image, no bias 
occurred as no threat was present. However, when the self-image was 
threatened, bias crept into the attributional process.
Individuals, then, attempt to make sense of their environment 
by analysing their performance and making attributions. On the field 
after a game and in the lab following perceptual tasks, patterns were 
the same. Only in an imaginary setting, when subjects were asked to 
read a scenario about themselves participating in a game, were biases 
absent. The lack of threat was proposed to be the cause of the lack of 
bias in responses.
To participate in sport is to expose oneself, to lay oneself open 
to evaluation and criticism, and to run the risk of failure. How 
one stands up to these pressures was found to depend on one's sports 
personality, the schemata they employ, and their past experience in 
sport. Attributions were merely the windows through which the scene , 
unfolds like a peep-hole to the mind.
Through these peep-holes, one can see how information is processed, 
In a unique way, the present study presents the scene as it unfolds, 
showing how individuals arrive at explanations for their performance 
in sport and how bias occurs in a self-serving manner.
lYhat remains to be tested is how sports personality relates to 
success in sport. One can only predict that those with 'winning-type' 
personalities are more successful in competition based on a logical 
extension of the findings presented here. To actually test personality 
in the field would be the next step in practically applying the 
theoretical work presented here. This and other recommendations for 
further study are presented in the following section for those with 
a desire to continue work in this field.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
1. Examine sports personality in the field using the sports personality 
inventory, to see the effect of self-processes on sports achievement.
2. Repeat attributional studies allowing subjects to ask for information. 
Use the questions they ask to find out the types of information they 
use to make attributions in sport.
3. Examine attributional responses following participation in sports 
other than hockey, including both team and individual sports.
4. Further examine male subjects attributional responses in team sports.
5. Design a developmental and longitudinal study of the relationships 
between causal attributions and success at sport.
6. Develop a cross-cultural study of attributions and success in 
sport.
7. Examine 'observer' attributions as well as 'actor' attributions 
relative to sport success. (Coaches, trainers, teammates, 
opponents, spectators, etc. could be asked to make causal attributions 
as well as the players themselves).
8. Examine elite performers' attributions following important 
international events such as World Cup hockey or soccer matches.
9. Develop a training programme which utilizes attributional retraining 
techniques and test its validity.
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Study: Attribution Theory in Sport 
Reported in Chapter 2.
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PRE-GAME
NAME _________'  . DATE
SEX
YOUR TEAM YOUR OPPONENT
TYPE OF TEAM LADIES LEVEL OF TEAM 1st XI
. _________ 2nd XI
_ _ _ _ _  3rd XI 
MIXED Other
MENS
Winning and succeeding may not mean the same thing. You might, for ex­
ample, not win but you might feel that you succeeded nonetheless. Keep 
ing this in mind, please circle the best answer below.
STRONGLY STRONGL
DISAGREE DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE AGREE
1. My team will probably win 1 2  3 4 5
today.
2. My team will probably 1 2 3 4 5
succeed today.
3. I, personally, will prob- 1 2 3 4 5
ably succeed today.
4. Today's game will probably 1 2 3 4 5
be difficult.
5. Today's game will probably 1 2 3 4 5
be frustrating.
6. It is important to me to 1 2 3 4 5
do well today.
7. It is important to me to 1 2 3 4 5
win today.
8. I am interested in playing 1 2 3 4 5
today's game.
9. I am worried about today's 1 2 3 4 5
game.
10. How easy the game is will 1 2 3 4 5
be very important in det­
ermining the outcome of
today's game.
11. How difficult the game is 1 2 3 4 5
will be very important in
determining the outcome of 
today's game.
12. My own ability will be very 1 2 3 4 5
important in determining
the outcome of today's game.
13. My own effort will be very 1 2 3 4 5
important in determining
the outcome of today's game.
14. Luck will be very important 1 2 3 4 5
in determining the outcome
of today's game.
NAME
My team is
345
HALF-TIME
winning
losing
drawing
The half-time score is (us)
(them)
Please circle the best answer. STRONGLY STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE AGREE
1. My team will probably win 1 
today.
2 3 4 5
2. My team will probably succeed 1 
today.
2 3 4 5
3. I, personally, will probably 1 
succeed today.
2 3 ' 4 5
4. Today's game has been difficult 1 
thus far.
2 3 4 5
5. Today's game has been frustra- 1 
ting thus far.
2 3 4 5
6. It is important to me to do 1 
well today.
2 3 4 5
7. It is important to me to win 1 
today.
2 3 4 5
8. I am interested in playing 1 
today's game.
2 3 4 5
9. I am worried about today's 1 
game.
2 3 4 5
10. How easy the game is, has been 1 
very important in determining 
the outcome of the game so far.
2 3 4 5
11. How difficult the game is, has 1 
been very important in determin­
ing the outcome of the game so far.
2 3 4 5
12. My own ability has been very 1 
important in determining the 
outcome of the game so far.
2 3 4 5
13. My own effort has been very 1 
important in determining the 
outcome of the game so far.
2 3 4 5
14. Luck has been very important 1 
in determining the outcome 
of the game so far.
2 3 4 5
When I did well, personally, it was because.
I. ... the game was so easy. 1 2 3 4 5
2. ... the game was so hard. 1 2 3 4 5
3. ... of my good ability. 1 2 3 4 5
4. ... of my good effort. 1 2 3 4 5
5. ... of my good luck. 1 2 3 4 5
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When I did well, personally, STRONGLY 
it was because... DISAGREE DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE
STRONGLlr
AGREE
6. . ..my opponents were less 1 
skilled.
2 3 4 5
7. ...my opponents put in less 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
8. ...my opponents had bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
9. ...the game was so easy for 1 
ny opponents.
2 3 4 5
10. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
11. ...of my teammates' good 1 
ability.
2 3 4 5
12. ...of my teammates' good 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
13. ...of my teammates' good 1 
luck.
2 3 4 5
14. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
15. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
When I did poorly, personally, 
it was because...
1. ...the game was so easy. 1 2 3 4 5
2. ...the game was so hard. 1 2 3 4 5
3. ...of my bad ability. 1 2 3 4 5
4. ...of my bad effort. 1 2 3 4 5
5. ...of my bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
6. ...my opponents were more 1 
skilled.
2 3 4 5
7. ...my opponents put in more 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
8. ...my opponents had good luck. 1 2 3 4 5
9. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
10. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
11. ...of my teammates' bad ability. 1 2 3 4 5
12. ...of my teammates' bad effort. 1 2 3 4 5
13. ...of my teammates' bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
14. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
15. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
16. ...my team's strategy didn't 
work.
2 3 4 5
POST-GAME 347
NAME
l.Hy tea.
lost
The final score was (us)
(them)
drew
Please circle the best, answer. STRONGLY STRONCL'
DISAGREE DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE AGREE
2. My team succeeded today. 1 2 3 4 5
3. I succeeded today. 1 2 3 4 5
4. Today's game was difficult. 1 .2 3 4 5
5. Today's game was frustrating. 1 2 3 4 5
6. It was important to me to do 1 2 3 4 5
well today.
7. It was important to me to win 
today.
1 2 3 4 5
8. I was interested in playing 
today's game.
1 2 4 5
9. I was worried about today's game. 1 2 3 4 5
10. How easy the game was, was very 1 2 3 4 5
important in determining the 
outcome of the game.
11. How difficult the game was, was 1 2 3 4 5
very important in determining ' 
the outcome of the game.
12. My own ability was very important 1 
in determining the outcome
of the game.
13. My own effort was very important 1 
in determining the outcome
of the game.
14. Luck was very important in deter- 1 
mining the outcome of the game.
Please rank order these factors in terms of importance in determining 
the scoreline.
 myself
my team 
my opponents 
luck
Have you completed this questionnaire for another match?
When I did well, personally, it was because... 
1« ... Che game was so easy. 1 2
2. ... the game was so hard. 1 2
3. ... of my good ability. 1 2
4. ... of my good effort. 1 2
3. ...of my good luck. 1 2
_yes
no
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When I did well, personally, STRONGLY 
it was because. •• DISAGREE DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE
STRONGL
AGREE
6. ...my opponents were less 1 
skilled.
2 3 4 5
7. ...my opponeats put in less 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
8. ...my opponents had bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
9. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
10. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
11. ...of my teammates' good 1 
ability.
2 3 4 5
12. ...of my teammates' good 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
13. ...of my te^nmates' good 1 
luck.
2 3 4 5
14. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
15. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
When I did poorly, personally, 
it was because.
1. ...the game was so easy. 1 2 3 4 5
2. ...the game was so hard. 1 2 3 4 5
3. ...of my bad ability. 1 2 3 4 5
4. ...of my bad effort. 1 2 3 4 5
5. ...of my bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
6. ...my opponents were more 1 
skilled.
2 3 4 5
7, ...my opponents put in more 1 
effort.
2 3 4 5
8, ...my opponents had good luck. 1 2 3 4 5
9. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
10. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my opponents.
2 3 4 5
11. ...of my teammates' bad ability. 1 2 3 4 5
12. ...of my teammates' bad effort. 1 2 3 4 5
13. ...of my teammates' bad luck. 1 2 3 4 5
14. ...the game was so easy for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
15. ...the game was so hard for 1 
my teammates.
2 3 4 5
16. ...my team's strategy didn't 
work.
2 3 4 5
APPENDIX B
MANOVA Results from the Experimental 
Study: Attribution Theory in Sport 
Reported in Chapter 2.
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ABILITY - MANOVA RESULTS
1. IMPORTANCE OF ABILITY TO OUTCOME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time, post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
1.20790
0.39706
97
1
1
MS
1.20790
0.39706
0.61943
0.20362
Sig.of F
0.433
0.653
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
1.45165
0.12711
0.58442
Sig.of F
0.237
0.881
0.558
2. CREDITING ABILITY
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
post-game).
Sum of Squares DF MS
Group
Group by Sex
2.10014 
0.60371
93
1
1
2.10014
0.60371
1.51036
0.43417
Sig.of F
0.222
0.512
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
2.86375 
0.00360 
0.72302
Sig.of F
0.094
0.952
0.397
3. BLAMING ABILITY
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
6.49513
0.05280
92
1
1
MS
6.49513
0.05280
3.59288
0.02921
Sig.of F
0.061
0.865
Time
Group and Time
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
2.59069 
0.45688 
1.08681
Sig.of F
0.111
0.501
0.300
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EFFORT - MANOVA RESULTS
1. IMPORTANCE OF EFFORT TO OUTCOME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
2.50091
0.24989
96
1
1
MS
2.50091
0.24989
1.42129 
0.14202
Sig.of F
0.236
0.707
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
6.76225
0.10787
1.72117
Sig.of F
0.001
0.898
0.182
2. CREDITING EFFORT
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full-time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
0.01118
0.97173
94
1
1
. MS
0.01118
0.97173
0.01112
0.96664
Sig.of F
0.916
0.328
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.21169
0.17692
1.13654
Sig.of F
0.883
0.675
0.289
3. BLAMING EFFORT
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full-time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
3.64659
0.23197
93
1
1
MS
3.64659
0.23197
1.96604 
0.12506
Sig.of F
0.164
0.724
Time
Group and Time
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.00000 
0.38057 
1.33940
Sig.of F
1.000
0.539
0.250
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LUCK - MANOVA RESULTS
1. IimORTANCE OF LUCK TO OUTCOME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time and post game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
1.91541
0.02114
97
1
1
MS
1.91541
0.02114
0.71371
0.00788
Sig.of F
0.400
0.929
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
1.88142
3.14607
2.84977
Sig..of F
0.155
0.045
0.060
2. CREDITING LUCK
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full-time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
1.19459 
2.49409
94
1
1
MS
1.19459 
2.49409
0.53379
1.11446
Sig.of F
0.467
0.294
Time
Group by Time 
Group by Sex
Averaged F
0.36586
1.73080
4.03169
Sig.of F
0.547
0.192
0.048
3. BLAMING LUCK
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full-time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF 
91
1.93772 
3.03708
MS
1.93772
3.05708
1.25136
1.97422
Sig.of F
0.266
0.163
Time
Group and Time
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.00941
0.82938
0.01690
Sig.of F
0.923
0.365
0.897
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TASK DIFFICULTY (EASE OF THE GAME) - MANOVA RESULTS
1. IMPORTANCE OF EASE OF THE GAME TO OUTCOME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
3.54220
0.32845
95
1
1
MS
3.54220
0.32845
2.02106 
0.18740
Sig.of F
0.158
0.666
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
15.28571
0.06369
1.08761
Sig.of F
0.000
0.938
0.339
2. CREDITING EASE OF THE GAME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full-time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
7.74544
4.40228
94
1
1
m
7.74544
4.40228
5.55386 
3.15665
Sig.of F
0.021
0.079
Time
Group by Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.66126
0.03477
3.92747
Sig.of F
0.418
0.852
0.050
3. BLAMING EASE OF THE GAME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
6.95860
0.89492
92
1
1
MS 2  Sig.of F
6.95860 6.85659 0.010
0.89492 0.88180 0.350
Time
Group and Time
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.38838
0.01762
0.58792
Sig.of F
0.535
0.895
0.445
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TASK DIFFICULTY (DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME) - MANOVA RESULTS
IMPORTANCE OF DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME TO OUTCOME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
5.98769
0.01477
97
1
1
5.98769
0.01477
4.04464
0.00998
Sig.of F
0.047
0.921
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
11.38952 
1.02892 
1.56793
Sig.of F
0.000
0.359
0.211
2. CREDITING DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF
2.60066 
1.68382
94
1
1
. MS F
2.60066 1.55950
1.68382 1.00971
Sig.of F
0:215
0.318
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.10093 
1.08120 
0.15325
Sig.of F
0.751
0.301
0.696
3. BLAMING DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
By group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
full time).
Group
Group by Sex
Sum of Squares DF MS
4.69256
0.34428
93
1
1
4.69256 2.99542
0.34428 0.21977
Sig.of F
0.087
0.640
Time
Group and Time
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
0.70057
0.22369
1.21567
Sig.of F
0.405
0.637
0.273
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THE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF OPPONENTS SCALE (CREDITING) - MANOVA RESULTS
Scale by group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
post-game).
The difficulty because of Opponents Scale (crediting) was made up of 
responses to these questions:-
I did well personally, because....
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
. the game was so easy 
. my opponents were less skilled 
. my opponents put in less effort 
. the game was so hard for my opponents 
. the game was so easy for my team-mates
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
194.63043
89.67753
98
1
1
MS
194.63043
89.67753
11.14256
5.13403
Sig.of F.
0.001
0.026
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F Sig.of F
0.51910 0,473
0.34890 0.556
0.28030 0.598
THE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF OPPONENTS SCALE (BLAMING) - MANOVA RESULTS
Scale by group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
post-game).
The difficulty because of Opponents Scale (blaming) was made up of 
responses to the following:-
I did poorly personally, because....
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
. the game was hard 
. my opponents were more skilled 
. my opponents put in more effort 
. the game was so easy for my opponents 
. the game was so hard for my team-mates
355
Sum of Squares
Group 218.98084
Group by Sex 1.53197
DF
98
1
1
MS
218,98084
1.53197
10.65651
0.07455
Sig.of F
0.002
0.785
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F Sig.of F
0.16135
0.05472
7.08029
0.689
0.816
0.009
THE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF LUCK SCALE (CREDITING) - MANOVA RESULTS
Scale by group (winners and losers) and sex, over-time (half-time 
and post-game).
The difficulty because of luck scale (crediting) was comprised of 
responses to the following:
I did well personally, because....
1. ... of my good luck
2. ... my opponents had bad luck
3. ... the game was so difficult for my opponents
4. ... of my team-mates' good luck
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
30.75147
0.01585
98
1
1
MS
30.75147
0.01585
2.11283
0.00109
Sig.of F
0.149
0.974
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F Sig.of F
0.20773
1.99947
3.47226
0.650
0.161
0.065
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THE DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF LUCK SCALE (BLAMING) - MANOVA RESULTS
Scale by group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (half-time and 
post-game).
The difficulty because of luck scale (blaming) was comprised of 
responses to the following:
I did poorly personally, because....
1. ... of my bad luck
2. ... my opponents had good luck
3. ... the game was so easy for my opponents
4. ... of my team-mates' bad luck
Sum of Squares MS F Sig.of F
98
Group 53.55021 1 53.55021 4.20461 0.043
Group by Sex 52,67682 1 52.67682 4.13603 0.045
Averaged F Sig.of F
Time 0.10509 0.746
Group and Time 0.65086 0.422
Group by Sex and Time 6.74602 0.011
MOTIVATION - MANOVA RESULTS
Motivation by group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game,
half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF MS L Sig.of F
98
Group 2,12082 1 2.12082 0.21757 0.642
Group by Sex 2.66080 1 2.66080 0.27297 0.603
Averaged F Sig.of F
Time 10.93925 0,000
Group and Time 4.49156 0.012
Group by Sex and Time 1.07644 0.343
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FRUSTRATION - MANOVA RESULTS
Frustration by group (winners and losers) and sex, over time (pre-game, 
half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
5,76240
2.04201
98
1
1
MS
5.76240
2.04201
2.60368
0.9226
Sig.of F
0.110
0.339
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
2.38948
3.64036
6.79343
Sig.of F
0.094
0.028
0.001
PERSONAL SUCCESS - MANOVA RESULTS
Perceived amounts of personal success by group (winners and losers) and 
sex, over time (pre-game, half-time and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
13.14350
0.00006
97
1
1
MS
13.14350 
0.00006
13.18623
0.00007
Sig.of F
0.000
0.993
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F Sig.of F
0.52631
14.22176
0.71216
0.592
0.000
0.492
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TEM SUCCESS - MANOVA RESULTS
Perceived amounts of team success by group (winners and losers) and sex, 
over time (pre-game, half-time,and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
54.44492 
3.25543
98
1
1
MS
54.44492
3.22543
73.47320
4.35271
Sig.of F
0.000
0.040
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F Sig.of F
0.93480
29.03181
6.24730
0.394
0.000
0.002
PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY - MANOVA RESULTS
Perceived difficulty of the game by group (winners and losers) and sex, 
over time (pre-game, half-time, and post-game).
Sum of Squares DF
Group
Group by Sex
16.25830
17.49951
97
1
1
MS
16.25830
17.49951
8.60423
9.26110
Sig.of F
0.004
0.003
Time
Group and Time 
Group by Sex and Time
Averaged F
26.36865
1.60727
0.03619
Sig.of F
0.000
0.203
0.964
APPENDIX C
T-Test Results from the Experimental Study: Attribution Theory
in Sport 
Reported An Chapter 2.
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GROUP T-TESTS
ABILITY (IMPORTANCE)
Pre-Game No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 3.0244 1.172 0.183 -0.70 75.02 0.484
W 61 3.1803 0.975 0.125
Half-Time
L 40 2.8780 0.853 0.135 -1.02 92.93 0.311
W 61 3.0656 1.014 0.130
Post-Game
L 41 2.9024 1.044 0.163 -0.55 82.88 0.583
W 61 3.0164 0.991 0.127
ABILITY (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 40 3.0250 0.891 0.141 -1.29 82.66 0.201
¥ 58 3.2586 0.870 0,114
Post-Game
L 40 3.1750 0.984 0.156 -1.04 79.26 0.303
¥ 58 3.3770 0.916 0.117
ABILITY (BLAME)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 40 3.2000 1.137 0.180 1.94 78.74 0.056
¥ 59 2.7627 1.040 0.135
Post-Game
L 40 3.2750 1.012 0.160 1.31 85.93 0.195
¥ 59 3.0000 1.050 0.137
360
GROUP T-TESTS
EFFORT (IMPORTANCE)
Pre-Game No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 3.4878 1.075 0.168 -0.94 68.30 0.350
W 61 3.6721 0.790 0.101
Half-Time
L 39 3.1026 1.071 0.172 -1.15 13.78 0.253
¥ 61 3.3443 0.947 0.121
Post-Game
L 41 3.2683 1.049 0.164 —0.85 81.58 0.400
¥ 61 3.4426 0.975 0.125
EFFORT (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 40 3.6500 0.802 0.127 -0.39 79.55 0.699
¥ 59 3.7119 0.744 0.097
Post-Game
L 40 3.6750 0.764 0.121 0.12 88.61 0.905
¥ 61 3.6557 0.834 0.107
EFFORT (BLAME)
Half-Time No. Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 40 3.1250 1.159 0.183 1.46 74.41 0.150
¥ 60 2.8000 0.988 0.128
Post-Game
L 40 3.0250 1.121 0.177 0.86 82.05 0.393
¥ 59 2.8305 1.085 0.141
361
GROUP T-TESTS
LUCK (IMPORTANCE)
Pre-Game No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 2.5122 1.165 0.182 -0.55 83.96 0.585
W 61 2.6393 1.126 0.144
Half-Time
L 40 2 .5500 1.108 0.175 0.98 85.03 0.332
W 61 2.3279 1.136 0.145
Post-Game
L 41 2.6585 1.039 0.162 1.75 84.00 0.083
Vf 61 2.2951 1.006 0.129
LUCK (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 40 2.7500 1.235 0.195 0.02 79.20 0.986
Vf 59 2.7458 1.139 0.148
Post-Game
L 40 2.9000 1.172 0.185 1.31 82.19 0.194
Vf 61 2.5902 1.146 0.147
LUCK (BLAME)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 38 2.6316 1.125 0.183 0.49 67.51 0.628
Vf 59 2.5254 0.916 0.119
Post-Game
L 40 2.7500 1.080 0.171 1.22 82.28 0.226
Vf 58 2.4828 1.047 0.137
GROUP T-TESTS
EASE OF THE GAME (IMPORTANCE)
362
Pre-Game
L
W
No
41
61
Mean
3.1220
3.2787
SD
1.029
1.019
SE
0.161
0.130
T
-0.76
DF
85.35
Prob
0.451
Half-Time
L 40 2.6500 1.027 0.162
W 61 2.8033 1.030 0.132
-0.73 83.75 0.466
Post-Game
L
W
40
60
2.4750 
2.7333
0.905
1.071
0.143
0.138
-1.30 92.51 0.198
EASE OF THE GAME (CREDIT)
Half-Time
L
W
No
40
59
Mean
2.1000
2.5254
SD
0.928
1.040
SE
0.147
0.135
T
-2.13
DF
89.86
Prob
0.036
Post-Game
L
W
40
59
2.0750 
2.4262
0.764
0.957
0.121
0.122
-2.04 95.08 0.044
EASE OF THE GAME (BLAME)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE
L 40 1.9500 0.714 0.113
W 60 2.3500 0.840 0.108
T
-2.55
. DF 
92.25
Prob
0.012
Post-Game
L
W
39
59
1.8974
2.3220
0.641
0.840
0.103
0.109
-2.83 93.94 0.006
GROUP T-TESTS
DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME (IMPORTANCE)
363
Pre-Game
L
W
No
41
61
Mean 
3.4878 
3.2623
SD
0.978
0.998
SE
0.153
0.128
T DF Prob
1.13 87.16 0.261
Half-Time
L
W
40
61
3.2250
2.7377
1.097
0.982
0.174
0.126
2.27 76.89 0.026
Post-Game
L 41 2.9268 0.985 0.154
W 61 2.7377 0.964 0.123
0.96 84.73 0.340
DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE
L 40 2.8500 1.122 0.177
W 59 2.5085 0.989 0.129
T
1.56
DF
76.62
Prob
0.123
Post-Game
L
W
40
61
2.7250
2.5410
1.062
0.959
0.168
0.123
0.88 77.45 0.379
DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME (BLAME)
Half-Time
L
W
No
40
60
Mean
2.6750
2.3833
SD
1.163
0.976
SE 
0.184 
0.126
T
1.31
DF
73.49
Prob
0.195
Post-Game
L
W
40
59
2.7250
2.4746
1.086
0.878
0.172
0.114
1.21 71.76 0.229
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GROUP T-TESTS
DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF OPPONENT (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 11.0488 3.354 0.524 -3.07 94.37 0.003
W 61 13.2787 3.933 0.504
Post-Game
L 41 11.0488 3.209 0.501 -2.54 93.94 0.013
W 61 12.8033 3.727 0.477
DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF OPPONENT (BLAME)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 13.5610 4.461 0.697 2.55 63.11 0.013
W 61 11.5410 2.936 0.376
Post-Game
L 41 13.8293 4.074 0.636 2.73 83.49 0.008
W 61 11.6230 3.908 0.500
DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF LUCK (CREDIT)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 9.5854 3.376 0.527 0.62 70.88 0.535
W 61 9.1967 2.607 0.334
Post-Game
L 41 10.1951 3.273 0.511 1.86 81.32 0.066
W 61 9.0000 3.028 0.388
DIFFICULTY BECAUSE OF L U Œ  (BLAME)
Half-Time No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 9.9024 3.499 0.546 1.23 65.59 0.224
W 61 9.1311 2.432 0.311
Post-Game
L 41 10.1220 3.116 0.487 2.02 90.93 0.047
W 61 8.8033 3.405 0.436
GROUP T-TESTS
PERSONAL SUCCESS
365
Pre-Game
L
W
No
41
60
Mean
3.5854
3.4333
SD
0.774
0.698
SE 
0.121 
0.090
T
1.01
DF
80.05
Prob
0.316
Half-Time
L
W
41
61
3.0732
3.6557
0.755
0.680
0.118
0.087
-3.98 79.77 0.000
Post-Game
L
W
41
61
2.9024
3.7541
0.995
0.830
0.155
0.106
-4.25 75.18 0.000
TEAM SUCCESS
Pre-Game
L
W
No
41
61
Mean
3.7561
3.8689
SD
0.830
0.718
SE
0.130
0.092
T DF Prob
-0.71 77.33 0.480
Half-Time
L
W
41
61
3.3415
4.2131
0.794
0.609
0.124
0.078
-5.95 70.50 0.000
Post-Game
L
W
41
61
2.7805
4.3770
1.037
0.637
0.162
0.082
-8.80 60.26 0.000
PERCEIVED DIFFICULTY
Pre-Game
L
W
No
41
61
Mean
3.7317
3.4918
SD
1.001
0.977
SE
0.156
0.125
T DF Prob
1.20 84.53 0.234
Half-Time
L
W
41
61
3.0976
2.5738
0.970
1.176
0.151 
0.151
2.45 95.76 0.016
Post-Game
L
W
40
61
3.3250
2.6885
1.047
1.133
0.166 
0.145
2.89 88.13 0.005
366
GROUP T-TESTS
MOTIVATION
Pre-Game No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 12.1463 2.174 0.340 0.92 74.82 0.363
W 61 11.7705 1.802 0.231
Half-Time
L 41 11.2927 1.887 0.295 -0.49 92.84 0.622
W 61 11.4918 2.142 0.274
Post-Game
L 41 10.7073 2.239 0.350 -1.51 86.51 0.134
W 61 11.3934 2.260 0.289
FRUSTRATION
Pre-Game No Me an SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 2.8780 1.122 0.175 -0.49 78.56 0.627
W 61 2.9836 0.991 0.127
Half-Time
L 41 3.2683 1.205 1.188 2.22 87.63 0.029
W 61 2.7213 1.240 0.159
Post-Game
L 41 3.4146 1.140 0.178 1.74 84.82 0.085
W 61 3.0164 1.118 0.143
WINNING
Pre-Game No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
L 41 3.2195 0.909 0.123 -2.97 77.90 0.004
W 61 3.7377 0.794 0.089
Half-Time
L 41 2.9268 0.787 0.130 -8.59 78.33 0.000
¥ 61 4.2295 0.693 0.092
PAIRED T-TESTS
367
ability
I did well because of good ab. 
I did poorly because of bad ab
No Mean SD SE 
99 3.2929 0.950 0.096
3.1111 1.039 0.104
T DF Sig
1.40 98 0.164
EFFORT
I did well because of good ef. 
I did poorly because of bad ef
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 3.6768 0.793 0.080 5.91 98 0.000
2.9091 1.098 0.110
LUCK
I did well because of good luck 
I did poorly because of bad luck
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
98 2.7143 1.167 0.118 1.15 97 0.255
2.5918 1.063 0.107
EASE OF THE GAME
I did well because the game was 
easy
I did poorly because the game was 
easy
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
98 2.2755 0.894 0.090 1.22 97 0.227
2.1531 0.791 0.080
DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
I did well because the game was 
difficult
I did poorly because the game was 
difficult
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 2.6263 1.006 0.101 0.43 98 0.667
2.5758 0.970 0.097
EASE AND DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
I did well because the game was 
easy
I did well because the game was 
difficult
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 2.2727 0.890 0.089 -2.45 98 0.016
2.5758 0.970 0.097
PAIRED T-TESTS
368
TEAM'S ABILITY
I did well because of my 
team's ability 
I did poorly because of my 
team's bad ability
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 3.6566 0.771 0.078 14.73 98 0.000
2.2020 0.670 0.067
TEAM'S EFFORT
I did well because of my 
team-mate's good effort 
I did poorly because of my 
team-mate's bad effort
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 3.8283 0.655 0.066 15.77 98 0.000
2.2727 0.767 0.077
TEAM'S LUCK
I did well because of my 
team-mate's good luck 
I did poorly because of my 
team-mate's bad luck
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 2.5960 1.068 0.107 2.55 98 0.012
2.3050 0.931 0.094
TEAM'S EASE OF THE GAME
I did well because the game 
was easy for my team-mates 
I did poorly because the game 
was easy for my team-mates
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
98 2.3980 0.870 0.088 2.10 97 0.038
2.2143 0.662 0.067
TEAM'S DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
No Mean SD SE
I did well because the game
was difficult for my team-mates 99 2.4545 0.860 0.086 
I did poorly because the game
was difficult for my team-mates 2.5758 0.938 0.094
T DF Sig 
-1.38 98 0.170
TEAM'S EASE AND DIFFICULTY
I did well because the game 
was easy for my team-mates 
I did poorly because the game 
was difficult for my team-mates
No Mean SD SE
99 2.4141 0.881 0.089
2.5758 0.938 0.094
T DF Sig
-1.25 98 0.213
PAIRED T-TESTS
369
OPPONENT’S ABILITY
I did well because of my 
opponent’s poor ability 
I did poorly because of my 
opponent’s good ability
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
98 2.6020 1.023 0.103 -1.76 97 0.081
2.8673 1.100 0.111
OPPONENT’S EFFORT
I did well because of my 
opponent’s poor effort 
I did poorly because of my 
opponent’s good effort
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 2.3333 0.881 0.089 -3.68 98 0.000
2.7980 1.059 0.106
OPPONENT’S LUCK
I did well because of my 
opponent’s bad luck 
I did poorly because of my 
opponent’s good luck
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
99 2.4242 0.949 0.095 -2.22 98 0.029
2.6465 1.013 0.102
OPPONENT’S EASE OF THE GAME
I did well because the game 
was easy for my opponents 
I did poorly because the game 
was easy for my opponents
No Mean SD SE
98 2.0000 0.609 0.062
2.0918 0.747 0.075
T DF Sig 
-1.41 97 0.161
OPPONENT'S DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
No Mean SD SE
I did well because the game
was difficult for my opponents 98 2.7755 1.051 0.106
I did poorly because the game
was difficult for my opponents 2.4694 0.888 0.090
T DF 'Sig 
3.07 97 0.003
PAIRED T-TESTS
370
OPPONENT'S EASE AND DIFFICULTY
I did well because the game 
was easy for my opponents 
I did poorly because the game 
was difficult for my opponents
No Mean SD SE T DF Sig
97 2.0000 0.612 0.062 -4.23 96 0.000
2.4639 0.890 0.090
OPPONENT'S DIFFICULTY AND EASE
I did well because the game 
was difficult for my opponents 
I did poorly because the game 
was easy for my opponents
No Mean SD SE 
99 2.7576 1.001 0.101
2.2323 0.767 0.077
T DF Sig
4.19 98 0.000
APPENDIX D
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrices 
from the Experimental Study: 
Attribution Theory in Sport 
Reported in Chapter 2.
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APPENDIX E
Questionnaire Used in Item Identification for 
Sports Personality Inventory.
NAME:
SEX:
Please tick the best answer to the following:-
Do you consider yourself a sports participant?
YES
□
NO
□
2 . In general, do you consider yourself a skilled 
player of team sports?
YES
□
NO
□
3. In general, do you consider yourself a skilled 
player of individual sports?
YES
□
NO
□
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For Office 
Use Only
(1-3)
C4)
(5)
C6)
(7)
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Please answer the following questions.
1. In general, what characteristics (psychological, personal, 
social, etc.) do you associate with sportsmen/women?
2. In general, what characteristics do you associate with those 
who do not participate in sports normally?
3. What characteristics do you think people who normally win 
at game sports have?
4. What characteristics do you think people who normally lose 
at game sports have?
Thank you for your help in completing this questionnaire 
Any additional comments?
APPENDIX F
Questionnaire Used in Item Selection for the 
Sports Personality Inventory,
NAME:
SEX:
Please tick the best answer to the following:-
1. Do you consider yourself a sports participant?
YES
□
NO
□
2. In general, do you consider yourself a skilled 
player of team sports?
YES
□
NO
□
3. In general, do you consider yourself a skilled 
player of individual sports?
YES
□
NO
□
377
For Office 
Use Only
(1-3)
(4)
(5)
C6)
(7)
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On the following page you will be shown a large number of 
personality characteristics in order to describe people who normally 
win at team sports. The questionnaire is also designed to describe 
those who normally lose at team sports.
Please indicate on a scale of 1 to 7 how true each of these 
characteristics are, first for winners and then for losers. PLEASE 
DO NOT LEAVE ANY CHARACTERISTICS UNMARKED.
Example
DESCRIBE WINNERS AND LOSERS. What characteristics do you think 
people who normally win at team sports have? What about those that 
normally lose?
WINNERS LOSERS
1. Shy
Mark, a 1 if it is NEVER OR ALMOST NEVER TRUE that winners are shy.
Also answer for losers.
Mark a 2 if it is USUALLY NOT TRUE that winners are shy. Also 
answer for losers.
Mark a 3 if it is SOMETIMES BUT INFREQUENTLY TRUE that winners are shy 
Also answer for losers.
Mark a 4 if it is OCCASIONALLY TRUE that winners are shy. Also answer 
for losers.
Mark a 5 if it is OFTEN TRUE that winners are shy. Also answer for 
losers.
Mark a 6 if it is USUALLY TRUE that winners are shy. Also answer for 
losers.
Mark a 7 if it is ALWAYS TRUE that winners are shy. Also answer for 
losers.
Thus, if you feel it is SOMETIMES BUT INFREQUENTLY true that winners 
are shy then you would answer 3. If you believe that it is OFTEN true 
that losers are shy, answer 5. Place your answers on the answer sheet 
in the following manner
________ WINNERS LOSERS
1. Shy
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APPENDIX G
T-Test Results of Item Selection.
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T-Test Results of 
(MALES)
Item Selection for the Sports Personality Inventory
Adjective No Mean SD SE MD DF Prob
Envied 27 (w)
CD
5.2222
2.1481
1.050
1.027
0.202 
0.198
3.0741 9.00 26 0.000
Praised 28 (w)
CD
5.5357
2.6429
1.071
1.254
0.202
0.237
2.8929 8.26 27 0.000
Skilled 
at sport
28 Cw)
(1)
6.1786
3.2857
0.723
1.213
0.137 
0.229
2.8929 10.76 27 0.000
Believes 28 
in your 
own ability
Cw)
CD
6.0714
3.0714
0.766
1.303
0.145
0.246
3.0000 9.59 27 0.000
Jubilant 28 Cw)
CD
5.2857
2.7500
1.013
1.266
0.191
0.239
2.5357 6.94 27 0.000
Confident 28 Cw)
CD
6.0357
3.2500
0.793
0.967
0.150
0.183
2.7857 9.83 27 0.000
Proud 28 Cw)
CD
5.7143
2.8214
0.763
1.124
0.144
0.212
2.8929 10.05 27 0.000
Admired 28 (w)
Cl)
5 .2500 
2.3214
1.206
1.056
0.228
0,200
2.9286 9.63 27 0.000
Has good
sports
ability
28 Cw)
CD
6.1786
3.1429
0.670
1.177
0,127
0,223
3.0357 11.26 27 0.000
Success­
ful
28 (w)
(1)
5.8929
2.8929
0.685
1.133
0.130
0.214
3.0000 9.59 27 0.000
Disappoint­
ed
-28 Cw)
CD
3.1429
5.0357
1.820
1.201
0.344
0.227
-1.8929 -3.66 27 0.001
Feels 28 
things are 
against you
(w)
CD
2.5000
4.9286
1.072
1.052
0.202
0.199
-2.4286 -7.08 27 0.000
Apathetic 28 Cw)
CD
1.8571 
4.3929
0.970
1.315
0.183
0.248
-2.5357 -7.75 27 0.000
Disillus­
ioned
28 Cw)
(1)
2.5357
4.7500
1.453
1.206
0.274
0.228
-2.2143 -5.33 27 0.000
Frustrated 27 Cw)
CD
2.9630
4.4444
1.315
1.086
0.253
0.209
-1.4815 -3.84 26 0.001
Adjective No Mean SD SE MD
383
T DF Prob
Depressed
Has a 
difficult 
time in 
sport
27 Cw) 
Cl)
28 Cw) 
Cl)
2.5185 
4.3704
3.1429
4.8214
0.975
0.926
1.604
1.090
0.188
0.178
0.303
0.206
-1.8519 -7.28 26 0.000
-1.6786 -4.28 27 0.000
Apologetic 27 (w)
C D
2.3704 
4.5185
1.043
1.341
0.201
0.258
-2.1481 -6.31 26 0.000
Embarrass­
ed
27 Cw)
C D
2.6667
4.2963
1.074
1.235
0.207
0.283
-1.6296 -5.56 26 0.000
Hesitant 27 Cw)
C D
2.3704
4.3704
0.884
1.006
0.170
0.194
-2.000 -6.96 26 0.000
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T-Test Results of 
(FEMALES)
Item Selection for the Sport Personality Inventory
Adjective No Mean SD SE MD T DF Prob
Envied 46 Cw)
CD
5.3913
1.6304
1.291
0.853
0.190
0.126
3.7609 14.55 45 0.000
Praised 47 Cw)
CD
5.6383
2.5957
1.072
1.245
0.156
0.182
3.0426 12.51 46 0.000
Skilled
at
sport
47 Cw)
CD
6.2128
3.3404
0.778
1.323
0.114
0.193
2.8723 12.13 46 0.000
Believes 47 
in your 
own ability
(w)
(1)
6.1702
3.3830
0.732
1.311
0.107
0.191
2.7872 13.10 46 0.000
Jubilant 46 Cw)
(1)
5.6739
2.6304
1.034
1.082
0.152
0.160
3.0435 10 . 88 45 0.000
Confident 47 Cw)
Cl)
6.0851
3.2553
0.747
1.242
0.109 
0.181
2.8298 13.67 46 0.000
Proud 47 Cw)
CD
5.5532
2.7872
0.951
1.122
0.139
0.164
2.7660 11.53 46 0.000
Admired 46 Cw)
CD
5.3696
2.6522
1.181 
1.251
0.174
0.184
2.7174 9.92 45 0.000
Has good
sports
ability
46 (w)
(1)
6.3696
3.7609
0.711
1. 417
0.105
0.209
2.6087 10.97 45 0.000
Success­
ful
47 (w)
CD
5.7447
3.2128
0.943
1.141
0.138
0.166
2.5319 9.75 46 0.000
Disappoint­
ed
•47 Cw)
(1)
2.4894 
5.5319
1.283
1.100
0.187
0.161
-3.0426 -11.33 46 0.000
FeeIs 46 
things are 
against you
(w)
CD
2.4783
4.9348
1.206
1.083
0.178
0.160
-2.4565 -11.44 45 0.000
Apathetic 47 Cw)
CD
1.8511
3.7872
0.908
1.250
0.133
0.182
-1.9362 -9.06 46 0.000
Disillus­
ioned
47 Cw)
CD
2.5745
4.6595
1.298
1.069
0.189
0.156
-2.0851 -7.77 46 0.000
Frustrated 46 Cw)
CD
2.5217 
5.0000
1.070
1.247
0.158
0.184
-2.4783 -9.48 45 0.000
Adjective No
Depressed
Has a 
difficult 
time in 
sport
47 Cw) 
CD
46 Cw) 
CD
Mean
2.1915
4.3191
2.8696
5.0870
SD
1.135
1.045
1.360
1.208
SE
0.166
0.152
0.201
0.178
MD
385 
DF Prob
-2.1277 -8.51 46 0.000
-2.2174 -7.03 45 0.000
Apologetic 47 Cw)
C D
2.1489
4.000
1.000
1.532
0.146
0.224
-1.8511 -7.55 46 0.000
Embarrass­
ed
46 Cw)
C D
2.2391
4.3696
1.037
1.103
0.153
0.163
-2.1304 -9.73 45 0.000
Hesitant 46 Cw)
(1)
2.4130
4.2609
1.107
1.021
0.163
0.150
-1.8478 -9.40 45 0,000
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T-Test Results of Item Selection for 
(SPORTS PARTICIPANTS)
the Sports Personality Inventory
Adjective No Mean SD SE MD DF Prob
Envied 49 Cw)
CD
5.4694
1.7551
1.082
0.902
0.155
0.129
3.7143 15.56 48 0.000
Praised 51 (w)
CD
5.6078
2.4510
1.021
1.222
0.143
0.171
3.1569 13 . 07 50 0.000
Skilled 
at sport
51 Cw)
CD
6.2549
3.1569
0.744
1.255
0.104
0.176
3.0980 14.75 50 0.000
Believes 51 
in your 
own ability
Cw)
CD
6.1176
3.0588
0.791
1.066
0.111
0.149
3.0588 15.54 50 0.000
Jubilant 50 Cw)
CD
5.4800
2.6600
1.035
1.154
0.146
0.163
2.8200 10.42 49 0.000
Confident 51 Cw)
CD
6.0784
3.0392
0.688
0.958
0.096
0.134
3.0392 17.85 50 0.000
Proud 51 Cw)
CD
5.6275
2.6863
0.824
1.068
0.115 
0.149
2.9412 13.74 50 0.000
Admired 51 Cw)
CD
5.2745
2.3922
1.282
1.185
0.179
0.166
2.8824 10.69 50 0.000
Has good
sports
ability
50 Cw)
CD
6.3200 
3.1000
0.683
1.266
0.097
0.197
3.2200 15.44 49 0.000
Successful 51 Cw)
(1)
5.9412
2.9804
0.785
1.191
0.110 
0.167
2.9608 11.90 50 0.000
Disappoint­
ed
-51 Cw)
CD
2.7843
5.3137
1.579
1.225
0.221
0.171
-2.5294 -7.62 50 0.000
Feels 50 
things are 
against you
Cw)
CD
2.4200 
4.9800
1.230
1.000
0.174
0.141
-2.5600 -12.06 49 0.000
Apathetic 51 Cw)
CD
1.8235
4.0784
0.932
1.197
0.130 
0.168
-2.2549 -11.29 50 0.000
Disillus­
ioned
51 Cw)
CD
2.4118
4.6667
1.152
1.211
0.161
0.170
-2.2549 -8.40 50 0.000
Frustrated 50 Cw)
CD
2.6800
4.7200
1.236
1.230
0.175
0.174
-2.0400 -7.14 49 0.000
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Adjective No Mean SD SE MD T DF Prob
Depressed 50 (w)
C D
2.3400 
4.3000
1.099
1.055
0.155
0.149
-1.9600 -8.58 49 0.000
Has a 
difficult 
time in 
sport
50 Cw)
CD
2.8000 
4.9200
1.457
1.104
0.206
0.156
-2.1200 -7.19 49 0.000
Apologetic 51 Cw)
Cl)
2.2941
4.2157
0.965
1.331
0.135
0.186
-1.9216 -8.87 50 0.000
Embarrass­
ed
50 Cw)
CD
2.3800 
4.4400
1.008
1.110
0.143
0.157
-2.0600 -9.52 49 0.000
Hesitant 49 Cw)
CD
2.3469
4.3878
1.032
0.996
0.147
0.142
-2.0408 -10.00 48 0.000
T-Test Results for Item Selection for the Sports Personality 
CSPORTS NON-PARTICIPANTS)
Adjective No Mean SD SE MD T .
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Inventory
DF Prob
Envied 24 Cw)
Cl)
5.0417
1.9583
1.398
1.042
0.285
0.213
Praised 24 Cw)
C D
5.5833
2.9583
1.176
1.233
0.240
0.252
Skilled 
at sport
24 Cw)
C D
6.0833
3.6667
0.776
1.274
0.158
0.260
Believes 
in your
24 Cw)
C D
6.1667
3.7083
0.637
1.654
0.130
0.338
3.0833 7.73 23 0.000
2.6250 7.50 23 0.000
2.4167 7.60 23 0.000
2.4583 7.01 23 0.000
own ability
Jubilant 24 Cw)
C D
5.6250
2.7083
1.056
1.160
0.215
0.237
2.9167 7.31 23 0.000
Confident 24 Cw)
C D
6.0417 
3.7083
0.908
1.367
0.185
0.279
2.3333 6.49 23 0.000
Proud 24 Cw)
C D
5.5833
3.0417
1.018
1.197
0.208
0.244
2.5417 7.24 23 0.000
Admired 23 Cw)
C D
5.4348
2.8261
0.945
1.154
0.197
0.241
2.6087 9.34 22 0.000
Has good 
sports
24 Cw)
C D
6.2500
4.4167
0.737
1.100
0.150
0.225
1.8333 7.05 23 0.000
ability
Successful 24 Cw) 5.5000 0.933 0.190 2.1667 6.84 23 0.000
C D 3.3333 1.007 0.206
Disappoint­>24 Cw) 2.6250 1.439 0.294 -2.7917 -6.56 23 0.000
ed C D 5.4167 1.018 0.208
Feels 24 Cw) 2.6250 0.970 0.198 -2 .2083 -6.12 23 0.000
things are C D 4.8333 1.204 0.246
against you
Apathetic 24 Cw)
C D
1.9167
3.8750
0.929
1.513
0.190
0.309
-1.9583 -5.05 23 0.000
Disillus­
ioned
24 Cw)
CD
2.8750
4.7500
1.676
0.897
0.342
0.183
-1.8750 -4.39 23 0.000
Frustrated 23 Cw)
CD
2.6957
4.9565
1.063
1.186
0.222
0.247
-2.2609 -6.44 22 0.000
Adjective No
Depressed
Has a 
difficult 
time in 
sport
24 Cw) 
CD
24 Cw) 
CD
Mean
2.2500
4.4167
3.3333
5.1250
SD
1.073
0.881
1.404
1.296
SE
0.219
0.180
0.287
0.265
MD
389
DF Prob
-2.1667 -6.97 23 0.000
-1.7917 -3.98 23 0.001
Apologetic 23 Cw)
CD
2.0870
4.1304
1.125
1.792
0.235
0.374
-2.0435 -4.77 22 0.000
Embarrass­
ed
23 Cw)
CD
2.4348
4.1304
1.199
1.217
0.250
0.254
-1.6957 -5.57 22 0.000
Hesitant 24 Cw)
CD
2.5000 
, 4.1250
1.022
1.035
0.209
0.211
-1.6250 -6.22 23 0.000
APPENDIX H
Questionnaire for the Sports Personality Inventory,
Please circle the answer which best describes you:-
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NOT AT 
ALL
1. ENVIED
2. DISAPPOINTED
3. PRAISED
4. FEELS THINGS ARE AGAINST YOU
5. SKILLED AT SPORT
6. APATHETIC
7. BELIEVES IN YOUR OWN ABILITY
8. DISILLUSIONED 
S. JUBILANT
10. FRUSTRATED
11. CONFIDENT
12. HAS A DIFFICULT TIME IN 
SPORT
13. PROUD
14. APOLOGETIC
15. ADMIRED
16. DEPRESSED
17. HAS A GOOD SPORTS ABILITY
18. EMBARRASSED-
19. SUCCESSFUL
20. HESITANT
NOT
MUCH
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
o
SOME
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
A A
LITTLE LOT
39f
P lease im ag ine th a t  you are  a tte n d in g  U n iv e r s ity  and you a re  
a U n iv e r s i t y - le v e l  hockey p la y e r .  You have been chosen as a 
member o f  your U n iv e r s ity  team , and you have been asked to  
p la y  in  th e  f i r s t  match o f  th e  season a g a in s t a n e ig h b o u rin g  
U n iv e r s ity .  You a r r iv e  a t  th e  ground in  p le n ty  o f  t im e , change 
in to  your u n ifo rm , and are w a it in g  in  th e  changing  room f o r  
your opponents to  a r r iv e .  P lease  answer the f o l lo w in g : -
P la y in g  to d a y 's  game is  a c h a lle n g e  
P la y in g  a game n e x t week w i l l  be a 
c h a lle n g e  
I  am c o n fid e n t about th e  game today  
I  am w o rr ie d  about th e  game today  
I  am in te r e s te d  in  th e  game today  
I t  is  im p o rta n t to  me to  w in today  
I  expect to  w in today  
I  f e e l  anxious about to d a y 's  game 
I  w i l l  f e e l  anxious about n e x t  
w eek's game 
The o th e r  p la y e rs  f e e l  anxious about 
to d a y 's  game 
I  f e e l  anxious today because o f  
fa c to rs  o th e r  than th is  game 
I  g e n e ra lly  f e e l  anxious about l i f e  
I  f e e l  anxious about f a i l i n g  to  l i v e  
up to  e x p e c ta tio n s  in  to d a y 's  game 
I  f e e l  anxious about f a i l i n g  to  l i v e  
up to  e x p e c ta tio n s  in  l i f e  in  , 
g e n e ra l
I  w orry, about what o th e rs  w i l l  th in k  
o f  my perform ance in  th e  game 
I  w orry  about what o th e rs  th in k  o f  
me in  g e n e ra l  
I  f e e l  p h y s ic a l ly  th re a te n e d  by 
to d a y 's  game
NOT AT NOT 
ALL MUCH
SOME A A 
LITTLE LOT
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
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Please imagine the same scene, as the opponents arrive. They 
change, and both teams proceed onto the field. After a 20- 
minute warm up, the teams line up and the opening whistle blows. 
Your team goes on the attack, but the opponent holds firm and 
soon the play is back in your end. Your team regains possession 
and mounts another attack. Before you realise it, it's half- 
time and the captain is giving the team talk. The second half 
progresses normally, and the teams are settled into the game.
The final whistle goes. You and your team rush to catch the bus 
back to the University.
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Please imagine the same scene, as the opponents arrive. They 
change, and both teams proceed onto the field. After a 20- 
minute warm up, the teams line up and the opening whistle blows. 
Your team goes on the attack, but the opponent holds firm and 
soon the play is back in your end. Your team regains possession 
and mounts another attack. Before you realise it, it's half- 
time and the captain is giving the team talk. The second half 
progresses normally, and the teams are settled into the game. 
When the final whistle goes, you find that you and your team 
have won. You rush to catch the bus back to the University.
Please imagine the same scene, as the opponents arrive. They 
change, and both teams proceed onto the field. After a 20- 
minute warm up, the teams line up and the opening whistle blows. 
Your team goes on the attack, but the opponent holds firm and 
soon the play is back in your end. Your team regains possession 
and mounts another attack; Before you realise it, it’s half- 
time and the captain is giving the team talk. The second half 
progresses normally, and the teams are settled into the game.
When the final whistle goes, you find that you and your team have 
lost. You rush to catch the bus back to the University.
To vhat extent do you agree that the following factors were 
responsible for your performance
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STRONGLY DISAGREE UNCERTAIN AGREE STRONGLY 
DISAGREE AGREE
a. Your good ability 1 2 3 4 5
b. Your poor ability 1 2 3 4 5
c. Your good effort 1 2  3 4 5
d. Your poor effort 1 2 3 4 5
e. Your good luck 1 2 3 4 5
f. Your bad luck 1 2 3 4 5
g. Your opponent's
good ability 1 2 3 4 5
h. Your opponent's
bad ability 1 2 3 4 5
i. Your opponent's
good effort 1 2 3 4 5
j. Your opponent's
bad effort 1 2 3 4 5
k. Your opponent's
good luck 1 2 3 4 5
1. Your opponent's
bad luck 1 2 3 4 5
m. The ease of the
game 1 2 3 4 5
n. The difficulty of
the game 1 2 3 4 5
If you feel that combinations of a-n above are responsible, please 
fill in the blank with the letters which combine and rank these 
combinations as above.
Fill in the blank with letters (a-n) which you would like to combine 
and consider as one factor
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NAME: __________  ,
SEX: ___________
NO YES
Are you a sports participant? 1 2
Do you consider yourself a skilled
team sports participant? 1 2
Do you consider yourself a skilled
individual sports participant? 1 2
APPENDIX I
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrices from the 
Experimental Study:
Perception of the Self and Others and Its 
Influence on Attributions.
Reported in Chapter 4.
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APPENDIX J
Group T-Tests from the Experimental Study: 
Perception of Self and Others in Sport and 
Its Influence on Attributions.
Reported in Chapter 4.
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T-TESTS
ANXIETY
No Mean SD SE T DF Prob
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 30.3385 8.550 1.060 2.18 118 0.032*
Skilled at
individual sports 55 27.054 7.854 1.059
GENERAL ANXIETY 
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 16.6923 5.359 0.665 2.35 118 0.021*
Skilled at
individual sports 55 14.4364 5.105 0.688
SPORTS ANXIETY 
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 11.9385 3.682 0.457 1.43 118 0.155
Skilled at
individual sports 55 10.9455 3.913 0.528
SPORTS PERSONALITY 
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 55.8000 8.946 1.110 -2.05 118 0.043*
Skilled at
individual sports 55 58.9091 7.449 1.004
SELF-DOUBT 
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 23.6154 5.343 0.663 3.11 118 0.002**
Skilled at
individual sports 55 20.5818 5.311 0.716
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS
Not skilled at
individual sports 65 22.3077 4.984 0.618 2.38 118 0.019**
Skilled at
individual sports 55 19.9818 5.707 0.770
* P Z .05
** P ^ .01
No Mean SD SE
401 
DF Prob.
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
OPPONENTS
Not skilled at 
individual sports 65 11.3385 3.515 0.436 1.53 118 0.130
Skilled at 
individual sports 55 10.3091 3.872 0.522
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S GOOD ABILITY
Not skilled at 
individual sports 65 3.3231 0.886 0.110 -1.61 116 0.110
Skilled at 
individual sports 53 3.6038 1.007 0.138
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
EFFORT
Not skilled at 
individual sports
Skilled at 
individual sports
65 3.8923 0.793 0.098 0.15 116 0.883
53 3.8679 1.001 0.137
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
ABILITY
Not skilled at 
individual sports
Skilled at 
individual sports
65 2.8615 1.029 0.128 2.57 115 0.011*
52 2.3654 1.048 0.145
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
EFFORT
Not skilled at 
individual sports
Skilled at 
individual sports
65 2.4615 1.174 0.146 0.72 115 0.475
52 2.3071 1.130 0.157
* P Z. .05
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T-TESTS
No Mean SD SE DF Prob.
ANXIETY
Not skilled at 
te;^ sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 30.3333 8.376 1.109 1.89 118 0.061
63 27.4762 8.189 1.032
GENERAL ANXIETY
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 16.6667 5.282 0.700 1.99 118 0.049*
63 14.7460 5.273 0.664
SPORTS ANXIETY
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 11.9123 3.542 0.469 1.18 118 0.242
63 11.0952 4.019 0.506
SPORTS PERSONALITY
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 57.0351 8.546 1.132 -0.23 118 0.815
63 57.3968 8.341 1.051
SELF-DOUBT
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 23.6316 5.006 0.663 2.73 118 0.007**
63 20.9524
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS
5.689 0.717
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 21.7895 5.738 0.760 1.05 118 0.295
63 20.7460 5.134 0.647
* P Z .05 
** P Z .01
403
No Mean SD SE DF Prob.
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
OPPONENTS
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
57 10.8772 3.761 0.498 0.03 118 0.977
63 10.8571 3.680 0.464
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
ABILITY
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
56 3.3571 0.819 0.109 -1.00 116 0.319
62 3.5323 1.051 0.134
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
EFFORT
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
56 3.8929 0.867 0.116 0.13 116 0.894
62 3.8710 0.914 0.116
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
ABILITY
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
56 2.8393 1.005 0.134 1.96 115 0.053
61 2.4590 1.089 0.139
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
EFFORT
Not skilled at 
team sports
Skilled at 
team sports
55 2.4909 1.184 0.160 0.86 115 0.890
62 2.3065 1.125 0.143
404
T-TESTS
ANXIETY
No Mean SD SE DF Prob.
8.281 1.565 0.33 118 0.745
8.433 0,879
Non—Participants 28 29.2857
Participants 92 28.6957
GENERAL ANXIETY
Non-Participants 28 16.1786 5.611 1.060 0.59 118 0.558
Participants 92 15.5000 5.280 0,550
SPORTS ANXIETY
Non-Participants 28 11.3214 3.486 0,659 -0.26 118 0.789
Participants 92 11.5326 3.915 0,408
SPORTS PERSONALITY
Non-Participants 28 57,7500 8.307 1.570 0.38 118 0.708
Participants 92 57,0652 8,473 0,883
SELF-DOUBT
Non-Participants 28 23.0000 5.464 1.033 0.85 118 0.398
Participants 92 21.9891 5.544 0.578
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS
Non-Participants 28 22.2143 4.492 0.659 -0.26 118 0.281
Participants 92 20.9457 5.675 0.408
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
OPPONENTS
Non-Participants
Participants
28 11.4643 3.203 0.849 0.98 118 0.332
92 10.6848 3.840 0.592
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No Mean SD SE DF Prob.
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
ABILITY
Non-Participants
Participants
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
EFFORT
Non-Participants
Participants
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
ABILITY
Non-Participants
Participants
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
EFFORT
Non-Participants
Participants
28
90
3.5357 
3.4222
28 4.0357
90 3.8333
28 2.4643
89 2.6966
28 2.2500
89 2.4382
0.881 0.167 0.55 116 0.582
0.971 0.102
0.693 0.131 1.05 116 0.294
0.939 0.099
1.036 0.196 -1.01 115 0.315
1.070 0.113
1.110 0.210 -0.75 115 0.425
1.167 0.124
T-TESTS
ANXIETY
Males
Females
No Mean SD SE
406
DF Prob.
60 27.6000 9.208 1.189 -1.63 118 0.107
60 30.0667 7.302 0.943
GENERAL ANXIETY
Males 60 14.9833 6.001 0.775 -1.39 118 0.167
Females 60 16.3333 4.542 0.586
SPORTS ANXIETY
Males 60 10.8667 4.023 0.519 -1.79 118 0.076
Females 60 12.1000 3.502 0.432
SPORTS PERSONALITY
Males 60 58.2000 8.171 1.055 1.27 118 0.205
Females 60 56.2500 8.590 1.109
SELF-DOUBT
Males 60 21.3667 5.609 0.724 -1.72 118 0.089
Females 60 23.0833 5.337 0.689
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS
Males 60 20.8833 6.070 0.784 -0.72 118 0.472
Females 60 21.6000 4.731 0.611
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
OPPONENTS
Males
Females
60 10.7833 3.971 0.513 -0.25 118 0.806
60 10.9500 3.447 0.445
407
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
ABILITY
Males
Females
No Mean
58 3.5345
60 3.3667
SD SE DF , Prob.
1.063 0.140 0.96 116 0.339
0.823 0.106
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN GOOD 
EFFORT
Males
Females
58 3.8103 0.907 0.119 -0.85 116 0.396
60 3.9500 0.872 0.113
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
ABILITY
Males
Females
57 2.5263
60 2.7500
1.037 0.137 -1.14 115 0.257
1.083 0.140
ATTRIBUTIONS TO 
ONE'S OWN BAD 
EFFORT
Males
Females
57 2.4035
60 2.3833
1.147 0.152 0.09 115 0.953
1.166 0.151
APPENDIX K
Cluster Analysis from the Experimental Study: 
Perception of the Self and Others in Sport and 
Its Influence on Attributions.
Reported in Chapter 4.
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Dendrogram using Single Linkage
Rescaled Distance Cluster Combine
C A S E  U 5 10 15 20 25
Label Seq +-------- +---- --+----  +----   -+-------- +
SKILLS? b -+------   — -----  — :----- -_+
SFORABIL 17 -+ I
ENVIED 1 ---------------- +-- + 1
ADMIRED lb + +—+
BELAbIL V  ------------+— ---- + I I I I
CÜNP1DEN 11 +—— + I I
SUCCESS? 19 -------------------------------------------+ I  +---------- + I
jubilant 9--------------------------— 1 I
PKÜUD 1 j          1
APULUÜET 14 . -------- - ---- - -----+'---   + I
HESllANl <£0 I I
DISAPP 2 ---------- — + — I I
DEPRESSD lb +—+ 1 I
AÜAINSTÜ 4     — -— ---+ 1 +-------- + I
FRUSTRAT 10 ---- - ------- --------- + 1 +-----+
EMBARRAS lb -------------------    + 1 I
ÜIFSPÜRT 12  + I
APATHY b       +
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Vertical Icicle Plot using Single Linkage
(Down) Number of Clusters (Across) Case Label and number
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APPENDIX L
Attributions by Group
One Way Analysis of Variance Results from the 
Experimental Study: Perception of the Self 
and Others in Sport and Its Influence on 
Attributions.
Reported in Chapter 4.
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Attributions by Group: One Way Analysis of Variance Results from the 
Experimental Study: Perception of the Self and Others in Sport and Its 
Influence on Attributions.
POSITIVE-SELF
YOUR GOOD ABILITY
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 11.6199 5.8100 7.140
Within Groups 115 93.5749 0.8137
Total 117 105.1948
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 3.7250 0.8161 0.1290
L 38 3.0000 1.0397 0.1687
W 40 3.6000 0.8412 0.1330
Total 118 3.4492 0.9482 0.0873
F .Prob 
0.0012
YOUR GOOD EFFORT
D.F. S. S. M.S. F .Ratio
Between Groups 2 19.9483 9.9741 15.845
Within Groups 115 72.3907 0.6295
Total 117 92.3389
Count Mean S .D. S.E.
N 40 4.1000 0.5905 0,0934
L 38 3.2895 1.0631 0.1725
W 40 4.2250 0.6587 0.1043
Total 118 3.8814 0.8884 0.0818
NEGATIVE-SELF
YOUR POOR ABILITY
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 10.0312 5.0156 4.730
Within Groups 114 120.8917 1.0605
Total 116 130.9229
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 2.7500 1.0801 0.1708
L 37 2.9459 1.0259 0.1687
w 40 2.2500 0.9806 0.1550
Total 117 2.6410 1.0624 0.0982
F.Prob 
0.0106
NEGATIVE-SELF
YOUR POOR EFFORT
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D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob.
Between Groups 2 11.3930 5.6965 4.557 0.0125
Within Groups 114 142.5213 1.2502
Total 116 153.9143
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 39 2.3846 1.0161 0.1627
L 38 2.7895 1.2554 0.2037
W 40 2.0250 1.0739 0.1698
Total 117 2.3932 1.1519 0.1065
POSITIVE-OPPONENTS
YOUR OPPONENT’S GOOD ABILITY
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob.
Between Groups 2 12.5514 6.2757 7.676 0.0007
Within Groups 116 94.8434 0.8176
Total 118 107.3949
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 3.750 0.7425 0.1174
L 39 3.8205 0.8847 0.1417
W 40 3.1000 1.0573 0.1672
Total 119 3.5546 0.9540 0.0875
YOUR OPPONENT’S GOOD EFFORT
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob.
Between Groups 2 1.9187 0.9594 1.322 0.2706
Within Groups 114 82.7173 0.7256
Total 116 84.6325
Count Mean D.S, S.E.
N 39 3.7692 0.8099 0.1297
L 38 3.7105 0.8023 0.1301
W 40 3.4750 0.9334 0.1476
Total 117 3.6496 0.8542 0.0790
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NEGATIVE-OPPONENTS
YOUR OPPONENT'S BAD ABILITY
D.F* S.S. M.S. F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 12.6921 6.3461 6.613
Within Groups 113 108.4456 0.9597
Total 115 121.1377
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 39 3.1026 0.9118 0.1460
L 37 2.4324 1.0149 0.1668
W 40 3.1750 1.0099 0.1597
Total 116 2.9138 1.0263 0.0953
YOUR OPPONENT'S BAD EFFORT
D.F, S.S. M.S. F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 9.0804 4.5402 4.889
Within Groups 112 104.0151 0.9287
Total 114 113.0955
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 39 2.8718 0.9782 0.1566
L 37 2.2703 0.9324 0.1533
W 39 2.8718 0.9782 0.1566
Total 115 2.6783 0.9960 0.0929
LUCK
YOUR GOOD LUCK
D.F. S.S. M.S. F .Ratio
Between Groups 2 22.5336 11.2668 10.911
Within Groups 116 119.7858 1.0326
Total 118 142.3193
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 2.8750 0.9658 0.1527
L 39 2.4103 1.0442 0.1672
W 40 3.4750 1.0374 0.1640
Total 119 2.9244 1.0982 0.1007
LUCK
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YOUR BAD LUCK
D.F. S.S M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2
114
116
Count
8.1359 
100.7529 
108.8888
Mean
4.0680
0.8838
S.D.
4.603 0.0120
S.E.
N
L
W
Total
39 
38
40 
117
2.5897
2.8684
2.2250
2.5556
0.8801 
1.0442 
0.8912 
0.9689
0.1409
0.1694
0.1409
0.0896
YOUR OPPONENT’S GOOD LUCK
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2
114
116
Count
11.9828
122.7864
134.7692
Mean
5.9914
1.0771
S.D.
5.563 0.0050
S.E.
N
L
W
Total
39 
38
40 
117
2.7949
3.1579
2.3750
2.7692
1.1045
1.1277
0.8679
1.0779
0.1769
0.1829
0.1372
0.0996
YOUR OPPONENT’S BAD LUCK
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
2
113
115
Count
18.8704
114.6812
133.5516
Mean
9.4352
1.0149
S.D.
9.297 0.0002
S.E.
N
L
W
Total
39 
37
40 
116
2.6154
2.1892
3.1750
2.6724
1.0666 
0.9672 
0.9842 
1.0776
0.1708
0.1590
0.1556
0.1001
TASK DIFFICULTY
EASE OF THE GAME
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D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 2 7.2903 3.6452 3.575 0.0312
Within Groups 115 117.2603 1.0197
Total 117 124.5507
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 3.4250 1.0099 0.1597
L 38 2.8158 0.9824 0.1594
W 40 3.1750 1.0350 0.1636
Total 118 3.1441 1.0318 0.0950
DIFFICULTY OF THE GAME
D.F. S.S. M.S. F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 2 2.6776 1.3388 1.607 0.2051
Within Groups 113 94.1498 0.8332
Total 115 96.8275
Count Mean S.D. S.E.
N 40 3.3250 0.9443 0.1493
L 36 3.5000 0.9103 0.1517
W 40 3.1250 0.8825 0.1395
Total 116 3.3103 0.9176 0.0852
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One Way Analysis of Variance Results
(Attributions by Group based on Outcome Information)
RELATIVE ATTRIBUTIONS
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
DF
2
117
119
F,Ratio 
1.078
F.Prob
0.3436
Mean SD SE
No Information Group 21.9750 4.8542 0.7675
Losing Information Group 20.2500 6.7776 1.0716
Winning Information Group 21.5000 4.3442 0.6869
Total 21.4170 5.4310 0.4958
(No two groups were significantly different)
ATTRIBUTIONS TO OPPONENTS
Source
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
Total
DF
2
117
119
F.Ratio
13.885
F.Prob
0.0000
Mean SD SE
No Information Group 11.2500 3.2165 0.5086
Losing Information Group 8,7250 3.8563 0.6097
Winning Information Group 12.6250 2.9325 0,4637
Total 10.8667 3.7031 0.3380
4 1 8
APPENDIX M
Pearson Correlation Results from the Experimental 
Study: Perception of the Self and Others in Sport 
and Its Influence on Attributions.
Reported in Chapter 4.
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Pearson Correlations
Self-
Doubt
Sports
Person­
ality
Anxiety General
Anxiety
Sports
Anxiety
Playing today’s game 
is a challenge
0.0056 
C 120) 
P=0.476
-0.0185 
C 120) 
P=0.421
0.1343 
C 120) 
P=0.072
0.0257 
C 120) 
P=0.390
0.2464** 
( 120) 
P=0.003
Playing a game next 
week is a challenge
-0.1146 
( 118) 
P=0.108
-0.0115 
C 118) 
P=0.451
0.0623 
C 118) 
P=0.251
-0.0357 
( 118) 
P=0.351
0.2021* 
( 118) 
P=0.014
I am confident about 
the game
-0.3137** 
( 120) 
P=0.000
-0.0993 
( 120) 
P=0.140
-0.1339 
( 120) 
P=0.072
-0.1567* 
( 120) 
P=0.044
-0.0712 
( 120) 
P=0.220
I am interested in 
today's game
-0.0796 
C 120) 
P=0.194
0.0171 
( 120) 
P=0.427
0.0222 
( 120) 
P=0.405
0.0020 
( 120) 
P=0.491
0.0739 
( 120) 
P=0.211
It is important to me 
to win today
-0.1393 
C 120) 
P=0.065
0.0455 
( 120) 
P=0.311
0.2213** 
C 120) 
P=0.008
0.1380 
( 120) 
P=0.066
0.2592** 
( 120) 
P=0.002
I expect to win -0.2339** 
C 120) 
P=0.005
-0.0820 
( 120) 
P=0.187
-0.1161 
( 120) 
P=0.183
-0.0958 
( 120) 
P=0.149
-0.0996 
( 120) 
P=0.140
Anxiety 0.4786** 
( 119) 
P=0.000
0.2497** 
( 120) 
P=0.003
1.0000 
C 0)
0.9112 
( 120) 
P=0.000
0.8084 
( 120) 
P=0.000
General anxiety 0.5201** 
( 120) 
P=0.000
0.3110** 
( 120) 
P=0.000
0.9112 
( 120) 
P=0.000
1.0000 
( 0)
0.5115 
( 120) 
P=0.000
Sports anxiety 0.3280** 
( 120) 
P=0.000
0.0762 
( 120) 
P=0.204
0.8084 
( 120) 
P=0.000
0.5115 
( 120) 
P=0.000
1.0000 
( 0) 
p=*****
* P Z .05
** P ^ .01
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Attributions to 
.,. your good ability
your poor ability
your good effort
your opponent’s good luck
your opponent's bad luck
the ease of the game
... the difficulty of the game
Relative attributions
Attributions to opponents
Attributions to 
... your poor effort
... your good luck
... your bad luck
SPORTS
ANXIETY
GENERAL
ANXIETY
-0.0416 
C 118) 
P=0.327
-0.0890 
C 118) 
P=0.169
0.1465 
C 117) 
P=0.058
0.2033* 
C 117) 
P=0.014
-0.0729 
( 118) 
P=0.216
-0.0633 
( 118) 
P=0.248
-0.0435 
C 117) 
P=0.321
0.0891 
( 117) 
P=0.170
0.0084 
( 116) 
P=0.464
-0.0234 
( 116) 
P=0.402
0.0479 
( 118) 
P=0.303
0.1405 
( 118) 
P=0.065
-0.0787 
C 116) 
P=0.201
-0.0895 
( 116) 
P=0.170
0.0584 
C 120) 
P-0.263
0.1217 
( 120) 
P=0.093
0.0938 
C 120) 
P=0.154
0.1217 
( 120) 
P=0.097
0.0989 
C 117) 
P=0.144
0.1658* 
( 117) 
P=0.037
-0.0026 
C 119) 
P=0.489
0.0167 
( 119) 
P=0.428
0.0267 
C 117) 
P=0.387
0.0626 
( 117) 
P=0.251
* P Z  .05
Attributions to
... your opponent’s good ability
... your opponent's bad ability
your opponent's good effort
your opponent's bad effort
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SPORTS
ANXIETY
GENERAL
ANXIETY
-0.0195 
C 119-1 
P=0.417
0.0141 
C 119) 
P=0.439
-0.0617 
C 116) 
P=0.255
0.0119 
C 116) 
P=0.450
-0.0698 
C 117) 
P=0.227
0.0280 
C 117) 
P=0.382
0.0818 
( 115) 
P=0.192
0.0862 
C 116) 
P=0.180
** p ^ .01
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PERSONALITY SELF-DOUBT
Relative Attributions 0.0250 
C 1201 
P=0.393
0.0443 
C 120) 
P=0.315
Attributions to opponents 0.0762 
C 120) 
P=0.204
-0.0179 
( 120) 
P=0.423
Attributions to
... your own poor effort -0.0543 
C 117) 
P=0.281
0.0566 
C 117) 
P=0.272
... your own good effort 0.1045 
C 118) 
P=0.130
0.1404 
( 117) 
P=0.066
... your own poor ability -0.119 
C 117) 
P=0.115
-0.0362 
( 118) 
P=0.349
.... your own good ability 0.0390 
C 118) 
P=0.338
-0.2404** 
( 120) 
P=0.004
APPENDIX N
Video Directions Used in Experimental Studies 
in Perceptual Skills 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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DIRECTIONS EXP. 2
Please do not read the papers on the desk in front of you until 
I tell you to do so.
A ten second segment of video tape will be shown of a ladies hockey 
match. Please observe the video carefully, as questions will be asked 
about the film. Questions will be about what has happened in the segment, 
what will happen next, and the successfulness of the play.
You will be asked not to look at the questions before the video 
segment is shown. Therefore, the questions for each of the six segments
will be presented on a separate page. You will next be shown the first
segment of video. At the end of the video you will see a 5 second still 
picture on the screen. After the 5 second still, the screen will go 
blank. At this time you will be asked to write the answers to the questions
We will complete a sample segment together now, to be certain that
you understand the procedure. Please ask questions as we go along if 
you do not understand the directions.
The video will now be shown. Please watch the segment carefully, 
as questions will be asked afterwards.
SHOW SAMPLE SEGMENT. (GREEN PLAYER DRIBBLES FROM CENTRE AT 50,
TO LEFT WING AREA, TO ENDLINE AND CENTRES TO A PLAYER ABOUT TO
SHOOT).
Now turn to the page entitled Sample, and answer the questions there.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER THE SAMPLE QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions about the "procedure" involved? (Apart 
from the correct answers which cannot be provided).
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Next we will proceed to Segment 1. Please watch, the TV monitor 
at this time.
SHOW SEGMENT 1 (2 GIRLS AND COACH ON SIDELINE. FREE HIT, GREEN 
FORWARD INTERCEPTS, CARRIES TO THE ENDLINE, AND PULLS BACK.
STOP BEFORE SHE SHOOTS).
Now turn to the next page entitled Segment 1, and answer the 
questions.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 1 QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions?
Next we will proceed to Segment 2. Please watch the TV monitor.
SHOW SEGMENT 2 (GREEN NO.5 TAKES THE BALL FROM OPPONENT, DRIBBLES 
DOWN THE SIDELINE, LOSES STICK. THE BALL IS TAKEN BY WHITE NO.9 
WHO PASSES TO K. BROWN WHO DRIBBLES INTO OPEN FIELD).
Now turn to the next page entitled Segment 2, and answer the 
questions.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 2 QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions?
Next we will proceed to Segment 3. Please watch the TV monitor.
SHOW SEGMENT 3 (WHITE NO.9 STARTS TO TAKE A FREE HIT, BUT LEAVES 
IT FOR ANOTHER WHO PASSES TO THE CENTRE HALF, WHO DRIBBLES RIGHT, 
PASSES TO OVERLAPPING RIGHT WING, WHO CARRIES THE BALL TO THE 
ENDLINE. STOP JUST AS SHE SHOOTS).
Now turn to page entitled Segment 3, and answer the questions. 
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 3 QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions?
Next we will proceed to Segment 4. Please watch the TV monitor.
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SHOW SEGMENT 4 (PURPLE PLAYER TAKES A PUSH, PASSES TO NO.10,
WHO PASSES BACK TO NO.12, WHO PULLS THE BALL BACK) .
Now turn to the page entitled Segment 4, and answer the questions.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 4 QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions?
Next we will proceed to Segment 5. Please watch the TV monitor.
SHOW SEGMENT 5 (WHITE NO.5 TAKES THE BALL OUT OF THE CIRCLE,
PASSES TO THE LEFT HALF, WHO PASSES STRAIGHT TO LEFT MIDFIELD).
Now turn to the page entitled Segment 5, and answer the questions.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 5 QUESTIONS.
Are there any questions?
Next we will proceed to Segment 6. Please watch the TV monitor.
SHOW SEGMENT 6 (WHITE 16 YD. HIT TO NO.6 WHO PASSES TO THE LEFT
LINK WHO PASSES BACK. STOP WHEN LEFT LINK HAS THE BALL).
Finally, turn to the page entitled Segment 6, and answer the questions
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO ANSWER SEGMENT 6 QUESTIONS.
Please answer the questions at the end of your question sheet.
Thank you very much for your participation in this study.
Appendix o
Video Answer Sheet Used in Experimental 
Studies in Perceptual Skills 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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ANSWER SHEET
Name
Date
Occupation
Education
(Highest level completed. Ext: School, College, 
University, Postgrad.)
Age
Sex
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SAMPLE
Please answer the following questions:
1. Not counting the goalkeeper, how many opponents made an attempt 
to get the ball from the forward? (Choose either one, two or 
three).
2. In which direction will the ball go next? (Choose either number 
1, 2, 3, or 4 as labelled on the television).
3, Will the player with the ball shoot, pass, or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
Successfulness will be judged as follows:
1. Shooting - A shot will be considered successful if it results 
in a goal.
2. Passing - A pass will be considered successful if a team-mate 
receives the ball cleanly.
3. Dribbling - A dribble will be considered successful if the 
opponent is eliminated.
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SEGMENT 1
Please answer the following questions:
1. How many players ran back to the goalline to replace the beaten 
goalie? CChoose either one, two, or three).
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2,3 or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball centre the ball or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
SEGMENT 2
Please answer the following questions:
1. Which one of these statements is true?
a. A player was injured.
b . A player dropped her stick.
c. The ball went out of bounds, but the umpire did not see it,
so play continued.
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2, 3, or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball shoot, pass or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
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SEGMENT 3
Please answer the following questions:
1. Which one of these statements is true?
a. The player dribbling accidently kicked the ball.
b. The ball hits the umpire.
c. One player starts to take the free hit, then moves away, 
allowing someone else to take it.
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2, 3, or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball centre the ball or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
SEGMENT 4
Please answer the following questions:
1. On which side of the pitch was the purple player when she dribbled 
the ball? (Choose either her team's left side, right side, or 
middle).
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2, 3, or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball shoot, pass, or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
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SEGMENT 5 , .
Please answer the following questions:
1. Did the white team begin in their defensive end or their 
attacking end of the pitch?
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2, 3, or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball shoot, pass, or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
SEGMENT 6
Please answer the following questions
1. True or False? The white team never lost possession of the 
ball during this segment.
2. In which direction will the ball go? (Choose either 1, 2, 3, or 4)
3. Will the player with the ball shoot, pass, or dribble?
4. Will the play be successful?
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Any additional comments?
Do you have any hockey experience?
If so, what was your highest level of participation? Choose 
either school (class or team), college. University, club, 
sectional, or national. _________________________________
How long ago was your last hockey experience?
For how long did you play regularly? (How many seasons?)
At what level did you play regularly?
Have you played any other team sports? 
If so, which sport? _________________
What was your highest level of participation? 
How long ago? __________________ __________
For how long did you play this sport regularly? 
At what level did you play regularly? __._____ _
Did you become frustrated?
If so, what caused your frustration?
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Please answer these final questions in the following manner:
Place a line under Strongly agree if you agree strongly with the 
statement.
Place a line under Agree if you agree with the statement.
Place a line under Uncertain if you are uncertain as to whether you
agree or disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Disagree if you disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Strongly disagree if you strongly disagree with the
statement.
U  This experiment was interesting.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
2. I was worried about failing.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
3. It was important to me to do well in this experiment.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
4. Having played hockey would help people to do well in this experiment. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
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This is a study of your feelings about those test questions which 
you answered. We would like to know why you succeeded when you succeeded, 
and why you failed when you failed. Answer the questions in the following 
manner:
Place a line under Strongly Agree if you agree strongly with the 
statement.
Place a line under Agree if you agree with the statement.
Place a line under Uncertain if you are uncertain as to whether you
agree or disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Disagree if you disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Strongly Disagree if you disagree strongly with
the statement.
1. When I failed to answer correctly, I failed because I had too little 
time.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
2. When I failed, the directions seemed clear to others, but I didn't 
understand them.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
3. When I succeeded, it was purely by chance.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
4. When I failed, it was because I was not intelligent enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
5. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught to play hockey 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
6. When I succeeded, it was because I tried very hard.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
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7. When I failed, it was because this test causes you to be nervous. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
8. When I failed, it was because I am not quick enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
9. When I succeeded, it was because the test was well constructed. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
10. When I failed, it was because I have a poor memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
11. When I failed, it was because the directions were poor.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
12. When I succeeded, it was because I have a background in sports. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
13. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught the rules of 
hockey.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
14. When I failed, it was because I don't concentrate well.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
15. When I succeeded, it was because I have a good memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
16. When I failed, it was because my inadequacies made me frustrated. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
17. When I failed, it was because the difficulty of the test made me 
frustrated.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
18. When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
APPENDIX P
Video Results;
Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix from the 
Experimental Study in Perceptual Skills 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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APPENDIX Q
Video Results:
Pearson Correlations from the 
Experimental Study in Perceptual Skills 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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PEARSON CORRELATIONS FOR ATTRIBUTIONAL RESPONSES
Pearson Correlations
ATT2 ATT7 ATTll ATT16 ATT 17
ATT2 1.0000 0.2906 0.4165 0.3034 0.1450
C 0) ( 70) C 70) ( 70) C 70)
P=0.001 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.056
ATT7 0.2906 l.OOOQ 0.2602 0.4203 0.3792
( 70) ( 0) ( 70) ( 70) C 70)
P=0.001 P=0.002 P=0.000 P=0.000
ATTll 0.4165 0.2602 1.0000 0.3721 0.3208
C 70) ( 70) ( 0) ( 70) ( 70)
P=0.000 P=0.002 p=***** P=0.000 P=0.000
ATT 16 0.3034 0.4203 0.3721 1.0000 0.6453
( 70) ( 70) ( 70) ( 0) C 70)
P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 p=****$ P=0.000
ATT17 0.1450 0.3792 0.3208 -0.6453 1.0000
( 70) ( 70) ( 70) ( 70) ( 0)
P=0.056 P=0.000 P=0.000 P=0.000 p=*****
Pearson Correlations between Motivation, Interest, Importance, ant
Motivation Interest Importance Worry
Interest 0.6279
P=0.0000
Importance 0.8083
P^O.OOOO
0.3939
P=0.0000
Worry 0.7775
P=0.0000
0.2496
P=0.019
0.3599
P=0.001
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APPENDIX R
Slide Directions Used in Experimental 
Studies in Perceptual Skills 
(Matching and Recognition) 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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DIRECTIONS
(The examiner should have answer sheets face up and diagram sheets 
face down on the desk. Have pencils on desks. As students enter, say 
"Please do not look at the papers on your desk").
Read the following directions to subjects:
You have been asked to be a subject for a test of memory. You
will be asked to observe colour slides of hockey matches, and then 
you will be asked to match the scene with a diagram provided. If you 
will look at your answer sheet, place your name, occupation, education, 
age, and sex in the space provided.
All writing and answers are to be placed on the answer sheet provided. 
Turn now to page 2 of your answer sheet. The answers to PART I will be 
filled in bn this page. You will have a limited amount of time to match
the slide which will be presented, to the diagram which will be provided.
You will be shown a slide for 1 minute, during which time you will match 
the slide to one of five diagrams. Now please turn over the section of 
diagrams provided. Do not write on these diagram sheets. When choosing, 
please choose either diagram 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5. When writing your 
answers, please include the full diagram number which includes the part 
number, question number, and choice number. Look at the first page; you 
will see numbers in the upper right hand corner. These correspond to 
Part I (shown by a Roman Numeral), Question 1, and choices 1-5. If you 
choose the first diagram, you would write I, 1, 1 in the space provided 
on your answer sheet. Be sure to concentrate on each slide as you will 
not be allowed a second look. Diagrams include letters which indicate 
the colour of the player's uniform, for example G for a player wearing 
green or W for a player wearing white. The ball is shown as a circle 
with a line through it, and gk indicates the position of the goalkeeper.
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PART I
We will begin with, the first slide. PART I, question 1.
PRESENT SLIDE 1 ALLOW 1 MINUTE
Time is up. Turn to the second page of diagrams, numbered Roman 
Numeral I, number 2, choices 1-5. You will now be shown slide 2.
Record your answer in Part I, number 2 of your answer sheet.
PRESENT SLIDE 2 ALLOW 1 MINUTE
Time is up. Turn to the third page of diagrams, numbered Roman 
Numeral I, number 3, choices 1-5. You will now be shown slide 3.
Record your answer in Part I, number 3 of your answer sheet.
PRESENT SLIDE 3 ALLOW 1 MINUTE
Time is up. Now please answer question no. 4, listing in order
of importance, the strategies used in Part I.
ALLOW Ih MINUTES-
PART II
You will next be asked to observe colour slides of a ladies' 
hockey match, and then to choose from diagrams provided. You will 
not be allowed to see the diagram choices until therprojector has 
been turned off. You will be shown the slide for 10 seconds only.
You will then be asked to choose the correct diagram from five diagrams 
provided. You will be asked to rank each slide according to difficulty 
You will not be expected to remember each slide after only 10 seconds. 
We are interested in the types of errors made, and we expect you to 
do your best. You will now see slide 1. Record your answers on 
your answer sheets number 1.
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PRESENT SLIDE 1 FOR 10 SECONDS
Now look at your diagram choices and record your answers.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER
Time is up. Turn to the next page of diagrams, numbered number 
2, choices 1-5. Do not study the diagrams. You will now be shown 
slide 2.
PRESENT SLIDE 2 FOR 10 SECONDS
Now look at your diagram choices and record your answers.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER
Time is up. Turn to the next page of diagrams, number 3, 
choices 1-5. Do not study the diagrams. You will now be shown slide 3.
PRESENT SLIDE 3 FOR 10 SECONDS
Now look at your diagram choices and record your answers.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO CHOOSE THE CORRECT ANSWER
Time is up. Next turn to the next section of your answer sheet 
and answer questions 1-8.
ALLOW 5 MINUTES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
Time is up. Finally we move to the final section. Please answer 
questions 1-18.
ALLOW 5 MINUTES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this 
study. I hope the information gained will be helpful in teaching sports, 
and helping athletes cope with their failures and successes. Your 
participation is greatly appreciated.
APPENDIX S
Slide Answer Sheet Used in Experimental 
Studies in Perceptual Skills 
(Matching and Recognition) 
Reported in Chapter 6.
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ANSWER SHEET
Name
Date
Occupation
Education
(Highest level completed. Ext: School, College, 
University, Postgrad.)
Age
Sex
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ANSWER SHEET
PART I
1. Slide 1 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
(Choose on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being an "easy" slide and 7 
being a "difficult" slide to match).
2. Slide 2 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
3. Slide 3 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
4. What strategies did you use in choosing these answers?
PART II
1. Slide 1 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
(Choose on a scale of 1-7, with 1 being an "easy" slide to remember 
and 7 being a "difficult" slide to remember).
2. Slide 2 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
3. Slide 3 matches diagram 
Rank of Difficulty
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4. What strategies did you use in matching the slide and diagram?
PART III
1. List strategies used overall
2. Rank order the above answers 1-5, with 1 being the most used 
strategy, and 5 being the least used strategy. If you listed 
fewer than five, include only as many strategies as you actually 
used. Do not include more than five. Place the rank order next 
to the strategy listed above.
3. Did you become frustrated?
If so, what caused your frustration?
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4. Any additional comments?
5. Do you have any hockey experience?
If so, what was your highest level of participation? Choose 
either school (class or team), college. University, club, 
sectional, or national.  _____ '___ _ ______
6. How long ago was your last hockey experience?
7. For how long did you play regularly? (How many seasons?)
At what level did you play regularly?
8. Have you played any other team sports? 
If so, which sport? _________________
What was your highest level of participation? 
How long ago? _ ________________ _______ __
For how long did you play this sport regularly? 
At what level did you play regularly?  ________
1.1.3)
Y"
1.1.4)
i 1.1.51
(1 .2,2 )
1 ,3,2
1.3.1
G W
W 0
1.3,3
W 0
p-
II, 2.2
G w
2X. 2.3
n,
w  G
G W
W
H  ,3.4
WG
GW
GW G
This is a study of your feelings about those test questions which 
you answered. We would like to know why you succeeded when you succeeded, 
and why you failed when you failed. Answer the questions in the following 
manner:
Place a line under Strongly Agree if you agree strongly with the 
statement.
Place a line under Agree if you agree with the statement.
Place a line under Uncertain if you are uncertain as to whether you
agree or disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Disagree if you disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Strongly Disagree if you disagree strongly with
the statement.
1. When I failed to answer correctly, I failed because I had too little 
time.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
2. When I failed, the directions seemed clear to others, but I didn't 
understand them.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
3. When I succeeded, it was purely by chance.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
4. When I failed, it was because I was not intelligent enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
5. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught to play hockey 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
6. When I succeeded, it was because I tried very hard.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
7. When I failed, it was because this test causes you to be nervous. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
8. When I failed, it was because I am not quick enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
9. When I succeeded, it was because the test was well constructed. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
10. When I failed, it was because I have a poor memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
11. When I failed, it was because the directions were poor.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
12. When I succeeded, it was because I have a background in sports. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
13. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught the rules of 
hockey.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
14. When I failed, it was because I don’t concentrate well.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
15. When I succeeded, it was because I have a good memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
16. When I failed, it was because my inadequacies made me frustrated. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
17. When I failed, it was because the difficulty of the test made me 
frustrated.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
18. When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
APPENDIX T
Slide Results (Matching and Recognition).
Pearson Correlations from the Experimental Study 
in Perceptual Skills.
Reported in Chapter 6.
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APPENDIX U
Slide Results (Matching and Recognition)
One Way Analyses of Variance Results from 
the Experimental Study in Perceptual Skills 
Reported in Chapter 6.
One Way Analyses of Variance Results
(Success at Matching and Recognition by Experience Groups)
(Matching Success by Experience)
4 54 À
Source DF SS MS F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 2.2435 1.1218 1.500
Within Groups 113 88.2687 0.7480
Total 120 90.5123
Group Count Mean SD SE
GRPOO 36 1.4444 0.9085 0.1514
(No Experience)
GRPOl 50 1.6200 0.8545 0.1208
(School Experience)
GRP02 35 1.8000 0.8331 0.1408
CUniv/Club Experience)
Total 121 1.6198 0.8685 0.0790
(No two groups were significantly different)
(Recognition Success by Experience)
Source DF SS MS F.Ratio
Between Groups 2 3.6073 1.8036 2.126
Within Groups 118 100.1116 0.8484
Total 120 103.7189
Group Count Mean SD SE
GRPOO 36 1.5556 0.9394 0.1566
(No Experience)
GRPOl 50 1.5200 0.9311 0.1317
(School Experience)
GRP 02 35 1.9143 0.8869 0.1499
(Univ/Club Experience)
Total 121 1.6446 0.9297 0.0845
(No two groups were significantly different)
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Matching Success by Strategy Ccontinued)
(No two groups were significantly different)
455
Group Count Mean SD SE
Colour Strategy 15 1.5333 0.8338 0.2153
Ball Strategy 22 1.6364 0.8477 0.18Ô7
Goal Strategy 33 1.5455 0.8326 0.1449
Total 70 1.5714 0.8266 0.0988
Recognition Success by Strategy
Source DF SS
Between Groups 2 4.2307
Within Groups 67 51.6121
Total 69 55.8428
Group Count Mean
Colour Strategy 15 1.5333
Ball Strategy 22 2.0909
Goal Strategy 33 1.5758
Total 70 1.7286
MS
2.1154
0.7703
SD
0.8338
0.8679
0.9024
0.8986
F.Ratio 
2.746
SE
0.2153
0.1850
0.1571
0.1075
F.Prob 
0.0714
(No two groups were significantly different)
APPENDIX V
Slide Directions Used in Experimental Studies 
in Perceptual Skills (Recall).
Reported in Chapter 6.
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DIRECTIONS
CTke examiner should have answer sheets face up and diagrams face 
down on the desk. Have pencils on the desk. As students enter, say 
"Please do not look at the papers on your desk").
Read the following directions to subjects:
You have been asked to be a subject for a test of memory. You 
will be asked to observe colour slides of hockey matches, and then you 
will be asked to construct a diagram of the scene depicted. If you 
will look at your answer sheet, place your name, occupation, education, 
age, and sex in the space provided.
The answers to Part A will be filled in on the blank answer sheets 
provided. You will have a limited amount of time to draw your diagram. 
The slide will be shown for 1 minute in Part A, during which time you 
may construct your diagram. Now please turn to the answer sheet provided 
Please indicate the colour of the player's uniform in your diagram, 
for example, G for a player wearing green, of W for a player wearing 
white.
We will now begin Part A.
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PART A
On the next page construct a diagram of the scene in the slide.
A blank sheet is provided for your answers. Please read the directions 
to Part A and be sure to include a ball in your diagram. If there 
are no questions, we will see slide 1. You may begin your diagram at 
any time.
PRESENT SLIDE 1 FOR 1 MINUTE
Time is up. Turn to the second blank diagram.
PRESENT SLIDE 2 FOR 1 MINUTE
Time is up. Turn to the third blank diagram.
PRESENT SLIDE Z FOR 1 MINUTE
Time is up. We will now begin Part B.
PART B
We will now begin Part B. On the next page construct a diagram 
of the scene in the slide. A blank sheet will be provided. You will 
not be allowed to see the slide while drawing the diagram. The slide 
will be shown for 10 seconds and then the projector will be turned off 
Only then should you begin to draw your diagram. We will now begin 
Part B with slide 1.
PRESENT SLIDE 1 FOR 10 SECONDS
Draw your diagrams on Part B, 1.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO DRAW THE DIAGRAM
Time is up. Turn to the second blank diagram.
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PRESENT SLIDE 2 FOR 10 SECONDS
Draw your diagrams on Part B, 2.
ALLOW 1 MINUTE TO DRAW TEE DIAGRAM
Time is up. Turn to the third blank diagram.
PRESENT SLIDE Z FOR 10 SECONDS
Draw your diagrams on Part B, 3.
ALLOW 1 MINVTE TO DRAW TEE DIAGRAM
Time is up. Turn to the next section of your answer sheet and
answer the questions numbered 1-8.
ALLOW 5 MINUTES TO ANSWER QUESTIONS
Time is up. Finally, we move to the final section.
THE FINAL SECTION
Please answer the question in the final section. Please read 
the directions carefully and answer questions 1-18.
ALLOW 5 MINUTES TO COMPLETE
Thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this 
study. I hope that the information gained will be helpful in teaching
sports, and helping athletes and non-athletes cope with their failures
and successes. Your participation is greatly appreciated.
APPENDIX W
Slide Answer Sheet Used in Experimental Studies 
in Perceptual Skills (Recall).
Reported in Chapter 6.
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ANSWER SHEET
Name
Date
Occupation
Education
(Highest level completed. Ext: School, College, 
University, Postgrad.)
Age
Sex
460
ANSWER SHEET
PART A
On the next page construct a diagram of the scene in the slide.
A blank sheet will be provided. You will be allowed to see the slide 
for one minute, during which time you should draw your diagram.
461
PART B
On the next page construct a diagram of the scene in the slide. 
A blank sheet will be provided. You will not be allowed to see the 
slide while drawing your diagram. The slide will be shown for 10 
seconds and then the projector will be turned off. Only then should 
you begin to draw your diagram.
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Any additional comments?
Do you have any hockey experience?
If so, what was your highest level of participation? Choose 
either school (class or team), college, University, club, 
sectional, or national, ___________ _______________________
How long ago was your last hockey experience?
For how long did you play regularly? (How many seasons?)
At what level did you play regularly?
Have you played any other team sports? 
If so, which sport? _________ '
What was your highest level of participation? 
How long ago? _______________ ______ ______
For how long did you play this sport regularly? 
At what level did you play regularly? _____ .
Did you become frustrated?
If so, what caused your frustration?
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List strategies used overall.
Rank order the above answers 1-5, with 1 being the most used 
strategy, and 5 being the least used strategy. If you listed 
fewer than five, include only as many strategies as you actually 
used. Do not include more than five. Place the rank order next 
to the strategy listed above.
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This is a study of your feelings about those test questions which . 
you answered. We would like to know why you succeeded when you succeeded, 
and why you failed when you failed. Answer the questions in the following 
manner:
Place a line under Strongly Agree if you agree strongly with the 
statement.
Place a line under Agree if you agree with the statement.
Place a line under Uncertain if you are uncertain as to whether you
agree or disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Disagree if you disagree with the statement.
Place a line under Strongly Disagree if you disagree strongly with
the statement.
1. When I failed to answer correctly, I failed because I had too little 
time.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
2. When I failed, the directions seemed clear to others, but I didn't 
understand them.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
3. When I succeeded, it was purely by chance.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
4. When I failed, it was because I was not intelligent enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
5. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught to play hockey 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
6. When I succeeded, it was because I tried very hard.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
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7. When I failed, it was because this test causes you to be nervous. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
8. When I failed, it was because I am not quick enough.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
9. When I succeeded, it was because the test was well constructed. , 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
10. When I failed, it was because I have a poor memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
11. When I failed, it was because the directions were poor.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
12. When I succeeded, it was because I have a background in sports. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
13. When I failed, it was because I have never been taught the rules of 
hockey.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
14. When I failed, it was because I don't concentrate well.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
15. When I succeeded, it was because I have a good memory.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
16. When I failed, it was because my inadequacies made me frustrated. 
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
17. When I failed, it was because the difficulty of the test made me 
frustrated.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
18. When I succeeded, it was because I was lucky.
Strongly agree Agree Uncertain Disagree Strongly disagree
APPENDIX X
Recall Results CLong and Short-Time).
Pearson Correlations from the Experimental Study 
in Perceputal Skills.
Reported in Chapter 6
467
4 50 50 > 50
CQ (D r CD cf CDc y O o O rh H*
CO O S» 3 (0 3
f+ 4 M crq M H- c+
r+ H> 1 M cr M*
P 1 H c <
f+ H CQ H- CQ rt- CD
H* H- p: 3 c H*
0 3 o CD o O
3 (D o o 3
<c CD CO
0) CO
CO CO
*3 1 •3 1 "3 1 *3
I o I O I O I M rt- > 50
O O O * H- e+ CDo M o * o O rt- M
w o to 31 CO CJI a> * o 3 3 3
M CO o M 00 H* M 00 * o o CO H» rh
M 31 O a Oi * o cr H-
►3 1 ►3 •3 "3 1 ■ rt- CQ 50
II O II o II M II O H* f c CD
O O * O 3 0 o O
o o * O o CD 3 (5 3  .
CO CJI CO 31 31 * O CO CJI 05 00 CD M
M M o CO M CO * o O M M 00 1 3 M
CO o 00 CO * O 05 05 CO
1 »3 ►3 1 rt- CQ 50
I o I M I O I o H* CQ c CD
O * O O 3 5T o O ato * O o M a> O. o 3 >o CJI M O CO CJI CJI to CJI M 3 CD M 50
<35 M -a * O O CO M CO o M CO rt CO M CQ
CO to * O 00 CO 31 o 1 CO o
** *
l^  In
p o
I—I Ln
*3 1 *3 1 *3 1 ■ 31
II M II o II O II O 3* o O o c
* O to o o CO* O o CJI M CO 31 «0 ,5kCJI o rt-
* O O 05 M -4 M o M CO 3
* O CO to CO o 31 M 3
01
EHM
i
CQ
"3 1 ►3 ■3 1 *3 1 CD M
I O I O I O I o f 3 X
O o O O O *3
M CO M o < CD CD
M CJI to o CJI ,5k M CJI to CO CJI CJI CD 300 M o M CO 00 M O CJI H to M H*to 05 ,5k 00 1
II - o  o  • •M
M Oi O W M ^ O
I
o
to CJIM M ^ w
M
O
to
*3 "3 1 ►3 1 O CD W
I O I o I O % 50 3 X
O O o CD O *3
O o M O CD 3
to CJI CO CO CJI ,5k M CJI 31 CD 3
,5k M CO M 05 ,5k M O 3 H*
CJI o ,5k to 05 CJI 1 1
*3 ►3 1 *3 1 CD W
I o I O I o W 3 X
O O O 3 O *3
M M o CR CD 3
M CJI CO to 31 M to CJI CO c 3
M M M M to CJI M- t3 M-
CO CJI •vj to CO 05 3 1
c+%
468
M W M
50 X 50 X f X
m *3 . 3 *3 (0 *3
oq CD O (D < m
3 3 <D 3 <D 3
M H* 3 MT H*
P (D O (0 (D
3 3 % 3 3
H- O O O
c+ (D (0 (D
31 1 "3 1 33 1II O II O II o (+ > 50O O O H* cf (DO M o o cf H*to 31 CO M 31 31 CO 31 31 3 3 P
31 M to ,5k M O 31 M to tn t-k cf
CO 05 05 31 «4 CO 3*
■f
H-
<A
IN
o
b
"3
IN
o
£
33 1 33 1 33 . 1 cf W 50II O II O II O H- r c A
O O O 3 0 o O
M o M s5 3 o Pto 31 M CO 31 ,5k M 31 to oq A M
M M to M 05 00 H* ■4 1 ta M
-4 to ,5k to •4 M ta
33 o 33 O 3) y-N O cf w 50II II II H- CO C A
O M O O O CO 3 3* O O
31 CO cn CO 31 ,5k A O o P
M M M to M CO O M CO 3 A M
31 Pk o o 4k cf ta !-•
CO 31 05 * 1 ta*
*3
I
o
to 31 
to M  -0
MO•O
to
>3
IO
to 31 W Mrfk ^
MO,5k
O
?
o
l-l
00#0
I
o
M 
31 to H* "0
s/ to
313cta
rt-
3Pf+
H-O3
33 O 33 O 33 M A t4
I II I f 3 X
O 4 O O * O A O 33
31 CO 31 CO * O < A A
O M CO to M o * o O A 3
O 00 00 to * O M H-
O * CO * 1
*
33 o 33 M 33 O o A tfl
I I I 4 50 3 X
O M * O O O  . A O 33
31 M * O 31 00 O A A
to M M * O O to M O A 3
M 05 * O CO to 3 H-
00 * 00 1 1
33 M 33 O 33 O A W
I I I 50 3 X
* O O M O 4 A O 33
* O en M en CO CR A A
* O o to M M o M CO C 3
* o M 05 o 00 M H*
* CO o * P 1
* 3
c+%
APPENDIX Y
Slide Results CRecall)
One Way Analyses of Variance Results from the 
Experimental Study in Perceptual Skills. 
Reported in Chapter 6
Analyses of Variance Results
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Recall CLong-Time) One Way Success by Strategy
Source DF SS MS F.Ratio F.Prob
Between Groups 2 14686.1108 7343.0547 5.925 0.0050
Within Groups 48 59492.6211 1239.4294
Total 50 74178.7188
Group Count Mean SD SE
Colour Strategy 19 194.0000 28.8771 6.6249
Ball Strategy 14 153.1429 39.6889 10.6073
Goal Strategy 18 186.9444 37.5773 8.8571
Total 51 180.2941 38.5172 5.3935
Multiple Range Test (Scheffe Procedure).
Ball Goal Colour
Strategy Strategy Strategy
153.1429 Ball Strategy 
186.9444 Goal Strategy *
194.0000 Colour Strategy *
* Denotes pairs of groups significantly different 
at the 0.100 level
Recall (Short-Time) One Way Success by Strategy
Source DF
Between Groups 2
Within Groups 48
Total 50
Group Count
Colour Strategy 19
Ball Strategy 14
Goal Strategy 18
51
SS
1251.8875
39387.1211
40639.0078
Mean
91.3158 
102.4286 
100.7222 
97.6863
MS
625.9437
820.5649
SD
28.0199
34.3729
24.1266
28.5093
F .Ratio 
0.763
SE .
6.4282
9.1865
5.6867
3.9921
F.Prob 
0.4719
(No two groups were significantly different)
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